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The Judicial Politics of Enmity
 A Case Study of the Constitutional Court of Korea’s Jurisprudence since 1988
Justine Guichard
 Among the countries which have experienced a political transition away from 
authoritarianism in the 1980s, South Korea is usually considered as a model of both 
democracy  and judicial review. Relying on an interpretive reading of jurisprudence, the 
present research however uncovers the double-edged way in which the Constitutional Court 
of Korea has discharged its role as guardian of the constitution. A critical analysis of 
constitutional jurisprudence indeed reveals how the court’s commitment to define and defend 
the post-transition constitutional order has translated into both liberal and illiberal outcomes. 
This ambivalent dimension of the court’s role has unfolded as the institution came to 
intervene in the major dispute opposing the state and parts of civil society after the 1987 
change of regime: reshaping the contours of enmity in the post-transitional period. Through 
the contentious issue of enmity, what has been put at stake in the constitutional arena is the 
very challenge of delineating the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in South Korean 
democracy. In light of this task, constitutional justice has imposed itself as a paradoxical site, 
where the post-transitional disagreement about what counts as ‘‘national’’ and ‘‘anti-
national’’ has been both staged and interrupted.
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NOTE ON THE ROMANIZATION AND USE OF KOREAN NAMES
 Two methods exist for romanizing Korean language: the traditional McCune-
Reischauer system and, since 2000, the official Revised Romanization system. While the use 
of the latter has recently  spread in scholarly publications, the former is still academically 
predominant. This dissertation therefore relies on the McCune-Reischauer system to 
romanize all common nouns and expressions from Korean, as well as the names of 
institutions, organizations, and places (except Seoul and Pyongyang) mentioned in the text.
 When it comes to the romanization of surnames, however, the following rules are 
applied: 
 -for well-known figures, the most common romanized version of the name is used; 
 (for example, Park Chung-hee instead of Pak Chŏng-hŭi)
 -for scholars, the romanized version of the name adopted by  the author and 
 reproduced in his or her English publications is used;
 (for example, Choi Jang-Jip instead of Ch’oe Chang-jip)
 -for constitutional judges, the romanized version of the name reproduced in the 
 court’s publications is used;
 (for example, Byun Jeong-soo instead of Pyŏn Chŏng-su) 
 -for other surnames, the McCune-Reischauer’s romanized version is always indicated 
 in parentheses, if necessary, upon the name’s first occurrence. 
 The Korean usage wherein surnames precede first names is followed throughout the 
body of the text. This order is however inverted in the bibliographical references contained 
in the footnotes, where the first name of the author is followed by his or her surname and the 
title of the reference. 
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PREAMBLE
From South Korea’s Prison Cells to the Constitutional Stage:
the Birth of the Topic  
 The present research is born from my fascination for an unsettling aspect of South 
Korea’s transition to democracy in the late 1980s: the resilience of political imprisonment 
after the change of regime, that is to say, the continuity apparently manifested in South 
Korea’s economy of punishment before and after 1987, the year when the military  regime of 
Chun Doo-hwan relinquished power and allowed for direct  presidential elections to take 
place. This continuity is conspicuously embodied in the sustained use of the repressive 
instruments inherited from the authoritarian period, such as the emblematic 1948 National 
Security Act (‘‘kukka poanpŏp’’) which has remained heavily enforced throughout the 
1990s, or the ideological conversion policy  (‘‘sasang chŏnhyang’’) deployed against 
imprisoned ‘‘thought criminals’’ until the early 2000s.
 The roots of both mechanisms not  only originate in the post-1945 era but  date back 
to the colonial rule which Korea as a whole experienced under the control of Japan between 
1905 and 1945.1  The Master thesis which I defended in June 2009 at Sciences Po was 
precisely dedicated to exploring the colonial matrix of Korea’s modern economy of 
punishment by focusing on a site where such modernity had been both physically  recorded 
and discursively erased: the prison of Seodaemun (‘‘Sŏdaemun hyŏngmuso’’), built in 1907 
as part of Japan’s ‘‘dispositif of power’’ in Korea, but transformed in the 1990s into a 
resistance memorial exhibiting the ‘‘unlawful’’ and ‘‘immoral’’ character of colonial 
xvii
1 Korea became Japan’s protectorate in 1905 and colony in 1910.
occupation.2  Among the many  silences embedded in the narrative of the reconstructed site 
and museum, was the unaddressed continuity  of its use as a penitentiary from 1945 to 1987. 
Seodaemun prison’s closing in 1987 - the year of South Korea’s transition to democracy - 
does not mark, however, a fundamental rupture in the history  of repressive practices and 
political imprisonment due to the post-transition resilience of instruments such as the 
ideological conversion policy and the National Security Act. While the security legislation’s 
maintenance and persistent application to date have been justified by  most successive elected 
governments in relation to the crisis situation which has characterized the Korean peninsula 
since its division in 1945, the resort to old security  tools after 1987 has been consistently 
denounced by its many critics (including the government of Roh Moo-hyun in the early 
2000s) as a lingering vestige of the authoritarian years. 
 Yet, neither of these two explanations - the security threat  posed by the North on the 
one hand, and the endurance of an anachronistic legacy  from the past on the other hand - 
exhausts the reality of repressive patterns in the South. Instead, the construction of enmity 
and the mechanisms deployed in relation to it after 1987 should be analyzed from the 
viewpoint of their functionality and efficacy  in the frame of South Korea’s contemporary 
state-society dynamics. This domestic dimension of national security has been more 
extensively  documented for the decades preceding the transition than for those following it. 
As demonstrated by Moon Seungsook and Choi Jang-Jip for instance, the primacy accorded 
to national security has indeed been indissociable from the modernization project pursued by 
the state since the 1960s and premised on the mass mobilization of all resources - labor and 
xviii
2 Justine Guichard, La prison de Seodaemun, lieu de mémoires. La renaissance d’une prison sud-coréénne en 
mémorial de la résistance anti-coloniale, Unpublished Master thesis, Sciences Po, Paris, 2009.
business forces alike.3 By contrast, the ‘‘productive effects’’ attached to the repressive uses 
of national security in post-transition South Korea still call for greater inquiry.4 
 While my study started in the vicinity of political prisoners and the practice of 
punishment, it  has come to displace the locus of its attention toward a site centrally involved 
in the definition of who enemies are and what  can be done to them in the democratic era. 
This site corresponds to the realm of constitutional adjudication. Indeed, the Constitutional 
Court of Korea (‘‘hŏnpŏp chaep’anso’’), an institution introduced by the constitutional 
revision of 1987, has been invested as the privileged stage upon which not only repressive 
practices but the very understanding of what counts as ‘‘national’’ and ‘‘anti-national’’ have 
been challenged since the change of regime. In return, the role played by the constitutional 
court is generally described as activistic and progressive in this area. The critical analysis 
which this research undertakes, however, interrogates this largely unanimous and univocal 
representation of the court’s role by exploring the ways in which its jurisprudence has 
contributed to reframe enmity over the past twenty-five years. 
 I came across a ruling of the Constitutional Court of Korea for the first time in the 
course of fieldwork conducted in the summer 2011 in Seoul, at the Korea Democracy 
Foundation (‘‘minjuhwa undong kinyŏm saŏphoe’’). The objective of that stay  was to collect 
qualitative data about the ideological conversion policy and the individuals who were still 
subjected to it in the 1990s. Research in the archives of the Korea Democracy Foundation 
drew me to encounter a judgment rendered by  the court in 2002 confirming the 
constitutionality of the ‘‘pledge to abide by the law,’’ as the conversion policy was renamed 
xix
3 Seungsook Moon, Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea, Durham, London: Duke 
University Press, 2005; Jang-Jip Choi, Democracy After Democratization. The Korean Experience, Stanford: 
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, 2012.
4  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991. 
[Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Paris: Gallimard, 1975].
following a 1998 reform. The reading of this decision prompted for my research a whole 
new field of investigation, revealing constitutional adjudication as a site where the 
construction of enmity had been disputed and possibly altered since the late 1980s. 
 As I further immersed myself into the jurisprudence of the court and the literature 
surrounding legal mobilization in South Korea, the resort to constitutional litigation as an 
arena where certain segments of society have contested their marginalization from the 
conservative confines of the post-transition order clearly  imposed itself. Through the issue of 
drawing the boundaries of ‘‘enmity,’’ the constitutional court has thus addressed a 
fundamental political problem: the contentious determination of how political inclusion and 
exclusion are negotiated in South Korean democracy, of who has ‘‘a place in the symbolic 
community  of speaking beings’’ by  opposition to who is instead considered as making noise 
- or, in the South Korean context, as posing a threat.5 Questioning whether and how the court 
has lived up to, or disappointed, the demand for recasting enmity  after 1987 delineates the 
horizon of the present research, which seeks to explore both the possibilities and limits 
associated with the constitutional stage after the regime change.
xx
5 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement. Politics and Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, 
p.25. [Jacques Rancière, La mésentente. Politique et philosophie, Paris: Galilée, 1995]. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
Interrogating the role of the Constitutional Court of Korea in reframing the 
boundaries of enmity after the 1987 transition
 Among the countries which have experienced a political transition away  from 
authoritarianism in the 1980s, South Korea is usually considered as a paragon of 
‘‘democratic success.’’ As with most instances of regime change since the late 18th century, 
its 1987 transition was accompanied by a constitutional reform.1 This episode has taken the 
form of a negotiated process between political elites which resulted in the revision, rather 
than replacement, of the constitution adopted in 1948, in the context of the two Korean 
states’ competing founding - with the Republic of Korea being established in the south of the 
peninsula on August  15, while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was proclaimed 
in the northern half on September 9. The South Korean transition of 1987 therefore fits 
within a larger universe of cases where political and constitutional change have been the 
product of pact-making between the ruling and opposition forces.2  However, South Korea 
also belongs to a rarer subclass of cases where the constitution of the ‘‘ancien régime’’ was 
retained and amended, as in the Republic of China on Taiwan, Chile, or Hungary - the three 
1
1 As stressed by Jon Elster, ‘‘constitution-making tends to occur in waves.’’ The first wave that he identifies 
took place between 1780 and 1791 in ‘‘various American states, the United States, Poland, and France.’’ The 
next waves respectively followed the 1848 revolutions in Europe, the end of the First and Second World Wars, 
the breakup of the French and British colonial empires, the fall of dictatorships in Southern Europe during the 
mid-1970s and across Eastern Europe, South America,  and Asia in the 1980s.  Jon Elster, ‘‘Forces and 
Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process,’’ Duke Law Journal, Vol.45, No.2, 1995, pp.368-369.
2 According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, ‘‘one of the most common paths away from a nondemocratic to a 
democratic regime is via a ‘pacted transition.’ ’’  Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p.356.
prominent states in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe respectively which did not 
enact a new basic norm during the wave of democratization and constitution-making of the 
1980s.3
 By contrast to the constitution of North Korea, which was replaced in 1972,4 that of 
the South has endured since 1948 and undergone nine amendments. While the last 
constitutional revision of 1987 was mainly aimed at transforming the presidential election 
from an indirect vote by an electoral college into a direct suffrage of the population, it also 
introduced a new institution to check the conformity of legislative statutes with 
constitutional norms and to strike down the former in case of conflict with the latter: the 
Constitutional Court of Korea. Since 1945, the establishment of judicial review has become 
a standard feature of constitutional transitions to democracy, in Europe and elsewhere.5 
Considerable attention has consequently  been dedicated to the variation which the 
institutions in charge of constitutional adjudication exhibit  in terms of independence and 
2
3 The scope of the amendment process however presents major differences among these cases. ‘‘The Hungarian 
Constitution [of 1949] was continuously amended throughout 1989 and 1990, until approximately 95 percent of 
the clauses had been rewritten.’’ Jon Elster, ‘‘Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe. An Introduction,’’ The 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol.58,  No.2,  1991, p.462. By contrast, ‘‘in Chile we observed a rather 
moderate and gradual process of amendment’’ of the so-called Pinochet’s constitution of 1980, ‘‘designed to 
maintain the privileges of specific groups (right-wing parties and the military).’’ Claudio Fuentes,  ‘‘A Matter of 
the Few. Dynamics of Constitutional Change in Chile, 1990–2010,’’ Texas Law Review, Vol.89, No.7,  2011, p.
1749. As for Taiwan, the Constitution of the Republic of China has been in force since 1947. Its 1991 
amendment however introduced major changes as institutions based on a multiparty system with regular, free 
elections now represent the island’s population, and it alone. Françoise Mengin, Fragments d’une guerre 
inachevée. Les entrepreneurs taiwanais et la partition de la Chine, Paris: Karthala, 2013.
4 The so-called ‘‘Socialist Constitution’’ which was enacted in 1972 registered the fact that Kim Il-sung had 
emerged as the unparalleled leader in the struggle for absolute power over North Korea.  The new text also 
incorporated both ‘‘chuch’e’’ ideology (or self-reliance) and the complete abolition of private ownership. See 
Dae-kyu Yoon, ‘‘The Constitution of North Korea. Its Changes and Implications,’’  Fordham International Law 
Journal, Vol.27, No.4, 2003, pp.1289-1305.
5  John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, ‘‘Constitutional Adjudication. Lessons from Europe,’’ Texas Law 
Review, Vol.82, No.7, 2004, pp.1671-1704. As will be developed in chapter two, institutions in charge of 
judicial review can be generically referred to as ‘‘constitutional courts’’ but they may further be divided into 
two categories: high courts which are in charge of judicial review while also serving as courts of last appeal 
(like the United States Supreme Court), and constitutional courts proper (such as the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany, the Constitutional Council of the French Republic, or the Constitutional Court of Korea)
strength, two dimensions along which the Constitutional Court of Korea is considered to 
score high.  
 Although much uncertainty  surrounded its birth and its capacity to act as a guardian 
of the constitution and of the fundamental rights that the text consecrates,6 the South Korean 
constitutional court is today recognized as ‘‘the most important and influential’’ institution of 
its kind among its counterparts in the region.7  Yet, concentrating on features such as the 
independence and authority  enjoyed by the Constitutional Court of Korea only sheds partial 
light on the role it  has assumed in the post-transition period. Indeed, the assumption that 
strong courts’ commitment to defend the constitutional order necessarily  translates into 
liberal outcomes, such as fortifying the rule of law, has been interrogated in a variety  of 
contexts, and deserves to be in the South Korean case.   
 As underlined by Choi Jang-Jip, ‘‘in Western societies, democracy and liberalism 
have been historically  closely interlinked and maintained a mutually complementary 
relationship, although their relationship has not always been smooth. That is, the 
development of democracy would lead to the reinforcement of liberalism and vice versa. In 
Korean society, however, such a phenomenon has hardly been identified.’’8 This disjunction 
between liberal norms and democratic development which Choi diagnoses for South Korea 
is nonetheless the result of a given political and socio-historical trajectory, rather than the 
expression of a cultural inability to accommodate liberal values. As a result, the critical 
3
6 James West and Edward Baker, ‘‘The 1987 Constitutional Reforms in South Korea. Electoral Processes and 
Judicial Independence,’’ Harvard Human Rights Yearbook, Vol.1, 1988, pp.135-178.
7 Tom Ginsburg, ‘‘The Constitutional Court of Korea and the Judicialization of Korean Politics,’’  in Andrew 
Harding and Penelope Nicholson (eds.), New Courts in Asia, New York: Routledge, 2010, p.145. In recent 
years, the court has advocated this role of constitutional leader for itself by encouraging initiatives such as the 
formation of the ‘‘Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions,’’  launched in 2010 
and whose inaugural congress was held in Seoul in May 2012.  
8  Jang-Jip Choi,  ‘‘The Fragility of Liberalism and its Political Consequences in Democratized Korea,’’ Asea 
Yŏngu, Vol.52, No.3, 2009, p.252.
analysis of constitutional politics which this dissertation undertakes is not premised upon a 
culturalist argument that would proclaim the incompatibility  between Western liberalism and 
Eastern forms of constitutionalism.9
 To explore the role of the Constitutional Court of Korea, this dissertation focuses on 
one of the central issues in which the new court has been asked to intervene, early on and 
consistently since the beginning of its operations in 1988: redrawing the boundaries of 
enmity after the change of regime, that is to say, defining which activities count  as 
‘‘national’’ or ‘‘anti-national’’ in democratic South Korea. Rather than raising the question of 
the inter-Korean division, contesting the contours of enmity before the constitutional court 
has primarily  implied for litigants to challenge the dynamics of political inclusion and 
exclusion shaping the post-transition order, that is to say, to dispute the distribution of who is 
recognized a part in this order and who is denied one through the deployment of security 
instruments such as the National Security Act. In the process, the division and the state of 
North-South relations have also been addressed, but they do not constitute the overriding 
point of contention or underlying disagreement brought onto the stage of constitutional 
adjudication. 
 The present research is therefore dedicated to analyzing how the Constitutional Court 
of Korea has embraced the task of reframing enmity since the change of regime. While it  is 
argued that the court has been ‘‘especially visible in dealing with the legacies of the 
authoritarian regime, particularly the National Security  Act and the Anti-Communist Act’’10 
4
9  Such argument has been classically formulated in the 1960s by South Korean legal scholar Hahm Pyong-
choon. See Pyong-choon Hahm, Korean Political Tradition and Law. Essays in Korean Law and Legal History, 
Seoul: Hollym, 1967. For a critique of Hahm, see Kun Yang,  ‘‘Law and Society Studies in Korea. Beyond the 
Hahm Theses,’’ Law and Society Review, Vol.23, No.5, 1989, pp.891-902.
10  Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies. Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.236. The two laws were fused in 1980, when the provisions of 
the 1960 Anti-Communist Act were incorporated into the 1948 National Security Act. 
and that its decisions have ‘‘had the effect of domesticating the administration of the 
National Security  Act, the single most egregious law associated with military rule by 
bringing the act into conformity  with the dictates of ordinary  procedural law,’’11  this 
dissertation seeks to interrogate the common and celebratory vision of the court’s role 
through a careful study of its jurisprudence over the past twenty five years. The project is 
thus interested in understanding a particular instance of ‘‘judicial politics’’ by exploring how 
the court has contributed to reframe, and potentially reinforce, the boundaries of political 
inclusion and exclusion challenged through constitutional channels in the post-transition 
period.
Literature review: the state of the art in constitutional politics and South Korean state-
society relations after 1987
 The literature relevant to this dissertation’s theme can be divided into two categories. 
The review first introduces the field of constitutional politics, which has developed in recent 
years an acute interest in excavating the non-inclusive dynamics which permeate 
constitutional lawmaking by legislators and judges. Focusing on South Korea contributes to 
this scholarship a valuable case study likely to both complement and subvert some of the 
main theoretical and comparative works to date. The review follows with the abundant 
literature which has emerged on South Korea’s contentious relations between the state and 
civil society since the transition. In particular, careful attention is devoted to synthesize the 
empirical findings upon which the present research builds concerning the domestic nature 
and evolving patterns of repression after 1987 on the one hand, and the growth of legal 
5
11 Ibidem, p.237.
mobilization as a strategy  for contestation on the other hand. Yet, the present research does 
not contend itself to appropriate these cumulative findings, but also enriches them through 
its reconceptualization of the constitutional court’s role in the post-transition era.  
Constitutional politics and non-inclusive dynamics
 i. Theoretical and comparative perspectives
  This project’s general research interest and contribution lie in comparative 
constitutional politics, where heightened attention has been drawn in recent years to non-
Western contexts in general, and new democracies in particular.12 From this perspective, the 
value of a study  centered on contemporary South Korea is not only to empirically document 
a largely overlooked case, but to uncover dynamics and processes generalizable beyond it.13 
The possible affinities between constitutionalism and certain forms of non-inclusiveness or 
illiberalism which the South Korean case exemplifies have indeed been increasingly taken 
into consideration by the literature on comparative constitutional politics, but an in-depth 
analysis of the Constitutional Court of Korea’s role reveals the pitfalls of studies which do 
not sufficiently taken into account the part  of contingency which characterizes the birth and 
development of institutions such as courts.
6
12  Besides Tom Ginsburg’s above-mentioned study of Asian cases - including Mongolia, Taiwan, and South 
Korea, stand the prominent comparative contribution of Ran Hirschl on Israel, Canada, South Africa, and 
Mexico,  and the work of scholars of Latin America. See Ran Hirshl, Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and 
Consequences of the New Constitutionalism,  Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2004; Gretchen 
Helmke and Julio Ríos-Figueroa (eds.),  Courts in Latin America, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011.
13 As demonstrated by the pioneering work of Marie Seong-hak Kim on colonial jurisprudence, the value of a 
case study centered on Korea can be inherently comparative. Marie Seong-hak Kim, Law and Custom in Korea. 
Comparative Legal History, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
 First of all, contemporary  research on constitutional politics, from both positive 
political science and normative political theory, seriously  takes into account the interests and 
potential non-inclusive dynamics which can pervade constitution-making and judicial 
review. As described by Jon Elster for the former, ‘‘in idealized stories about constitution-
making, impartial and rational framers design institutions that will reduce the scope for 
dangerous passions and channel the self-interest of future generations to promote the public 
good. Constituent assemblies are made up by  saints or demigods who legislate for beasts. 
But this is nonsense. In general, framers are no less subject to interest and passion than those 
for whom they are legislating.’’14 
 In so far as the present analysis conceives constitutionalism in general, and 
constitutional courts’ practice in particular, in this non-idealized way, it situates itself in the 
continuity  of the realist tradition. This approach can be traced to the early  20th century when 
the school of American legal realism rejected the classical idea - and ideal - of law as an 
autonomous field.15  Instead, the hallmark of the realist tradition which further developed 
after World War II and in the 1960s especially 16 is to consider constitutional lawmaking, by 
legislators or judges, as a ‘‘form of politics by  other means.’’17 While Jon Elster’s analysis of 
7
14 Jon Elster,  ‘‘Executive-Legislative Relations in Three French Constitution-Making Episodes,’’ in Revolusjon 
og Resonnement, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1995, p.69.
15  The legal realists (among whom were figures such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jerome Frank, Benjamin 
Cardozo, or Karl Llewellyn) were united by their dismissal of ‘‘mechanical jurisprudence and the faith that 
legal reasoning is determined by principles of logical deduction.’’ Instead, they understood jurisprudence as 
being shaped by the ways in which judges interpret the law, which are in turn influenced by ‘‘the value 
judgments and political morality of their cultures, as well as more personal perspectives on law, morality, 
economics, and the like.’’  Susan Dimock, Classic Readings and Cases in Philosophy of Law, New York: 
Pearson Longman, 2007, p.36.
16  The works of Robert Dahl and Martin Shapiro are seminal in this respect. See Robert Dahl, ‘‘Decision-
Making in a Democracy. The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,’’  Journal of Public Law, Vol.6, No.1, 
1957, pp.279-295; Martin Shapiro, ‘‘Political Jurisprudence,’’ Kentucky Law Journal, Vol.52, No.1,  1964, pp.
294-345.
17 Ran Hirschl, ‘‘The Realist Turn in Comparative Constitutional Politics,’’ Political Research Quaterly, Vol.62, 
No.4, 2009, p.825.
the political interests and passions at work in constitutionalism has been mainly confined to 
constitutional design, with special attention being paid in his work to the Federal Convention 
in Philadelphia (1787) and the first  French constituent assembly (1789-1791),18 authors such 
as Melissa Schwartzberg have fruitfully  incorporated both the process of legislative and 
judicial constitutional lawmaking into their analyses.   
 In particular, Schwartzberg’s work highlights how entrenchment, or the insulation of 
certain parts of a constitution from the possibility  of legal change through amendment, 
‘‘serves as a means by which legislators can seek to protect not only those rules that they 
regard as most important or those that serve a ‘constitutive’ purpose - securing the conditions 
of democratic decision making, or preventing democracy from revising itself into tyranny - 
but as a means of preserving privileges and power asymmetries.’’19 As stressed by her work, 
the resort to entrenchment is most likely to protect a certain form of regime type (republican 
or democratic), as illustrated by the constitutions of Brazil, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
or Germany.  
 The risk ensuing from entrenchment is to render courts solely responsible for shaping 
the content of non-modifiable constitutional clauses and constructs such as ‘‘human 
dignity,’’ the ‘‘basic order of free democracy,’’ or the ‘‘republican form of government,’’ 
which they can do in ways that will only be mended by judges themselves through reversing 
precedents. Indeed, ‘‘we must bear in mind that entrenchment of a provision as vague as 
regime type may empower the constitutional court to determine the contours of what, 
precisely, a ‘republic’ entails, with the distributive consequences and the irreversibility such 
8
18 Jon Elster, ‘‘Constitution-Making and Violence,’’ Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol.4, No.1, 2012, pp.7-39.
19 Melissa Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007, p.2.
a decision might entail.’’20 The scope of this argument can nonetheless be extended as courts 
in charge of judicial review are ordinarily endowed with the task of defining and therefore 
shaping the ‘‘basic structures’’ or ‘‘fundamental principles’’ which compose the 
constitutional order, even in the absence of entrenchment. 
 Specifying what these structures and principles are does not merely contribute to the 
historicization of law in the context of post-WWII legal systems’ re-foundation outside any 
meta-referentiality to philosophical norms or to nature.21  It  can also contribute to the 
politicization of constitutional law - and correlatively, the judicialization of politics - in 
contexts where these ‘‘basic structures’’ and ‘‘fundamental principles’’ are a source of 
disagreement. Ran Hirschl has mobilized the concept of ‘‘mega-politics’’ to describe these 
‘‘matters of outright and utmost political significance that often define and divide whole 
polities’’ and whose resolution is increasingly delegated to constitutional courts.22  These 
issues ‘‘range from electoral outcomes and corroboration of regime change to matters of war 
and peace, foundational collective identity  questions, and nation-building processes 
pertaining to the very nature and definition of the body politic.’’23 
 Defining which activities count as ‘‘national’’ or ‘‘anti-national’’ in post-transition 
South Korea pertains to this type of matters. While all constitutional courts may be 
confronted with such a task, it has occupied a prominent place in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court of Korea. Contrary  to what may seem, the construction of enmity  in 
9
20 Ibidem, pp.190-191.
21  François Ewald, ‘‘Une expérience foucaldienne. Les principes généraux du droit,’’  Critique,  Vol.42, No.
471-472, 1986, pp.788-793.
22  Ran Hirschl, ‘‘The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts,’’ Annual Review of 
Political Science, Vol.11, No.1, 2008, p.94.
23 Ibidem.
which constitutional courts can engage does not contradict the essence of constitutionalism. 
Indeed, safeguarding the constitution does not merely entail for courts to uphold the rights 
and freedoms that it  recognizes. As pointed out by John Finn, the task of ‘‘constitutional 
maintenance’’ involves a commitment to preserve both the ‘‘physical’’ and ‘‘constitutional’’ 
integrity of the existing order.24 
 This dual concern is for instance expressed in article 37, section 2 of the South 
Korean constitution, which provides that ‘‘the freedoms and rights of citizens may be 
restricted by  Act only  when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order 
or for public welfare. Even when such restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the 
freedom or rights shall be violated.’’ The South Korean constitution is additionally 
committed to defending itself against another figure of enmity  than the enemy of the state, 
who threatens national security. The text also appears ready to confront the enemy of the 
‘‘basic order of free democracy,’’ following the model set by the 1949 Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. This ‘‘basic order’’ (‘‘freiheitlich demokratische 
Grundordnung’’ in German, ‘‘chayuminjujŏk kibonjilsŏ’’ in Korean) is however a notion left 
undefined by the two constitutions and which courts have had to refine, thus paving the way 
for the potential distortions and asymmetries described by Melissa Schwartzberg and Ran 
Hirschl.
 In a work which sees itself as exemplary  of the contemporary  realist  approach to 
comparative politics, Ran Hirschl analyzes the process of constitutionalization undergone by 
countries such as Israel or Canada in the 1980s-1990s (that is to say, in the absence of 
‘‘transition scenario’’) as a form of self-interested preservation from threatened political, 
10
24  John Finn, Constitutions in Crisis. Political Violence and the Rule of Law, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991, p.219.
economic, and judicial elites with a shared interest in maintaining their hegemony.25  For 
instance, Hirschl demonstrates how elites’ attitude toward judicial review started to evolve in 
Israel ‘‘as the secular Ashkenazi bourgeoisie and its political representatives increasingly lost 
their grip on Israeli politics.’’26  The 1992 Basic Law on Human Dignity  and Liberty was 
precisely enacted in the context of the shifting demographics associated with the growth of 
the religious and non-Ashkenazi segments of the Jewish population, and the corresponding 
erosion of traditional elites’ power and influence over imposing their sense of the 
‘‘national.’’ 
 As a result, the constitutionalization of basic rights is not conceived as the product of 
a progressive revolution, but as the outcome of a strategic interplay between elites with 
compatible interests in preserving their vision of the state. Because of the variety of actors 
taken into account, Hirschl distinguishes his ‘‘thick’’ strategic explanation from the ‘‘thin’’ 
view emphasizing partisan competition only. In the latter framework, the emergence of an 
effective mechanism for judicial review stands as the result  of a bargain among political 
parties which are not sure of winning the first  election after the transition. This explanation 
is in particular associated with Tom Ginsburg who has applied it to the South Korean case.27 
 Ginsburg’s theory accounts for the introduction and variation in strength of 
constitutional courts in new Asian democracies in relation to the degree of electoral 
uncertainty which exists at  the time of constitution-making. Judicial review is supported 
when two or three political parties of roughly equal weight seek to ‘‘insure’’ themselves 
against the risk of losing elections by  introducing a mechanism which will constrain the 
11
25 Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy. 
26 Ibidem, p.54.
27 Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies. 
policy-making power of the future majority. If electoral uncertainty is severe (as it was in the 
South Korean case), a constitutional court will be empowered by the framers to minimize the 
costs of not being in power; while if this uncertainty is weak (as in Mongolia and to a lesser 
extent Taiwan), the dominant political party does not have an incentive to bind its future 
policy-making capacity.  
 ii. Contribution of the case study
 Hirschl’s ‘‘thick’’ strategic explanation can be used against the ‘‘thin’’ theory of 
Ginsburg to bring attention to the broader variety of interests than mere partisan ones 
involved in, and potentially entrenched through, the process of constitutionalizing 
fundamental rights and new institutional arrangements. In the South Korean case, the 
transition to democracy  was controlled by political elites from both the ruling and opposition 
parties whose interests were irreducible to particular policy preferences. While both sides are 
only presented as antagonistic in Ginsburg’s account, they  were also united around a 
consensual and common objective: resisting the pressure for systemic and substantive reform 
exerted by the popular democratization movement, composed of the various groups (mainly 
student organizations, trade unions, and church activists) which were mobilized against the 
regime throughout the 1970s-1980s and prompted its collapse.
 In this perspective, Choi Jang-Jip has remarkably demonstrated how the modalities of 
the 1987 change of regime, and of its constitution-making moment in particular, made it 
possible for conservative forces and interests to survive and even reinforce themselves.28 
According to Choi, ‘‘the period from June 29, 1987, until the constitutional amendments 
12
28 Jang-Jip Choi, Democracy After Democratization. The Korean Experience, Stanford: Walter H. Shorenstein 
Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, 2012.
were adopted in the National Assembly in October of the same year can be called the period 
of pact-making between the ruling and the democratic forces in Korea. The bilateral 
negotiations took the form of a political meeting between representatives of the ruling and 
opposition parties, participating on behalf of major political forces of the time. But these 
roundtables meetings for negotiating democratic institutions were a political game among 
the elites of institutional politics, and did not involve movement forces.’’29 
 The elites in question were the respective leaders of the governing Democratic 
Justice Party  (DJP, or ‘‘minju chŏngŭidang’’) and of the opposition Reunification 
Democratic Party (RDP or ‘‘t’ongil minjudang’’), namely General Roh Tae-woo on the one 
hand, and Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung on the other hand, who all successively 
became presidents after 1987. Choi further argues that the way in which democracy was 
institutionalized as a result of political elites’ compromise has not only contributed to the 
eviction of the popular democratization movement from the constitution-making moment, 
but it also explains the post-transition relevance of national security tools used to perpetuate 
the marginalization of a crucial part of South Korean society from politics: workers and 
trade unions. Indeed, the dual logic of limiting the political representation and participation 
of labor ‘‘has created a vicious cycle where it promotes conflicts, which in turn requires an 
authoritarian state mechanism.’’30 
 While South Korea’s transition and constitution-making process were clearly 
dominated by the kind of coalition stressed by Hirschl (with the interests of the political, 
bureaucratic, and economic elites being secured to the detriment of the popular 




late 1980s cannot be automatically attributed to a calculated effort on the part of these elites 
to preserve the ‘‘conservative bias’’ of the new democratic order.31 Indeed, the introduction 
of a specialized court patterned on the Continental model of constitutional adjudication and 
able to settle direct  complaints from citizens was a non-predetermined outcome of the 
‘‘Eight-Member Party Talks’’ through which the constitution was reformed in the summer of 
1987.32 Moreover, ‘‘many feared that [the court] would turn out to be like the Constitutional 
Committees of previous constitutions, and end up being just  another agency that existed only 
on paper. In fact, the governing elites at the time of its creation were not unlike the previous 
regimes in that  they were not so enthusiastic about the idea of activating the system of 
constitutional adjudication. A number of legal scholars and jurists were therefore doubtful 
about the court’s future and its role in the constitutional order.’’33   
 The Constitutional Court of Korea’s empowerment therefore stands as the contingent 
product of a series of paradoxes which elite-based strategic theories fail to elucidate. While 
the court emerged in the context of the 1987 elite-controlled revision of the constitution, it 
was not necessarily  crafted by its designers to become the strong institution that it now 
appears to be. To understand this transformation’s advent, the literature on the contentious 
dynamics which have opposed the state and civil society after the transition can be relied 
upon. In particular, works on legal actors and mobilization reveal how constitutional 
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31  Ibidem, p.5.  Choi Jang-Jip’s insightful analysis is particularly useful to distinguish between two processes 
and temporalities which account for the tension between democracy and liberalism in contemporary South 
Korea: in the short term, the modalities of the 1987 change of regime are responsible for the ‘‘conservative 
bias’’  which South Korean democracy continues to display to date; but in the long term, a shared illiberalism 
has characterized both the right and the left since 1945, whose common ground has instead lied in their 
ideological identification with nationalism.
32  Jung-Kwan Cho, ‘‘The Politics of Constitution-Making During the 1987 Democratic Transition in South 
Korea,’’ Korea Observer, Vol.35, No.2, 2004, pp.171-206.
33 The Constitutional Court of Korea, Twenty Years of the Constitutional Court of Korea, Seoul: Constitutional 
Court of Korea, 2008, p.99.
litigation has been invested as a site where the very forces marginalized by the 
institutionalization of democracy have contested, with the help of public interest lawyers, the 
boundaries of enmity after the change of regime.
Post-transition contentious relations between the state and civil society in South Korea
 i.  The irreducibility of repression to the inter-Korean division
 The South Korean case offers the particularity to be a new democracy  operating 
under an old and lasting security  threat: the 1945 division of the Korean peninsula, which 
remains in a ‘‘state of war’’ since no peace treaty  was signed following the civil and 
international conflict which opposed the U.S.-backed South and the Communist North 
between 1950 and 1953. The inter-Korean division is not  however the only marker of 
political inclusion and exclusion in the peninsula. Its own coming into being has given birth 
to a more insidious line of separation than the 38th parallel, a division not only between but 
inside both regimes as each became obsessed with eliminating its ‘‘enemies from within.’’ 
Scholars such as Choi Jang-Jip have consequently  underlined how ‘‘the law that contains the 
ideological foundation and practical guidelines in South Korea is not the constitution,’’ but 
the National Security  Act which was adopted the same year, in 1948.34 To Choi, ‘‘this law is 
the higher normative law that supersedes all other laws in South Korea; this was true under 
authoritarian rule, and it is true today.’’35 
15
34 Jang-Jip Choi, Democracy After Democratization, p.48.
35 Ibidem, p.49.
 Choi Jang-Jip’s analysis nonetheless leaves relatively  unaddressed the dissensus 
which has existed around the status of the security legislation in the post-transition period, 
and which has led its validity and relevance to be repeatedly challenged before the 
Constitutional Court of Korea. Officially, the purpose of the National Security  Act is to 
suppress the activities of ‘‘anti-state organizations,’’ defined since 1948 as the groups which 
‘‘claim the title of government’’ (i.e., North Korea) or which aim at disrupting the state. 
While the permanence of the security  legislation has been justified by  the real and enduring 
threat posed by the scission of the peninsula and the hostility of the North, it has not merely 
remained in the books in the post-transition period. On the contrary, the law has been 
actively resorted to by all successive elected governments, at times more intensively than 
during the authoritarian era, and regardless of the provocations emanating from North 
Korea.36 The law has therefore resisted the test of the transition to democracy  in 1987, the 
first political alternation in power in 1998, and even the attempt by one administration to 
repeal it in the mid-2000s.
 While marginally dealt  with in the literature on post-transition politics, this 
problematic dimension of the democratic era has not been entirely neglected as demonstrated 
by the pioneering study of William Shaw on human rights,37 the work of legal scholars such 
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36  U.S. Congressional Research Service,  North Korean Provocative Actions. 1950-2007,  Washington: U.S. 
Library of Congress, 2007. Several provocative actions have been undertaken by the North since 1987, such as 
the bombing of a civilian aircraft in November of that year and the deadly cross-border incidents recurrently 
taking place along the terrestrial Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the disputed maritime Northern Limit Line 
(NLL) delineated at the end of the Korean War. Yet, the correlation between the intensity of the North Korean 
menace and the enforcement patterns of the National Security Act appears at best imperfect.
37  William Shaw (ed.),  Human Rights in Korea. Historical and Policy Perspectives, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991.
as Cho Kuk,38 and the more recent contributions of José Alemán, Nam Taehyun, or Shin Gi-
Wook and his colleagues from Stanford University.39 On the side of the sources available in 
Korean language, the National Human Rights Commission (‘‘kukka inkwŏn wiwŏnhoe’’) has 
best contributed to document, in a systematic way, repressive patterns since the late 1980s.40 
In particular, its 2004 Report on the Situation of Human Rights Arising from the Application 
of the National Security Act established that, 1,529 individuals were prosecuted under the 
National Security  Act between 1988 to 1992, which exceeds the 1,093 prosecutions 
registered from 1980 to 1986 during the Chun Doo-hwan regime.41  This number rose to 
1,989 between 1993 and 1997 and reached 1,058 between 1998 and 2002.42
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indicates that ‘‘this article stems from the fact that few comprehensive, academic articles appear in English 
with regard to the NSL [National Security Law], although some publications have provided a general 
discussion of South Korea’s human rights situation’’ (pp.129-130). Cho’s point is however an understatement 
as most of the materials published in English consist of reports from human rights organizations, particularly 
Amnesty International.
39  José Alemán, ‘‘Protest and Democratic Consolidation. A Korean Perspective,’’ International Journal of 
Korean Studies, Vol.9, No.1, 2005, pp.71-90; Taehyun Nam, ‘‘The Broken Promises of Democracy. Protest-
Repression Dynamics in Korea, 1990-1991,’’ Mobilization: An International Journal, Vol.11, No.4,  2006, pp.
427-442; Gi-Wook Shin, Paul Chang, Jung-eun Lee, and Sookhyung Kim, South Korea’s Democracy 
Movement (1970-1993). Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report,  Stanford: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-
Pacific Research Center, Stanford University,  2007; Jung-eun Lee, ‘‘Categorical Threat and Protest Policing. 
Patterns of Repression Before and After Democratic Transition in South Korea,’’  Journal of Contemporary 
Asia, Vol.43, No.3, 2013, pp.475-496. See also Jong Bum Kwon, ‘‘Exorcizing the Ghosts of Kwangju. Policing 
Protest in the Post-Authoritarian Era,’’ in Gi-Wook Shin and Paul Chang (eds.),  South Korean Social 
Movements. From Democracy to Civil Society, Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2011.
40  National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Arising from the 
Application of the National Security Act (Kukka poanpŏp chŏgyongsa esŏ nat’anan in’gwŏn silt’ae), Seoul: 
Minjuhwa silchŏn kajok undong hyobuihoe, 2004.  Other notable sources include human rights lawyer Park 
Won-Soon’s three-volume study of the security legislation: A Study of the National Security Act (Kukka 
poanpŏp yŏnʾgu), Seoul: Yŏksa pip’yŏngsa,1989-1992.
41 National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Report on the Situation of Human Rights, p.36.
42 Ibidem, p.44 and p.66.
Table 1. Number of individuals annually prosecuted under the National Security Act and the Anti-
Communist Act between 1960 and 2002. 
Source: National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Report on the Situation of Human Rights 
Arising from the Application of the National Security Act, 2004.
 As a result, the sustained application of the National Security Act has not only 
characterized the presidency of Roh Tae-woo (February 1988 - February 1993), who 
personally embodied the continuity between the old regime and the new order, but also the 
civilian administration of Kim Young-sam (February 1993 - February 1998) and the ‘‘human 
rights era’’ of the Kim Dae-jung government (February 1998 - February  2003). Both Kim 
Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung were politicians who opposed the authoritarian regimes and 
together formed in 1987 the Reunification Democratic Party  which participated in the 
negotiations to revise the constitution. Later that year, Kim Dae-jung left the RDP and both 
Kims separately ran for presidency  in the first post-transition elections of December 1987, 
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thereby enabling the victory of Roh Tae-woo43 and causing civil society groups’ distrust vis-
à-vis the political sphere.44  Their disenchantment heightened when Kim Young-sam’s 
opposition party merged with Roh’s ruling camp to give birth to the Democratic Liberal 
Party in 1990 (DLP or ‘‘minju chayudang’’), an alliance which made it possible for Kim 
Young-sam to be voted president in December 1992.45  The first alternation in power 
therefore occurred when Kim Dae-jung won the presidential election of December 1997.46 
Although Kim Dae-jung was arrested and sentenced to death under the National Security Act 
in the early 1980s, the security legislation continued to be frequently applied during his 
administration.47
 The enforcement patterns of the National Security  Act after 1987 indicate that the law 
was more heavily resorted to during the ten years which have followed the transition than 
during the decade which preceded it. Rather than declining over time, the number of annual 
prosecutions under the security  legislation climaxed in 1997. The repressive peak reached in 
the late 1990s overlaps with the economic and social upheaval that South Korea experienced 
in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Indeed, ‘‘in the period of economic downturn 
which followed the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the [National Security Act] 
proved to be a useful tool enabling the government to harass students and workers who 
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43 36.6% of the vote went to Roh Tae-woo, 28% to Kim Young-sam, 27% to Kim Dae-jung, 8.1% to Kim Jong-
pil, and 0.2% to Shin Jung-il.
44  Sunhyuk Kim, ‘‘State and Civil Society in South Korea’s Democratic Consolidation. Is the Battle Really 
Over?,’’ Asian Survey, Vol.37, No.12, 1997, p.1139.
45 42% of the vote went to Kim Young-sam against 33.8% to Kim Dae-jung.
46  Kim Dae-jung won 40.3% of the vote, against the conservative candidate Lee Hoi-chang who received 
38.7% of it.
47  During the first two years of Kim Dae-jung’s presidency (1998-2000), Kim Jong-pil, the founder of the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, served as Prime Minister.
organized demonstrations and other forms of protest against unemployment.’’48 These trends 
suggest that the primary  relevance of the security legislation has been domestic rather than 
premised on the state of inter-Korean relations. 
Table 2. Total number of prosecutions per provision of the National Security Act under Kim Young-
sam (February 1993 - February 1998) and Kim Dae-jung (February 1998 - February 2003).
Source: National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Report on the Situation of Human Rights 
Arising from the Application of the National Security Law, 2004.
 Indeed, the specific post-transition uses made of the National Security Act can be 
refined by examining which provisions of the law have been most  heavily mobilized. 
Between 1993 and 2002, provisions related to forming anti-state groups (article 3), 
committing anti-state acts (article 4), infiltrating from North Korea (article 6), 
20
48 Ian Neary, Human Rights in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, London: Routledge, 2002, p.82. 
communicating with anti-state groups and their members (article 8) or aiding them (article 
9), and not reporting anti-state acts (article 10), have only been incidentally  resorted to 
compared with the prohibition of ‘‘praising or sympathizing with an anti-state organization’’ 
under article 7. 
 These patterns of enforcement reveal that  the greatest challenge associated with 
national security after the transition has not resulted from ‘‘anti-state acts’’ or ‘‘espionage,’’ 
but has instead derived from certain forms of expression as article 7 prohibits the act of 
‘‘praising’’ (‘‘ch’anyang’’), ‘‘encouraging’’ (‘‘komu’’), ‘‘propagandizing’’ (‘‘sŏnjŏn’’), and 
‘‘sympathizing with’’ (‘‘tongjo’’) an ‘‘anti-state organization,’’ its ‘‘members,’’ or ‘‘any 
individual receiving orders from them.’’ Looking more closely at the enforcement patterns of 
the National Security Act reveals that students and progressive intellectuals have been 
disproportionately prosecuted under the security legislation, mostly for the speech crimes 
sanctioned under article 7.
Table 3. Classification of the individuals prosecuted under the National Security Act per social status 
between 1993 and 2002.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Student 31 193 102 318 500 310 227 104 91 114 1,998
Worker 5 38 20 38 44 18 1 2 10 0 176
Intellectual 63 128 110 92 89 71 46 16 15 9 640
Military 13 34 53 51 44 13 14 6 2 3 233
Total 112 393 285 499 677 412 288 128 118 126 3,047
Source: National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Report on the Situation of Human Rights 
Arising from the Application of the National Security Act, 2004. 
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 The two main trends in the National Security Act enforcement patterns after 1987, 
mainly the disproportionate amount of prosecutions for speech crimes under article 7 and the 
targeting of students and intellectuals, call into question many scholars’ claim that  the 
deployment of security instruments has predominantly  been a function of sustained 
‘‘radical’’ and at times violent mobilization, in particular from trade unions. Several studies 
have indeed underlined the continued mobilization of civil society  and its confrontational 
engagement with the state following the change of regime.49 The part of civil society  which 
was the most active and contentious after 1987 has been widely  identified with so-called 
‘‘radical people’s movement groups,’’ such as student associations or labor unions, by 
opposition to the ‘‘moderate citizens’ movement groups’’ which multiplied after the change 
of regime but only became prominent in the mid to late-1990s.50 
 The label ‘‘radical’’ is highly ambiguous in this context as referring to it amounts to 
appropriate the language of state policing, also conveyed by the conservative press which 
dominates South Korea’s media landscape. The differentiation within civil society  groups is 
also captured by  the distinction between ‘‘minjung’’ (or ‘‘mass people’’) militancy and 
‘‘simin’’ (or ‘‘citizen’’) activism,51 which connotes that the former is revolutionary, utopian, 
and engaged in an antagonistic relationship  with the state, while the latter is reformist and 
tolerated, or even accommodated, by the state. Repressive patterns after 1987 are thus 
commonly understood by the literature on state - society relations in connection to two 
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49  Hagen Koo (ed.), State and Civil Society in Contemporary Korea,  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993; 
Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea. The Role of Civil Society, Pittsburg: University of 
Pittsburg Press, 2000; Charles Armstrong (ed.), Korean Society. Civil Society, Democracy, and the State, 
London, New York: Routledge, 2007.
50 Sunhyuk Kim, ‘‘State and Civil Society in South Korea’s Democratic Consolidation,’’ p.1137.
51  Namhee Lee,  ‘‘From Minjung to Simin.  The Discursive Shift in Korean Social Movements,’’ in Gi-Wook 
Shin and Paul Chang (eds.), South Korean Social Movements, pp.41-57. 
mutually  reinforcing processes: the frustrations born of the transition are thought to explain 
why civil society  in general, and ‘‘radical’’ groups in particular, have not demobilized and 
therefore encouraged the state to respond through traditional channels given the strong 
permanence of authoritarian ‘‘enclaves’’ and ‘‘reflexes’’ expected in ‘‘non-crisis transitions’’ 
- that is to say, in cases where the change of regime is negotiated between the ruling elites 
and opposition forces, thus leaving the former leadership  and state apparatus highly 
influential during and after the transition process.52 
 As empirical patterns demonstrate however, the National Security  Act has been 
primarily  resorted to in order to sanction the discursive claims articulated by students and 
intellectuals. Although labor has remained active after the transition, especially  during the 
‘‘Great Struggle’’ of the summer 1987 and throughout the two following years (with 3,749 
disputes erupting in 1987, 1,873 in 1988, and 1,616 in 1989),53 workers’ militancy has been 
handled through extra-legal violence and specific tools of policing, such as anti-
demonstration and anti-union laws.54 Contrary to the labor movement who tended after 1987 
to mobilize around interests and issues of its own (in particular over wage increase and 
collective bargaining), thus breaking its 1980s alliance with the other forces of the 
democratization movement, students and intellectuals have continued to advocate a 
maximalist definition of democracy in the wake of the transition.
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52  Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman,  ‘‘The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions,’’ Comparative 
Politics, Vol.29, No.3, 1997, pp.263-283.
53  Hagen Koo, ‘‘The Dilemmas of Empowered Labor in Korea. Korean Workers in the Face of Global 
Capitalism,’’ Asian Survey, Vol.40, No.2, 2000, p.231.
54 George Ogle, South Korea. Dissent Within the Economic Miracle, London, New Jersey: Zed Books, 1990. As 
noted by Ogle in his analysis of labor activism during the years 1987-1989, ‘‘intimidation, kidnappings and 
beatings are standard procedures used against union people.’’ (p.120). 
 In the context of South Korea, this maximalist conception has not only  entailed 
demands related to substantive reforms and socio-economic justice, but to the reconciliation 
of the peninsula, thereby revolving around the ‘‘three min’’: achieving democracy (‘‘minju 
chaengch’wi’’), liberating the people (‘‘minjung haebang’’), and realizing national 
reunification (‘‘minjok t’ongil’’).55  The roots of this maximalist discourse plunged in the 
1980s, when the student movement started to shape its mission and identity  in relation to the 
‘‘othering’’ of three forces: the authoritarian regime, the ‘‘chaebŏl’’ or business 
conglomerates, and the United States, all accountable in the movement’s terms for South 
Korea’s unrealized process of decolonization and the artificial division of the homeland 
against the aspirations of the ‘‘true’’ people or ‘‘minjung.’’ 56
 Against the bulk of the literature on state - society relations, the work of Lee Jung-
eun contributes to show how the groups articulating the anti-government discourse 
associated with the ‘‘minjung’’ after 1987 have been primarily repressed as a result of being 
perceived by  authorities as posing an unconditional menace, rather than due to circumstantial 
factors such as the size and tactics of their protests. Indeed ‘‘people’s movements 
experienced differential repression due to their categorical threats, independently of the 
situational threats, targets and goals. [...] Whereas the distinction between people’s and 
citizens’ movements was not salient under authoritarianism because most protests were pro-
democracy  by  nature, it became one of the most important factors that shaped protest 
policing during democratization, where movement groups sharply  diverged between two 
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55 Namhee Lee, The Making of Minjung. Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2007,  p.23. This program was in particular advocated by the student organization 
‘‘Sammint’u’’ (‘‘Committee of the Three Min Struggle’’) in the mid-1980s.
56  According to Lee Namhee, ‘‘in the students’  moral-ethical discourse, the dichotomy of the world as abang 
(friends) and t’abang (enemies) became crucial. The minjung was projected as a true intersubjective agency, 
and the military dictatorship, conglomerates, and foreign powers, as not only anti-minjung but also as anti-
national and anti-democratic.’’ Namhee Lee, ‘‘The South Korean Student Movement. Undongkwŏn as a 
Counterpublic Sphere,’’ in Charles Armstrong (ed.), Korean Society, p.135.
camps. The categorical threat attributed to people’s movements affected the police’s 
decision-making process, which resulted in the higher probability  of police containment and 
the higher intensity of repression during their protests than those of citizens’ movements.’’57 
  Given the frustrations and disillusions emanating from the institutionalization of 
democracy  (in particular the elite control of the transition process, the split of the political 
opposition in the presidential elections of December 1987 leading to the victory  of Roh Tae-
woo, and the 1990 merger of Kim Young-sam’s forces with the ruling party), the post-
transition period did not extinguish but rather intensified the dispute about the meaning of 
democracy  and the understanding of the ‘‘national’’ originating in the 1980s.58  Yet, this 
dispute has not been permitted to fully unfold after the change of regime, as national security 
tools remained deployed against the articulation of any alternative way of imagining the 
nation. South Korea therefore presents us with a case where political elites from both the old 
regime and former opposition have supported the use of security instruments to suppress the 
maximalist discourse principally formulated by students and intellectuals. It is in this context 
that constitutional justice became invested as a site to contest such instruments by the forces 
whose exclusion from politics they enforced and maintained.
 ii. Contesting enmity through constitutional channels
 According to the hierarchy of norms, the National Security Act as well as the security 
instruments premised upon ordinary legislative provisions are subordinated to constitutional 
norms and thus susceptible of being challenged before the constitutional court. In addition, 
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57 Jung-eun Lee, ‘‘Categorical Threat and Protest Policing,’’ pp.486-487. 
58 Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea; Charles Armstrong (ed.), Korean Society; Jang-Jip 
Choi, Democracy after Democratization.
the institution is in charge of adjudicating direct constitutional complaints - a mechanism 
which originated in post-war Germany and enables any individual in South Korea who has 
suffered an infringement of his or her basic rights as a result of ‘‘an exercise or non-exercise 
of governmental power [...], except the judgments of the ordinary  courts’’ to petition the 
court.59 Since the change of regime, the constitutionality  of security  tools inherited from the 
authoritarian period and their uses have been repeatedly raised before the constitutional 
court. In recent years, an increasing number of significant studies have explored how legal 
mobilization in general, and constitutional litigation in particular, have been resorted to as 
channels for contestation since 1987.60 
 While the small community  of South Korean lawyers has been traditionally 
marginalized from the field of state power and politics,61 one pivotal actor can be identified 
as a catalyst  in the transformation of the country’s socio-legal landscape since the change of 
regime: ‘‘Minbyun,’’ or ‘‘Lawyers for a Democratic Society’’ (‘‘minju sahoe rŭl wihan 
pyŏnhosa moim’’) an association founded in May 1988 by fifty-one attorneys. The literature 
on legal mobilization in South Korea largely converges over the claim that ‘‘the birth of the 
group marked the beginning of a new era in the systematic activities of lawyers in Korea.’’62 
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Feeley (eds.), Fighting for Political Freedom. Comparative Studies of the Legal Complex and Political 
Liberalism, Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007; Patricia Goedde, ‘‘From Dissidents to Institution-
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2009, pp.63-89; Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, Asian Legal Revivals. Lawyers in the Shadow of Empire, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010; Seong-hyun Kim, ‘‘The Democratization and Internationalization 
of the Korean Legal Field,’’ in Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth (eds.), Lawyers and the Rule of Law in an Era of 
Globalization, Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2011.
61  Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth,  ‘‘International Strategies and Local Transformations.  Preliminary 
Observations of the Position of Law in the Field of State Power in Asia: South Korea,’’ in William Alford (ed.), 
Raising the Bar. The Emerging Legal Profession in Asia, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. 
62 Jae Won Kim, ‘‘The Ideal and the Reality of the Korean Legal Profession,’’ p.62.
As pointed out by Kim Jae Won for instance, ‘‘Minbyun was the first  official organization 
dedicated to ‘cause lawyering’ in Korea. In addition to representing workers in labor 
disputes, Minbyun lawyers have vigorously  pursued lawyers’ ideals, including campaigning 
for the release of prisoners of conscience and for the abolition of undemocratic laws such as 
the National Security Law.’’63  
 Out of the 2,274 individuals prosecuted under the security legislation between June 
1988 and May  1995, 1,623 were represented by Minbyun lawyers.64  During this period, 
nearly half of the cases handled by  the association concerned offenses against the National 
Security Act (43% of its caseload). In the meantime, ‘‘Minbyun’s defense of political 
dissidents, whether students, workers or intellectuals (nearly  half of whom were arrested on 
grounds of violating the National Security  Law), more or less situated it as being part of the 
ideological left,’’ and throughout the 1990s,‘‘the government perceived ‘human rights’ as 
voiced by Minbyun as being too related to socialism.’’65 It is in this context that investing 
constitutional adjudication as a site where to contest the contours of political inclusion and 
exclusion after the transition became one of the strategies adopted by the association.66
 This phenomenon has led Tom Ginsburg to note in his comparison of South Korea 
and Taiwan that ‘‘the private legal profession emerged along with democracy in both 
countries. [...] In this sense the story is similar to Epp’s (1998) account of ‘Rights 
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Process since 1988,’’ in Gi-Wook Shin and Paul Chang (eds.), South Korean Social Movements, p.231.
65 Ibidem, pp.228-229.
66  Litigation in general has been the central,  yet not the exclusive, strategy pursued by Minbyun,  which also 
drafted reports and held or attended domestic and international conferences to obtain the abolition or revision 
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social welfare laws, laws concerning the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, telecommunications, education, 
and media.’’ Ibidem, pp.232-233.  
Revolutions.’ A support structure of activist  lawyers was needed to effectuate and channel 
broader demands for rights. At the same time, the ‘supply’ side of the equation cannot be 
ignored. Had it not been for the crucial factor of constitutional courts making themselves 
available to claims challenging the government, the activists’ strategies would have been 
ineffectual. The constitutional courts’ willingness to constrain governmental decisions at the 
highest level had great symbolic importance for scaling back the previously dominant 
administrative apparatus. This emboldened activist elements in the legal profession to pursue 
their agendas more vigorously.’’67
 The literature addressing post-transition contentious dynamics between the state and 
civil society  is fruitful to construe the empowerment of the Constitutional Court of Korea as 
a contingent product of the asymmetrical struggle between the political elites who 
institutionalized democracy and the segments of society which this process marginalized. 
Studies which apprehend legal mobilization in this perspective do not however critically 
interrogate the role played by the court and the ambivalence with which it  has met the 
demand for redrawing the boundaries of enmity  after the change of regime. Although 
scholarship  on the ‘‘judicialization’’ of South Korean politics is blooming, authors tend to 
contend themselves to assess the independence and prominence gained by the court  since its 
establishment.68 In this respect, due attention has been devoted to the constitutional review 
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Politics in Asia, Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2012.
of the security instruments inherited from the authoritarian regime and to the court’s effort to 
bring them into conformity with the rule of law.69 
 This characterization of what the institution has done is however incomplete on at 
least two accounts. First, it fails to specify the fundamental political disagreement behind the 
cases brought before the Constitutional Court of Korea. This dispute has not primarily 
concerned undoing the legacies of the authoritarian regime, but redrawing the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion embedded in the institutionalization of democracy. Second, missing 
this dimension of the court’s intervention necessarily  leads to a partial understanding of how 
it has discharged its role as guardian of the constitution. Excavating the two-sidedness of 
South Korean constitutional justice is where the present research ventures through its 
interpretive analysis of jurisprudence since 1988.  
Toward a critical analysis of the constitutional court’s role in reframing enmity
 
 The present research explores the subtle solidarity  between constitutionalism and the 
political exclusion of certain segments of society in contemporary South Korea, commonly 
considered as a model of democracy and judicial review among the countries which have 
transitioned in the late 1980s in general, and in East Asia in particular. The point of the 
analysis is to demystify  what these two insignias entail by highlighting the ambivalence 
which has characterized the way  in which the constitutional court has played its role as 
guardian of the constitution. This ambivalence does not however epitomize the possible 
separation between constitution and constitutionalism formulated, for example, by Jon 
Elster: ‘‘Constitutions may  exist without constitutionalism, if they are perceived mainly as 
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policy tools or as instruments for short-term or partisan interests. Conversely, 
constitutionalism may exist without a written constitution, if the unwritten rules of the game 
command sufficient agreement.’’70 
 Constitutional democracy in South Korea is not a sham or a façade, as illustrated by 
the vibrancy  of constitutional adjudication and the court’s commitment to promote the rule 
of law and fundamental rights. Therefore, the critical perspective adopted by this dissertation 
does not aim at refuting that the court has acted as a guardian of the constitution. Instead, it 
seeks to call attention to the illiberal dimension which has accompanied the court’s 
commitment to defend the post-transition constitutional order. As a result, the research 
concentrates on constitutional language as an order of discourse or form of discursivity to 
explore the ways in which an institution thought to be liberal can nonetheless instantiate an 
illiberal component. This dissertation’s approach to constitutional discourse, as articulated in 
jurisprudence, is thus an interpretive one, which enables the analysis to take into account 
both the text and subtext of the court’s decisions. The underlying dispute forming the subtext 
of constitutional litigation in contemporary South Korea concerns defining the very 
boundaries of what constitutes enmity after the change of regime. In this respect, the concept 
of judicial politics of enmity that this study proposes aims at capturing the fact that the 
court’s intervention has taken place in the midst of an ongoing disagreement about what 
counts as ‘‘national,’’ ‘‘legitimate,’’ and ‘‘authorized’’ conduct in South Korean democracy, 
by opposition to what  is still criminalized as ‘‘anti-national,’’ ‘‘deviant,’’ and ‘‘threatening’’ 
behavior.
 Identifying the nature of this disagreement makes possible, in turn, to uncover the 
court’s response to the demand for more inclusiveness emanating from the parts of society 
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which the institutionalization of democracy by political elites has marginalized. In 
discharging its role as guardian of the post-transition constitutional order, the Constitutional 
Court of Korea appears to have been caught in a paradox: that of defining and defending the 
constitutional order when the foundations that it lays for society  exclude certain segments of 
the polity. 
 Excavating this two-sidedness of the court’s intervention discloses how 
constitutionalism is not an institutional-discursive formation intrinsically tied to the 
promotion of liberal values. The critical argument advanced by  this dissertation consequently 
goes further than contending that  constitutional courts are bound to weigh liberty  against 
security in times of crisis, and to impose restrictions on the former in the interest on the 
latter. Instead, the present research highlights how safeguarding the constitutional order can 
imply for courts to preserve the non-inclusive interests by  which such an order is shaped. 
Although critical of constitutional lawmaking in South Korea, the present analysis does not 
entail a normative assessment about what the court should have done. One of the reasons 
why the research refrains from this judgment stems from our belief that the court may not 
have had the possibility to act much differently than it did. Ultimately, the court indeed 
appears constrained by the very  nature of the paradox in which it has been caught: that of 
defining and defending the constitutional order when the foundations that it sets 
institutionalize a durable bias against certain segments of society. 
 The implication of this argument is double. In terms of methodology, the structural 
roots of the paradox outlined and of the court’s ambivalence justify why the dissertation’s 
approach is not primarily  sociological and focuses on the multilayered language articulated 
by the court  in place of the choices made by the individual actors who compose it - i.e., nine 
justices appointed for a six-year renewable term, three of whom are designated by the 
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President of the Republic of Korea (‘‘taet’ongnyŏng’’), three by the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court (‘‘taebŏbwŏn’’), and three by  the National Assembly (‘‘kukhoe’’). In terms of 
comparative scope, it could be expected that transitions taking place by  amendment may  be 
symptomatic of the non-inclusive configuration displayed by  the South Korean case given 
the limited re-foundation of the political order which revising rather than replacing the 
constitution materializes.
 In South Korea, the fact that security tools have been used to enforce the 
‘‘conservative bias’’ of democracy as demonstrated by Choi Jang-Jip  should be understood 
as an outcome of the transition rather than as a mere legacy of authoritarianism. Overall, 
most behaviors sanctioned as threats since the transition have therefore either concerned the 
speech crimes defined under article 7 of the National Security  Act or the declaration of faith 
by which conscientious objectors have refused to perform the compulsory military service 
on religious grounds and have been correspondingly penalized under article 88 of the 
Military Service Act. Since the 1990s, the number of imprisoned conscientious objectors, 
principally Jehovah Witnesses, has been dramatically  on the rise. In so far as they are 
objecting to conscription on the ground of their belief in a higher normative order than 
patriotism, religious minorities such as Jehovah’s Witnesses jeopardize a certain idea of the 
‘‘national,’’ not by formulating an alternative version of its contents (as the ‘‘minjung’’ did), 
but by making a claim that situates itself beyond the realm of the nation-state.
 In the name of protecting national security, instruments such as the National Security 
Act, the ideological conversion policy, or the ban on conscientious objection therefore police 
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a certain distribution of speech or ‘‘partition of the sayable’’ in the post-transition period.71 
Rather than operating in the defense of the state, these security tools act in the defense of a 
non-inclusive and contentious way  of envisioning the ‘‘national.’’ In light of this imbalance, 
constitutional justice has been invested as a site where to challenge the boundaries of enmity 
and the mechanisms of exclusion alienating certain segments of society from the post-
transition order. Indeed, the compelling, and seemingly subversive, power of the 
constitutional stage in this regard is to apparently give a voice to those who are being denied 
one by the very mechanisms of exclusion that judicial review offers the opportunity  to 
contest, by raising the issue of their conformity to constitutional norms. 
 Some authors have however questioned the possibility to speak and to become visible 
which the constitutional stage supposedly  effectuates. Indeed, this possibility only exists as 
long as individuals are able and willing to articulate a particular language and subjectivity, 
that of the right-claiming subject, which ‘‘as Kirstie McClure has argued, [...] implies the 
modern constitutional state as ‘a privileged expression of political community and hence as 
the principal and necessarily privileged site of political action.’ ’’72 Although the individual 
gains derived from bringing one’s case on the constitutional stage can be real, appealing to 
law and courts to denounce injustice also risks lending credibility  to the order being 
opposed, thus producing a form of ‘‘involuntary legitimation.’’73  Jacques Rancière’s 
skepticism goes further when he argues that ‘‘the practice of the ‘constitutionality checkup’ 
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71  This expression is borrowed from Jacques Rancière who defines politics as ‘‘a way of framing, among 
sensory data, a specific sphere of experience. It is a partition of the sensible, of the visible and the sayable, 
which allows (or does not allow) some specific data to appear; which allows or does not allow some specific 
subjects to designate them and speak about them.’’  Jacques Rancière, Dissensus. On Politics and Aesthetics, 
London, New York: Continuum, 2010, p.152. [Jacques Rancière, Le partage du sensible. Esthétique et 
politique, Paris: la Fabrique, 2000].
72 Namhee Lee, ‘‘The South Korean Student Movement,’’ p.120.
73 Stephen Ellmann, ‘‘Struggle and Legitimation,’’ Law and Social Inquiry, Vol.20, No.2, 1995, pp.339-348.
’’ is nothing more than ‘‘state mimesis of the political practice of litigation.’’74 What judicial 
review achieves according to him thus amounts to the ‘‘transformation of the political 
dispute into a legal problem.’’75 For Rancière, constitutional justice is therefore not a stage 
where politics - conceived as disagreement, ‘‘a dispute over the object of the discussion and 
over the capacity of those who are making an object of it’’76 - is likely to happen.77
 By contrast, this dissertation and its hypotheses are located in between the optimistic 
view and the skeptic stance toward legal mobilization and constitutional intervention, with 
the former mostly celebrating the political achievements of courts such as the South Korean 
one while the latter discounts the possibility  of such achievements’ occurrence on the 
constitutional stage. In place of these two approaches, the present research seeks to highlight 
the ambivalence which has characterized constitutional litigation in South Korea, as a site 
where the fundamental political disagreement of the post-transition era has been both staged 
and interrupted. Analyzing its jurisprudence over the past twenty-five years indeed reveals 
how the Constitutional Court of Korea, in the name of defining and defending the 
constitutional order, has been involved in the struggle over redrawing the contours of enmity 
in an ambiguous way.
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77  It should be underlined that the separation drawn by Rancière between political disagreement and 
constitutional dispute is not a matter of intrinsic incompatibility, as a lawsuit - like ‘‘an election, a strike, a 
demonstration - can give rise to politics or not give rise to politics.’’  Ibidem,  p.32. This contingent possibility is 
illustrated by the 1832 trial of August Blanqui, which engendered ‘‘a speech scene that is one of the first 
political occurrences of the modern proletariat subject.’’ Ibidem, p.37.
Hypothesis: explaining the twofold role of the constitutional court
 The dissertation’s main hypothesis posits the ambivalence of the constitutional 
court’s contribution to the reframing of enmity  in post-transition South Korea. The court’s 
very commitment to defend constitutionalism can indeed be expected to have translated into 
both liberal and illiberal outcomes, setting bonds on the powers of government by 
dismantling a number of authoritarian legacies while reinforcing the non-inclusiveness of the 
post-transition order by confirming the continued relevance of security  instruments which, 
since 1987, have been primarily deployed not to protect the state but to enforce a certain and 
contentious way of envisioning the ‘‘national.’’ To be adequately captured, the double-edged 
role of the court can be broken down into two sub-propositions.
Sub-hypothesis 1: the Constitutional Court of Korea has tried to undo the authoritarian 
legacies attached to security instruments and their uses.
 The positive understanding which exists in the literature about the Constitutional 
Court of Korea’s role derives from the fact  that the institution has indeed strived to bring the 
security tools inherited from the authoritarian period into conformity with the requisites of 
the rule of law. These efforts can be expected to be highly visible in decisions reviewing the 
constitutionality of the rules and practices implemented by law-enforcing agencies. In terms 
of judicial reasoning, the court’s concern may take the form of a debate about whether too 
much continuity or enough differentiation with the past has prevailed. When it comes to 
adjudication results, the court’s commitment to reform authoritarian legacies should result in 
the introduction of new procedural guarantees in order to rule out the extra-legal and 
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arbitrary uses of national security which litigants have challenged early  on, and consistently. 
The judicial reshaping of security  instruments may have however met two limits: the 
unwillingness of law enforcement institutions to comply with constitutional jurisprudence, 
and the fact that undoing some of the authoritarian past’s remains does not amount to 
dismantling the non-inclusive legacy of the transition.  
Sub-hypothesis 2: while the Constitutional Court of Korea has tried to bring inherited 
security tools into conformity with the rule of law, its jurisprudence has also contributed to 
reinforce their post-transition relevance as mechanisms of exclusion.
 In acting as a guardian of the new constitutional order, the Constitutional Court of 
Korea could have both sought to reform various authoritarian legacies attached to security 
tools and contributed to consolidate their post-transition functionality as mechanisms of 
exclusion. While the constitutional court may have endeavored to bring the security 
instruments inherited from the authoritarian era into conformity with the requisites of the 
rule of law, its jurisprudence can also be expected to have reinforced the legitimacy of their 
resilience as mechanisms of exclusion enforcing the non-inclusive bias of the post-transition 
order. This should translate into the confirmation of such mechanisms’ constitutionality  and 
relevance for the democratic era across the court’s jurisprudence. The promotion of the rule 
of law which the court may have embraced would therefore represent only one side of the 
dual way in which the institution has carried its task of defending the constitution: 
introducing procedural guarantees against  discretionary and arbitrary uses of security 
instruments while validating their function as devices policing the boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion in contemporary South Korea.  
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Methodology: collection and textual analysis of constitutional jurisprudence 
Constitution of the corpus 
 The total volume of decisions included in the present research consists of eighty-
some rulings delivered since the constitutional court began to operate. Between September 
1988 and September 2013, 24,445 cases have been filed with the court, which amounts to a 
thousand cases being annually received by  the institution. An overwhelming majority of 
them (96%) reach the court through one of the two mechanisms for constitutional 
complaints, and especially through the procedure of article 68, section 1 of the Constitutional 
Court Act by which any person alleging a violation of his or her basic rights by  an exercise 
or non-exercise of government can directly  petition the court (19,350 complaints were filed 
through this mechanism between 1988 and 2013, that is to say 79% of the caseload). 
 Approximately  half of the cases filed with the court are dismissed as non-justiciable 
by a small bench of three justices (11,753 cases between 1988 and 2013). Out of the 
remaining 12,692 cases, 757 were withdrawn and 771 still pending as of September 2013, 
leaving the total of the cases decided by the court’s full bench of nine justices to 11,164 over 
the past twenty-five years, which amounts to less than 500 cases settled a year. Most of the 
cases decided by the full bench are however rejected (6,496), dismissed (1,663) or annulled 
(455). As a result, only a slim minority of cases (2,544) has resulted in a decision of 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality between September 1988 and September 2013: 1,822 
of them were found constitutional, 480 unconstitutional, 148 non-conform to the 
constitution, 66 only  partly  unconstitutional, and 28 only partly constitutional. About 60 
judgments of constitutionality  or unconstitutionality are included in the present analysis, 
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which also counts six cases dismissed by  a small bench and a dozen dismissed or rejected by 
the full bench.
Table 4. Case statistics of the Constitutional Court of Korea between September 1988 and September 
2013.




















§68 I §68 II
Filed 24445 820 1  81 23543 19350 4193
Settled 23674 780 1  76 22817 18945 3872
Dismissed by Small 
Benches











148 55    93 34 59
Unconstitutio-
nal in certain 
context




28 7    21  21
Constitutional 1822 289    1533 4 1529
Annulled 455    16 439 439  
Rejected 6496  1  20 6475 6475  
Dismissed 1663 61   27 1575 1339 236
Miscellaneous 6     6 5 1
Withdrawn 757 119   13 625 547 78
Pending 771 40   5 726 405 321
Source: The Constitutional Court of Korea.78
 While the decisions covered by the dissertation represent only a small numeric 
proportion of the cases whose constitutionality  was adjudicated by the court (less than 3%), 
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78  Statistics of the Constitutional Court of Korea from the court’s website,  accessed on January 17, 2014, at: 
http://english.ccourt.go.kr.
the selected corpus deals with one of the overriding issues in which the court  has had to 
intervene since 1988: redrawing the boundaries of enmity in post-transition South Korea. 
This issue encompasses most of the major matters examined by the court over the past 
twenty-five years: reviewing the constitutionality  of the National Security  Act, the 
ideological conversion policy, the compulsory military service, and the criminal justice 
process; putting the past on trial and examining measures of transitional justice; defining the 
contours of the national community through the assessment of nationality, citizenship, and 
immigration laws; or settling matters of war and peace. 
 The body of cases chosen as relevant for the analysis is therefore not limited to the 
constitutional rulings concerning the main security instruments which have remained 
deployed after the change of regime. The corpus also interrogates the court’s construction of 
enmity in relation to a broader set of issues which incorporates several of the court’s most 
momentous and commented judgments, such as its 1995 decisions relating to the prosecution 
of former dictators Roh Tae-woo and Chun Doo-hwan, or its 2004 verdict against the 
impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun. Both instances have indeed been fully part of the 
disagreement about what counts as ‘‘national’’ and ‘‘anti-national’’ in post-transition South 
Korea. 
 The corpus upon which the analysis is based was collected and analyzed over a ten-
month period, between December 2011 and October 2012, from the entire volume of 
decisions rendered by the court since the late 1980s. All of the court’s settled cases are 
accessible in Korean through the Constitutional Court of Korea’s official website, on which 
rulings can be found through their case number or by keyword search. This option first 
enabled me to gather cases in which expressions such as ‘‘national security’’ made an 
appearance. In approaching them, I relied on both the Korean text and the court’s official 
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English translation, when available. Approximately 10% of the court’s decisions are indeed 
either summarized or fully  translated into English by the institution, which makes them 
accessible through the English version of its official website and its own publications. The 
latter comprise the court’s 2008 report entitled Twenty Years of the Constitutional Court of 
Korea, which covers the period from 1988 to 2008 with cases’ summaries as well as 
commentaries on the history of constitutional adjudication in South Korea and its present 
structures. A more thorough compilation of summarized and fully translated rulings is also 
available in the Constitutional Court Decisions Volume I (1998-2004), Volume II 
(2005-2008), 2009, and 2010. 
 This collection was extensively consulted in the course of a four-week internship 
carried out at the Research Institute of the Constitutional Court  of Korea (‘‘hŏnpŏp chaep’an 
yŏn’guwŏn’’), located in Seoul, during September 2012. A substantial part of the four weeks 
spent at the Research Institute was dedicated to an in-depth reading of the judgments 
published in these volumes, through which the universe of cases relevant for the present 
study was expanded in two directions: by including decisions relating to nationality and 
immigration laws as well as rulings connected to the compulsory military service. My time 
at the Institute also provided me with the opportunity to conduct informal interviews with 
constitutional researchers, to perfect my understanding of the court and of its internal 
dynamics, to attend working sessions and conferences at  the Research Institute and at the 
Constitutional Court of Korea, and to consult the records of some of the main cases on which 
the dissertation focuses. 
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Table 5. Constitutional appointments since 1988.
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 The present research spans over four terms of the constitutional court, under the 
presidency of Cho Kyu-Kwang (1988-1994), Kim Young-jun (1994-2000), Yun Young-chul 
(2000-2006), and Lee Kang-kook (2007-2013). Among the forty-some individuals who have 
served as constitutional justices between 1988 and 2013, only two were women (Jeon Hyo-
suk, from 2003 to 2006) and Lee Jungmi (who was appointed in 2011). Constitutional 
justices are usually former judges or prosecutors, a difference in terms of career and 
professionalization which seems to weigh more on their sensibility than the branch of power 
(executive, judicial, or legislative) which has appointed them. As will be justified in the 
following section, the research does not rely  on a sociological approach to the court in order 
to understand the role played by the institution in the reframing of enmity  after the change of 
regime. It does not focus on the trajectory of, or interactions between, individual justices as 
undertaken by  the attitudinal model79 or the strategic framework.80 Instead, the dissertation’s 
primarily  adopts an interpretive approach to constitutional discourse through a textual 
analysis of the court’s jurisprudence.
An interpretive reading of constitutional jurisprudence
 The argument put forth by  the present research highlights the double-edged way in 
which the court has embraced its role as guardian of the constitutional order. This study 
therefore hopes to demonstrate how constitutionalism has served to both curb and strengthen 
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79  The attitudinal model postulates that the voting patterns of judges translate their personal preferences. See 
Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind. The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946-1963, 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965; Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the 
Attitudinal Model, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
80 According to the strategic approach to judicial decision-making, judges’ choices are the result of calculated 
interactions between different actors - that is to say, between judges themselves as well as between the court 
and the other branches of government. See Walter Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1964; Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make, Washington: CQ Press, 
1998.
the instruments which have remained deployed after 1987 to enforce the non-inclusive 
legacy of the transition - such as the National Security Act, the Military  Service Act, and the 
ideological conversion policy. To do so, the dissertation primarily  relies on an interpretive 
reading of constitutional jurisprudence. While paying close attention to the language of the 
court, this approach neither concentrates on the doctrinal dimension of constitutional 
decisions, nor provides an internal, juridical analysis of their content.
 Instead, the research focuses on constitutional language as a form of discursivity 
which encompasses both legal and non-legal arguments and considerations articulated in the 
frame of a conflict. Such a conflict is usually not exhausted by  the constitutional terms and 
claims through which it has to be framed. Although it has been argued that judicial review 
amounts to the ‘‘transformation of the political dispute into a legal problem,’’81 traces of the 
underlying and society-wide disagreement which constitutes the subtext of judicial 
intervention can be unearthed from rulings. This notion of ‘‘subtext’’ echoes the idea that 
multiple layers of discourse and meaning are embedded in jurisprudence, whether they are or 
not explicitly  articulated in it. In this perspective, the interpretive method offers the 
possibility to restore these layers and the subtext which they convey. 
 The interpretive reading of law embraced by the present research distinguishes itself 
from the approach advocated by Clifford Geertz to law as a language, that is to say  a 
symbol-system and a “distinctive manner of imagining the real.”82  The analysis of legal 
discourse undertaken by this dissertation is less cultural than political, envisioning 
43
81 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement, p.110.
82  Clifford Geertz, ‘‘Local Knowledge. Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective,” in Local Knowledge. 
Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, New York: Basic Books, 1983, p.182.  Against Geertz and the idea 
of a common imaginary at work in and through law, Sally Humphries has for instance evoked the multiple 
imaginaries operating within a single legal system, highlighting how ‘‘what is ideologically coherent in the 
legal discourse appears as ‘theory,’ while discordant elements are relegated to the status of mere ‘practice.’  ’’ 
See Sally Humphreys, ‘‘Law as Discourse,’’ History and Anthropology, Vol.1, No.2, 1985, p.256. 
constitutional jurisprudence as a multilayered text whose analysis is incomplete without 
reconstructing its implicit  subtext. As this research contends for the South Korean case, the 
fundamental dispute which composes the subtext of constitutional intervention concerns the 
very definition of what counts as ‘‘national’’ or ‘‘anti-national’’ in the post-transition era. 
This conflict has gained access to the constitutional stage in so far as the mechanisms of 
exclusion preventing it  from unfolding in the public sphere have been challenged before the 
court. Yet, constitutional adjudication has only represented a limited place of contention, one 
which has both contributed to stage and interrupt the disagreement about the boundaries of 
enmity. Such ambivalence is precisely treated as part of the constitutional court’s discourse 
by the interpretive reading of jurisprudence which this dissertation adopts. In other words, 
the bifurcation between constitutionalism and liberalism which the case study exemplifies is 
not conceived as a deficiency or anomaly vis-à-vis what the court’s intervention ought to 
have been or done.  
 The approach of the present research therefore accords equal significance to the 
reliefs and recesses of the court’s language, its emphases and silences, what distinguishes 
judges’ opinions and the consensus which they nonetheless share beyond their apparent 
discordances. Indeed, the court often appears as ‘‘polyvocal’’ and its members frequently 
pronounce split decisions taking the form of a majority ruling accompanied by one or several 
dissenting opinions. Disagreements within the institution have not only been synchronic but 
diachronic, manifested overtime through the practice of reversing established precedents. 
While differences among judges and judgments reflect the existence of both ‘‘conservative’’ 
and ‘‘progressive’’ sensibilities, the polarization that  they imply should not, however, be 
exaggerated. 
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 This is the reason why the dissertation departs from studies of judicial politics which 
focus on judges’ individual attitudes and choices. While it is possible to identify important 
contrasts in terms of decision-making among the justices of the South Korean constitutional 
court, there also exists among them a largely shared order of discourse when it comes to 
enmity. The commonality upon which this order of discourse ultimately rests is not only 
produced by  the fact that constitutional language emanates from a certain kind of elites (to 
be sure, the legal profession does enjoy an elite status in South Korea where it forms a 
closely-knit community). This commonality is also premised upon the institutional nature of 
the constitutional court and the dual solidarity  which binds it to the state, that is to say, not 
only to the state’s physical integrity which the court is committed to defending, but also to a 
certain way of envisioning the ‘‘national.’’
 This double cohesion, in turn, shapes the order of discourse shared by constitutional 
justices. If the discourse of the court is regularly  traversed by a debate and discord between 
justices over the extent to which basic rights, which are never recognized as absolute, should 
be protected, judges’ diverging positions never express a dispute over their understanding of 
the ‘‘national.’’ This shared understanding is itself an incomplete part  or fragment of the 
larger and contentious subtext upon which the court’s intervention is based, namely the 
asymmetrical dispute between the state and parts of civil society over the boundaries of 
inclusion in and exclusion from the ‘‘national’’ body. 
 An interpretive reading of constitutional jurisprudence therefore exposes the 
domestic and self-referential nature of the issues raised by the construction of enmity. 
Indeed, the dispute surrounding its definition can neither be reducible to a disagreement 
about the authoritarian past nor to a conflict over the status of North Korea and the nature of 
inter-Korean relations. Rather than convoking dyschronic and dystopic alterities, the 
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underlying textuality  of the court’s intervention refers to the present of South Korean 
democracy  and to the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion as enforced and contested in the 
post-transition period. To better reconstitute how this subtext comes into play for each of the 
particular issues brought before the court, this dissertation’s textual analysis of constitutional 
jurisprudence is supported by  the use of secondary sources, newspaper articles, and human 
rights reports helpful to identify litigants, their lawyers, as well as the public debates 
surrounding a given case. In addition, these materials and the court’s own publications are 
particularly relevant to track the impact of constitutional verdicts once litigation is over. 
 
Outline of the dissertation
 The seven chapters which compose the rest of this dissertation proceed as follows. 
Chapter two provides a political genealogy of the Constitutional Court of Korea, analyzing 
the institution’s coming into being in the context of the negotiated constitutional revision of 
1987, which was controlled by  political elites from both the authoritarian leadership  and the 
opposition to the exclusion of the forces, demands, and alternative ‘‘national’’ imaginary of 
the grassroots democratization movement. Taking into account the inherent contingency of 
institutional design, this chapter evades the functionalist argument according to which the 
court was strategically created by political elites in order to reinforce the conservative bias of 
the transition. 
 Chapter three surveys the intensity  of South Korea’s constitutional commitment 
against enmity, by examining the two figures of threat which the basic norm is ready to 
confront: the enemy of the state who jeopardizes the integrity and security  of the nation, as 
well as the enemy of the regime who endangers constitutional democracy. This second figure 
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has provided the constitutional court with the language and ground to establish itself as a 
privileged actor in charge of defending the ‘‘basic order of free democracy’’ and of 
unpacking, in its name, the values and arrangements worthy of being upheld in the post-
transition period.     
  Chapter four delves into the paradox of the court’s empowerment, showing how 
constitutional justice became invested as a site where to contest the non-inclusive legacy of 
democracy’s institutionalization after the change of regime. This non-inclusive legacy is not 
only manifested in the security instruments inherited from the authoritarian period and 
operating after 1987 as mechanisms of exclusion, but also in the limited path to transitional 
justice which was contested before the court in the mid-1990s. 
 Chapters five, six, seven, and eight undertake a detailed examination of constitutional 
jurisprudence for the mechanisms of exclusion challenged before the court since the late 
1980s. Each of them indeed sheds light upon different aspects of the illiberal and excluding 
dimension of South Korean constitutional democracy  after the change of regime. Chapter 
five interrogates how the notion of enmity  has been reshaped by the court in the aftermath of 
the transition, focusing on rulings delivered in relation to the National Security Act. This 
chapter revisits the traditional understanding made of these decisions as landmarks of the 
court’s commitment to protect fundamental rights.  
 Chapter six complements the analysis of how the court’s has redefined enmity by 
looking at the ways in which the contours of the national community have been delineated 
by constitutional jurisprudence. The court has indeed reviewed a variety  of laws which 
highlight criteria of inclusion in, and conditions of exclusion from, the collective body. 
These decisions reveal that the contours of the national community can be projected both 
beyond and within the territory of the South, as illustrated by the ideological conversion 
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policy following which political prisoners refusing to pledge allegiance to the prescribed 
notion of the ‘‘national’’ have remained identified and detained as ‘‘thought criminals’’ in the 
post-transition era.
 Chapter seven is dedicated to a closely  related mechanism of exclusion: the special 
procedures - or lack thereof - deployed against national security  suspects and defendants in 
the criminal justice process. The rulings delivered by the court in this area demonstrate the 
firmness of its commitment to defend the rule of law and to undo several of the extra-legal or 
arbitrary rules and practices associated with the criminal handling of national security. The 
militant idea that rights have to be protected against the risk of being abused and misused 
has nonetheless provided the ultimate constitutional rationale for their restriction.        
 Finally, chapter eight  analyzes the role of the court  in cases calling into question the 
exigencies of national defense. The dispute over the ‘‘national’’ which constitutes the subtext 
of the court’s intervention has indeed led various South Korean military  initiatives to be 
constitutionally  challenged on the ground that they  represented aggressive and unfavorable 
behavior towards North Korea and the perspective of reunification. While these issues reflect 
that constitutional adjudication has been increasingly invested as a site of political 
contention, they also highlight how the court has prevented the dispute between competing 
‘‘national’’ imaginaries from unfolding on its stage. 
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CHAPTER TWO
A Political Genealogy of the Constitutional Court of Korea
THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Enacted    Jul.      17, 1948
   Amended    Jul.        7, 1952
Nov.    29, 1954
Jun.     15, 1960
Nov.    29, 1960
Dec.    26, 1962
Oct.     21, 1969
Dec.    27, 1972
Oct.     27, 1980
Oct.      29,1987
   PREAMBLE
 We, the people of Korea, proud of a resplendent history and 
traditions dating from time immemorial, upholding the cause of the 
Provisional Republic of Korea Government  born of the March First 
Independent Movement of 1919 and the democratic ideals of the 
April Nineteenth Uprising of 1960 against  injustice, having assumed 
the mission of democratic reform and peaceful unification of our 
homeland and having determined to consolidate national unity with 
justice, humanitarianism and brotherly love, and
    To destroy all social vices and injustice, and
   To afford equal opportunities to every person and provide for the 
fullest development of individual capabilities in all fields, including 
political, economic, social and cultural life by further strengthening 
the basic free and democratic order conducive to private initiative 
and public harmony, and
  To help each person discharge those duties and responsibilities 
concomitant to freedoms and rights, and
  To elevate the quality of life for all citizens and contribute to 
lasting world peace and the common prosperity of mankind and 
thereby to ensure security, liberty and happiness for ourselves and 
our prosperity forever, Do hereby amend, through national 
referendum following a resolution by the National Assembly, the 
Constitution, ordained and established on the Twelfth Day of July 
anno Domini Nineteen hundred and forty-eight, and amended eight 
times subsequently.
                              Oct. 29, 1987
 
 This chapter explores the context in which the Constitutional Court of Korea was 
created in 1987, as a result of a revision of the constitution which was negotiated by political 
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elites from the authoritarian leadership and the opposition to the exclusion of the actors, 
demands, and alternative ‘‘national’’ imaginary  of the popular democratization movement. 
Both this elite bargain and the marginalization which it produced are recorded in the text of 
the amended constitution in general, and in the making of the constitutional court in 
particular. The chapter however highlights the paradox of institutional design, as the way  in 
which the court was fashioned - i.e., by  political elites through a number of selective 
borrowings to South Korean history and comparative experience (especially  the German 
model) - did not pre-determine what it would become.
  
A constitution in place since 1948: the imprint of history and politics
 Constitutional transitions often serve as established landmarks in the history of 
nations, where they conveniently  provide a definite date to which the (re)foundation of a 
political order can be traced back. Of course, history neither starts nor closes with the 
enactment of a new founding document, and constitutions always run the risk to be no more 
than ‘‘parchment institutions,’’1 that is to say, inconsequential rules merely existing on paper. 
Where they matter, constitutions are both common and uncommon legal texts: common, 
because despite the language of generality, and sometimes of universality, in which they are 
carved, constitutions remain man-made localized institutions - in time and space; yet, 
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1 Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo, ‘‘Variation in Institutional Strength,’’ Annual Review of Political 
Science, Vol.12, No.1, 2009, pp.115-133.
uncommon given their higher status in the ‘‘hierarchy of norms,’’2 where they stand as the 
‘‘supreme law of the land.’’3 
 Constitutions are not merely a system of higher rules and principles binding power, 
but they also consist of an ensemble of concrete and local arrangements which can be shaped 
by specific interests. They rarely  imitate the 1920 Federal Constitutional Law of Austria,4 
exclusively  the work of jurists and legal scholars such as Hans Kelsen, devoid of the 
grandiloquent declarations and guiding ideals which saturate the preamble of the South 
Korean constitution. On the contrary, constitutions are usually designed by political forces 
rather than jurists alone. They can be authored by a dominant actor (such as the French 1958 
constitution, the work of De Gaulle’s entourage) or be the negotiated outcome of a bargain 
among several parties, and therefore reflect elements of comprise (such as the American 
constitution, with the infamous three-fifths rule of its first article by which Southern states 
obtained that each slave be counted as three-fifths of a person when calculating each state’s 
demographic strength and the corresponding number of seats to be attributed in the House of 
Representatives). Conversely, the absence of a formal written constitution in Israel, replaced 
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2 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, New Brunswick: Transaction, 2005 (c1945).
3  ‘‘This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,  shall be the supreme law of the 
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,  anything in the constitution or laws of any state to 
the contrary notwithstanding’’  (Article 6, clause 2 of the United States Constitution, also referred to as the 
‘‘supremacy clause’’). According to Jon Elster, ‘‘any of the following features might be used’’ to define a 
constitution: ‘‘The constitution regulates all and only the basic aspects of political life; The constitution 
regulates the adoption of lower-level norms, such as statutes and ordinances; The constitution takes precedence 
in the case of conflict with a lower-level norm; The constitution is entrenched to a higher degree, more difficult 
to change, than ordinary statutes.’’ Jon Elster, ‘‘Why a Constitutional Court?,’’ Paper presented at the VIIth 
Conference of the Colombian Constitutional Court, Bogotá, 2011. 
4 The 1920 Constitution of Austria was reinstated as the fundamental norm of the country in 1955,  when the 
Allies’ occupation following World War II ended.  According to Michael Thaler, the sobriety and purely 
juridical nature of the text, coupled with a tradition of strict interpretation, exactly fitted the need of the torn 
postwar Austrian society, and provided it with a formal consensus that was lacking in all the other spheres of 
social life. Michael Thaler, ‘‘La constitution et le consensus fondamental d’une société,’’ Paper presented at La 
constitution en question.  Concepts et conceptions à l’épreuve de l’évolution du droit. Contributions des écoles 
allemandes et autrichiennes, Institut Historique Allemand, Paris, January 18, 2013.
by the adoption of separate basic laws, results from the failure of secular and religious forces 
in the 1949 constituent assembly to reach together a comprehensive agreement. Many 
constitutions - or lack thereof - thus bear the mark of their inscription in specific historical, 
and therefore local, contexts. 
 So does the constitution of South Korea, enacted with the country’s founding in 
1948. Since then, the text  was never replaced but instead modified nine times, reflecting the 
major shifts of regime that  the Republic of Korea experienced throughout its six decades of 
existence.5 Out of the nine revisions, five coincide with post-1948 political transitions. As 
underlined by  Choi Jang-Jip, most amendments have moreover centered on the issue of 
presidential power.6 The first  two, promulgated on July 7, 1952 (in the midst of the Korean 
War) and November 29, 1954, stiffened President Rhee Syngman’s hold on power by 
transforming the presidential election from an indirect to a direct vote and by removing the 
two-term limit on the presidential office. This allowed Rhee to successfully run for a third 
term in 1956 and a fourth in 1960. 
 The blatantly rigged election of 1960 ignited nation-wide protests which led Rhee to 
flee by the end of April. The regime change that ensued was consecrated by the 
constitutional amendment of June 15, 1960. It marked the success of the April 19 student 
revolution which ousted Rhee, the sole president of the twelve-year long First Republic, and 
brought about a short-lived democratic government, the Second Republic. This episode of 
South Korean history is celebrated by the 1987 preamble of the constitution, which makes 
reference to ‘‘the democratic ideals of the April Nineteenth Uprising of 1960 against 
injustice’’ as a milestone on the road toward political liberalization. 
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 The Second Republic engendered two constitutional revisions but surrendered a year 
after its birth to a coup d’état by General Park Chung-hee, followed by  the establishment of a 
new regime on December 26, 1962, the Third Republic. Two additional modifications of the 
constitution were later prompted by Park Chung-hee himself to tighten his grip on South 
Korean politics: on October 21, 1969, allowing him to run for a third presidential term; and, 
on December 27, 1972, when the Yusin constitution (meaning ‘‘revitalization’’) begot the 
Fourth Republic and a greater concentration of prerogatives in the hands of the executive. 
This hardening of Park’s regime took place in the immediate aftermath of the Joint 
Communiqué of July 4, 1972, through which the two Koreas pledged to pursue the peaceful 
reunification (‘‘t’ongil’’ in Korean) of the peninsula.7 
 The domestic response to this rapprochement was abrupt, as martial law was declared 
throughout the country and all political activity  banned. Seven years later, Park Chung-hee 
was assassinated by the chief of his security services and a clique of generals led by  Chun 
Doo-hwan seized power by  a coup d’état on December 12, 1979. On October 27, 1980, they 
proceeded to a seventh constitutional revision which coincided with the establishment of the 
Fifth Republic. Under the pressure of mass street demonstrations against the regime which 
culminated in June 1987 across the country, the Fifth Republic was replaced on October 29, 
1987 by the current and longest-lived regime in South Korea up to date, the Sixth Republic.
53
7 Like Chinese language, Korean only knows the term ‘‘unification’’ to designate what in English is usually 
translated as ‘‘reunification.’’ The North-South Joint Communiqué of 1972 stated three principles of 
reunification: first,  reunification should be solved independently,  without interference from or reliance on 
foreign powers; second, it had to be realized in a peaceful way without using armed forces; finally, it was to 
transcend ideological and institutional differences by resting on the unity of Korean people as an ethnic group.
Table 6. Political events and systems of judicial review associated with South Korean constitutional 
revisions. 
Constitutional Event Political Event Judicial Review
July 17, 1948 First Republic, President Rhee Syngman
Constitutional CommitteeJuly 7, 1952 Revision making the presidential election direct
November 29, 1954 Revision lifting the two-term limit on 
presidential office
June 15, 1960 April 19 Revolution, Second Republic, Premier 
Chang Myon
Constitutional CourtNovember 29, 1960 Revision introducing ex post facto penalties for  
crimes of corruption under the previous regime 
and creating a special tribunal and prosecutor 
for those crimes
December 26, 1962 Coup d’état, Third Republic, General Park 
Chung-hee
Supreme Court
October 21, 1969 Revision allowing the president to run for a 
third term
December 27, 1972 Yusin Constitution, Fourth Republic, General 
Park Chung-hee
Constitutional Committee
October 27, 1980 Coup d’état, Fifth Republic, General Chun 
Doo-hwan
Constitutional Committee
October 29, 1987 June Democratization Movement, Sixth 
Republic, Presidents Roh Tae-woo 
(1988-1993), Kim Young-sam (1993-1998), 
Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), Roh Moo-hyun 
(2003-2008), Lee Myun-bak (2008-2013), Park 
Geun-hye (2013-)
Constitutional Court
 Whereas previous regimes bore the imprint of a single man (Rhee Syngman for the 
First Republic, General Park Chung-hee for the Third and Fourth Republics, General Chun 
Doo-hwan for the Fifth Republic), the Sixth Republic has been characterized by  a 
compromise among ruling and opposition elites at its founding and by their subsequent 
rotation in power. To this end, article 70 of the 1987 constitution prescribes that the president 
be in office for five years, but forbids his reelection.8 This prohibition is further entrenched 
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8 ‘‘The term of office of the President shall be five years, and the President shall not be reelected’’ (Article 70 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea).
in article 128, which provides that amendments to extend the presidential term of office or to 
allow for reelection cannot be effective for the president in office at the time of the 
proposal.9 
 Such safeguards are only meaningful in so far as they are complied with by political 
actors, which was verified when ex-General Roh Tae-woo stepped down in February  1993. 
The handpicked successor of Chun Doo-hwan, Roh had been victorious in the first free 
direct presidential election of December 1987 thanks to the division of the opposition.10 The 
following election of December 1992 was won by Kim Young-sam, the first  civilian 
president since 1960 but candidate of the ruling coalition after merging his party  with that of 
Roh Tae-woo in 1990 to form the Democratic Liberal Party. It meant that, by the mid-1990s, 
the Sixth Republic still failed to meet the definition of democracy  as ‘‘a system in which 
parties lose elections.’’11 This eventually occurred in December 1997, when Kim Dae-jung 
became the first opposition candidate to ever ascend to power. Therefore, the three dates of 
1987, 1992, and 1997 all represent complementary  but also potentially competing starting 
points in the genealogy of contemporary South Korean democracy. They also illustrate the 
limits of democracy’s institutionalization as a result of a closed compromise between elites 
of the old regime and the political opposition. As pointed out by Charles Armstrong, 
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11Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and 
Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990,  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000.
 [I]f South Korea’s democratic transition was accomplished by  a popular movement, 
 its democratic consolidation was effected by intra-elite coordination - leading Choi 
 Jang-Jip, one of the most eminent scholars of Korean politics, to term it a ‘‘passive 
 revolution.’’ From the outset, South Korea’s ‘‘transition to democracy’’ was arguably 
 more procedural than  substantive - a ‘‘conservative democratization,’’ in Choi’s term, 
 over-determined by the structures of the country’s Cold War state and its chaebŏl 
 [South Korean conglomerates]-dominated industrialization which has failed to 
 produce a party system representative of the real diversity of interests in Korean 
 society.12 
 As this dissertation contends, the role of the constitutional court consequently  has to 
be interrogated in light of the dual outcome arising from democratization: on the one hand, 
the non-inclusiveness of South Korea’s post-1987 order; and, on the other hand, the 
continued mobilization of parts of civil society contesting the conservative legacy of the 
transition embedded in the making and in the text of the revised constitution.  
 
The preamble’s exclusionary narrative
 The constitution of 1987 is rooted in continuity rather than rupture by the historical 
narrative displayed in its preamble. The very first  words opening the text bring together the 
combination of generality and particularism pervasive in most constitutions. The canonical 
reference to ‘‘We, the people’’ is immediately  qualified in time and space: ‘‘We, the people 
of Korea, proud of a resplendent history and traditions dating from time immemorial.’’ The 
celebration of the immemorial history of the country reflects the political appropriation of 
Korea’s mythical foundation in 2333 B.C.13  The ancientness and uniqueness of Korean 
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13 According to a legend recorded in the 13th century, the first Korean kingdom was founded in 2333 B.C. by 
Tan’gun, a prince of heavenly descent. This anachronistic claim was part of an effort to legitimize the kingdom 
of Koryŏ (935-1392) and the ancientness of its origins vis-à-vis the Chinese Empire. The mythical birth of the 
Korean nation is celebrated every year on October 3rd as the National Foundation Day. 
history is particularly a commonplace of nationalist historiography since the late 19th 
century, when the threat posed by foreign powers’ territorial greed made pressing the 
constitution of a discourse on Korean identity.14 
 The colonial experience that Korea underwent under Japanese rule from 1910 to 
1945 is integrated in the preamble’s narrative through the reference to ‘‘the cause of the 
Provisional Republic of Korea Government born of the March First Independent Movement 
of 1919.’’ Colonial history  is thus reified to a pair of powerful symbols: on the one hand, the 
Korean declaration of independence of March 1, 1919 and the ensuing mass demonstrations 
which were ruthlessly repressed by the Japanese authorities; on the other hand, the formation 
of a provisional government exiled in Shanghai in April 1919. Both are emblematic of the 
post-1945 nationalist discourse, articulated around the condemnation of the unlawful 
occupation of Korea by  Japan and the correlated glorification of Korea’s resistance.15 All the 
conventional ingredients of nationalist historiography are therefore assembled in the vision 
of Korea’s past conveyed by the preamble of 1987, where they coexist with an effort to 
overcome parochial interests and tie the country’s destiny to the universal values of 
mankind.  
 Yet, by tracing ‘‘the mission of democratic reform and peaceful unification of our 
homeland’’ to the anti-colonial independence movement of March 1, 1919 and the student 
revolution of April 19, 1960 which put an end to the dictatorship of Rhee Syngman 
57
14 The shaping of the nationalist discourse in terms of ‘‘minjok,’’  that is to say the people as ‘‘race,’’  or Korean 
nationalism defined in terms of ethnic identity, emerged at the end of the 19th century but only fully imposed 
itself with the construction of Korean identity in the discourses of the colonial era (that is to say in both 
colonialist and anti-colonialist discourses).  See Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea. Genealogy, 
Politics, and Legacy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.
15  In doing so, nationalist historiography is trapped in a certain number of falsifications: falsification of the 
complexities of colonial history, during which resistance to Japan was marginal, and falsification of the 
independence movement itself, irreducible to the March 1, 1919 demonstrations as its forces became 
dominated by radical and communist activists after the 1920s.   
(1948-1960), the preamble voluntarily  omits the foundational event of South Korea’s 
democratization movement: May 18, 1980, or the Kwangju uprising which erupted in 
reaction to the coup d’état  and nation-wide martial law imposed by Chun Doo-hwan and his 
clique of fellow generals, including future president Roh Tae-woo. According to Henri Em, 
Kwangju indeed represents the turning point after which a new and alternative ‘‘national’’ 
narrative developed within the democratization movement, identifying both the military 
regime in power from 1980 to 1987 and the United States as responsible for the rebellion’s 
brutal crackdown. In Em’s words, 
 [I]t was the people’s uprising in the city of Kwangju in 1980 [...] and the massacre 
 perpetrated by  South Korean troops that finally broke the South Korean 
 government’s  ideological hegemony. The magnitude of the state violence drove 
 students and intellectuals to search for the structural and historical origins of South 
 Korea’s dictatorships. [...] Students  and intellectuals sought to constitute the 
 minjung (the subaltern) as a national and nationalist subject, a subjectivity  that could 
 be an alternative to and autonomous from nationalist narratives authorized by either 
 the North Korean or the South Korean state.’’16 
 As the very leaders behind the perpetration of the massacre negotiated the 1987 
change of regime and the correlated reform of the constitution, its preamble’s pledge ‘‘to 
consolidate national unity with justice, humanitarianism and brotherly love, and to destroy 
all social vices and injustice’’ while leaving the memory of May 1980 unmentioned could 
only resonate as bitter irony to the forces of the democratization movement. No matter their 
ambitions, all national constitutions thus remain localized texts which can produce 
surreptitious forms of exclusion while speaking in the name of ‘‘We, the people.’’ 
 In addition, the embeddedness of South Korea’s constitution in a particular space is 
much deeper in original language than its English translation makes readily available. In 
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Korean, the expression ‘‘We, the people of Korea’’ becomes ‘‘uri taehan kungmin,’’ literally 
‘‘We, the people of the Great Han’’ - where ‘‘uri’’ stands for ‘‘us/we,’’ ‘‘taehan’’ for ‘‘the 
Great Han/Korea,’’ and ‘‘kungmin’’ for ‘‘people/nation.’’ However, the Korea associated 
with ‘‘taehan’’ in the post-1945 context is unmistakably ‘‘taehanmin’kuk,’’ that is to say the 
Republic of Korea or South Korea as referred to by South Koreans. As a result  of the 
division of the peninsula in two halves situated north and south of the 38th parallel since 
1945, Korean language does not possess one generic word to name Korea, as English does, 
but instead resorts to four localized terms: South and North Koreas in the mouth of the South 
(respectively ‘‘han’guk’’ and ‘‘pukhan’’); North and South Koreas in the mouth of the North 
(respectively ‘‘chosŏn’’ and ‘‘namjosŏn’’). A similar cleavage governs the use of the term 
‘‘people,’’ ‘‘kungmin’’ in the South by opposition to ‘‘inmin’’ in the North.
 Although it does not openly mention the existence of North Korea, the preamble of 
the 1987 constitution does not, and linguistically  cannot, escape the fact  of the division. Its 
presence pervades the text, both implicitly  and explicitly. Implicitly, references to pre-1945 
history, and the ‘‘immemorial time’’ during which the country was united, neighbor a 
definition of the Korean people which, by contrast, cannot be politically neutral. Explicitly, 
the division is strongly  echoed when the preamble embraces ‘‘the mission of democratic 
reform and peaceful unification of our homeland,’’ in order ‘‘to consolidate national unity 
with justice, humanitarianism and brotherly love.’’ The rest of the constitution is not silent 
either. The horizon set forth by the preamble is reasserted in article 4 of the constitution: 
 The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry  out a 
 policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy. 
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 The language of ‘‘peaceful unification’’ is not a novelty  introduced in the constitution 
by the 1987 revision. It was initially  made reference to ‘‘in the preamble of the 1972 
Constitution after the first-ever inter-Korean Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, and was 
kept in the 1980 Constitution.’’17 The perspective of the peninsula’s ‘‘peaceful unification’’ 
is reinforced in the 1987 text, through the addition of article 4. Yet, the indirect recognition 
of the division which this provision implies conflicts with how the boundaries of South 
Korea’s political sovereignty are still defined by article 3 of the constitution: 
 The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its 
 adjacent island.
 The straight congruence established between the territory of the ROK and the whole 
Korean peninsula rather than its southern half testifies to the official position of the South 
Korean state in 1948, when it considered itself as the only legitimate government on the 
Korean Peninsula.18 More than sixty years later, this fiction remains legally, if not politically, 
valid.  
 Although the government in the South cannot exercise its sovereign authority over 
 the North, the territory  of the northern part of the peninsula still belongs to the South 
 Korean government from the viewpoint of the constitution. Article 3 has been the 
 basic legal grounds for negating the legitimacy of the North Korean government and 
 the grounds on which the government in Pyongyang has been defined as ‘‘an anti- 
 state organization.’’ Laws such as the Anti-Communist Act and the National Security 
 Act that ban or legitimize crackdowns on pro-North Korean activity in the South 
 were justified on the basis of Article 3.19
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18 Ibidem, p.261.
19 Ibidem.
 Apart from the references to reunification, the rhetoric of peace and pacification 
features prominently  in both the preamble and the constitution, but interestingly, the 
language of security never looms very  far away. For instance, the declared objective to 
‘‘contribute to lasting world peace and the common prosperity of mankind’’ is supposed to 
ensure the realization of a tryptic of unalienable rights akin to those enshrined in the 
American Declaration of Independence: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.20 
However, in the Korean version, the enumeration becomes ‘‘security, liberty and happiness 
for ourselves and our posterity forever.’’ Article 5 of the constitution further intensifies this 
juxtaposition of peace and security, and reinforces the consecration of the latter as the 
ultimate collective good: 
 (1) The Republic of Korea shall endeavor to maintain international peace and shall 
 renounce to all aggressive wars.
 (2) The Armed Forces shall be charged with the sacred mission of national security 
 and the defense of the land and their political neutrality shall be maintained.
 
 The ‘‘sacred mission of national security’’ entrusted to the armed forces is not a 
distinctive aspiration of post-1987 democratic South Korea, but  ensuring the political 
neutrality of the army  represents an exigency with a particular resonance in the history  of the 
ROK, under the yoke of military regimes from 1961 to 1987. Both Generals Park Chung-hee 
(1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1987) seized power as a result  of coups d’état and 
legitimized their rule through indirect presidential elections. At the time of the revision,
 Debate on how the new constitution should mandate the military’s political neutrality 
 was contentious. The RDP [the opposition Reunification Democratic Party] wanted 
 the preamble to proscribe the military’s involvement in politics and the body to 
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Happiness’’ (United States Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776).
 forbid ‘‘any king of military intervention for any reason.’’ The governing DJP 
 [Democratic Justice Party] protested, arguing that Article 4.2 of the incumbent 
 constitution - ‘‘The Armed Forces shall be charged with the sacred mission of 
 national security and the defense of the land’’ - adequately defined the military’s 
 duty.21
 Defining the role of the military was only  one of the divisive issues which were 
settled through the talks held between the government and the political opposition to 
negotiate the constitutional revision of 1987. 
A negotiated constitutional revision
 The opposition’s demand for constitutional reform emerged in the mid-1980s when it 
crystallized around the modalities of the presidential election. Under the Fifth Republic’s 
constitution, the president was to be elected for a seven-year non-renewable term through 
indirect vote. With the prospect of Chun Doo-hwan’s presidency terminating in 1987, 
opposition parties started to campaign for direct suffrage as early  as 1985. In April of that 
year, three of them (the New Korea Democratic Party or ‘‘sinhan minjudang,’’ the 
Democratic Korea Party  or ‘‘minju han’gukdang,’’ and the Korea National Party or 
‘‘han’guk kukmindang’’) won together more than the majority  of the popular vote in the 
legislative polls, a victory which strengthened their determination even though it  did not 
translate in a majority of seats in the parliament given electoral malapportionment rules.  
 Convinced that the incumbent leader General Chun Doo-hwan and his handpicked 
successor General Roh Tae-woo could be defeated in the forthcoming presidential election if 
the voting system was altered, the opposition continued to press for a constitutional reform 
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that the government kept on resisting. However, the organized political opposition was far 
from being the only force mobilized in favor of change in the 1980s. Major social movement 
groups independent from the opposition parties were also engaged in the struggle to take 
down Chun’s regime and bring democracy  in its place: students, workers, and church 
activists principally. In the spring of 1987, the pro-democracy struggle accelerated as anti-
regime groups were crucially rallied by the urban middle class, outraged by a series of 
torture cases against student dissidents made public earlier that year. The mobilization 
culminated in the mass demonstrations of the ‘‘June Democracy Movement,’’ leading the 
ruling camp to concede an eight-point reform proposal presented by  Roh Tae-Woo on June 
29. It is commonly thought that the massive nature of the demonstrations, coupled with the 
prospect of the upcoming 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, were responsible for discouraging 
the incumbent military elite from resorting to repression and spilling blood the way it had in 
May 1980, when the Kwangju uprising was crushed.22 
 Although the amendment of October 27, 1987, was the first  of South Korea’s 
constitutional revisions to take place following negotiations between the government and the 
opposition, its process was mainly elite-controlled and highly exclusive.  
 The dramatic opening of political transition rapidly shifted public focus from 
 confrontation  between the state and contentious civil society to negotiation between 
 governing and opposition parties [...]. The change of focus gained political parties 
 increasing autonomy  from previous power sources - the governing Democratic 
 Justice Party (DJP) from the state and the opposition Reunification Democratic Party 
 (RDP) from the pro-democracy movement. Negotiation about political schedules and 
 rules would be conducted primarily by party politicians.23
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 The negotiation format that the Democratic Justice Party, led by  Roh Tae-woo, and 
the  newly  formed Reunification Democratic Party, dominated by the rival factions of Kim 
Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, agreed upon was the following:
 The two parties alone would reach a bipartisan proposal not by vote but by  mutual 
 compromise during the Eight-Member Political Talks (EMPT). Next they would 
 invite minor parties to participate in a Special Committee for Constitutional Revision 
 (SCCR) in the National Assembly  to turn the bipartisan proposal into a formal 
 constitutional amendment bill for adoption by referendum.24
 The ‘‘Eight-Member Political Talks’’ (‘‘8in chŏngch’i hoedam’’) proceeded daily 
from August 3 to 31, when a final compromise was adopted. The creation of a constitutional 
court features among the institutional changes decided by the two camps. Judicial review in 
itself was not a novelty introduced by the constitution of 1987. The various political regimes 
experienced by the Republic of Korea all displayed mechanisms to uphold the supremacy of 
the constitution and potentially review the conformity of legislative statutes to its norms. By 
1987, three different systems had been put to test: the constitutional committee of the First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Republics; the constitutional court of the short-lived Second Republic; and 
the decentralized model embraced by  the Fourth Republic, in which constitutional 
adjudication was carried through the ordinary  tribunals and the supreme court (as is done in 
the United States, in contrast  to the practice of continental Europe). Even though judicial 
review was not completely inexistent, it never went very far given the absence of separation 
of powers and lack of independence on the part of the judiciary that characterized most of 
South Korean governments after 1948 - with the exception of the Second Republic, which 
perished only a year after its coming into being. 
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 As a matter of fact, the institution conceived in articles 111, 112, and 113 of the 1987 
constitution is closely modeled on the constitutional court which was envisioned for the 
democratic Second Republic, but never had the opportunity  to operate due to the regime’s 
very limited existence - the Constitutional Court Act was passed on April 17, 1961, a month 
before General Park Chung-hee seized power through a coup d’état. The ‘‘unrealized’’ 
precedent of 1960 was itself designed after the European system of constitutional 
adjudication, centralized in the hands of a specialized institution rather than delegated to 
ordinary  tribunals as exemplified by the American model. Yet, such choice was not 
predetermined in the South Korean context.  
 With the collapse of the Syngman Rhee government [in 1960], many arguments arose 
 regarding the need to establish a constitutional court. The Korean Bar Association, 
 however, opposed the idea on the basis that, given that the Rhee government had 
 weakened the  judiciary  through unlawful interferences by the executive, establishing 
 a constitutional court  separate from the Supreme Court would further weaken the 
 judiciary  as it would be tantamount to dividing and diminishing the judicial powers 
 into smaller parts. By  contrast, the scholarly community of public law experts was 
 actively in favor of creating a constitutional court. They argued not  only that the 
 adoption of the constitutional court system  was a worldwide trend, but also that it  is 
 right and proper to confer the power to adjudicate constitutional issues on a 
 constitutional court that has expertise on constitutional matters.25
 
 In 1987, debates about the most appropriate form of constitutional adjudication were 
rekindled, and both options considered again. According to the Constitutional Court of 
Korea’s own account of the events, 
 During the revision process, different political factions expressed different views on 
 how to structure the system of constitutional adjudication. As of July 1987, during 
 the initial stages of negotiations within the National Assembly, the ruling party  and 
 the opposition were all in agreement as regards the idea of granting the power of 
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 judicial review to the Supreme Court. However, as negotiations progressed, the idea 
 of adopting the system of constitutional complaints began to emerge, and both the 
 ruling party  and the opposition eventually agreed to establish an independent 
 Constitutional Court for adjudicating constitutional complaints.26
 This narrative nonetheless appears to simplify and slightly mischaracterize the 
positions of the actors and their respective evolutions when contrasted with Cho Jung-
Kwan’s study of the constitution-making process during August 1987. According to Cho, the 
ruling Democratic Justice Party did not enter the ‘‘Eight-Member Political Talks’’ supporting 
the proposal to grant the supreme court the power to review the constitutionality  of laws. 
Indeed, the DJP’s position regarding existing institutions in general, and judicial institutions 
in particular, was to ensure as minimal as possible a departure from the framework of the 
Fifth Republic. The mechanism for judicial review provided by the 1980 constitution being a 
constitutional committee separate from the judiciary, the DJP limited itself to advocate its 
transformation into a constitutional court. 
 On the contrary, the opposition Reunification Democratic Party defended the project 
to transfer the power of judicial review from the ineffective constitutional committee to the 
supreme court, while reforming the procedure to appoint the institution’s chief justice and 
justices by requiring that  the President of the ROK (responsible for all appointments under 
the 1980 constitution) ‘‘secure recommendations and consent from an autonomous judges 
council.’’27 None of these proposals were however retained in the final compromise. By the 
end of August 1987, ‘‘the opposition relented on many issues,’’ including more important 
ones to it than the reform of the judiciary which did not appear to be at the forefront of the 
negotiations that lasted less than a month. According to Kim Young-sam, the feeling then 
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prevailing in the opposition was that ‘‘since ninety percent was already obtained by 
introduction of direct presidential election, we did not need to delay  the political schedule 
because of a mere ten percent remaining.’’28
 The Constitutional Court of Korea’s description of the bargaining process which 
preceded its birth remains instructive in so far as it highlights why agreeing to the ruling 
party’s proposal to create a constitutional court  did not represent  a one-sided concession on 
the part  of the opposition. Indeed, not only did the constitution of the democratic Second 
Republic provide a framework for the new institution, but a court separate from the judiciary 
could also be granted a competence which had never existed before in any system of judicial 
review experimented with by the ROK: the power to adjudicate constitutional complaints. 
The making of a new institution: from selective borrowing to creative adaptation
 Neither decentralized judicial review (through ordinary  tribunals and the supreme 
court), nor the European model of constitutional adjudication by a specialized institution, 
were abstract novelties first discussed in 1987. By contrast, the introduction of a system of 
constitutional complaints represented a true innovation in the Korean scheme of 
constitutional review. The constitution of 1987 did not specify anything about what this 
system would look like, leaving the issue to be determined later through ordinary legislation. 
Yet, the general procedure was well known from the constitutional experience of other 
societies. The primary purpose of constitutional complaints is to enable individuals who 
allege that their basic rights have been violated by an exercise of state power to directly 
bring their case before a constitutional jurisdiction. It  is a mechanism particularly relevant in 
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post-transitional contexts as it is considered to make possible an effective protection of basic 
rights. The procedure itself is deeply  associated with German constitutional justice, which is 
why the Constitutional Court of Korea is often said to have been modeled after the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany sitting in Karlsruhe. The kinship  between the two courts is 
real, but should not be exaggerated. 
 The first element of convergence between them lies in the general structure of 
centralized adjudication entrusted to a specialized constitutional court. The model was born 
in Austria in the early 1920s, but  was truly ‘‘popularized’’ after the constitutional re-
foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
Indeed, as the West German constitutional court imposed itself as one of the most successful 
institutions of the post-war order, it came to embody a model of rupture with the 
authoritarian past and commitment to basic rights emulated by  many post-transitional 
societies in Europe and the rest of the world. The German experience seemed to exemplify 
how the establishment of a new, small, and specialized constitutional court  could represent 
an efficient way to isolate constitutional review from the institutions and personnel of the 
traditional judicial order, necessarily  part of the old regime’s state apparatus. The creation in 
1951 of a mechanism of direct constitutional request concretized the German court’s mission 
of protecting and promoting basic rights.29 
 Both the general structure of centralized adjudication and the specific replication of 
the direct  request procedure constitute strong elements of resemblance between the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany and the Constitutional Court of Korea. Yet, institutions are 
far from being predetermined in their inner workings by the formal mold in which they were 
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made. As a result, two courts similar in design can operate in diverging ways depending on 
the context in which they are placed. The constitutional courts sitting in Karlsruhe and Seoul 
are not such twin jurisdictions. A closer comparative examination of both institutions reveals 
that the borrowings made by  the Korean court to its German counterpart are highly  selective, 
while they also display completely unrelated features.
Composition and selection
 In terms of composition, the two courts notably present little likeness. While the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany is made of sixteen justices chosen for a twelve-
year term by  the parliament, the Constitutional Court  of Korea appears to be strictly 
fashioned after its 1960 predecessor. It  consists of nine full-time members (only six of them 
were full-time members in 1987),30 appointed for a six-year renewable term.31 Although all 
justices are formally appointed by the President of the ROK, the selection process is evenly 
divided between the executive, the judiciary, and the parliament, as each branch nominates 
three judges.32 The President of the ROK also designates the president of the constitutional 
court among the three justices of his choice and the nomination has to be validated by the 
69
30 ‘‘The Constitutional Court shall be composed of nine Justices qualified to be court judges, and they shall be 
appointed by the President’’ (Article 111, section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea).
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National Assembly.33  A very similar formal selection process based on institutional checks 
and balances was designed for the ‘‘unrealized’’ constitutional court of 1960. 
 Yet, procedural additions were also made to this original scheme rehabilitated in 
1987. Regarding the three nominees of the National Assembly, an important informal 
practice has developed since the early days of the Sixth Republic: one of the judges has to be 
chosen by the opposition, while another is selected as a result of an agreement between the 
majority  and the opposition.34 This second constraint, of more recent origin than the first, has 
produced a deadlock situation throughout 2012, leaving the court with only eight justices for 
a year as rival parties could not settle on a common nominee. They finally  concurred for the 
wave of appointments which took place in September 2012, when five new justices were 
inaugurated at the constitutional court (three of whom were nominated by the National 
Assembly and two by the chief justice of the supreme court). A further transformation of the 
selection process was initiated in September 2000 with the start of confirmation hearings for 
the appointment of the president of the court as well as for National Assembly nominees. 
During these hearings,
 Candidates were asked about their views on controversial constitutional issues and on 
 certain decisions of the Constitutional Court as well as about their decisions during 
 their past career as judges. Candidates were also scrutinized about their wealth, and 
 educational and professional backgrounds.35 
 This practice was extended to the presidency’s and judiciary’s remaining nominees in 
September 2006. Relatively  blurred, ideological preferences and ‘‘judicial philosophies’’ are 
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34 Research Institute of the Constitutional Court of Korea, personal communication, September 2012. 
35 The Constitutional Court of Korea, Twenty Years, p.111.
not seen as playing the same role in the Korean selection process as they do in the U.S. 
context.36 So far, controversies have tended to crystallize on the appointment of the head of 
the court alone, and were not directly  related to the beliefs of the candidates in question. On 
the contrary, most incidents seem to have mainly derived from inter-institutional disputes 
between the presidency and the parliament. The first controversy  occurred in 2006, when 
President Roh Moo-hyun chose Justice Jeon Hyo-sook (the first of the only two women who 
have served in the court to date) to become the next president of the institution. On the 
constitutional court’s bench since 2003, Jeon resigned in August 2006 in order for Roh to 
proceed to her nomination as president of the court, but a polemic arose over the meaning of 
article 112, section 1 of the constitution, which was interpreted as implying an obligation for 
judges to complete their six-year term. The plan to appoint Mrs. Jeon had to be nullified, and 
a judge from the supreme court, Lee Kang-kook, was designated at  the head of the 
jurisdiction in February 2007. The replacement of Lee Kang-kook scheduled for February 
2013 also led to a conflict within the National Assembly, which must consent to the 
appointment of the court’s president. The nomination of Justice Lee Dong-heub at the head 
of the institution was strongly resisted by the opposition party, on the ground that Lee was 
guilty of embezzlement practices which leaked after his designation. The significance of this 
quagmire still has to be appraised, as it represents the first corruption scandal hitting the 
constitutional court, potentially putting its reputation at risk in the eyes of the public.37 
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Table 7. The composition of the Constitutional Court of Korea in comparative perspective.
Composition of the Constitutional Court of 
Korea
Comparisons with South Korea’s 1960 
precedent and Germany
-nine full-time members for a six-year 
renewable term
-Constitutional Court of 1960: same composition 
-Federal Constitutional Court of Germany: 
sixteen full-time members for a twelve-year term
-three members nominated by President of the 
ROK, three by the National Assembly, and 
three by the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court; all appointed by the President of the 
ROK 
-informal practice that one of the 
parliamentary nominations be decided by the 
opposition and one as a result of a 
compromise between the majority and 
opposition parties
-Constitutional Court of 1960: similar formal 
selection process
-Federal Constitutional Court of Germany: 
nomination by Parliament, appointment by 
President of the Republic
-confirmation hearings since 2000 for the 
National Assembly nominees, since 2004 for 
all nominees
-post-1987 innovation
-Federal Constitutional Court of Germany: no 
confirmation hearings
-feature inspired by the American system
-qualifications: at least forty years of age and 
fifteen years or more of experience as (1) 
judge, prosecutor, or attorney; (2) a worker in 
a law-related area in a state agency, a public or 
state corporation, a state-invested or other 
entity, with a license to practice law; (3) a 
faculty member (assistant professor or higher) 
in the discipline of law at an accredited 
college, with a license to practice law
-Constitutional Court of 1960 and Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany: justices also 
have to be qualified as court’s judges 
-early and continuing debates about whether such 
qualifications are too narrow or not, French 
Constitutional Council considered a model by 
those in support of diversifying the composition 
of the court
Jurisdiction
 In terms of jurisdiction, the constitutional court  of 1987 is endowed with five 
competences enumerated in article 111 of the constitution:
 The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction over the following matters:
  1. The Constitutionality of a law upon the request of the courts;
  2. Impeachment;
  3. Dissolution of political party;
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  4. Competence disputes between State agencies, between State agencies and 
  local governments, and between local governments; and   
  5. Constitutional complaint as prescribed by Act.
 i. Constitutional review of legislation through and outside the ordinary courts
 The top four attributions were already those granted to the constitutional court of 
1960. The first constitutes the essence of constitutional review, controlling the conformity of 
laws to the text of the constitution. This task is of a relative recent origin in the history of 
judicial institutions, invented or ‘‘discovered’’ by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1803 ruling 
Marbury v. Madison.38  As mentioned before, the model of decentralized judicial review 
associated with the American system can be contrasted with the centralized model of 
constitutional adjudication which appeared in Europe in the 1920s and is characterized by 
the existence of a specialized jurisdiction. Within the centralized system, different forms of 
constitutional review are available. The type of constitutional review implied in article 111, 
section 1 of the South Korean constitution is ‘‘a posteriori’’ or ‘‘reactive,’’ taking place once 
laws are enacted and in force (by opposition to an ‘‘a priori,’’ or ‘‘preventive’’ form of 
control, occurring before the lawmaking process is completed as was exclusively the case in 
France before 2008). It is also a ‘‘concrete’’ or ‘‘incidental’’ mode of review, that is to say, 
happening in the course of a concrete dispute, and as a result  of a request by the ordinary 
courts (by opposition to ‘‘abstract’’ review, when the constitutional jurisdiction intervenes 
regardless of whether the challenged statute applies to a concrete dispute). 
 In the system of centralized adjudication, ordinary courts are not empowered to 
engage in constitutional interpretation the way  they are in decentralized judicial review, but 
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their role is not necessarily  void. Indeed, in the incidental type of constitutional control 
which always takes place a posteriori, ordinary tribunals are in charge of deferring issues 
before the constitutional court. Consequently, they  may also filter what gets decided by the 
higher jurisdiction. In the South Korean post-transition context, this potential source of 
discretion and inaction has raised legitimate concerns: 
 If the Constitutional Court’s power to review the constitutionality  of statutes can only 
 be exercised upon the request of ordinary  courts, there is a danger that this power will 
 become dependent upon the decisions of ordinary  courts. Indeed, under previous 
 constitutions, the courts were so timid in making any request for a review that the 
 review powers of the  constitutional adjudicator could rarely be exercised.39
 As a result, a remedy against the possible obstruction of ordinary  tribunals was 
explicitly introduced by the Constitutional Court Act enacted on August 5, 1988. Drafted 
almost a year after the political talks and compromise of August 1987, the Constitutional 
Court Act was designed to ‘‘set forth the provisions necessary  for the organization and 
operation of the Constitutional Court and its adjudication procedures,’’40 issues which had 
not been decided at the time of the constitutional revision. The configuration of the political 
forces in the summer 1988 was however different from what it was a year before, when the 
ruling Democratic Justice Party negotiated with the opposition Reunification Democratic 
Party. 
 The Constitutional Court Act was indeed drafted and enacted after the legislative 
elections of April 1988 in which the ruling DJP lost its absolute majority  but remained the 
strongest party in the National Assembly, while the former united opposition was now split 
between Kim Young-sam’s Reunification Democratic Party  and Kim Dae-jung’s Peace 
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Democratic Party (‘‘p’yŏnghwa minjudang’’).41 Therefore, the Constitutional Court Act was 
the product of a new compromise which included the possibility to circumvent the ordinary 
courts’ traditional inertia. This remedy is exposed in article 68, section 2 of the law and 
ensures that if an ordinary tribunal declines to ask the constitutional court to examine a 
statute’s validity, a request can be filed by the litigants directly  with the constitutional 
jurisdiction.42 Therefore, this mechanism offers parties the opportunity to bypass the possible 
reluctance of ordinary courts to activate judicial review, which was considered their 
dominant attitude under the authoritarian regimes. This disinclination is not only a matter of 
judicial independence, but also of institutional rivalry, as established jurisdictions can be - 
and often are - unwilling to cooperate with new ones that encroach upon some of their 
entrenched interests. This has been the situation in South Korea where the supreme court and 
the constitutional court have been and, to a certain extent, still are in competition for 
institutional preeminence.
 To come back to article 68, section 2, although its mechanism is ‘‘categorized as a 
constitutional petition, it is no more than an initiation to review the constitutionality of 
law.’’43 Constitutional petitions in the usual sense are covered by  article 68, section 1 of the 
Constitutional Court Act. They entitle ‘‘any person who claims his basic right which is 
guaranteed by the Constitution has been violated by an exercise or non-exercise of 
governmental power’’ to file a constitutional complaint. The provision does not specify what 
75
41 Let’s recall that the two Kims competed separately in the presidential election of December 1987,  enabling 
the victory of Roh Tae-woo.
42 ‘‘If the motion made under Article 41 (1) for adjudication on constitutionality of statutes is rejected [by an 
ordinary court], the party may file a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. In this case, the 
party may not repeatedly move to request for adjudication on the constitutionality of statutes for the same 
reason in the procedure of the case concerned’’ (Article 68, section 2 of the Constitutional Court Act).
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constitutes ‘‘an exercise or non-exercise of governmental power,’’ leaving it to the court to 
define the notion’s contours. As noted above, the possibility of an abstract control of laws’ 
constitutionality - which implies that legislative acts may be reviewed outside litigation - is 
not explicitly  provided for by the South Korean constitution of 1987. However, the 
constitutional court has deduced it  from the mechanism of constitutional complaint in article 
68, section 1: 
 When there is no concrete dispute being litigated at an ordinary court, an individual 
 can file a constitutional complaint on grounds that a specific statute is infringing 
 upon his or her constitutional rights. Article 68 Section 1 of the Constitutional Court 
 Act provides that constitutional complaints may be filed to seek relief for violations 
 of right caused by the exercise of state power. The Constitutional Court has 
 interpreted ‘‘state power’’ in this provision to encompass legislative power, and 
 therefore ruled that if an individual’s constitutional rights are being violated directly 
 and currently  by a statute, even before any specific act takes place to implement it, 
 then the individual may file a constitutional  complaint without having to go through 
 prior relief procedures (2 KCCR 200, 89 Hun-Ma  220, June 25, 1990). This has 
 become the established precedent of the Court.44
 Therefore, there are three channels through which the Constitutional Court of Korea 
can be asked to review the constitutionality of laws: upon the request of an ordinary court in 
the course of a legal dispute where the constitutionality  of a statute has been raised by  a 
party  (article 41 of the Constitutional Court  Act); by a party  who may file a constitutional 
complaint if the ordinary  court does not request the review (article 68, section 2 of the 
Constitutional Court Act); and, outside a concrete dispute, by any individual who estimates 
that a statute constitutes an exercise of legislative power, and by extension of state power, 
which directly infringes upon one of his or her basic rights (article 68, section 1 of the 
Constitutional Court Act as interpreted by the jurisprudence of the constitutional court). 
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 By September 2013, 24,445 cases had been filed with the Constitutional Court of 
Korea. However, less than 20% of them were challenging the constitutionality of legislation, 
either through ordinary courts (820 cases filed between 1988 and 2013) or article 68, section 
2 (4,193 were filed against decisions by  ordinary courts not  to request a review of 
constitutionality to the constitutional court). Almost 80% of the cases (19,350) reached the 
court through constitutional petition against state power (article 68, section 1).45  As was 
mentioned above, legislative power has been interpreted by the court as falling within the 
scope of governmental power which can violate basic rights and be directly  appealed 
against. However, only a small portion of petitions against state power are filed against 
legislative power, with about 80% of them being raised against executive acts.
 The complaint  procedure of article 68, section 2 is supposed to be unique to the 
South Korean system.46  The possibility  to trigger constitutional review when the judiciary 
does not request it expresses a clear defiance against ordinary  courts, as it sets up a remedy 
against their possible inaction. However, judicial dynamics are complex and the powers 
vested in the constitutional court  do not unequivocally make it an all-powerful institution in 
the face of ordinary tribunals in general, and of the South Korean supreme court in 
particular. In the first  place, three of the nine constitutional justices are designated by the 
chief justice of the supreme court, a practice recently criticized by Lee Kang-kook - former 
president of the constitutional court (2007-2012) and himself a judge at  the supreme court 
before - on the ground that it  confers undue ascendency to the supreme court over the 
constitutional jurisdiction.47 Second, the judgments of ordinary courts cannot be construed as 
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falling under the category of ‘‘state power’’ susceptible to infringe on basic rights. This 
exemption is explicitly provided by  article 68, section 1, according to which ‘‘any person 
who claims that his basic right which is guaranteed by the Constitution has been violated by 
an exercise or non-exercise of governmental power may  file a constitutional complaint, 
except the judgments of the ordinary  courts, with the Constitutional Court.’’ As a result, 
constitutional complaints can only target ordinary tribunals’ decision not to defer a 
constitutional issue before the constitutional court. Petitions cannot challenge ordinary 
courts’ judgments, which contrasts with the German system where such judgments can be a 
proper matter for review. Finally, the rulings of the constitutional court are not immune 
against the risk of being ignored and left unapplied by the judiciary, an adversary  position 
which the South Korean supreme court has embraced for a long time.   
 ii. Rationalization of the legal order
 The Constitutional Court of Korea’s jurisdiction over ‘‘competence disputes between 
State agencies, between States agencies and local governments, and between local 
governments’’ has only drawn an infinitesimal portion of cases: 81 out  of 24,445 cases 
received in the course of the past twenty-five years. However, this function is not a marginal 
one in the broader history  of judicial review. Indeed, seminal institutions such as the United 
States Supreme Court or the constitutional courts of Austria and Czechoslovakia (the first 
ones to emerge on the continent in 1919 and 1920) were not created to ensure the protection 
of individual basic rights, which is recognized as the prominent function of courts today. 
Instead, judicial review first appeared as a mechanism designed to stabilize the hierarchy of 
norms which exists in any rational legal system - whether it is democratic or not. Therefore, 
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it is not a coincidence if the first constitutional courts developed in federal polities where 
conflicts between national and local legislation needed to be reconciled. By contrast, the 
Republic of Korea has a long tradition of centralized government. After the 1987 transition 
and especially since the mid-1990s, local autonomy has progressively  increased, leading to 
more cases being filed with the constitutional court in recent years. While only nine 
competence disputes were brought to the court between 1988 and 1998, this number was six 
times higher in the following decade (reaching forty-two cases), and thirty new cases were 
filed between between 2008 and 2013 alone. 
 
 iii. Militant powers and the defense of the democratic order
 Two of the court’s five tasks enumerated in article 111 of the constitution can seem 
highly  politically  charged: impeachment and dissolution of a political party. These 
responsibilities are precisely conferred upon the court so that  they can be withdrawn from 
the realm of pure partisan decision-making and thus receive an extra-political source of 
legitimacy. Both the impeachment and dissolution procedures sanction the same type of 
behavior from public officials or political parties: acting in contradiction with the ‘‘basic 
order of free democracy.’’ Impeachment is meant to remove a high profile public official 
(such as the President of the Republic, Prime Minister, Members of the State Council and 
Ministers, etc.) if he or she has committed a grave violation of the constitution or of the laws 
in the course of his or her services.48 Judges of the constitutional court can also be expelled 
from office through the impeachment procedure.49  Impeachment resolutions have to be 
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passed by the parliament (which is unicameral in South Korea), leading to a trial where the 
chairman of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee of the National Assembly (‘‘kukhoe 
pŏpche pŏpsa wiwŏnhoe’’) stands as the impeachment prosecutor and the constitutional 
court as the adjudicator. The impeachment procedure was famously used on one occasion 
since the beginning of the Sixth Republic, against President Roh Moo-hyun in the spring of 
2004.50 
 The other possible involvement of the constitutional court in defense of the 
democratic order stems from its power to pronounce the dissolution of political parties. 
Article 55 of the Constitutional Court Act  specifies the conditions under which a party can 
be outlawed:
 If the objectives or activities of a political party are contrary to the basic order of 
 democracy, the Executive may request  to the Constitutional Court, upon a 
 deliberation of the State Council, an adjudication on dissolution of the political party. 
 This procedure is exemplary  of the means at the disposal of democracies to defend 
themselves against the forces that try to subvert them by  abusing their very rules and 
principles - such as the freedom of association or the freedom of speech. The notion of 
‘‘militant democracy’’ captures the attitude of constitutional regimes which prevent rights 
and freedoms to be used in a way meant to undermine the democratic order. The most 
notorious example of a constitutionally  militant democracy is Germany. As stated in article 
21 of the 1949 Basic Law for Federal Republic of Germany:
 (1) Political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the 
 people. They  may be freely  established. Their internal organization must conform to 
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 democratic principles. They must publicly account for their assets and for the sources 
 and use of their funds.
 (2) Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to 
 undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of 
 the Federal Republic of Germany  shall be unconstitutional. The Federal 
 Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality.
 Two cases of dissolution were rendered in the early  years of the Federal 
Constitutional Court: in 1952, against the Socialist Reich Party, openly  neo-Nazi; and in 
1956, against the Communist Party of Germany.51 As the German constitutional court made 
clear in its 1956 decision against the Communist Party, the basic law’s provisions are only 
aimed at those parties which, by their purpose or plan, demonstrate their hostility  to the 
‘‘free democratic basic order,’’ thereby asserting that it was not advocating the doctrine of 
Marxism-Leninism itself which was on trial.52  In South Korea, no request to dissolve a 
political party was ever brought by  the executive before the constitutional court until 
recently.53 This does not mean that political tolerance has reigned in the country  since its 
transition to democracy in the late 1980s. On the contrary, 
 Registration of a political party with the National Election Management Committee 
 under the Political Party Act is required for it  to be eligible for legal protection. When 
 a political party’s objectives or activities run contrary to constitutional order, the 
 party  is subject to criminal prosecution under the National Security Act, which 
 outlaws ‘‘anti-state organizations’’ (whether or not constituted as political parties) 
 and subject individuals to severe criminal punishment for any form of association 
 with or assistance provided to such outlawed organizations. Threat of prosecution 
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 under the National Security  Act makes it difficult  to imagine a situation where a 
 registered political party would be subject to dissolution by judgment of the 
 Constitutional Court. Consequently, no such case has yet been filed.54
 As will be explored in this dissertation, the language of militant democracy and the 
rhetoric of defending the constitutional order have led the court to discharge its role as 
guardian of the constitution in an ambivalent way, both curbing the security instruments 
inherited from the authoritarian regimes and strengthening their relevance as mechanisms 
enforcing the non-inclusive legacy of the transition. 
 iv. The moving contours of the protection against basic rights violations
 The two ‘‘militant’’ attributions of the court (adjudication of impeachment and 
dissolution of political parties) are not unprecedented features of constitutional adjudication 
in South Korea. They were already envisioned as part of the jurisdiction of the court 
established by the 1960 constitution. The introduction of constitutional complaints is thus the 
true novelty  of the 1987 constitution when it comes to judicial review. Under article 68, 
section 2 of the Constitutional Court Act, constitutional complaints can be used to bypass 
inactive courts when they refuse to request that the constitutionality of a statute contested in 
the course of a concrete dispute be examined by the constitutional court. However, this 
procedure is only one of the two mechanisms of constitutional petition set up by the revised 
version of the constitution. It is not the most important one either. The other procedure is 
directly  inspired by German constitutional justice, and consists in the possibility  to file a 
constitutional complaint against state power. As provided for in article 68, section 1 of the 
Constitutional Court Act:
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 Any person who claims that his basic right which is guaranteed by  the Constitution 
 has been violated by  an exercise or non-exercise of governmental power may file a 
 constitutional  complaint, except the judgments of the ordinary  courts, with the 
 Constitutional Court:  Provided, That if any relief process is provided by other laws, 
 no one may file a constitutional complaint without having exhausted all such 
 processes.
 After the provision was enacted in 1988, there was no sense of certainty about how it 
would work in practice and how heavily the enunciated restrictions would weigh on its use. 
Progressively, the scope of governmental power falling under the article was specified, and 
extended, by  the court. As mentioned earlier, it was first interpreted to encompass legislative 
power, thereby allowing individuals to seek relief against statutes and treaties infringing 
upon their basic rights outside the course of a concrete dispute. The scope of article 68, 
section 1 was then construed as including executive orders, administrative regulations, and 
ordinances,55 as well as state action not subject to administrative litigation.56 Judgments of 
the ordinary courts stand nonetheless outside the purview of the court, an exception which 
exists in Austria but not in Germany and is lamented by some constitutional activists.57
 Almost 80% of the cases filed with the Constitutional Court of Korea are 
constitutional petitions against state power. The majority of them are raised against executive 
acts, and in particular against public prosecutors’ decisions to indict - and more frequently 
not to indict - a person suspected of a crime. Until 2008, a constitutional complaint 
represented the ‘‘last means available to challenge prosecutors’ broad discretion to indict.’’58 
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Yet, a ruling of unconstitutionality from the court could only bind prosecutors to reexamine a 
decision of (non-) indictment, and not force them to change the decision’s outcome. Since 
the revision of the Criminal Procedure Act enforced on January  1, 2008, it is now possible to 
also challenge a prosecutor’s decision before the higher court active in the same jurisdiction 
as the prosecutor.
 While the Constitutional Court of Korea has held that executive prerogative actions 
constitute proper subject  matters for constitutional complaints,59 it has also removed issues 
of a ‘‘highly political nature’’ from falling under its scrutiny.60 In 2004 for instance, the court 
considered that it  could not pronounce itself on whether the executive decision to dispatch 
South Korean troops to Iraq was constitutional or not, thus resisting the judicialization of the 
issue prompted by  the demand for review.61 As the present research contends, this attitude is 
far from being anecdotical within the national security  jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court of Korea, or of its corresponding institutions in other democracies. Jurisdictions in 
charge of judicial review can importantly assert themselves through the decision not to 
rule.62 Such an act of self-restraint does not necessarily indicate that they are in a situation of 
relative weakness or intrinsic subservience vis-à-vis the political branches of the 
government. On the contrary, self-restraint constitutes an important resource whose 
activation is not antagonistic to courts’ own interests.
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Table 8. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court of Korea in comparative perspective.
Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court of 
Korea
Comparisons with South Korea’s 1960 
precedent and Germany
1. the constitutionality of statutes at the request  
of ordinary courts
2. impeachment motions
3. dissolution proceedings of political parties
4. competence disputes 
5. constitutional complaints as provided by law
-attributions 1, 2, 3, 4 are the same as those of 
the Constitutional Court of 1960
-attribution 5 is an innovation of the 1987 
constitution, modeled on the German practice of 
direct constitutional request
Two mechanisms for constitutional 
complaints: 
1. constitutional complaint to seek relief for a 
violation of basic rights caused by an exercise 
or non-exercise of state power (Article 68, 
section 1 of the Constitutional Court Act) 
2. constitutional complaint to trigger the 
Constitutional Court’s power of reviewing the 
constitutionality of statutes when an ordinary 
court refuses to request constitutional review 
(Article 68, section 2 of the Constitutional 
Court Act)
-procedure 1 against state power is derived from 
the German model, which has influenced other 
systems than the South Korean one (see the 
recurso de amparo in Spain for instance); in 
South Korea however, possible violations of 
rights by judgments of the ordinary courts are 
outside the scope of review (like in Austria but 
unlike Germany)
-procedure 2 is idiosyncratic to the South 
Korean system; judgments by the ordinary 
courts cannot be reviewed but an individual may 
bypass an ordinary court’s decision not to raise 
the constitutionality of a statute through a direct 
constitutional complaint
Adjudication procedures
 When it  comes to composition and selection, the new constitutional court of 1987 
looks like a copy on paper of its 1960 predecessor. However, formal rules only  account for 
part of an institution’s life. Some unwritten procedures greatly  contribute to the specificity  of 
the Constitutional Court of Korea, such as the requirement that one of the parliament’s three 
nominations be left to the discretion of the opposition and another be the result  of a 
consensus between the opposition and the majority. In terms of jurisdiction, the procedure of 
direct constitutional complaint and the fact that petitions against state power have become 
the central vehicle to reach the court justify comparisons with its German counterpart, even 
though the two systems are not identical. The relation of the South Korean system to the 
85
German model is consequently best described as one of selective borrowing and creative 
adaptation. 
 The Constitutional Court of Korea’s adjudication procedures illustrate how the 
institution is a mix of both idiosyncratic elements and selective transfers. For instance, a 
distinctive feature of the current court, inherited from its 1960 model, rests in the 
supermajority  constraint. The vote of six justices (instead of five for a simple majority) is 
indeed necessary for a decision of unconstitutionality  to be pronounced.63 In addition to the 
structural difficulty  of invalidating a legislative act, the court has manifested early on its 
reluctance to render a straight unconstitutionality ruling. Less than a year after having started 
its operations, the court defended the position that ‘‘a statute must be interpreted as 
constitutionally  as possible to the extent that such interpretation  does not change the letter of 
the law or make the legislative intent ineffectual,’’64 thereby establishing its ‘‘preference for 
constitutionally valid interpretation.’’65  
 As a result, the institution has adopted the German practice of modified holdings, 
which provides it greater flexibility  in its review of statutes’ constitutionality. Alongside the 
dichotomous possibility to declare a legislative provision constitutional (‘‘haphŏn’’) or 
unconstitutional (‘‘wihŏn’’), the court has also engaged in rulings of limited constitutionality 
(‘‘hanjŏng haphŏn’’) and limited unconstitutionality (‘‘hanjŏng wihŏn’’), as well as 
incompatibility with the constitution (‘‘honpŏp pulhapch’i’’). The first two are 
fundamentally similar in terms of legal effects and amount to a decision of partial 
constitutionality. They reflect the court’s ‘‘preference for constitutionally valid 
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interpretation,’’ which was evoked before. While leaving the flawed legislation in place, 
rulings of partial constitutionality or unconstitutionality create a non-binding incentive for 
the legislature to reform the incriminated provisions. The ‘‘incompatibility’’ decision is used 
by the court when it censures a statute but holds it applicable until the legislative branch 
cures the defects of the law. The justices usually set a deadline by which the lawmakers have 
to abide, and justify the delayed nullification of the provisions as necessary to prevent the 
emergence of a ‘‘legal void.’’ 
 Customary  in the common law tradition, the practice of publishing dissenting 
opinions was adopted by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in 1971, and by the 
Constitutional Court of Korea since its inception. As a matter of fact, ‘‘the practice became 
particularly identified in the first term with the single justice nominated by opposition parties 
in the National Assembly,’’ Byun Jeong-soo, while in the second term of the court ‘‘this role 
shifted to Justice Cho Seung-hyung, another Kim Dae-jung appointee.’’66  Byun is most 
famously  associated with the dissenting opinion that he wrote against the constitutionality 
article 7 of the National Security Act in 1990, while Cho has continued to criticize the law’s 
provisions which have subsequently been examined by  the court. Interestingly, their 
disagreements with the majority have not primarily  rested on diverging understandings of 
national security, as both Byun and Cho recognized the serious threat posed by North Korea 
in the context of the division. 
 The tools of reasoning deployed in the court’s majority  and minority decisions have 
been strongly influenced by the practice of other institutions. With the passing of time, the 
Constitutional Court of Korea has notably refined its application of a stricter four-step 
proportionality test comparable to the one elaborated and practiced in Europe or Israel. 
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However, the appeal of the continental model coexists with alternative sources of reference, 
most prominently from the United States. This hybridization of influences was exposed by 
former justice and president of the court Kim Yong-joon (1994-2000) when he recognized 
that:
 We have drawn a great deal of inspiration from the German constitutional 
 adjudication  system which is, in a sense, the forerunner of the European model. 
 Nevertheless, we often face situations in which we wish to look away from the 
 elaborate and heavily theoretical system of Germany and to the more lively decisions 
 of the United States. This is probably  because we feel that we can witness the spirit 
 of freedom embedded in the American decisions, which are a source of inspiration 
 and stimulation for us on the essence of constitutional values. Even though the 
 Constitutional Court of Korea is patterned after the German model, we are 
 continually looking to learn from the merits of the American system. This, I think, 
 also partly explains the recent trend among our constitutional legal researchers, who 
 assist the Justices of the Constitutional Court, in choosing to come to the United 
 States for their long-term overseas training opportunities.67
 For instance, the influence of U.S. legal doctrine is manifest in the Constitutional 
Court of Korea’s above-mentioned justification not to review the executive decision to 
dispatch the national armed forces to Iraq. In the course of defending why ‘‘utmost deference 
should be given to such a decision of highly political nature,’’68 the court compared its own 
attitude with the ‘‘judicial self-restraint over the matters concerning diplomacy and national 
defense that require a resolution of highly political nature in other nations with a long 
tradition of democracy.’’69  The framing of the court’s decision is thus very close to the 
‘‘political question doctrine’’ which exists in American constitutional law and according to 
which issues by  nature political, and not  legal, are non-justiciable. The ‘‘political question 
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doctrine’’ is only one of the many filters available to the U.S. Supreme Court. Procedurally, 
its main selecting device corresponds to the ‘‘writ  of certiorari.’’ Cases indeed reach the 
institution through petitions for ‘‘writ of certiorari,’’ requiring that at  least four justices out 
of nine agree to grant the writ and hear the case; otherwise, the petition is denied - which 
occurs for an overwhelming majority of petitions.
 With or without a procedure similar to the writ, all constitutional courts narrowly 
select the cases that they choose to review through their screening process. The 
Constitutional Court of Korea cannot dismiss requests to review legislation referred by 
ordinary  courts, but it can filtrate constitutional complaints. Over the last two decades, 
‘‘more than half of the cases disposed by the Constitutional Court were denied the 
opportunity to be reviewed on their merit. The grounds for dismissing a petition in the 
course of preliminary examination include failure to exhaust other available remedies, 
failure to satisfy the time limits for filing a petition, and failure to submit the petition through 
a licensed attorney.’’70
 As a result, solely  focusing on the decisions of constitutionality or unconstitutionality  
rendered by the court does not give an accurate depiction of its activities. Legislation was 
deemed unconstitutional in 234 out of 820 cases referred by ordinary courts between 
September 1988 and September 2013, which amounts to about 30% of the laws challenged 
through incidental review being struck down. This proportion increases when decisions of 
non-conformity to the constitution or partial constitutionality are added; however, it 
diminishes when constitutional review of legislation is initiated through petition. Out of the 
4,193 petitions raised against ordinary  courts’ decisions not to request review, half were 
dismissed during the screening process and only 5% led to a decision of unconstitutionality. 
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This rate is even smaller for complaints against state power, which make up 80% of the 
docket before the court. Half of them were also dismissed during the screening process and 
less than 1% resulted in a ruling of unconstitutionality. These statistics do not erode the 
significance of the judgments that will be paid attention to in the course of this study. Yet, it 
should be kept in mind that rulings of constitutionality, unconstitutionality, or the other 
modified adjudication outcomes are actually very rarely pronounced by the court in 
comparison with the number of cases filed. Most cases are dismissed during the screening 
process by small benches of three justices or later rejected by a decision of the full bench. 
These rulings are no less important or ‘‘positive’’ than (un)constitutionality judgments, for 
they  enact moments when the court decides not to rule, a position which is not  neutral choice 
but can instead constitute a political choice. 
Table 9. Adjudication procedures of the Constitutional Court of Korea in comparative perspective.
Adjudication by the Constitutional Court of 
Korea
Comparisons with South Korea’s 1960 
precedent, Germany, and the United States
-super-majority of six members required for 
unconstitutionality and impeachment decisions
-same requirement in the Constitutional Court of 
1960
-dichotomous type of holding (either 
constitutional or unconstitutional rulings) 
provided for by Article 45 of the Constitutional 
Court Act
-in practice, adoption of the German system of 
multiple types of holding less than a year after 
the establishment of the Constitutional Court of 
1987; modified decisions include: limited 
constitutionality, limited unconstitutionality, and 
incompatibility with the constitution
-review of constitutional complaints by 
designated panels of three justices
-Germany: same preliminary review system
-United States: writ of certiorari
-issuance of minority opinions (dissenting or 
concurring)
-Germany, United States: similar practice
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Reconstructing South Korea’s ‘‘legal universe’’
Germany as the Western mirror of the national division?
 The institutional influences evoked so far have been mainly confined to recent 
constitutional borrowings to the post-war German model and South Korean history through 
the ‘‘unrealized’’ precedent of 1960. Almost invisible on paper, inspiration has also been 
drawn in practice from the U.S. Supreme Court. The emulation of the continental model best 
exemplified by the court of Karlsruhe has been both selective and creative. Moreover, it is 
not unique to the South Korean case as other transitioning societies, like Spain, have shown 
interest in German constitutional patterns. Nonetheless, the parallel between judicial review 
in South Korea and Germany is all the more tempting since further affinities seem to tie the 
two cases. An element of convergence between them which is rarely insisted upon by the 
literature comparing the two courts is the national division context.71 
 After all, the German paradigm that South Korean lawmakers could contemplate in 
1987 and 1988 was only that of the Western half of the country. The potential kinship 
between (West) German and (South) Korean institutions due to the division not only  has to 
be raised, but interrogated, for it  may hide more differences than similitudes. Both the Basic 
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany before 1990 and the Constitution of the Republic 
of Korea today allude to the prospect of reunification, albeit under different terms. The 
German basic law was precisely envisioned by its drafters as a provisional document, and 
not a full constitution, given the political situation of the country in 1949. Provisions in the 
preamble and main body of the text plainly expressed the understanding that the division 
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itself was a temporary fact, and that the whole German nation could be accommodated in 
due time under the system of the Federal Republic. For instance, article 23 formerly read as:
 For the time being, this Basic Law shall apply in the territory of the Länder of Baden, 
 Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine 
 Westphalia, the Rhineland Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden, and 
 Württemberg- Hohenzollern. In other parts of Germany it shall be put into force on 
 their accession. 
 The language in the preamble and provisions of the South Korean constitution are far 
from displaying the same degree of clarity and confidence. The main concern tied to 
reunification is with the peaceful nature of the process, which comes as no surprise since the 
ROK and the DPRK are still technically  in a state of war. Indeed, no peace treaty was signed 
after the war which ravaged the peninsula from 1950 to 1953 ended. The North remains 
designated as an ‘‘anti-state organization’’ (‘‘pande kukka tanch’e’’) in part of South Korea’s 
criminal legal system - most conspicuously  by the National Security Act in force since 1948. 
Yet, as will be explored in subsequent chapters, the division is not an overriding factor in 
explaining how enmity is construed in the post-transition era by the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court of Korea. 
 Although the court is today respected as one of the most trusted public institutions of 
the country,72 its success has not been equated with the development of a new culture such as 
the ‘‘constitutional patriotism’’ of West Germany. This concept emerged in the late 1970s to 
capture the idea that the basic law could embody  the common land of the divided nation. It 
also expressed the possibility  that patriotism could be disconnected from nationalism, and 
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based on liberal norms rather than blood or faith.73 This vision of constitutionalism as an a-
nationalistic ideal is very far from being echoed in South Korea today. Therefore, the 
semblance stemming from the division may conceal more differences than similarities 
between the German and Korean cases. 
 An alternative source of affinity nonetheless exists between them, predating the post-
war era. This kinship derives from the early 20th-century reception of the German civil law 
tradition in the Korean peninsula through Japan’s colonial rule. Yet, it does not  imply that the 
three systems are interchangeable. As cautioned by Marie Seong-hak Kim,
 The general lack of interest in the West in Korean law can be ascribed, at least in 
 part, to the common belief that Korean law during the Chosŏn dynasty was 
 dominated by, and hardly  distinct from, Chinese law, whereas its modernization in 
 the twentieth century was fastidiously modeled after German law modified by  the 
 Japanese, rendering modern Korean  law rarely distinguishable from Japanese law.74 
 Just as post-transitional South Korean constitutional order and practice are only 
selectively patterned after the German model of constitutional justice, the legal system of 
colonial Korea was far from being a copy of its Japanese counterpart. Nonetheless, the 
colonial period did have a profound impact on legal institutions, as South Korea retained 
most of them in the wake of the Liberation. 
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The unavowed colonial matrix of legal modernity
 In 1905, the Korean peninsula, then known as the Kingdom of Chosŏn, became a 
protectorate of the Empire of Japan, only to be annexed as a colony five years later. 
Independence was only recovered on August 15, 1945, close to the surrender of Japan in the 
Pacific War. Forty years of experience under the Japanese colonial government brought 
about profound and irreversible changes in Korean society. They are hardly acknowledged 
by South Korean nationalist historiography, which mainly apprehends the colonial situation 
as an ‘‘unlawful’’ occupation on the part  of Japan, a deplorable ‘‘distortion’’ forced upon 
Korean history. Since the early 1990s, the relations between the two countries have 
periodically deteriorated over issues such as the demand for official apologies, especially  in 
relation to the tragedy  of ‘‘comfort women’’ (‘‘wianbu’’), the sexual slaves of the Japanese 
army coercively recruited from Korea and other countries in the region during the 1930s and 
1940s. 
 While nationalist narratives obstruct a proper understanding of the significance and 
complexity of the colonial experience, critical approaches have emerged - mainly outside 
Korea - to account  for the transformative nature of the period. One of the most powerful 
frameworks is the ‘‘colonial modernity’’ paradigm, first articulated by Tani Barlow,75  and 
applied to Korea by  Shin Gi-Wook and Michael Robinson.76 This approach shows how the 
reality  of any society experiencing a ‘‘colonial situation’’ does not  amount to a unidirectional 
application of power, but a complex set of interactions and dynamics. The legal sphere is one 
of the realms where this type of analysis can be fruitfully  deployed to nuance the 
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oversimplified view of law as an indiscriminate tool of oppression in the hands of colonial 
authorities.
 The preoccupation of Korean legal historians with the ‘‘premodern’’ or ‘‘distorted’’ 
 character of the legal-governmental process under Japanese rule has resulted in a 
 disregard of the important changes in the nature of power and mode of domination 
 that accompanied colonial legal-governmental change. Japanese rule has been 
 described as ‘‘brutal’’ and ‘‘arbitrary,’’ but little effort has been made to discern the 
 logic of power and domination underlying that governmental practice. If Japanese 
 rule was repressive, we must ask what kind of repression there was, specify its 
 characteristics, and identify  its differences from the repression experienced by 
 precolonial Koreans.77
 As stressed by Lee Chul-woo, the legal modernization that took place in Korea 
during the colonial period first has to be distinguished from the ‘‘civilizing’’ project through 
which Japan justified its enterprise, especially in the eyes of the West. From the beginning, 
Japan adopted the language of legality and legislation as part of its colonizing politics, 
appropriating the very terms of Western imperialist discourse to demonstrate the rightfulness 
of its status as a new ‘‘civilizing’’ nation.78 Indeed, it was widely thought in the international 
order of the 20th century that:
 A regime was civilized only  if it could claim the ability to transform an uncivilized 
 people. The logic of the politics of enlightened exploitation can be described as the 
 practice of legalizing the claim to protect a place inhabited by people who were 
 defined as incapable of becoming civilized on their own. It was understood, of 
 course, that  the protecting regime had access to the material and human resources of 
 the place it protected. Ultimately, the ability to control colonial space defined a nation 
 as ‘‘sovereign’’ and ‘‘independent.’’79 
95
77 Chul-woo Lee, ‘‘Modernity, Legality, and Power in Korea Under Japanese Rule,’’ in Ibidem, p.23.
78  Alexis Dudden, Japan's Colonization of Korea. Discourse and Power, Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i 
Press, 2005.
79 Ibidem, p.9.
  The declared objective of modernizing legal institutions was already familiar to 
Tokyo, not only in rhetoric but also in practice. It had governed Japan’s own domestic 
reform movement during the ‘‘Meiji Restoration’’ (1869-1912), impulsed as a means to 
defend its sovereignty against the assaults of Western foreign powers in the region, 
embodied by the concession of extra-territorial privileges and unequal commercial 
territories. In this context of resistance to the West through emulation, the Japanese 
government remodeled many of its institutions, especially  in the legal sphere, drawing from 
the German civil law tradition to rationalize and codify its own legislation.80 
 This process resulted in the six codes making the Japanese modern legal system: the 
Criminal Code of 1870, the Constitution of 1889, the Criminal Procedure Act  and Civil 
Procedure Act of 1890, the Civil Code of 1896, and the Commercial Code of 1899. Initially 
associated with Japan’s own domestic strategy  of renewal, legal modernization then became 
a critical element in asserting its colonizing and ‘‘civilizing’’ capacity as a developed and 
‘‘enlightened’’ power. Yet, analyzing the experience of Korea between 1905 and 1945 in 
terms of ‘‘colonial modernity’’ does not mean espousing the modernization discourse of 
Japanese authorities. On the contrary, it is an invitation to understand the specificity of the 
changes that were produced, more than introduced, by the distinctive form and nature of 
Japanese colonial domination.  
 [M]odernization took place in the sense that the legal-governmental system was 
 organized and implemented in such a way that the state was able to extend its powers 
 and control to  minute details of life untouched by the traditional Korean state. Such 
 intensification of control may be a common feature of modern states, whose 
 preoccupation with internal pacification has led to the extensive reach of 
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 administrative power coupled with enhanced knowledge of the population, but the 
 particularities of Japanese colonial practice led to unique features in Korea.81
 
 Along with Lee Chul-woo, Marie Seong-hak Kim’s work has also significantly 
contributed to overcome the nationalist bias embedded in research on colonial law and 
historiography. According to her study of custom as a product of colonial jurisprudence, ‘‘the 
‘myth’ of [pre-colonial] customary law was bolstered in Korean historiography by an effort 
to safeguard the identity of indigenous legal culture in the dynastic period from the stifling 
influence of colonial law.’’82 The impact of Japanese colonial rule on Korean legal structures 
is therefore deep and manifold. Its institutional legacy  has been strengthened by the 
unfolding of events after independence was recovered. 
 Indeed, the colonial state apparatus was largely preserved under the provisional 
government of the U.S. Army, which was established in the southern half of the peninsula in 
early September 1945. While reforms were implemented in the northern part of the territory 
under Soviet control, the American military government relied on the administrative 
structures and personnel in place.83  As the concern for anti-communism overrode other 
policy objectives in South Korea, stability largely prevailed over change, contrary  to the 
political reforms that were encouraged by the United States in Japan. Elements of continuity 
between the colonial and post-war periods are for instance visible in the National Security 
Act, modeled after the 1925 Peace Preservation Law which was first enacted in Japan, and 
then extended to Korea, in order to fight communism, socialism, and anarchism, construed 
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as ‘‘thought crimes.’’84  While the law was repealed in Japan by the American occupation 
authorities at the end of the Second World War, it became the matrix of the National Security 
Act that the South Korean government enacted in 1948. The effacement of the legislation’s 
colonial origins is however manifest in contemporary  discourses, including the 
Constitutional Court of Korea’s jurisprudence.  
Theorizing uncertainty
 The judicial mechanisms that were created by the revised constitution of 1987 and 
the Constitutional Court Act of 1988 did not necessarily  bear in them the seeds of later 
developments. On the contrary, nothing seemed to ensure that the constitutional court and its 
new instruments would be sufficient to realize a strong and effective commitment to basic 
rights in the post-transition era. In particular, 
 The fact that the judgments of ordinary courts could not be challenged through 
 constitutional  complaints, and the requirement that  all other avenues of remedy must 
 be exhausted before a constitutional complaint could be filed, led many to believe 
 that in reality the range of state powers amenable to constitutional complaints would 
 be extremely limited. Many also expected that the ordinary courts would not be 
 proactive in requesting constitutionality of review of statutes, just as they had been in 
 the past.85
 Among further potential obstacles to the court’s action were the supermajority 
requirement for unconstitutionality decisions and the undefined notion of state power which 
could be interpreted restrictively. Nascent institutions are never predestined to become what 
they  are at some later point in time. Their initial formal design matters, as it allows or 
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precludes possible trajectories, but without prescribing a single and particular one. This 
dimension of uncertainty is often forgotten in analyzing institutions, especially  when their 
well-established authority exhales an impression of naturalness which conceals the 
constructed character of their strength and legitimacy. Yet, those qualities are always 
acquired, and even conquered, rather than inherent. Texts alone do not suffice to bequeath 
them. 
 This reality not only  applies to the Constitutional Court of Korea, but also to the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany or the U.S. Supreme Court, whose celebrated paths 
and successes were not ingrained in the story  of their origins. For instance, the recognition of 
the German constitutional court as a national symbol was only consecrated three decades 
after its creation, when the philosopher and political scientist  Dolf Sternberger coined the 
expression ‘‘constitutional patriotism’’ in a 1979 article.86 As for the U.S. Supreme Court, its 
Marbury v. Madison decision of 1803, associated with the creation of judicial review, did not 
instate the court in the powerful position that it is widely seen to occupy today. After 
Marbury, the institution refrained from using its self-conferred power to strike down a 
federal statute for more than fifty years, until the infamous Dred Scott decision of 1857 
which held the Missouri Compromise of 1820 unconstitutional.87 
 In light of this broader pattern, it is no wonder that much uncertainty surrounded the 
birth of South Korea’s constitutional court. Doubts did not only  project their shadow over the 
issue of how provisions regulating the new institution would be interpreted. They  were also 
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tied to a more general concern about the fate of democratization in the country. Indeed, many 
contemporary  observers seem to have shared the perception that the judiciary’s potential role 
and very independence were not solely  in its hands, but highly subject to external factors 
such as how the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches would 
consolidate.
 As of March 1988, it is too early  to pronounce the Constitution[al] Court  stillborn, 
 but it is also too early to offer an optimistic prognosis about its future guardianship of 
 human rights.  At best, the Constitution[al] Court will reflect and coordinate a 
 separation of powers  instituted through political processes. It cannot be relied upon 
 to discharge the threshold task of overcoming South Korea’s long-entrenched 
 military-executive supremacy. In the short  term, if the National Assembly  elections 
 result in an opposition majority and this majority succeeds in achieving legislative 
 autonomy, then the Constitution[al] Court may become a very significant factor. On 
 the other hand, if no true separation of powers can be instituted, the Court may not 
 play a major role in protecting human rights.88
 While democratization did not suffer any significant reversal in the aftermath of the 
transition, the process of its entrenchment has neither been smooth nor linear. As was evoked 
earlier in the chapter, it took a decade before the first alternation of parties in power took 
place, as the two initial presidents of the ROK, Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam, were 
members of the same conservative coalition. This was the outcome of an unexpected merger 
between their camps in 1990, which allowed Kim, a long-time critic of the military regimes, 
to ally with the political forces behind Roh, the ex-general and handpicked successor of 
former dictator Chun Doo-hwan. Roh’s election as first president of the Sixth Republic was 
itself responsible for much of the skepticism surrounding the political becoming of the 
young democratic regime. It is during his mandate that  the major attempt at reducing the 
burgeoning constitutional court’s powers was made.
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 Political forces sought to punish the court by limiting jurisdiction, most prominently 
 in 1992, when the ruling party  proposed to restrict the court’s jurisdiction to cases of 
 interbranch disputes. This proposal by the ruling party was withdrawn due to strong 
 public pressure.89
 The uncertainty that accompanies the birth of new institutions such as the 
Constitutional Court of Korea in 1987 or the Federal Constitutional Court  of Germany in 
1949 is usually poorly  taken into account by theories of institutional design in general, and 
constitutional design in particular. Institutional analysis has known a revival in the 1980s, 
under the impulse of three methodological approaches: historical institutionalism, rational 
choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism.90 It is in the wake of this renewed 
interest for institutions that courts emerged as an object of comparative political inquiry in 
the early 1990s.91 Since then, the realm of comparative judicial and constitutional politics 
has been thriving, while the avenues for research have diversified, geographically and 
thematically. For instance, new works in the field have recently  focused on the active role of 
courts in authoritarian settings, including countries such as Argentina, Egypt, or China.92 A 
major trend has also been the increasing application of rational choice frameworks to the 
analysis of courts in general, and constitutional design in particular. 
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 At the crossroads of these two movements - the diversification of comparative 
judicial politics to new objects and regions on the one hand, and the increasing application of 
rational choice theories on the other hand - stands Tom Ginsburg’s study of constitutional 
courts in Asia, where he offers a comparative analysis of Mongolia, South Korea, and 
Taiwan.93  The rational choice premise of Ginsburg’s analysis lies in the postulate that 
constitutional design is the result of strategic decisions made by politicians acting in their 
own self-interest. In crafting a new system of judicial review, constitutional drafters follow 
the motivation to maximize their political benefit in the present. They are not interested in 
setting constraints upon their future actions as contended by the ‘‘commitment theory’’ of 
constitutional design which Ginsburg criticizes. Construing judicial review as a form of self-
binding is problematic according to Ginsburg because it veils the political dynamics and 
interests at work in constitutional design: 
 In light  of the agency problem of constitutional design, we must ask why self-
 interested politicians would design a system of judicial review. It is not sufficient to 
 describe constitutional review as a device to protect citizens from future politicians 
 without explaining why it serves the interests of present politicians who serve as a 
 veto gate for the constitution. Although constitutional designers are subject to the 
 same constraints of bounded rationality as everyone else, there are reasons for 
 assuming that they consider their institutional choices carefully.94
 One of these institutional choices is whether to create or not a strong mechanism for 
judicial review. To account for the variation in institutional strength of Mongolia’s, South 
Korea’s, and Taiwan’s respective constitutional courts, Ginsburg elaborates an ‘‘insurance 
theory’’ based upon the calculations of politicians involved in constitutional design at the 
time of the transition. The ‘‘insurance theory’’ predicts that if a strong party then dominates 
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politics, the emergence of a weak court can be expected. Indeed, constitutional designers do 
not anticipate their side to lose elections any time soon. As a result, they do not see the need 
to insure themselves against  the risk of a change of majority in power by  creating a strong 
court which would constrain its policies. Instead,
 By setting up a weak court, the dominant party may gain some marginal benefits in 
 legitimacy without sacrificing policy flexibility.95 
 On the contrary, if two or three parties of roughly equal strength compete at the time 
of the transition, they are uncertain about their ability to secure electoral victory and 
therefore push for the establishment of a strong system of judicial review. According to 
Ginsburg, this scenario is best exemplified by South Korea. Therefore, two variables are 
critically  important to explain differences in the design of judicial review across cases: the 
political uncertainty that reigns before the constitutional bargain, and the political diffusion 
which exists afterwards. If the prospective positions of political parties are unsure at the time 
of the transition and remain so in its aftermath, all the conditions are met for a strong judicial 
system not only to develop, but to be intentionally designed and implemented. 
 This is where the ‘‘insurance theory’’ appears to give too mechanical an explanation 
of the different dynamics at work in constitutional processes, with the strength of judicial 
review being largely predetermined by  the electoral calculations of the designing actors. 
Nonetheless, it  should be stressed that the theory’s point of departure - not to consider 
constitutional institutions as the result  of disinterested choices on the part of politicians - is a 
relevant one. As a matter of fact, this claim does not constitute a point of contention between 
the ‘‘insurance’’ and ‘‘commitment’’ theories which Ginsburg associates with authors such as 
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Jon Elster and Stephen Holmes.96  As confessed by  Elster more than twenty years after he 
first extended the metaphor of individual self-binding or precommitment to 
constitutionalism,
 I have been much influenced by a critical comment on Ulysses and the Sirens by my 
 friend  and mentor, the late Norwegian historian Jens Arup  Seip: ‘‘In politics, people 
 never try  to bind themselves, only to bind others.’’ Although that statement is too 
 stark, I now think it closer to the truth than the view that self-binding is the essence 
 of constitution-making. Ulysses bound himself too the mast, but he also put wax in 
 the ears of the rowers.97
 Ginsburg recognizes that  both the ‘‘commitment’’ and ‘‘insurance’’ theories are 
similar in many respects but suggests that they  diverge in terms of empirical implications, 
since the former conceives judicial review as ‘‘a device of self-binding by powerful parties 
to get other parties to accede to the constitutional scheme.’’98 As a result, ‘‘the commitment 
theory  might  predict more powerful institutions of judicial review with a dominant party,’’ 
whereas ‘‘the insurance theory predicts less powerful institutions of judicial review’’ under 
the same circumstances.99 
 This statement seems to mischaracterize the distinctive claim of authors such as 
Elster vis-à-vis Ginsburg’s approach. While he does not disagree with the rational premise of 
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Ginsburg’s analysis, Elster’s approach to constitution-making contains a much more radical 
criticism than a mere departure on empirical grounds. In the ‘‘insurance theory’’ framework, 
constitutional designers do not only act strategically; the very weakness or strength of 
constitutional courts is the outcome of intentional choices on their part. Consequently, the 
success or failure of judicial review appears largely predetermined by the will of political 
actors and their shared perception that a strong system of judicial review is the most 
desirable option available to them in a context of electoral competition.
 A similar strategic logic is advanced by Ran Hirschl to explain the constitutional 
revolution undergone by countries such as Israel in the early 1990s or South Africa in the 
late 1990s: their late constitutionalization of rights is described as a ‘‘form of self-interested 
hegemonic preservation’’ by threatened elites ‘‘who seek insulation from majoritarian 
policy-making processes by transferring policy-making authority  to semiautonomous, 
professional bodies’’ such as courts.100 These strategic accounts are particularly vulnerable to 
falling prey  to a pitfall known as the ‘‘functionalist fallacy.’’ This type of reasoning occurs 
when ‘‘the explanation of institutional forms is to be found in their functional consequences 
for those who create them.’’101  It implies that, too often, intention is derived from 
consequences. This is problematic because these consequences may have been entirely 
unintended or wrongly  anticipated by  actors, even when they benefit them in retrospect. 
According to Jon Elster, 
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 [The] appeal to beneficial but  unintended consequences to explain behavior (or, 
 alternatively,  the inference from consequences to intention) is the hallmark of the 
 functional explanation.102
 As a result, functionalist  explanations leave no room for the unpredicted effects of 
institutional design. Uncertainty itself is not absent from functional theories, but  it is only the 
motive that prompts risk-averse actors to try to insure themselves against the reversals of the 
democratic policy-making process when they cannot - or can no longer - expect to control it. 
The outcome of these political calculations itself is not uncertain.103  In the case of Tom 
Ginsburg’s theory, the strength of judicial review is the product of constitution-makers’ 
deliberate crafting. A court will be strong where they want it strong, and weak where they 
want it  weak. The type of contextual uncertainty featured in the ‘‘insurance theory’’ is thus 
very different  from the fundamental contingency surrounding the birth and trajectory of 
institutions. This contingency is erased by functional explanations which commit the mistake 
to consider positive outcomes as necessarily  desired and conscientiously produced by actors 
through careful institutional engineering. This can happen, but its occurrence is very likely 
unfrequent. Elster for instance finds a rare example of it in the reform of the French 
Constitutional Council orchestrated by President Valéry Giscard in 1974.
 A conspicuously successful attempt to present partisan goals in the guise of self-
 binding is provided by  the strengthening of the French Conseil Constitutionnel by 
 President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1974. Up  to that point, the council had mainly 
 been an instrument of the government of the day in its dealings with unruly 
 parliaments. The opposition had no power  to call upon the council to scrutinize 
 laws for their possible unconstitutionality. As president, Giscard d’Estaing offered 
 this weapon to the opposition on a plate, by allowing any group of sixty  deputies or 
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 senators to bring a law before the council. His motive, however, was not to 
 restrict his own freedom of action. He foresaw, correctly, that the next parliamentary 
 majority  would be socialist; also, correctly again, that one of its priorities would be to 
 nationalize important industries; and finally, once more correctly, that the council 
 would strike down such legislation as unconstitutional. He very  deliberately and 
 successfully sought to restrain the freedom of actions of his successors.104
 The congruence between actors’ calculations and institutional outcomes is however 
probably  not the rule in terms of constitution-making. Even when institutional designers 
obtain what they may have initially wanted for the protection of their interests, such 
consequences can result from other processes that the ones they intended to create. 
 As John Schiemann has shown, some Hungarian Communists were in favor of a 
 strong  constitutional court because they  predicted, correctly, that  if parliament were 
 to adopt retroactive legislation or extend the statute of limitations for the purpose of 
 bringing them to justice, these measures would be struck down by the court. One 
 Communist delegate to the Round Table Talks said, ‘‘We thought that this was one of 
 the institutions which would later be able to prevent a turning against the 
 constitution, a jettisoning of the institution, the creation of  all sorts of laws seeking 
 revenge.’’ One should add, however, that unlike Giscard d’Estaing they were proved 
 right for the wrong reasons. The Hungarian Communists thought they would be able 
 to appoint ‘‘reliable’’ judges as the first members of the court, as an insurance device 
 in case they should become a minority  in the new parliament. The court  that was 
 actually appointed had a quite different composition. The principle the judges 
 invoked when striking down the retaliatory legislation, namely, that it violated the 
 principle of legal certainty, was not  in any way window dressing for Communist 
 self-protection.105
 Jon Elster’s analysis therefore confirms that constitutional design can be the result of 
strategic decisions on the part of politicians, but that their intentions - even when realized - 
do not predetermine the institutional effects that they seek to create. When it comes to South 
Korea, there seems to be little evidence in the genesis of the constitutional court indicating 
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that the system was purposively designed to be strong and proactive. On the court’s own 
admission,
 [M]any feared that it would turn out to be like the Constitutional Committees of 
 previous constitutions, and end up  being just another agency  that existed only on 
 paper. In fact, the governing elites at the times of its creation were not unlike the 
 previous regimes in that they were not so enthusiastic about the idea of activating the 
 system of constitutional adjudication. A number of legal scholars and jurists were 
 therefore doubtful about the court’s future and its role in the constitutional order.106   
 Consequently, the way in which judicial review developed was far from being 
preordained by the intentions and choices of political actors in a context of electoral 
volatility. Factors such as the diffusion of power between the political parties and, maybe 
more importantly, between the different branches of government (something which was not 
assured in the aftermath of the transition) probably sustained the possibility for an 
independent court to not only emerge, but to assert itself. Yet, this dissertation contends that 
one of the most powerful forces behind the court’s empowerment has to be found elsewhere: 
in the investment of constitutional adjudication as a site where to contest the non-inclusive 
legacy of the transition for the very actors which the elite-controlled change of regime 
marginalized. An unintended outcome has however ensued from this activation of 
constitutional justice from below. Although political elites did not necessarily want a strong 
court, the institution has discharged its role as guardian of the constitution in a way which 
has nonetheless benefited them by strengthening the conservative bias of South Korea’s 
democratic order.   
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CHAPTER THREE
Defending Society Within the Rule of Law
Article 8
(1) The establishment of political parties shall be free, and the 
plural party system shall be guaranteed. 
(2) Political parties shall be democratic in their objectives, 
organization, and activities, and shall have the necessary 
organizational arrangements for the people to participate in 
the formation of the political will. 
     [...]
(4) If the purposes or activities of a political party are contrary to 
the fundamental democratic order, the Government may bring 
an action against  it in the Constitutional Court for its 
dissolution, and the political party shall be dissolved in 
accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court.
Article 37
(1) Freedoms and rights of citizens shall not  be neglected on the 
grounds that they are not enumerated in the Constitution.
(2) The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by Act 
only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of 
law and order or for public welfare. Even when such 
restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or 
right shall be violated.
Article 65
(1) In case the President, the Prime Minister, members of the 
State Council, heads of Executive Ministries, justices of the 
Constitutional Court, judges, members of the National 
Election Commission, the Chairman and members of the 
Board of Audit  and Inspection, and other public officials 
designated by Act have violated the Constitution or other Acts 
in the performance of official duties, the National Assembly 
may pass motions for their impeachment. 
             [...]
The Constitution of the Republic of Korea
 This chapter surveys the intensity  of South Korea’s constitutional commitment 
against enmity, by examining the two figures of threat which its basic norm is ready to 
confront: the enemy of the state who jeopardizes the integrity and security  of the nation, as 
well as the enemy of the regime who endangers constitutional democracy. Defending society 
against these two figures of enmity while staying within the boundaries of the rule of law is a 
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challenge which all constitutional democracies can potentially face and answer through the 
use of emergency  measures, militant provisions, or ordinary  legislation. Courts such as the 
South Korean one are however caught in a further paradox: that of defending 
constitutionalism when the foundations that it  lays for society institutionalize a durable bias 
against certain segments of the polity. While the measures designed against enmity  in the 
constitution of South Korea have hardly  been deployed, they have nonetheless provided the 
constitutional court with the language and ground to establish itself as guardian of the ‘‘basic 
order of free democracy’’ and to unpack, in its name, the values and arrangements worthy of 
being upheld in the post-transition era.
Democracy and enmity: beyond Carl Schmitt
 Two figures of enmity have been predominant in the history of political regimes in 
general, and of democracies in particular. On the one hand, is identified as enemy he who 
violently  challenges the territorial integrity of the state and the nation (i.e., separatists, 
independentists, or secessionists expressing their claims to sovereignty outside the ordinary 
institutional channels). On the other hand, is also an enemy he who opposes and endangers 
the nature of the regime or the form of government (for instance, monarchists and 
conservatives denying the legitimacy  of a republican government; revolutionaries such as 
anarchists at the turn of the 20th century or leftist radicals in the 1970s; and of course, 
interwar fascist movements). These two figures - the enemy of the state’s territorial integrity 
and the enemy of the democratic or republican form of government - are not exhaustive. A 
third archetype may be represented by the spy, he who secretly operates within the country 
he lives in for the benefit of another government. 
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 It can be contended that terrorism in itself does not outline the contours of a specific 
figure of enmity as it is best understood as a strategy  of violence deployed by  a variety  of 
actors, from 19th century Russian anarchists to independence movements such as the Irish 
Republican Army and the Basque ETA, or radical leftist organizations like the German Red 
Army Faction or the Italian Red Brigades following the genealogy established by David 
Rapoport.1 Terror is not even a weapon limited to non-state actors. When deployed on a large 
scale and systematized, it is a strategy of violence most often associated with state 
resources.2 If no specific figure of enmity is tied to terrorism, the actors that resort to it are 
likely to be labeled as enemies in a democratic polity. This is the case with the perpetrators 
and supporters of the new international terrorism, which does not easily  fit within the 
categories of enmity briefly sketched above. 
 Democracies are not candid, but they are not unprincipled regimes either. As a result, 
the issue of how crises and threats can be fought within the law may pose a puzzle, but it 
does not necessarily represent a paradox. Different types of constitutional traditions reflect 
the concern and possibility  for a norm-abiding defense of society, that is to say, for 
responding to a situation of exception through norms which regulate the exception. 
Affirming this possibility contradicts the thesis of authors such as the German jurist Carl 
Schmitt, whose early  essays combat the idea that liberalism is able to face the moment of 
decision created by unpredictable crises.3  As famously asserted by  Schmitt  in the first 
sentence of his Political Theology:  
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 Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.4
 According to Schmitt, the liberal constitutional order precisely ‘‘attempts to repress 
the question of sovereignty by a division and mutual control of competences.’’5 This posture 
is untenable in a state of exception, defined as a situation in which no preexisting norm can 
apply. The general significance of the exception in Schmitt’s theory  is not to prove the rule, 
but instead to disprove the whole regime of rules by which liberal constitutional regimes 
abide in normal times.
 What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited authority, which means the 
 suspension of the entire existing order. In such a situation it is clear that the state 
 remains, whereas law recedes. Because the exception is different  from anarchy  and 
 chaos, order in the juristic sense still prevails even if it  is not of the ordinary  kind. 
 The existence of the state is undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity of the 
 legal norm. The decision frees itself  from all normative ties and becomes in the true 
 sense absolute. The state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its 
 rights to self-preservation, as one would say.6
 For Schmitt, the rule of law necessarily fades away in the exception, demonstrating 
the structural fragility and weakness of liberalism.  
 The essence of liberalism is negotiation, a cautious half measure, in the hope that the 
 definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary 
 debate  and permit the decision to be suspended forever in an everlasting discussion. 
 Dictatorship is the opposite of discussion.7
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 Carl Schmitt’s thesis about  the retreat of the norm in front of the exception has been 
recently  revived by Giorgio Agamben, under the form of a dual paradox: If law employs the 
exception to suspend itself, does the exception remain inside or stand outside the juridical 
order? 
 In truth, the state of exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical order, 
 and the problem of defining it concerns precisely  a threshold, or a zone of 
 indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but  rather blur with 
 each other. The suspension of the norm does not  mean its abolition, and the zone of 
 anomie that is established is not (or at least  claims not be) unrelated to the juridical 
 order. Hence the interest of those theories that, like Schmitt’s, complicate the 
 topographical opposition into a more complex topological relation, in which the very 
 limit of the juridical order is at issue. In any case, to understand the problem of the 
 state of exception, one must first correctly determine its localization (or 
 illocalization).8
 Yet, the threshold of indeterminacy where Agamben locates the ‘‘real state of 
exception in which we live’’ has clearly no ties left with the rule of law. It conjures up a 
much more monstrous ‘‘paradigm of government’’ than Schmitt’s dictatorship. This new 
Leviathan is described by Agamben as nothing less than a ‘‘killing machine,’’9 whose power 
over life and death derives its effectivity not from mere force but the very guise of law in 
which it dresses. Agamben goes further than Schmitt when he contends that the state of 
exception ‘‘has continued to function almost without interruption from World War I, through 
fascism and National Socialism, and up to our own time.’’ 
 Indeed, the state of exception has today  reached its maximum worldwide 
 deployment. The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted 
 with impunity  by a governmental violence that - while ignoring international law 
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 externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally - nevertheless still 
 claims to be applying the law.10   
 In essence, the vision shared by  Schmitt and Agamben is one of impotence and 
worthlessness of liberal norms in times of exception - a state of things which is 
extraordinary, yet  determinant, according to Schmitt, while voluntarily  made permanent in 
contemporary  politics for Agamben. Yet, the historical experience of constitutional systems 
and the present experience of democracies bear evidence to contradict the idea that such 
regimes are condemned to negate their rules and principles when they confront a crisis and, 
therefore, their enemies. 
 The very use of the notion of ‘‘enmity’’ deserves some discussion and clarification. 
Democracies are not candid regimes and identify as enemies the groups or individuals which 
threaten their physical or constitutional integrity.11  In doing so, they engage in what this 
study refers to as ‘‘the politics of enmity,’’ by  which democratic governments define who 
their enemies are and what are the permissible means to deal with them. This conception of 
enmity does not follow Carl Schmitt’s claim that the distinction between friend and enemy is 
the essence of politics.12 The proposition advanced here is much more modest and restricted. 
Enmity needs not be consubstantial to democratic politics, but it is not alien to it  either. 
Engaging in the politics of enmity is a potentiality  of democratic life that may  or not become 
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actualized but for which most  constitutional regimes are prepared given the ‘‘claim to 
perpetuity’’ which characterizes them.13  
Confronting the exception within the rule of law
Constitutional traditions of emergency institutions
 Various constitutional systems going as far back as Ancient Rome have experienced 
the triadic challenge of being exposed to exceptional circumstances and surmounting them 
without falling outside rules. Indeed, departing from the ‘‘normal’’ - as the ordinary state of 
affairs - does not inevitably entail to depart  from the ‘‘norm.’’ For regimes like the Roman 
republic, the response to crises has not  taken place outside the legal order but within it, by 
resorting to constitutional arrangements specifically designed to cope with the exception. 
Such arrangements consist of what are generally known as ‘‘emergency institutions.’’ 
Against Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, multiple authors have sought to demonstrate 
that the use of emergency  measures does not amount to a suspension of law by itself. In this 
respect, one institution that they  have paid considerable attention to is the dictatorship of 
Ancient republican Rome (509 B.C. - 27 B.C.), for it has influenced many of the later 
constitutional devices meant to deal with crises. Indeed,
 
 No emergency institution has attracted more attention than the Roman dictatorship; it 
 has been considered a model of constitutional emergency  powers by  a long tradition 
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 of writers ranging from Machiavelli and Rousseau to Clinton Rossiter and Carl 
 Friedrich in recent times.14
 The image that can be restituted of the dictatorship is necessarily  a reconstructed one, 
subject to two constraints. First  of all, available Latin sources are posterior to the time when 
the institution appeared and became regularly in use.15 Secondly, the model itself lacks a 
formal written basis given the customary character of the Roman constitution. Despite these 
difficulties, the dictatorship can nonetheless be described as a delegation of undivided 
authority, for a temporary  period of time (usually  six months), and with the purpose that a 
specified task be accomplished by the individual in charge. 
 The fact that records always indicated the task for which a given dictator was 
 appointed demonstrates the importance of this feature. While the dictatorship was 
 originally  designed to confront military  crises or internal dissensions, its use 
 gradually extended to circumstances in which a magistrate enjoying supreme power 
 (imperium) was needed while the consuls were unavailable (such as performing 
 religious rituals in case of epidemics, or convening electoral assemblies). In the 
 context of military crises the six-month time limit might have been due to 
 pragmatic considerations (such as the length of military  campaigns by  the time of the 
 early republic), but it could also be seen as the symbol of the republican character of 
 an office that was otherwise similar to kingship.16
 According to Bernard Manin, the office of dictator presents three important 
characteristics that always recur in subsequent constitutional devices: it authorizes a 
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indicate that seventy-six dictators were appointed from 501 B.C. to 202 B.C. After that, dictatorship fell into 
disuse for one hundred and twenty years. Then, Sulla and Caesar briefly revived it (in 82 B.C. and 49-44 B.C. 
respectively),  although in ways that have traditionally been viewed as destructive of republican institutions. 
Thus, while it is the dictatorship of the earlier period that has been held up as a model of constitutional 
emergency government, most of our information about it involves some measure of conjecturing in the sources 
themselves.’’ Ibidem, p.138.
16 Ibidem, p.141.  
deviation from ordinary norms (1) which is time-bounded (2) and subject to special 
conditions designed to ensure that circumstances necessitate such a deviation (3).17  These 
conditions can take the form of ex ante, continuing, or a posteriori controls. In the case of 
the Roman Republic, control was exercised ex ante by the Senate which would instruct the 
consuls to appoint the to-be dictator. This means that the dictator was not he who decided on 
the exception but instead had its power externally conferred (a procedure which can be 
described as ‘‘heteroinvestiture’’). 
 The other constitutional traditions in which features of the Roman dictatorship can be 
found are identified by Manin as the Anglo-American liberal tradition of suspension of 
habeas corpus and martial law on the one hand, and the continental tradition exemplified by 
the French state of siege on the other hand. The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (i.e., 
the injunction that any individual under arrest be presented before a court, otherwise his or 
her detention is unlawful) is a clear example of emergency  institution limited in time and 
scope. The suspension always has to be justified by special circumstances, be authorized by 
the parliament, and only  amounts to a temporary deviation from the ordinary  criminal 
process. For instance, the United States Constitution asserts in section 9, clause 2 of its 
article 1 dedicated to the legislative branch that:
 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
 cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.
 Against the letter of the constitution, the writ of habeas corpus was unilaterally 
suspended by President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War (1861-1865), first on April 
27, 1861 in parts of the territory, and then nationwide on September 24, 1862 when martial 
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law was declared - that  is to say, military  tribunals proclaimed in place of regular courts. 
However, Lincoln’s very decision was subject to the review of courts, which illustrates 
another dimension of the Anglo-saxon liberal approach to constitutional emergency 
institutions, namely that the judiciary can exercise ex-post controls and therefore validate or 
invalidate the use of emergency  measures. The actions of President Lincoln were first  upheld 
by the U.S. Supreme Court when they  were reviewed in the course of the Civil War,18 only to 
be partially  nullified after peace was restored.19 In the frame of the American response to 
terrorism after 9/11, neither Congress nor the president formally decided to suspend the writ 
of habeas corpus, but the issue of whether prisoners detained at Guantánamo could avail 
themselves of the writ was raised and settled in the affirmative by the U.S. Supreme Court 
following a protracted struggle between the judiciary and the political branches.20     
 The potential controls exercised by courts on the use of emergency institutions 
distinguish the liberal tradition from the continental model, but the two still present essential 
commonalities. Similarly to the Anglo-American martial law, the French state of siege does 
not correspond to an unchecked delegation of power that would amount to establishing a 
government by  the military. Repeatedly declared throughout the 19th century and from 1914 
to 1919, the French state of siege also abides by conditions of time limitation which are as 
important as in the Roman and Anglo-American constitutional traditions.21  A general 
‘‘emergency  paradigm’’ can therefore be outlined from the converging features displayed by 
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18 Ex parte Vallandighman, 68 U.S. 243 (1864).
19 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). In this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Lincoln’s unilateral 
suspension of habeas corpus was lawful, but that military tribunals could not apply to citizens in states where 
civilian courts were still operating.
20 This episode and the corresponding judicial rulings are analyzed later in the chapter.
21 Bernard Manin, ‘‘The Emergency Paradigm and the New Terrorism,’’ p.158.
these various constitutional systems in their institutional response to crises. It illustrates the 
feasibility of regulating deviations from the ‘‘normal’’ (or regular) operations of the legal 
order, while remaining within the ‘‘normative’’ framework of the rule of law, which never 
ceases to exist and apply. Against Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, the ‘‘emergency 
paradigm’’ disproves claims of an impossible constitutional response to exceptional 
circumstances.     
South Korean emergency institutions
 Constitutions, written and unwritten, vary in the degree of precision and 
thoroughness that accompanies their emergency institutions. While the suspension of habeas 
corpus, from which is derived the possibility to implement martial law, is parsimoniously 
alluded to in the constitution of the United States, emergency provisions are laid out with a 
greater wealth of details in other documents, such as article 115a of the 1949 German basic 
law on the state of defense,22 or article 16 of the 1958 French constitution on the exceptional 
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22   ‘‘(1) Any determination that the federal territory is under attack by armed force or imminently threatened 
with such an attack (state of defense) shall be made by the Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat. Such 
determination shall be made on application of the Federal Government and shall require a two-thirds majority 
of the votes cast, which shall include at least a majority of the Members of the Bundestag.
    (2) If the situation imperatively calls for immediate action, and if insurmountable obstacles prevent the 
timely convening of the Bundestag or the Bundestag cannot muster a quorum, the Joint Committee shall make 
this determination by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast,  which shall include at least a majority of its 
members.
   (3) The determination shall be promulgated by the Federal President in the Federal Law Gazette pursuant to 
Article 82. If this cannot be done in time, promulgation shall be effected in another manner; the determination 
shall be printed in the Federal Law Gazette as soon as circumstances permit.
   (4) If the federal territory is under attack by armed force, and if the competent federal authorities are not in a 
position at once to make the determination provided for in the first sentence of paragraph (1) of this Article, the 
determination shall be deemed to have been made and promulgated at the time the attack began. The Federal 
President shall announce that time as soon as circumstances permit.
   (5) If the determination of a state of defense has been promulgated, and if the federal territory is under attack 
by armed force, the Federal President, with the consent of the Bundestag, may issue declarations under 
international law respecting the existence of the state of defense. Under the conditions specified in paragraph 
(2) of this Article, the Joint Committee shall act in place of the Bundestag.’’ 
(Article 115a of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany).
powers of the president.23 Article 16 is often thought to be the defining emergency institution 
of the French tradition, but it was used only once, in reaction to a 1961 failed putsch 
attempted by a clique of generals to overthrow President Charles De Gaulle during the 
Algerian War (1954-1962). This isolated invocation contrasts with the regular proclamation 
of the state of siege from the French Revolution until the end of World War I, an institution 
which still features in the 1958 constitution under article 36 even though it has never been 
used since then.24 Another departure from the continental tradition of parliamentary, rather 
than judicial, supervision of exceptional powers was introduced by a 2008 reform of the 
French constitution. Were they to be exercised again, the emergency powers of article 16 
could now be subject to an ex-post control by the constitutional council after thirty  days of 
use, in order to determine whether the conditions that led to article 16’s activation still apply. 
 Similarly  to the German basic law or the French constitution, the South Korean 
revised constitution of 1987 contains elaborate provisions about emergency  powers in its 
articles 76 and 77. Both are located in chapter four, section one of the document dedicated to 
the powers of the executive. Article 76 sets the conditions under which the president can 
issue orders which have the effect of legislative acts: ‘‘in time of internal turmoil, external 
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23 ‘‘(1) Where the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or 
the fulfillment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat, and where the proper 
functioning of the constitutional public authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take 
measures required by these circumstances, after formally consulting the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the 
Houses of Parliament and the Constitutional Council.
   (2) He shall address the Nation and inform it of such measures.
  (3) The measures shall be designed to provide the constitutional public authorities as swiftly as possible,  with 
the means to carry out their duties. The Constitutional Council shall be consulted with regard to such measures.
   (4) Parliament shall sit as of right.
   (5) The National Assembly shall not be dissolved during the exercise of such emergency powers.
   (6) After thirty days of the exercise of such emergency powers, the matter may be referred to the 
Constitutional Council by the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate,  sixty Members 
of the National Assembly or sixty Senators,  so as to decide if the conditions laid down in paragraph one still 
apply.  The Council shall make its decision publicly as soon as possible. It shall, as of right, carry out such an 
examination and shall make its decision in the same manner after sixty days of the exercise of emergency 
powers or at any moment thereafter.’’ 
(Article 16 of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic).
24 ‘‘A state of siege shall be decreed in the Council of Ministers. The extension thereof after a period of twelve 
days may be authorized solely by Parliament.’’ (Article 36 of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic).
menace, natural calamity  or a grave financial or economic crisis,’’ as well as ‘‘in case of 
major hostilities affecting national security.’’25 Such executive orders must be notified to the 
unicameral parliament - the National Assembly - and its retrospective approval has to be 
obtained, otherwise ‘‘the actions or orders shall lose effect forthwith.’’ 
 As with article 16 of the French constitution, the extraordinary  powers of the 
presidency are not however conferred upon it by an external source of power (i.e., the 
parliament is not in charge of determining whether the conditions to declare a state of 
emergency are fulfilled, as in the German case). In a strict sense, the South Korean article 76 
and the French article 16 do not conform to the condition of ‘‘heteroinvestiture’’ (or ex-ante 
authorization) found in the Roman dictatorship. Nonetheless, the decisions taken in the 
course of a crisis are subject  to a variety of continuing and a posteriori controls in both 
cases. Moreover, the president’s freedom to interpret emergency institutions and declare the 
exception is counterbalanced by the parliament’s freedom to interpret the crime of treason 
for which the head of state can be criminally  charged.26 Consequently, neither the French 
article 16 nor the South Korean article 76 allows the executive to construe the exception at 
will. 
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25 ‘‘(1) In time of internal turmoil, external menace, natural calamity or a grave financial or economic crisis, the 
President may take in respect to them the minimum necessary financial and economic actions or issue orders 
having the effect of Act, only when it is required to take urgent measures for the maintenance of national 
security or public peace and order, and there is no time to await the convocation of the National Assembly. 
   (2) In case of major hostilities affecting national security, the President may issue orders having the effect of 
Act, only when it is required to preserve the integrity of the nation, and it is impossible to convene the National 
Assembly. 
   (3) In case actions are taken or orders are issued under paragraphs (1) and (2), the President shall promptly 
notify it to the National Assembly and obtain its approval. 
   (4) In case no approval is obtained, the actions or orders shall lose effect forthwith. In such case, the Acts 
which were amended or abolished by the orders in question shall automatically regain their original effect at 
the moment the orders fail to obtain approval. 
    (5) The President shall, without delay, put on public notice developments under paragraphs (3) and (4).’’ 
(Article 76 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea).
26  This argument is advanced for the French case by Michel Troper, Le droit et la nécessité, Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France,  2011, p.106. Troper’s analysis can be applied to the South Korean case and the 
reading of article 76 on the emergency powers be paired with article 84 of the constitution: ‘‘The President 
shall not be charged with a criminal offense during his tenure of office except for insurrection or treason.’’
 However, the focus of institutional controls slightly varies between the two cases. In 
the French text since 2008, the constitutional council determines whether the conditions that 
led to the declaration of emergency continue to apply, while in the South Korean document 
the National Assembly has to retrospectively approve all the measures taken by the executive 
in response to a crisis. This important  parliamentary check imposed on the presidential 
power to act during exceptional circumstances was quickly agreed upon by the ruling and 
opposition parties during the political negotiations preparing the constitutional revision of 
October 1987.27 The 1980 constitution was indeed characterized by an unrestricted system of 
presidential emergency measures. Ruling by emergency decrees was also a well-tried 
practice of Park Chung-hee’s regime in the 1970s, and three of them (Decrees No.1, 2 and 9) 
were recently declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Korea.28 
 In addition to presidential emergency powers, martial law represents another device 
used and abused by South Korean authoritarian regimes, hence the attempt of the 1987 
constitution to regulate its applicability in article 77.29 Most importantly, the new provision 
introduces the requirement that the president complies with the decision of the National 
Assembly ‘‘when [it] requests the lifting of martial law with the concurrent vote of a 
majority  of [its] total members.’’ Here again, the absence of ex-ante authorization is 
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27  Jung-Kwan Cho, ‘‘The Politics of Constitution-Making During the 1987 Democratic Transition in South 
Korea,’’ Korea Observer, Vol.35, No.2, 2004, p.189.
28 2010Hun-Ba70.132.170, March 21, 2013. The decisions are analyzed in chapter four.
29  ‘‘(1) When it is required to cope with a military necessity or to maintain the public safety and order by 
mobilization of the military forces in time of war, armed conflict or similar national emergency, the President 
may proclaim martial law under the conditions as prescribed by Act. 
   (2) Martial law shall be of two types: extraordinary martial law and precautionary martial law. 
   (3) Under extraordinary martial law, special measures may be taken with respect to the necessity for warrants, 
freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association, or the powers of the Executive and the Judiciary under 
the conditions as prescribed by Act. 
    (4) When the President has proclaimed martial law, he shall notify it to the National Assembly without delay. 
   (5) When the National Assembly requests the lifting of martial law with the concurrent vote of a majority of 
the total members of the National Assembly, the President shall comply.’’ 
(Article 77 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea).
compensated by the role of potential censor attributed to the parliament. Even though the 
South Korean president does not enjoy unchecked powers in the face of exceptional 
circumstances, he remains unmistakably designated by the 1987 constitution as the actor 
with preeminent impulse in ‘‘matters relating to the national destiny,’’ which necessarily 
includes national security. For instance, sections 2 and 3 of article 66 proclaim that, as head 
of state: 
 (2) The President shall have the responsibility and duty to safeguard the 
 independence, territorial integrity and continuity of the State and the Constitution. 
 (3) The President shall have the duty to pursue sincerely the peaceful unification of 
 the homeland.
 
  Moreover, article 72 makes possible for him to bypass the legislature and directly 
seek approval of his policies from the people on issues which are considered to fall within 
his privileged  realm of action:
 The President may submit important policies relating to diplomacy, national defense, 
 unification and other matters relating to the national destiny to a national referendum 
 if he deems it necessary. 
 When it comes to the distribution of war powers, the South Korean arrangements 
resemble the American scheme where the president is commander in chief of the armed 
forces,30 while the parliament has ‘‘the right to consent to the declaration of war, the dispatch 
of armed forces to foreign states, and the stationing of alien forces in the territory  of the 
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30 ‘‘The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces under the conditions as prescribed by the 
Constitution and Act’’ (Article 74, section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea) and ‘‘The President 
shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, 
when called into the actual service of the United State’’ (Article 2, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution). It should 
be stressed that broad provisions concerning the executive in the U.S. Constitution (such as his role as 
commander in chief) have led to the affirmation that ‘‘inherent powers’’ are vested in the presidency. This 
doctrine was notoriously defended by John Yoo, the George W. Bush administration’s legal adviser, to justify a 
series of extra-legal actions by the executive (including torture) in the course of the ‘‘war on terror.’’  Kent 
Roach, The 9/11 Effect. Comparative Counter-Terrorism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p.175.
Republic of Korea.’’31  This last element echoes the strength of the United States’ military 
presence which has been very  significant in South Korea since the armistice of 1953, with 
U.S. troop levels currently reaching 28,500. Moreover, the ROK does not have the full 
operational control of its own troops as the Korea-U.S Combined Forces Command is still 
scheduled to retain the wartime operational control of the South Korean armed forces until 
2015.
Disuse and inadequacy of constitutional emergency powers
The prominence of the legislative model
 In his analysis of the emergency paradigm, Bernard Manin raises the question of the 
threats for which the use of constitutional emergency provisions constitutes an adequate 
response. Indeed, the fact that such institutions are designed for temporary and national 
dangers, rather than perils diffuse in both time and space, seems to make ‘‘the emergency 
paradigm [...] fundamentally inappropriate for confronting the present terrorist threat.’’32 As 
a matter of fact, constitutional emergency institutions fell into desuetude a long time before 
the rise of the ‘‘new global terrorism,’’ whose manifestations preceded the 9/11 attacks. 
According to John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, contemporary democracies have 
responded for more than half a century to the challenges of domestic and international 
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31  Article 60, section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Under article 2,  section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution, ‘‘the Congress shall have power to declare war,’’ a provision which has been seldom respected in 
American history.
32 Bernard Manin, ‘‘The Emergency Paradigm and the New Terrorism,’’ p.168.
violence without resorting to the emergency powers inspired by the classical model of the 
Roman dictatorship:  
 Advanced democracies do not necessarily need to use constitutional powers when 
 confronting emergencies. They often prefer to deal with emergencies through 
 ordinary  legislation. Such legislation may delegate a great deal of authority  to the 
 executive and may  be enacted for temporary periods. And there may be a sense that 
 the legislation is in some ways exceptional.  But, however unusual it may be, 
 emergency legislation remains ordinary within the framework of the constitutional 
 system: it  is an act of the legislature working within its normal competence. Such 
 legislation is, in the postwar constitutional systems, reviewable by  the 
 constitutional court (if there is one) and is regulated in exactly the same manner as 
 any other legislative act. For example, in Britain we see the succession of Defense 
 Against Terrorism acts and the United States has the PATRIOT Act. Each is ordinary 
 though time-limited legislation. Many antiterrorist laws have been passed in the same 
 way by the German and Italian parliaments in the 1970s and the 1980s.33
 
 According to Ferejohn and Pasquino’s analysis, the legislative response presents the 
distinctive advantage to provide contemporary democracies with more flexibility  to adjust to 
the particular and actual circumstances of the crises they face, while fulfilling their need for 
legitimation through the legislature’s ‘‘democratic support for the executive’s actions.’’34 In 
this scheme, ex-post or continuing control can potentially be exercised through both 
legislative supervision of the parliament and judicial review of the courts.35  Yet, the latter 
can only  be triggered if constitutional adjudication is set into motion. For instance, no 
challenge was brought against the constitutionality of the U.S. Patriot  Act, nor against the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force which was passed by Congress on September 14, 
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33  John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, ‘‘The Law of Exception. A Typology of Emergency Powers,’’ 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, No.2, 2004, p.215.
34  ‘‘It must be realized, however, that if Congress has already recognized an emergency and authorized 
executive action to deal with it, then attempting to temper executive actions within the bounds of the legislative 
model will be politically difficult.’’Ibidem, p.220.
35 Ibidem, p.236.
2001 and grants the president the power ‘‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.’’ 
 In conjunction with the doctrine of the ‘‘inherent powers’’ vested in the presidency,36 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force has constituted the basis for all the executive 
actions taken by the George W. Bush administration in the course of the ‘‘war against 
terror,’’ including extra-legal policies such as torture during investigations and indefinite 
detention on military bases. Since 2008, the Obama administration solely relies on this 
congressional authorization to pursue counter-terrorist strategies such as extraordinary 
renditions or targeted killings.37  None of these policies has been examined by the courts, 
besides the issue of whether detainees at Guantánamo Bay - and there alone - were entitled 
to habeas corpus rights and could therefore have the basis of their detention as ‘‘enemy 
combatants’’ reviewed before being tried.38 The fact that major aspects of national security 
policies can evade the scrutiny of courtrooms demonstrates the vicissitudes of the judiciary’s 
role in shaping the politics of enmity.
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36 See note 30 for an introduction to the ‘‘inherent powers’’ doctrine.
37 Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect, p.175.
38 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), the Supreme Court recognized the habeas corpus rights of American citizens 
detained at Guantánamo and their corresponding right to challenge the basis of their detention as ‘‘enemy 
combatants,’’  therefore affirming the government’s duty to create a mechanism to review their detention. In 
Rasul v. Bush (2004), habeas corpus rights were also recognized to alien ‘‘enemy combatants’’ detained at 
Guantánamo. In response to the rulings, the Department of Defense set the Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRT) to determine whether detainees were properly classified as ‘‘enemy combatants’’ before being tried by 
military commissions. The system of military commissions was invalidated by the court in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld (2006), for it lacked congressional approval. The Congress therefore passed the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, which also prevented detainees to challenge their detention before federal courts 
through habeas petitions. In Boumediene v. Bush (2008), the Supreme Court held that federal courts could hear 
such petitions but that ‘‘except in cases of undue delay,  such as the present, federal courts should refrain from 
entertaining an enemy combatant’s habeas petition at least until after the CSRT has had a chance to review his 
status.’’
 The most serious and prolonged threats experienced by  a majority of democratic 
regimes after 1945 relate to terrorism, today mostly international but domestic for a long 
time, either deployed by challengers of the territorial integrity of the state (such as the Irish, 
Basque, or Corsican independence movements), or by opponents of democratic institutions 
(such as the West German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, or the French Action 
Directe). The South Korean case displays similarities with the predicament of ‘‘unsettled 
states, disputed lands’’ found in cases characterized by  a conflict of sovereignty, such as the 
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland until recently, or Israel with the West  Bank and Gaza 
to date.39 In these two situations, terrorist violence has been a strategy deployed by non-state 
actors involved in a struggle over territorial sovereignty against the state. These features 
hardly  suit  the reality of the Korean conflict. Its specificities thus need to be delved into in 
order to comprehend the nature of South Korea’s national security  fears and of its responses 
to them.
The prolonged crisis of the Korean division
 North and South Koreas are technically in an ongoing state of war as the three-year 
long conflict  that ravaged them was concluded by an armistice on July 27, 1953, but never 
sealed by  a peace treaty. The division into two separate states of what had been a politically 
unified territory  since the unification of the peninsula by the Koryŏ dynasty  in 935 AD 
proceeded in two major steps. Korea recovered its independence from Japan on August 15, 
1945, toward the end of World War II on the Pacific front, only  for its sovereign destiny to 
be confiscated again a few weeks later. In early September 1945, the peninsula was de facto 
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39 Ian Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands. Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West 
Bank-Gaza, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
split between two zones of military occupation along the 38th parallel, with its northern and 
southern halves under the respective control of the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Three years later, two separate states contesting each other’s legitimacy were established: the 
Republic of Korea in August 1948, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 
September 1948. 
 The conflictual nature of the state of affairs in the Korean peninsula has both endured 
and yet transformed throughout the past sixty years. On the macro scale of historical events, 
a radical shift of power has occurred between the North and the South, with the latter being 
at a definite economic comparative disadvantage in 1945, when most infrastructures and 
mineral resources were concentrated in the North, a pivotal region in Japan’s war economy.40 
Despite the massive destructions suffered by the DPRK in the Korean War as a result  of 
American bombings, the North continued to be more industrialized and affluent than the 
South until the ROK entered a period of accelerated export-led economic development in the 
mid-1960s. The South now enjoys a level of prosperity which contrasts with the North’s 
collapse following decades of mismanagement and the breakdown of its Soviet  patron. The 
repercussions of communism’s fall in Russia and Europe were also political, as North Korea 
became increasingly isolated and marginalized in the international community.41  In 
September 1991, the two Koreas’ concurrent accession to the United Nations symbolized a 
form of mutual recognition, as did the ‘‘Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and 
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40  ‘‘After the division, 80 percent of heavy industry,  76 percent of mining, and 92 percent of electricity-
generating capacity lay in the North, while light manufacturing and agriculture dominated in the South. The 
North Koreans literally turned off the electricity in the South in 1948, but even before the Korean War the 
South had faced serious power shortages. Its agricultural production could not meet the food requirements of 
the population, and the country survived on bulk grain shipments from the United States into the 1960s.’’ 
Michael Robinson, Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey, Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2007, p.120. 
41 Charles Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak. North Korea and the World, 1950-1992,  Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2013.
Exchanges and Cooperation’’ or ‘‘Basic Agreement’’ (‘‘nambuk kibon habŭisŏ’’) signed on 
December 31 of the same year. On that occasion,
 The two Koreas agreed that their relationship is not a relationship between states but 
 ‘‘a special one constituted temporarily  in the process of unification.’’ Both sides want 
 to differentiate their relationship from standard relationships between foreign 
 countries. Such differentiation seems to have been aimed at emphasizing the common 
 goal of unification to  come. However, since both Koreas are members of the United 
 Nations and have respective  sovereignty, the inter-Korean agreements are thus 
 similar in character to that of agreements between two separate states.42 
 The very use of the term ‘‘agreement’’ (‘‘habŭiso’’) instead of ‘‘treaty’’ (‘‘choyak’’) 
illustrates the will of both parties to distinguish inter-Korean compacts from settlements 
concluded between two foreign countries. This semantic nuance was however abandoned for 
the two inter-Korean summits that took place in Pyongyang and were referred to by the 
South as ‘‘nambuk ch’ŏngsang hoedam,’’ with the expression ‘‘ch’ŏngsang hoedam’’ 
connoting an inter-state summit. The first meeting took place in June 2000 (between North 
Korean leader Kim Jong-il and South Korean president Kim Dae-jung) and the second in 
October 2007 (between Kim Jong-il and his counterpart Roh Moo-hyun) as a result of the 
‘‘Sunshine Policy’’ (‘‘haetpyŏt chŏngch’aek’’)43 followed by the ‘‘progressive’’ governments 
of Kim and Roh between 1998 and 2008. As stressed by Charles Armstrong, the term 
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42  Dae-kyu Yoon, Law and Democracy in South Korea. Democratic Development since 1987, Seoul: 
Kyungnam University Press, 2010, p.267.
43  Besides the two inter-Korean summits and the creation of joint projects such as the Kaesŏng industrial 
complex or the Kŭmgangsan tourist site (closed in 2008), both located in North Korea, the foreign policy fruits 
of the ‘‘Sunshine Policy’’ have been meager. The ‘‘sociospatial boundaries’’ of the peninsula have nonetheless 
been importantly affected during this period, as illustrated by the exponential involvement of South Korea in 
the foreign trade of the North or the growing number of North Korean refugees in the South since the late 
1990s. See Valérie Gélézeau, ‘‘Espoirs et désillusions de la décennie du ‘rayon de soleil’,’’  Critique 
internationale, No.49, 2010, pp.12-13.  
‘‘progressive’’ is the one favored by the Korean left but all ‘‘progressive’’ administrations 
have largely embraced neoliberal policies in the socioeconomic realm.44   
 Notwithstanding apparent changes in inter-Korean relations at the turn of the new 
millennium, hostility has not waned in the peninsula. Since the end of the Korean War, 
threats from the North have taken many forms, from targeted attacks against  the South 
Korean leadership (most conspicuously with an aborted attack against the Blue House in 
1968 and the failed assassination of President Chun Doo-hwan in Rangoon in 1983) to 
incursions by infiltrators, kidnappings, and incidents along the Demilitarized Zone (or DMZ, 
which serves as a border heavily guarded by each side’s military forces), as well as naval 
conflicts (the last instance being the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel on March 16, 
2010, in which forty-six sailors died).45 
 In the aftermath of South Korea’s transition to democracy, the bombing of the Korean 
Air Flight 858 on November 29, 1987 caused the death of 104 civilian passengers and 11 
crew members, leading the United States State Department to qualify the attack as a 
‘‘terrorist act’’ and to inscribe North Korea on the list of states sponsoring terrorism, from 
which it  was removed in 2008. More commonly a strategy in the hands of non-state actors 
without the traditional resources of armies, terrorism as the use of indiscriminate violence 
against civilian targets46  has not been central to the arsenal of threats deployed by the 
North.47  Military provocations have been comparatively more important, even when they 
130
44 Charles Armstrong, ‘‘Contesting the Peninsula,’’ New Left Review, Vol.51, 2008, p.117. 
45  U.S. Congressional Research Service, North Korean Provocative Actions. 1950-2007,  Washington: U.S. 
Library of Congress, 2007.
46 Michael Walzer, Arguing About War, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
47 If local and random violence through terrorist attacks is a resource of relatively weak groups, the deployment 
of mass and systematic terror requires means that are often associated with a state apparatus. Domestically, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea puts in force a regime of state terror. 
resulted in no casualties. This has been the case with the repeated ballistic missile and 
nuclear tests that have intensified tensions in the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asian 
region since the early 1990s. 
 The Korean crisis born out of the division and the continued aggressiveness of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea explains that national security be such a deep 
concern and priority in the South, as reflected by the constitution of 1987. The many 
references to the military  dispersed in the document also allude to the tension between the 
language of national security  and the rhetoric of peace which coexist in the constitution. 
Their cohabitation is best exemplified by article 5 in which the Republic of Korea’s 
commitment to ‘‘international peace’’ neighbors the ‘‘sacred mission of national security and 
the defense of the land’’ entrusted to the armed forces. Most significantly, this ‘‘sacred 
mission’’ entails the constitutional obligation for all Korean young men to serve in the 
military:
 (1) All citizens shall have the duty  of national defense under the conditions as 
 prescribed by  Act. 
 (2) No citizen shall be treated unfavorably on account of the fulfillment of his 
 obligation of  military service.48
 Compulsory conscription has aroused litigation in the Constitutional Court of Korea 
on several occasions. In practice, the eighteen-month-long military service is only performed 
by males between 18 and 35, which has ignited contestation on the basis of an 
unconstitutional violation of the right to equality. The first case against discrimination in 
relation to the military service was brought before the court by female students challenging 
the automatic extra-points attributed to discharged soldiers in all civil service exams. The 
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48 Article 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea.
constitutional court stroke down the extra-point system in a 1999 decision which deemed 
that the sacred duty of serving in the military was not a special sacrifice that should be 
compensated by  favorable treatment.49 The court articulated its decision in terms of formal 
and substantive equality, considering in rather paternalistic terms conform to the letter of the 
constitution that the very  categories of person exempted from military service - women and 
disabled men - deserved special protection.50
 Women and the handicapped are the weak of our society. The Constitution professes 
 in several instances the state’s duty  to affirmatively protect them in accordance to the 
 principle of substantive equality and social state.51
 The issue of the discrimination against men caused by  the absence of female military 
service was raised before the constitutional court  in 2010. The present system was upheld by 
a majority  of six justices (including the two concurring opinions of three judges). However, 
the ruling reveals highly  polarized arguments among justices about how to construe gender 
categories and relations in South Korea. Indeed, the majority  decision went so far as to 
advance a series of patriarchal reasons preventing the enlistment of women, such as:
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49  ‘‘Article 39 (1) of the Constitution imposes duty of national defense on people in order to protect national 
independence and land from direct or indirect aggression from external hostile forces. Serving in the military 
pursuant to the Military Service Act is merely discharge of a sacred duty, and cannot be considered a special 
sacrifice that the state imposes on individuals for public interest. People’s discharge of their constitutionally 
imposed duties is indispensable to national integrity and livelihood. Each instance of such discharge cannot be 
considered a special sacrifice that requires compensation,’’ 11-2 KCCR 770, 98Hun-Ma363, December 23, 
1999, in The Constitutional Court of Korea, Constitutional Court Decisions. Volume I (1998-2004), Seoul: 
Constitutional Court of Korea, 2006, p.600.
50  ‘‘Special protection shall be accorded to working women, and they shall not be subjected to unjust 
discrimination in terms of employment, wages and working conditions’’ (Article 32, section 4 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Korea).  ‘‘The State shall endeavor the welfare and rights of women’’  (Article 
34, section 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea).  In both cases, each provision is followed by a 
similar protection relating to children.  
51 The Constitutional Court of Korea, Constitutional Court Decisions. Volume I, p.603.
 In light of the physical capability required for conducting combat operations, men, 
 who are superior in their physical strength needed for carrying and activating a 
 weapon or war equipment, are more likely  to have proper physical capabilities than 
 women.52
 [...]
 Even a woman with excellent physical capability may have a hard time in conducting 
 her duties of training or war drills during around one-week menstrual period in every 
 month. […] In addition, women rather than men are more likely to be exposed to a 
 danger including sexual abuses when they are taken prisoner in wartime so that 
 dispatching a woman to a real battle  such as military operation is more demanding.53
 [...]
 In addition, we are not convinced that, if we also make women to have full-scale 
 duties of military service under current male-oriented military  organization and its 
 facilities, crimes like  sexual harassment based on power and dominance within the 
 military or the slack military   discipline caused by  relationships between men and 
 women would not happen.54 
 
 Justices Cho Dae-hyen and Kim Jong-dae concurred by stressing how the 
incorporation of female forces in the army could harm the objective of training military 
troops of the best quality. 
 In light of physical characteristics of women and other concerns in case of women’s 
 enlistment in military service as explained above, the legislature decided that  it is 
 proper for it to make only men to be subject to the military  service duties for the sake 
 of preserving the best troops through the Instant Provision. We find that such 
 legislative decision was reasonable and fair, considering the legislative intent of the 
 imposition of national defense duties, constant maintenance of the best combat 
 efficacy, and particularly our nation’s national defense circumstances which, as the 
 only divided country  under a ceasefire in the world, constantly requires effective 
 preparations for the mobilization of the best military forces due to currently 
 continuous armed conflict between South and North Korea whatsoever local war or 
 all-out  war.55
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52  22-2(B) KCCR 446, 2006Hun-Ma328, November 25, 2010, in The Constitutional Court of Korea, 




 In opposition to the sexist arguments mobilized by the majority, Justices Lee Kong-
hyun and Mok Young-joon reasoned that differential treatment between men and women 
may be justified under the constitution, but cannot be based on such ‘‘archaic 
generalizations’’ and ‘‘stereotype of gender roles’’ as those upon which rested the majority’s 
defense of the current male-oriented military  service. Claims of gender discrimination are 
not the only challenges raised against conscription. The most critical debate over it revolves 
around the difficulty  to reconcile today’s system with fundamental rights such as the 
freedom of conscience. Indeed, conscientious objection is not accommodated under the 
present constitutional and legislative scheme, by contrast with article 12a of the Basic Law 
for the Federal Republic of Germany:
 (1) Men who have attained the age of eighteen may be required to serve in the Armed 
 Forces, in the Federal Border Police, or in a civil defense organization.
 (2) Any person who, on grounds of conscience, refuses to render military service 
 involving the  use of arms may be required to perform alternative service. The 
 duration of alternative service shall not exceed that of military service. Details shall 
 be regulated by a law, which shall not interfere with the freedom to make a decision 
 in accordance with the dictates of conscience, and which shall also provide for the 
 possibility of alternative service not connected with units of the Armed Forces or of 
 the Federal Border Police.
 No alternative to serving in the army is offered in South Korea and conscientious 
objectors - most of whom are Jehovah Witnesses - are sent to jail for the corresponding 
amount of time (eighteen months).56  All the above-mentioned patterns of military 
mobilization (gender discrimination and the criminalization of conscientious objection) have 
perdured after the 1987 transition to democracy. This resilience suggests how the modalities, 
and even the functionality, of conscription are far from being determined by the issue of the 
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56 The Constitutional Court of Korea’s 2004 ruling on conscientious objection will receive an in-depth analysis 
in chapter eight.
national division only, but are also importantly  shaped by  domestic dynamics of inclusion 
and exclusion in the body politic of the South.
 Going back to the argument formulated by  John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino on 
the disuse of constitutional emergency  institutions, the language of military preparedness 
that permeates South Korea’s constitution does not exhaust the scope of its response to the 
threat posed by the North. Indeed, focusing on constitutional provisions overshadows the 
fact that the national division is also construed outside the framework of war and peace 
embedded in the constitution, which synoptically  envisions both the risk of military conflict 
and the prospect of peaceful reunification. Ferejohn and Pasquino’s legislative model seems 
to provide a better point of entry into South Korea’s politics of enmity, most prominently 
exemplified by  the National Security Act of 1948. The security  legislation evidences that the 
partition of the Korean peninsula into two states ideologically  antagonistic has engendered a 
more insidious line of separation than the 38th parallel, a separation not only  between but 
inside both Korean states as each became obsessed with eliminating its enemies within. The 
great figure of enmity in this configuration is not embodied by the hostile soldier, the 
conventional and ‘‘external’’ enemy in warfare, but the infiltrated spy, the domestic ‘‘thought 
criminal’’ - he who praises or sympathizes with the other ‘‘side’’ - and, since the late 1980s, 
the adversary of the constitutional order. 
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Confronting the enemy of the constitutional order: meaning and means of militant 
democracy
Interwar legislative militancy
 The concept of militant democracy  comes from a series of two articles written in 
1937 by the German political scientist Karl Loewenstein.57  His argument and call for 
democracy  to become militant  were formulated in the context of the interwar collapse of 
European liberal regimes under the blows of fascism. To Loewenstein, democracies could 
not let themselves be destroyed by the hand of their enemies - the very individuals or parties 
who were abusing the institutions and principles of the democratic order to overthrow it.58 
Instead, democracies had to turn militant and restrict the use of the rights and freedoms 
formally granted to all for the sake of their own survival. 
 Democracy and democratic tolerance have been used for their own destruction. 
 Under cover of fundamental rights and the rule of law, the anti-democratic machine 
 could be built up  and set in motion legally. Calculating adroitly that democracy could 
 not, without self-abnegation,  deny to any  body of public opinion the full use of the 
 free institutions of speech, press, assembly, and parliamentary  participation, fascist 
 exponents systematically discredit  the democratic order and make it unworkable by 
 paralyzing its functions until chaos reigns. They exploit the tolerant confidence of 
 democratic ideology that in the long run truth is stronger than falsehood, that the 
 spirit asserts itself against force. Democracy was unable to forbid the enemies of its 
 very existence the use of democratic instrumentalities. Until very recently, 
 democratic fundamentalism and legalistic blindness were unwilling to realize that the 
 mechanism of democracy  is the Trojan horse by which the enemy enters the city. To 
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57  Karl Loewenstein, ‘‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I,’’ The American Political Science 
Review, Vol.31,  No.3, 1937, pp.417-432; ‘‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights II,’’ The American 
Political Science Review, Vol.31, No.4, 1937, pp.638-658. 
58  As pointed out by Melissa Schwartzberg,  the general fear of ‘‘democratic autophagy’’or ‘‘the concern that 
democracy, perhaps through its tolerance of antidemocratic forces, will harbor the forces of its own 
destruction’’ can be traced to Plato. Melissa Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, Cambridge,  New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.7.
 fascism in the guise of a legally recognized political party were accorded all the 
 opportunities of democratic institutions.59
 In essence, political actors who only  exploit the rules of the democratic game to 
subvert them should not be entitled to play  in the first place. Therefore, outlawing extremist 
parties and behaviors had to be the primary purpose of militant legislation according to 
Loewenstein. Of course, the sagacious analyst that he was knew very  well that  militant 
legislation was a necessary, but insufficient, condition to defeat fascism. It could only  be 
efficient in conjunction with the political will of all constitutional parties to unite against 
anti-democratic forces and the commitment of law-enforcing bodies to execute the law. By 
the late 1930s, Loewenstein could estimate that militant legislation or ‘‘prophylactic 
measures’’ had been established in ‘‘all democratic countries except France,’’60  and were 
featuring a strong degree of resemblance across cases. 
 The means of democratic militancy were more legislative - with the enactment of 
special anti-extremist legislation - than constitutional - through the use of emergency 
powers. Indeed, emergency institutions were not absent from interwar constitutions but did 
not necessarily  help democratic regimes to resist as illustrated by the notorious example of 
the Weimar constitution. Its article 48 did include provisions that could have been deployed 
to militantly defend the democratic institutions of the Weimar Republic,61 but the use that 
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59 Karl Loewenstein, ‘‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I,’’ pp.423-424.
60 Ibidem, p.430.
61 ‘‘If public security and order are seriously disturbed or endangered within the German Reich, the President of 
the Reich may take measures necessary for their restoration, intervening if need be with the assistance of the 
armed forces. For this purpose he may suspend for a while, in whole or in part, the fundamental rights provided 
in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153. The President of the Reich must inform the Reichstag without 
delay of all measures taken in accordance with Paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article. These measures are to be 
revoked on the demand of the Reichstag.’’ (Article 48 of the Constitution of the Weimar Republic).
was made of them contributed to condemn rather than save the regime.62 As noted by Oren 
Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, 
 Between 1919 and 1932, article 48 was invoked more than 250 times. It became a 
 constitutional source for the promulgation of an extensive array of executive decrees, 
 most  frequently in the context of economic disturbances. The extensive use of 
 article 48 during the Weimar years led to a broad construction of the range of 
 circumstances in which article 48 powers could be employed so as to encompass 
 crises that did not fall within the traditional  understanding of threats ‘‘endangering 
 the public safety and order.’’ [...] And so it  came to be that  when Hitler became the 
 chancellor in 1933, article 48 was ready  to be used by  the Nazis in order to finish off 
 the republic.63
 Therefore, the existence of emergency powers in a democracy’s constitution is only a 
poor test of its militancy, best  captured by the legislative means of defense that the regime 
deploys and which require enough political will and union to be both enacted and effectively 
implemented. In interwar Europe, such measures centered on the indiscriminate prohibition 
of all subversive movements and the reaffirmation of the state’s exclusive monopoly over 
violence through the ban of military  bands and private party militias. Anti-fascist policies 
were part of what Karl Loewenstein referred to as an ‘‘authoritarian’’ or ‘‘disciplined’’ 
version of democracy, one in which fundamental rights could neither be considered as 
absolute nor universally distributed. Loewenstein also recognized that the curtailment of 
some categories of rights (especially  those related to the freedom of expression) would prove 
more delicate than restraints on political association and participation.
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62  After the February 27, 1933 arson attack on the Reichstag, fomented by the Nazis but blamed on the 
Communists,  President von Hindenburg was persuaded by Hitler to issue on the basis of article 48 an 
emergency decree which curtailed most constitutional rights. 
63  Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Law in Times of Crisis. Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp.84-85.
 Perhaps the thorniest problem of democratic states still upholding fundamental rights 
 is that of curbing the freedom of public opinion, speech, and press in order to check 
 the unlawful use thereof by  revolutionary and subversive propaganda, when attack 
 presents itself in the guise of  lawful political criticism of existing institutions.64
 [...]
 As happens frequently in anti-fascist legislation, the border-line between unlawful 
 slander and justified criticism as lawful exercise of political rights is exceedingly 
 dim, and the courts of democratic states are called upon to decide on legal grounds 
 what in fact is a political problem for which a new ratio decidendi is yet to be 
 discovered.65
 Restrictions on freedoms such as speech and association are indeed characteristic of 
European democracies’ militancy against  their enemies - be they extremist political parties 
or terrorists. In his analysis of comparative counter-terrorism after 9/11, Kent Roach insists 
on the existence of ‘‘a European constitutional culture that is much more willing to accept 
limits on speech and association in the name of the ability of militant democracies to protect 
themselves than more libertarian North American constitutional cultures.’’66 However, this 
cleavage is not merely the product of differences in the civic and legal cultures of both 
continents, but largely  results from diverging historical experiences. The European approach 
to counter-terrorism is indeed indissociable from a long ‘‘history of internal violence and 
terrorist acts by extreme left-wing groups [...] and regional separatist groups advocating 
independence or greater autonomy.’’67
 Both during the interwar and today, the means of democratic militancy in European 
societies have been primarily  legislative. However, its principle has also been enshrined in 
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64 Karl Loewenstein, ‘‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights II,’’ p.652.
65 Ibidem, pp.653-654. 
66 Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect, p.241.
67  Judith Sunderland, Preempting Justice. Counterterrorism Laws and Procedures in France,  New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 2008, p.4.
some fundamental texts following the Second World War, such as the Basic Law for the 
Federal Republic of Germany or the European Convention on Human Rights. It should come 
as no surprise that Germany stands as the paradigmatic militant case given the trauma left by 
the breakdown of the Republic of Weimar in 1933, considered by  Loewenstein and others as 
a democracy  which failed because it did not resist. The principle of democratic militancy is 
also consecrated in South Korea’s constitution since the revision of 1960 which established 
the Second Republic (1960-1961) and heavily borrowed from the provisions of the German 
model to protect - in vain - its new and precarious democratic order.  
  
Post-war constitutional militancy
 Emergency powers are not the only  constitutional provisions to deal with threats. 
After World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany translated into its basic law measures 
that were typical of the interwar militant  legislation that the Weimar Republic itself did not 
adopt or enforce. Contrary to emergency  institutions which can mainly operate when the 
territorial integrity of the state and the security  of the nation are endangered, constitutional 
militant institutions are designed to operate in normal times against the enemies of the 
democratic order. In the name of preserving democracy, they  deprive subversive actors of 
fundamental rights such as the freedoms of speech, political activity, or participation. 
 Militant measures’ iconic constitutional manifestation lies in four articles of the 
German basic law. Article 18 strips of the freedom of expression whoever abuses it ‘‘to 
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combat the free democratic basic order.’’68 The freedom to form and to belong to a political 
organization is similarly curtailed by article 21 which bans as unconstitutional political 
parties ‘‘that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to undermine or 
abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic 
of Germany.’’69 As for article 20, it recognizes in its section 4 the right of all Germans ‘‘to 
resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is 
available.’’70  Finally, article 19 confirms the possibility consecrated in all constitutional 
systems to restrict basic rights, by principle inviolable and inalienable.71  Even such 
fundamental rights as the right to life and physical integrity may  therefore be interfered with, 
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68 ‘‘Whoever abuses the freedom of expression, in particular the freedom of the press (paragraph (1) of Article 
5), the freedom of teaching (paragraph (3) of Article 5), the freedom of assembly (Article 8), the freedom of 
association (Article 9),  the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications (Article 10), the rights of 
property (Article 14), or the right of asylum (Article 16a) in order to combat the free democratic basic order 
shall forfeit these basic rights. This forfeiture and its extent shall be declared by the Federal Constitutional 
Court.’’ 
(Article 18 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany).
69 ‘‘(1) Political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely 
established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account for 
their assets and for the sources and use of their funds.
    (2) Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the 
free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be 
unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality.
       (3) Details shall be regulated by federal laws.’’
(Article 21 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany).
70 ‘‘(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.
    (2) All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and 
other votes and through specific legislative, executive, and judicial bodies.
   (3) The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and 
justice.       
    (4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order,  if no 
other remedy is available.’’
(Article 20 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany).
71 ‘‘(1) Insofar as, under this Basic Law, a basic right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law, such law must 
apply generally and not merely to a single case. In addition, the law must specify the basic right affected and 
the Article in which it appears.
    (2) In no case may the essence of a basic right be affected.
   (3) The basic rights shall also apply to domestic artificial persons to the extent that the nature of such rights 
permits.
   (4) Should any person’s rights be violated by public authority, he may have recourse to the courts. If no other 
jurisdiction has been established, recourse shall be to the ordinary courts. The second sentence of paragraph (2) 
of Article 10 shall not be affected by this paragraph.’’
(Article 19 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany).
albeit ‘‘only pursuant to a law.’’72 In this scheme, the protection of basic rights entrusted to 
constitutional courts concretely means for them to review whether the interference with a 
fundamental right  is legal (i.e. has an appropriate basis in law) and whether it  is excessive or 
not (i.e., does not affect the ‘‘essence’’ of the basic right). In practice, courts have elaborated 
concrete tools and modes of reasoning to conduct this type of analysis. 
 As this study contends, the conditionality of basic rights is an essential element to 
understand the discursive possibilities of courts when they address constitutional issues in 
general, and national security matters in particular. In other words, there is no ‘‘rights’ 
absolutism’’ in the jurisprudence of contemporary courts. Restrictions on basic rights can 
always be tolerated provided that they  have a proper legal ground and that the ‘‘essence’’ of 
the basic right itself is not affected. The legal ground of rights’ conditionality  is usually 
known as the ‘‘derogation clause.’’ It exists in both national law (see article 37 of the South 
Korean constitution and article 19 of the German basic law) and supranational law, as 
exemplified by article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights73 and article 4 of the 
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72 ‘‘Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. 
These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law.’’ (Article 2, section 2 of the Basic Law for the 
Federal Republic of Germany).
73 ‘‘(1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party 
may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law.
    (2) No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from 
Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.
      (3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also 
inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the 
provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.’’
(Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.74 The countries whose constitutions are 
silent over the issue of rights’ restriction (as in the United States, with the exception of the 
suspension clause for the writ of habeas corpus), or without a codified constitution (like 
Israel or the United Kingdom) abide by  this doctrine of rights’ conditionality as 
demonstrated by their high courts’ rulings. 
 Although generally  possible, the restriction of fundamental rights is however subject 
to a number of conditions and controls. First of all, some texts (mostly international 
conventions) stipulate articles that  cannot be derogated: article 2 (right to life), article 3 
(prohibition of torture), article 4, paragraph 1 (prohibition of slavery and servitude), and 
article 7 (no punishment without a law) under the European Convention on Human Rights; 
article 6 (right to life), article 7 (prohibition of torture), article 8, paragraphs 1 and 2 
(prohibition of slavery  and servitude), article 11 (no imprisonment on the ground of inability 
to fulfill a contractual obligation), article 15 (no punishment without a law), article 16 (right 
to be recognized everywhere as a person before the law), and article 18 (right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion) under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. These exceptions still leave a vast array of basic rights susceptible of limitations. In 
practice, democratic regimes and their constitutional courts even allow such supranational 
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74  ‘‘(1) In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is 
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their 
obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not 
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin.
  (2) No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15,  16 and 18 may be made under this 
provision.
   (3) Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform 
the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A 
further communication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such 
derogation.’’
(Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
‘‘absolute’’ rights to become conditional, as repeatedly articulated by the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court of Israel sitting as High Court of Justice.
 Israeli constitutional law has a consistent  approach to human rights in periods of 
 relative calm  and in periods of increased fighting. We do not recognize a clear 
 distinction between the two.  We do not have balancing laws that are unique to times 
 of war. Naturally, human rights are not absolute. They can be restricted in times of 
 calm and in times of war.75
 The Constitutional Court of Korea engaged in similar reasoning when it upheld the 
constitutional validity of capital punishment against the right to life in 2010.
 [O]ur Constitution does not recognize absolute fundamental rights and Article 37 
 Section 2 of the Constitution prescribes that any kind of people’s freedom and right 
 may  be restricted by Act to the extent that it  is necessary  to protect national security, 
 public order, or public welfare. […] The right to life, like any other rights, may  be 
 subject to the general statutory  reservation  under Article 37 Section 2 of the 
 Constitution.76
 This judicial understanding of rights as never being absolute does not entail that they 
are reduced to mere fiction. As summarized by the Israeli supreme court, 
 Admittedly, human rights are not absolute. It is possible to restrict  their realization. 
 But there are limits to the restriction of the realization of human rights.77
 This discursive order is critical not only  to draw similarities between the 
jurisprudence of diverse institutions, but also, and maybe more importantly, to overcome the 
traditional dichotomy between liberal (or progressive) and conservative (or repressive) 
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75 HCJ 7052/03, Adalah v. Minister of Interior (2006).
76 22-1(A) KCCR 36, 2008Hun-Ka23, February 25, 2010, in The Constitutional Court of Korea, Constitutional 
Court Decisions. 2010, p.21.
77 HCJ 7052/03, Adalah v. Minister of Interior (2006).
decisions. Actually, the two have much more in common than is usually thought given the 
shared discursive boundaries in which they operate. This ‘‘epistemic commonality’’ does not 
leave constitutional courts powerless to make significant and differential choices. While the 
distinction between liberal and conservative decisions should be relativized, it is not 
completely abolished by the realization of their joint premises - the fact that basic rights can 
always be restricted, provided that certain conditions are met. The intervention of 
constitutional courts therefore focuses on the determination and/or examination of the 
necessary  conditions to limit fundamental rights, and not on the issue to decide if they  can be 
restricted or not.78
 Given the militant character of the German basic law, the court of Karlsruhe has a 
role which apparently  goes beyond that of corresponding institutions in other democracies. 
The institution indeed appears as the ultimate authority in charge of identifying who the 
enemies of the ‘‘free democratic basic order’’ are. This empowerment stems from the belief 
that the mission of protecting the constitutional order needs to be entrusted to an 
independent, apolitical guardian. Therefore, when the basic rights related to the freedom of 
expression (including the freedoms of the press, teaching, assembly, association, and privacy 
of correspondence) are abused for non-democratic purposes, the constitutional court is the 
sole authority  competent to declare the forfeiture of the rights and its extent.79 Likewise, it 
has to determine whether the existence and activities of a political party endanger the ‘‘free 
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78  While the absence of rights’ absolutism can be claimed from the viewpoint of an empirical theory of 
constitutional and jurisprudential discourse which this study adopts, it can however be contested from the 
perspective of a normative theory of law in which rights are construed as universal and categorical norms not 
susceptible to derogation. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1977; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.
79 Article 18 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
democratic basic order’’ and should be ruled unconstitutional.80 Among other prerogatives 
associated with the defense of the constitutional order, the German constitutional court 
decides cases of impeachment against the president for ‘‘willful violation of this Basic Law 
or any other federal law’’ brought before it by  the Bundestag or the Bundesrat.81 The same 
power is granted to the court  ‘‘if a federal judge infringes the principles of this Basic Law or 
the constitutional order of a Land in his official capacity or unofficially.’’82
Militant democracy’s exclusionary logic
 There unmistakably exists a post-war German matrix for constitutional militancy, 
paralleled by similar provisions in other texts such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights, whose article 17 prohibits activities aimed at the destruction of the rights and 
freedoms granted by the document.83 This model has also inspired militant measures in other 
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80 Article 21 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
81  ‘‘(1) The Bundestag or the Bundesrat may impeach the Federal President before the Federal Constitutional 
Court for willful violation of this Basic Law or of any other federal law. The motion of impeachment must be 
supported by at least one quarter of the Members of the Bundestag or one quarter of the votes of the Bundesrat. 
The decision to impeach shall require a majority of two thirds of the Members of the Bundestag or of two 
thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat. The case for impeachment shall be presented before the Federal 
Constitutional Court by a person commissioned by the impeaching body.
    (2) If the Federal Constitutional Court finds the Federal President guilty of a willful violation of this Basic 
Law or of any other federal law, it may declare that he has forfeited his office. After the Federal President has 
been impeached, the Court may issue an interim order preventing him from exercising his functions.’’
(Article 61 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany). 
82 ‘‘(1) The legal status of federal judges shall be regulated by a special federal law.
    (2) If a federal judge infringes the principles of this Basic Law or the constitutional order of a Land in his 
official capacity or unofficially, the Federal Constitutional Court,  upon application of the Bundestag, may by a 
two-thirds majority order that the judge be transferred or retired. In the case of an intentional infringement it 
may order him dismissed. [...]’’
(Article 98 of the Basic Law for the Republic of Germany).
83  ‘‘Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State,  group or person any right to 
engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth 
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention’’ (Article 17 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights).
constitutions as well as the development across constitutional courts of a ‘‘basic structure’’ 
jurisprudence, defining the fundamental values and features which ought to be defended in a 
given polity. As underlined by Melissa Schwartzberg, foundational elements such as the 
republican or democratic form of government are often entrenched in constitutional texts, 
that is to say, insulated from the possibility of being altered through amendments. This 
protection however raises a double dilemma according to Schwartzberg, as the arrangements 
in question may have been shaped by specific interests and as constitutional courts become 
the sole actors in charge of interpreting them. 
 Entrenchment reifies a particular formulation of rights that, emerging from political 
 processes of deliberation, negotiation, and bargaining during constituent assemblies, 
 may  be normatively  attractive or unattractive, adequate to their challenges or 
 inadequate. Further, instead of inhibiting legal change altogether, entrenchment shifts 
 the authority to alter the law away from legislatures and towards courts. That is, 
 entrenched rights are not, in fact, immutable because they remain subject to 
 interpretive change by  judges - and these alterations may be both substantial and 
 themselves immutable except through subsequent decisions, given the inability  to 
 revise these norms through the amendment process.84
 Similarly, the act and language of defending the constitutional order may not only 
help  to protect democracy against political threats, but can contribute to fashion a certain 
kind of order from which some actors will be excluded: Nazis and Communists in post-war 
West Germany; the forces behind the popular democratization movement (particularly 
students and workers) in post-1987 South Korea as this dissertation contends. 
 The rhetoric of militant democracy which the Constitutional Court of Korea has 
appropriated is supported by the militant attributions expressly  bestowed upon the court. 
Article 8, section 4 of the South Korean constitution, closely modeled on article 21 of the 
German basic law, states that:
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84 Melissa Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, p.22.
 If the purposes or activities of a political party are contrary  to the fundamental 
 democratic order, the Government may bring an action against it  in the Constitutional 
 Court for its dissolution, and the political party shall be dissolved in accordance with 
 the decision of the Constitutional Court.85
 As discussed in chapter two, no case has yet been decided by  the Constitutional Court 
of Korea on the ground of article 8,86 in contrast with the two rulings rendered by the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany against subversive political parties: on October 23, 1952, 
when justices outlawed the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party, and on August 17, 1956, when 
they  censored the Communist  Party of Germany on the basis of the court’s commitment to 
‘‘fortified democracy’’ (‘‘streitbare Demokratie’’). The absence of litigation before the 
Constitutional Court of Korea does not  imply that South Korean democracy  after 1987 has 
been more tolerant of the activities of political parties than was West Germany in the 1950s. 
On the contrary, South Korean politics have been characterized by a ban on leftist  ideology 
since the 1945 division. Both freedoms of speech and association are still very restricted 
under the National Security Act. Its article 7 criminalizes praising or sympathizing with an 
‘‘anti-state organization,’’ which encompasses activities such as disseminating or merely 
possessing certain materials interpreted as including the works of Marx and Engels until the 
late 1980s. 
148
85 ‘‘(1) The establishment of political parties shall be free, and the plural party system shall be guaranteed. 
   (2) Political parties shall be democratic in their objectives, organization, and activities, and shall have the 
necessary organizational arrangements for the people to participate in the formation of the political will. 
     (3) Political parties shall enjoy the protection of the State and may be provided with operational funds by the 
State under the conditions as prescribed by Act.
   (4) If the purposes or activities of a political party are contrary to the fundamental democratic order, the 
Government may bring an action against it in the Constitutional Court for its dissolution, and the political party 
shall be dissolved in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court.’’
(Article 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea).
86 A request to dissolve the minor and left-wing Unified Progressive Party was however filed on November 5, 
2013. 
 After the Korean War, not just  socialist politics but also academic studies on Marx 
 were severely repressed in South Korea under the anti-communist dictatorships of 
 Rhee Syngman (1948-60), Park Chung Hee (1961-79), and Chun Doo Hwan 
 (1980-87). Even just  carrying Marx’s books was punished by more than two years in 
 prison. Progressive scholars who wanted to study Marxism in this period had no way 
 but to do so under such rubrics as dependency theory, the Frankfurt School, or 
 alienation in ‘‘early  Marx.’’ Marxism flourished in Korea after the Kwangju People’s 
 Uprising in 1980 and the Great Democratic Struggles of 1987. The Anti-Communist 
 Law could not prevent the sudden and explosive growth of publication of Marxist 
 literature which began in the mid-1980s. The government’s arrest  and acquittal of 
 Kim Tae-Gyeong, president of the publisher of the first volume of Capital in 1987 
 was the turning point. About 70 Korean versions of various works of Marx and 
 Engels were published during 1987-1991.87
 If Marx’s writings are no longer prohibited readings, how to interpret and apply  the 
National Security Act in general, and its article 7 in particular, is still a contentious issue in 
democratic South Korea, and one which raises the question of who is considered as included 
or not in the post-transition order. As a result, what appears problematic and at stake through 
the National Security Act goes beyond the possibility  to restrict fundamental rights per se, 
since such limitation is authorized in all democratic societies and regulated by article 37, 
section 2 of the South Korean constitution:
 The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by Act only when necessary for 
 national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare. Even when 
 such restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be 
 violated.
 This provision is construed by  South Korean jurists as the legal ground for the 
application of the proportionality test.88 The principle of proportionality is supposed to find 
its jurisprudential roots in German constitutional law, where it was first employed in the Lüth 
decision of 1958, that is to say, almost ten years after the creation of the Federal 
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87 Seongjin Jeong, ‘‘Marx in South Korea,’’ Socialism and Democracy, Vol.24, No.3, 2010, p.199.
88 Research Institute of the Constitutional Court of Korea, personal communication, September 2012.
Constitutional Court.89 As a method of balancing between competing constitutional interests 
(such as the protection of national security and of fundamental rights), proportionality has 
been refined into a four-step  process which is employed by courts such as the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court of Israel: (1) there should be a legitimate aim 
to the restriction of a basic right, (2) the means to achieve this aim (i.e., the concrete 
restriction) should be appropriate, (3) the means should be necessary, in the sense that it 
should be the least restrictive means to achieve the pursued aim, and (4) the balance between 
the concerned legal interests has to be proportionate. While the first three stages deal with 
the legitimacy of the aim and the adequacy  of the means, the last step represents a 
proportionality test  in the narrow sense, assessing whether the overall advantages of the 
restriction outweighs its disadvantages. 
 The fact that basic rights are not unconditional, and never stand as absolute, in the 
different constitutional and jurisprudential orders does not imply that democracies are 
arbitrary regimes in disguise. Their limitation of basic rights does not resuscitate the paradox 
of law suspending itself. Indeed, limitations, like derogations, remain within the confines of 
the normative framework in which they are explicitly  envisioned. The absence of paradox 
does not entail that restricting fundamental rights is an easy matter, but it  is permitted when 
justified by the pursuit of alternative democratic goods such as the preservation of public 
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89 BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958). Mr. Lüth had petitioned the court of Karlsruhe after an ordinary tribunal found that 
section 826 of the Civil Code prohibited him from making appeals to boycott the movies produced after 1945 
by Veit Harlan, a prominent Nazi film director. According to the ordinary court, his appeal to boycott was 
contrary to public policy and  to ‘‘the democratic convictions of law and morals of the German people’’ since 
Harlan had already been sentenced in a criminal proceeding for having committed Nazi crimes. In its decision, 
the constitutional court argued that it was not enough to determine the scope of Lüth’s freedom of expression in 
relation to the rules of civil law that allow its restriction. Instead, the court held that his freedom of expression 
had to weighed against ‘‘competing constitutional considerations’’  and, as a result of this balancing, concluded 
that it should be given priority to. According to Robert Alexy, ‘‘the lesson of the Lüth decision that is most 
important for everyday legal work runs, therefore, as follows: ‘A ‘balancing of interests’ becomes necessary.’ 
From a methodological point of view, the concept of balancing is the central concept in the adjudication of the 
Federal Constitutional Court, which has developed further the line first set out in the Lüth decision.’’ Robert 
Alexy, ‘‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality,’’ Ratio Juris, Vol.16, No.2, 2003, p.133.
order or national security. How to balance and reconcile apparently  contradictory 
constitutional interests remains a delicate endeavor, all the more since the criteria of what is 
a necessary and just restriction of basic rights are generally not specified by constitutions. 
Instead, it has been left to the courts to clarify them. 
 The militant character of the South Korean constitution is also contained in article 65 
concerning the impeachment of high officials. Contrary to the impeachment device that 
exists in the American constitution and is solely  oriented toward the sanctioning of high 
crimes like treason,90 the German basic law and the South Korean constitution additionally 
punish behavior deemed in violation of the constitution.91 This precaution may derive from 
the fact that, in the past, German and South Korean leaders alike have importantly 
contributed to the distortion of the constitutional order. For instance, the South Korean 
constitution was manipulated by  both Presidents Rhee Syngman (in 1954) and Park Chung-
hee in (1969) to extend the duration of the presidential term and allow them to stay in power 
while preserving a façade of legality. 
 As a result, the present version of the constitution states that the president, elected for 
five years, shall not be reelected (article 70). In addition, article 128, section 2 guarantees 
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90  ‘‘The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on 
impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.’’ (Article 2, 
section 4 of the United States Constitution).
91 ‘‘(1) In case the President, the Prime Minister, members of the State Council,  heads of Executive Ministries, 
justices of the Constitutional Court, judges, members of the National Election Commission, the Chairman and 
members of the Board of Audit and Inspection, and other public officials designated by Act have violated the 
Constitution or other Acts in the performance of official duties, the National Assembly may pass motions for 
their impeachment. 
   (2) A motion for impeachment prescribed in paragraph (1) may be proposed by one third or more of the total 
members of the National Assembly, and shall require a concurrent vote of a majority of the total members of 
the National Assembly for passage: Provided, That a motion for the impeachment of the President shall be 
proposed by a majority of the total members of the National Assembly and approved by two thirds or more of 
the total members of the National Assembly. 
   (3) Any person against whom a motion for impeachment has been passed shall be suspended from exercising 
his power until the impeachment has been adjudicated.
   (4) A decision on impeachment shall not extend further than removal from public office: Provided, That it 
shall not exempt the person impeached from civil or criminal liability.’’
(Article 65 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea).
that article 70 cannot be revised and the presidential term prolonged to benefit the 
incumbent.92 Interestingly, similar provisions were already inserted in the 1980 constitution, 
in which the presidential office was defined as ‘‘a one-time, seven-year term, with no 
possibility for constitutional amendment to extend one’s term or seek a second term.’’93 
According to Yoon Dae-kyu, ‘‘this was an important redeeming grace for the new military 
leadership, which lacked legitimacy’’ after having seized power through a military coup 
d’état in December 1979, the nationwide imposition of martial law, and the bloodshed of 
Kwangju.94   
 Obviously, the term limit introduced in 1980 was not a sufficient guarantee against 
undemocratic rule since the indirect mode of election for presidency  remained, ensuring that 
General Chun Doo-hwan and his associates would continue to monopolize power even after 
the end of Chun’s term. In 1987, the one-term limit was retained, not only  to avoid the 
constitutional abuses characteristic of the previous regimes, but out of a compromise 
between the three candidates of the coming presidential election: Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-
sam, and Kim Dae-jung. Indeed, 
 [N]one of the three prospective candidates was a sure bet to win. Everyone knew this. 
 For each candidate to minimize the risk of not gaining office, a compromise would 
 have to be reached. This ‘‘compromise’’ came in the form of constitutional reform, 
 that is, the amendment that would restrict  a president  to a single five-year term. Thus 
 whoever won  would be out of the running come the next election.95    
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92  ‘‘Amendments to the Constitution for the extension of the term of office of the President or for a change 
allowing for the reelection of the president shall not be effective for the president in office at the time of the 
proposal for such amendments to the Constitution.’’ (Article 128, section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Korea).
93 Dae-kyu Yoon, Law and Democracy in South Korea, p.19.
94 Ibidem.
95 Ibidem, p.27.
 The one-term limit did produce some of its intended effects as the three rivals of 
1987 succeeded one another at the head of the Republic of Korea. This outcome was made 
possible by the institutional mechanism established in articles 70 and 128, but was not 
predetermined by it. As discussed in chapter two, the logic of strategic and self-interested 
choices on the part of constitution-makers is a powerful, yet non-exhaustive one to account 
for the birth and development of institutions. Moreover, all the provisions instituted in the 
1987 revised constitution may not be readable through the prism of a clear compromise 
between the ruling elite and the opposition. On many issues, both parties - and especially  the 
opposition - had to settle for a less preferred option than their initial choice, which happened 
for the reform of the judiciary. 
 More importantly, institutional design only opens a set of possibilities without 
conditioning a given trajectory. An institution may function the way  it was intended to for 
other reasons than the ones initially envisioned, but it  can also deviate from the course that 
may have been more or less anticipated at the time of its conception. When it comes to the 
Constitutional Court of Korea, what strikes most is not the ability but rather the difficulty of 
actors to picture both its potential and future role, during the constitution-making process 
and beyond. 
 
The militant powers of the Constitutional Court of Korea in action: adjudicating the 2004 
motion for impeaching President Roh Moo-hyun
 As a result  of the militant character of the South Korean constitution, the 
constitutional court can dissolve political parties and impeach officials, including the 
President of the Republic of Korea. Actually, two distinct procedures exist against  potential 
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abuses of power committed by the chief of state: prosecution for treason (article 84 of the 
constitution) and impeachment for violation of the constitution (article 65). Article 65 does 
not explicitly attribute a role to the constitutional court, but article 111 includes 
impeachment in the jurisdiction of the institution.96 While no dissolution of a political party 
has yet been pronounced, the impeachment procedure was activated on one occasion. In 
2004, the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled on the impeachment case filed against 
President Roh Moo-hyun by Kim Ki-chun (Kim Ki-ch’un), chairman of the National 
Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee.97 
 The impeachment decision of 2004 provides a rare example of the Constitutional 
Court of Korea’s use of its militant powers. As with all judicial actions, such intervention 
was triggered as the result of a procedure set into motion by another actor, the parliament. 
Indeed, courts can never impulse the disputes that they  have to settle, and are therefore 
acting only reactively. In the matter at hand, the impeachment case against President Roh 
Moo-hyun was brought before the court after 193 members of the National Assembly (out of 
271 at the time) voted a motion for impeachment on March 12, 2004. The principal ground 
of the parliamentary  resolution was the alleged violation of Roh’s obligation to remain 
politically  neutral in electoral times. By  supporting a particular political party before the 
coming legislative elections, Roh was deemed to have acted ‘‘in contempt of the 
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96 ‘‘The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction over the following matters:
 1. The constitutionality of a law upon the request of the courts;
 2. Impeachment;
 3. Dissolution of a political party;
 4. Competence disputes between State agencies, between State agencies and local governments, and 
 between local governments; and
 5. Constitutional complaint as prescribed by Act.’’
(Article 111, section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea).
97 16-1 KCCR 609, 2004Hun-Na1, May 14, 2004.
constitutional institutions’’ according to an overwhelming majority of the National 
Assembly. 
 The decision rendered by the constitutional court is enlightening in so far as it reveals 
features of the court’s attitude vis-à-vis each of the two political branches. Moreover, it 
illustrates dynamics that are proper and internal to the institution itself. The petition for the 
impeachment adjudication was rejected by the constitutional court. Its ruling was justified 
through a fifty-page long reasoning which represents an affirmation of judicial independence 
toward both the executive and legislative powers.98 First  of all, the court refused to be bound 
by the National Assembly’s narrow vision of its role in this case. Instead, the responsibility 
envisioned by  the court for itself was much more comprehensive than the one ascribed to it 
by the parliament, which saw ‘‘the scope of the subject matter in the impeachment 
adjudication proceeding at  the Constitutional Court’’ as ‘‘limited to the question of the 
constitutionality and legality  of the impeachment procedures and to the question of whether 
or not the specific violations that allegedly constitute the grounds for impeachment in fact 
exist.’’99 
 While the justices recognized that the subject  matter of review was determined by the 
grounds for impeachment stated by the parliament, they  also asserted their capacity to 
‘‘determine the facts that led to the impeachment based on other relevant legal provisions’’ 
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98 16-1 KCCR 609, 2004Hun-Na1, May 14, 2004, in The Constitutional Court of Korea, Constitutional Court 
Decisions. Volume I, pp.289-341. This length corresponds to the translated English version of the ruling.
99 Ibidem, p.297.
than the ones ‘‘which the petitioner alleges have been violated.’’100 This reasoning enabled 
the court to find President Roh Moo-hyun guilty of some of the violations alleged by the 
National Assembly, but to construe these facts in light of other provisions than the ones 
invoked by the parliament. In the end, the court rejected the impeachment motion but its 
decision should not be read as demonstrating a bias in favor of the presidency. As mentioned 
above, the ruling did not amount to an absolute exculpation of the president. On the contrary, 
the court found that Roh Moo-hyun committed several infractions against the law, including 
the violation of his neutrality obligation in times of election. However, the court argued that 
not all violations of law justify a removal from office given the gravity of the effect of such a 
measure on democratic institutions themselves.
 [A] decision to remove the President from his or her office shall be justified in such 
 limited circumstances as where the maintenance of the presidential office can no 
 longer be permitted from the standpoint of the protection of the Constitution, or 
 where the President has lost the qualifications to administrate state affairs by 
 betraying the trust of the people.101
 
 Since the specific acts by which President Roh violated the law ‘‘cannot be deemed 
as a threat to the basic order of free democracy since there was no affirmative intent to stand 
against the constitutional order therein,’’102  the petition for impeachment was nullified. 
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100 ‘‘The Constitutional Court, as a judicial institution, is restrained in principle to the grounds for impeachment 
stated in the National Assembly’s impeachment resolution. Therefore, no other grounds for impeachment 
except those stated in the impeachment resolution constitute the subject matter to be adjudicated by the 
Constitutional Court at the impeachment adjudication proceeding. However, with respect to the ‘determination 
on legal provisions’ the violation of which is alleged in the impeachment resolution, the Constitutional Court in 
principle is not bound. Therefore, the Constitutional Court may determine the facts that led to the impeachment 
based on other relevant legal provisions as well as the legal provisions which the petitioner alleges have been 
violated. Also,  the Constitutional Court is not bound by the structure of the grounds for impeachment as 
categorized by the National Assembly in its impeachment resolution in determining the grounds for 
impeachment. Therefore, the question of in which relations the grounds for impeachment are legally examined 
is absolutely to be determined by the Constitutional Court.’’ Ibidem, p.296.
101 Ibidem, p.337.
102 Ibidem, p.339.
Interestingly, this outcome only represented the first part  of a twofold conclusion. The last 
paragraphs of the ruling are indeed dedicated to the court’s justification for not disclosing the 
process and result of its deliberation. Contrary to the ordinary practice of the institution,
 Here, non-disclosure of the deliberation by  the Constitutional Court Justices means 
 that neither the separate opinions of individual Justices nor the numbers thereof shall 
 be disclosed, as well as the course of the deliberation.103 
   
 Through defending its unanimous ruling, the court  tacitly admitted a dual divergence 
among justices: over the very  subject matter of review (some judges might have been in 
favor of a different  outcome than the rejection of the impeachment resolution but how many 
of them was not divulged), and over the issue of whether or not judges’ individual opinions 
should be disclosed. It can be inferred from the present case that the court decided to 
reinforce the legitimacy  of its ruling by  presenting a united front, but that the adoption of this 
very strategic position was itself premised upon the existence of contentious views within 
the institution. The ruling was not  the only decision involving highly political controversies 
that the court settled during its third term (from September 2001 to September 2007), when 
it also had to pronounce itself on the construction of a new ‘‘administrative capital’’ outside 
Seoul104 and on the electoral system of proportional representation.105 
 While the Third Term Court may be regarded as having reestablished the stature of 
 the Court as the final defender of the Constitution through its peaceful and orderly 
 adjudication of these  political cases, these decisions also stimulated fierce 
 discussions on the proper relationship  between the system of constitutional 
 adjudication on the one hand, and the principles of representative democracy and 
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103 Ibidem, p.340.
104 16-2(B) KCCR 1, 2004Hun-Ma554 et al., October 21, 2004.
105 13-2 KCCR 502, 2000Hun-Ma92 et al., October 25, 2001.
 majoritarian rule-making on the other hand. Fortunately, during its Third Term, the 
 Court received consistently the highest mark in surveys conducted by the media 
 asking the people’s opinion on state agencies which they felt  to be the most 
 trustworthy and influential.106
  
 The fruits that can be yielded from an analysis of constitutional courts’ militant 
powers are enriching, yet limited given these powers’ infrequent use. This is true for both the 
Constitutional Court of Korea and its many counterparts, inscribing the relative disuse of 
constitutional militant powers in the pattern described by John Ferejohn and Pasquale 
Pasquino for constitutional emergency  institutions. The role and rhetoric of protecting the 
constitutional order which the South Korean court has embraced is, however, irreducible to 
its militant functions. As will be examined in the rest of this dissertation, the institution has 
heavily mobilized the language of militant democracy  to review the security  instruments 
inherited from the authoritarian period and to justify their resilience in the post-transition 
era, thereby  highlighting the ambivalence of its commitment as guardian of the constitutional 
order. 
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Paradox of Constitutional Empowerment
‘‘MINBYUN was established during one of Korea’s most repressive 
regimes - the Roh Tae-Woo dictatorship of the Sixth Republic. This 
era was marked not only by a repression of basic human rights, but 
also by violence against those who publicly criticized the government. 
MINBYUN therefore sought to fill the critical gap in legal 
representation for activists, particularly those activists resisting the 
Roh dictatorship.’’
Minbyun, Lawyers for a Democratic Society
‘‘Spies such as Kim Nak-jung and his accomplices do not deserve the 
right  to legal assistance while in detention for interrogation. Allowing 
lawyers of Minbyun (the Association of Lawyers for Democracy) to 
have an interview with Kim Nak-jung and the other spies is like 
giving a child a knife. [...]. When the arrested people return from their 
meeting with the lawyers they become like soldiers returning from a 
victorious battle, very bold and upright. Lawyers advise them not to 
make any confession. The flow of interrogation is interrupted from 
this moment. Furthermore, if an application for a review of legality of 
detention is recognized, then all investigation comes to nothing. If a 
review of legality of detention is held, then arrested people must be 
brought to the court. There are among the audience at  the court 
members of their organization and the ensuing debate with the 
interrogators exposes all the information about  the investigation. And 
this is inevitably reported in the media. Then it becomes impossible to 
carry on the investigation [...].’’
Chong Hyong-kun, Deputy Director of the
Agency for National Security Planning, 1992
 This chapter questions the conditions which have led to the Constitutional Court of 
Korea’s empowerment after the 1987 change of regime. Indeed, the activation of judicial 
review did not result from political elites’ strategic design at the time of the transition, but 
was instead prompted by  the mobilization of human rights lawyers representing the groups 
marginalized by the institutionalization of democracy  and the continued deployment of 
security instruments. Their investment of constitutional justice as a site where to contest the 
non-inclusive legacy of the transition has presented the court with two tasks: undoing the 
politics of enmity’s effects in the present, but also addressing its abuses in the past. In this 
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regard, the South Korean path to transitional justice - or its avoidance - illustrates how the 
definition of enmity has remained a deep object of contention in the post-transition period 
and how the role played by the constitutional court in relation to it has been ambiguous. 
The 1987 transition and the displacement of enmity
 ‘‘People are the masters of the country, and the people’s will must come before 
everything else.’’1  On June 29, 1987, this dramatic acknowledgment was pronounced in a 
nationally televised address by an unlikely  voice for political reform: Roh Tae-woo. A few 
weeks earlier, Roh had been designated as the ruling Democratic Justice Party’s presidential 
candidate, a nomination which amounted to a succession choice by President Chun Doo-
hwan as the 1980 constitution provided for the indirect election of the president, leaving the 
vote in the hands of an electoral college dominated by the ruling elite. Roh’s speech was all 
the more surprising since the incumbent regime, brought to power by a 1979 military coup 
d’état in which Roh himself participated, had firmly resisted the opposition parties’ demand 
for constitutional reform since the mid-1980s. As unexpected as his declaration was, it did 
not come out of nowhere but was prompted by the mass street protests ignited in Seoul and 
other cities throughout South Korea by Roh’s designation as the handpicked successor of 
Chun Doo-hwan on June 10. 
 The mobilization against Chun’s regime did not start in 1987, but the scale of the 
struggle for change dramatically amplified in the spring and summer of that year. During 
these few months, the contestation sustained by the longtime anti-regime forces (mostly 
students, workers, and church activists) was joined by the urban middle class, outraged by 
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1 The New York Times, ‘‘Excerpts from Speech by Seoul Party Chief,’’  June 30, 1987.
widely  publicized abuses of power, such as the torture and death of Seoul National 
University  student activist Park Jong-chul (Pak Chong-ch’ŏl) during his interrogation by  the 
police.2  It is believed that a combination of factors, from the very scale of the June 
demonstrations to the prospect of the Olympic Games to be held in Seoul in 1988, prevented 
the ruling elite from resorting to martial law and violence,3 which it had done in 1980 to 
restore order, resulting in the death of hundreds protesters in the city of Kwangju.4
Negotiating change and continuity
 As repression did not appear a viable response to the mass rallies, now supported and 
fueled by the middle class, Roh’s June 29 speech heralded a series of eight major 
concessions, starting with the promise to amend the constitution and to revise the electoral 
law in order to allow for the direct and competitive election of the president. Following these 
two points, Roh announced the amnesty of political prisoners, including the restoration of 
dissident leader Kim Dae-jung’s civil and political rights, thus allowing him to take part in 
the race for the December 1987 presidential election. Roh’s declaration also proposed 
reforms aimed at promoting human rights, the freedom of the press, local autonomy, free 
political parties, and social renovation to ‘‘build a clean and honest society.’’5 
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3 Jung-Kwan Cho, From Authoritarianism to Consolidated Democracy in South Korea, Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, 2000, p.251.
4  Immediately after the incident, ‘‘estimates of casualties varied from the government's figure of 191 killed 
(including 23 soldiers), to claims by dissidents that 2,000 or more perished.’’  James West,  ‘‘Martial 
Lawlessness. The Legal Aftermath of Kwangju,’’ Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, Vol.6, No.1, 1997, p.93.
5 The New York Times, ‘‘Excerpts from Speech by Seoul Party Chief.’’
 The impact of these promises was immediate and twofold. On the one hand, the 
above-mentioned concessions ‘‘satisfied the basic demands of the relatively  conservative 
urban middle class that had tipped the balance in favor of popular reform,’’ while relegating 
in the background the more substantive demands of students and union leaders - such as ‘‘the 
freedom to organize labor, the institution of distributive justice, the elimination of the 
National Security Law, and the creation of a social welfare system that had also been a part 
of the protest agenda since the 1960s.’’6 On the other hand, the political opposition instantly 
seized the opportunity for change opened by the announced reforms and concentrated its 
efforts on negotiating the revision of the constitution to transform the presidential election 
into a direct vote. Consequently,
 
 The period from late June through December 1987 saw rapid implementation of 
 political reforms in an unusual mood of compromise between the ruling and 
 opposition parties. In July the government paroled 357 political offenders, amnestied 
 more than 2,000 other prisoners, and restored full political rights to prominent 
 opposition figure Kim Dae-jung. In August the National Assembly established a 
 committee to study  constitutional revision. Representatives of four parties took one 
 month to negotiate and propose a draft constitution that incorporated most of the 
 provisions long sought by  the opposition parties: greater press freedom and 
 protection for civil rights, a stronger National Assembly, and direct presidential 
 elections. After the bill passed the National Assembly, more than 93 percent  of the 
 voters approved the new draft in a plebiscite on October 28, 1987.7
 Whether political change is brought about by  a ‘‘ruptured’’ transition (in which the 
old regime is defeated), or a ‘‘pacted’’ one (when reform is the product of negotiations 
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between the ruling elite and the opposition), the amnesty of political prisoners is a 
preliminary and emblematic step in the effort to rectify  the politics of enmity pursued in the 
authoritarian days. In most transitional settings, the release of political prisoners is a 
characteristic claim of the opposition and a symbolic measure implemented early on. 
According to Pierre Lascoumes’ study of Germany, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey in the 
1990s, the prison population of each country  significantly decreased within a few months 
after the process of regime change began, reflecting a ‘‘broad categorization’’ of the notion 
of ‘‘political prisoners’’ in order to signal a clear break with the past.8  As the rules and 
boundaries of political participation are redefined, yesterday’s opponents cease to be 
criminalized or persecuted for activities which become part of the routine political process. 
Some of them even accede to power after having spent years behind bars or in exile, like 
Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung, respectively elected presidents in May 1994 and 
December 1997.
 An important task upon which a new democratic regime has to concentrate is to 
redress the terrible unbalance between the government’s power to punish and the procedural 
rights that individuals enjoy against its arbitrary  and discretionary exercise. For instance, 
article 12 of the South Korean constitution of 1987 details a series of procedural safeguards 
against unlawful arrest, detention, search, seizure, and interrogation. The prohibition of 
torture in the course of the criminal process is reaffirmed on two occasions: ‘‘no citizen shall 
be tortured or be compelled to testify against himself in criminal cases’’ (section 2) and ‘‘no 
confession obtained through torture or other coercive means shall be admitted as evidence of 
guilt’’ (section 7). These provisions are all the more meaningful in the post-1987 context 
since the repressive tactics of South Korean authoritarian regimes largely rested upon broad 
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police powers to arrest  and detain into custody for several weeks. If charges were eventually 
pressed, most suspects would be prosecuted for violating political control laws (‘‘chŏngch’i 
kyujepŏp’’), i.e., the National Security  Act and the Anti-Communist  Act (‘‘panʾgongpŏp’’) 
which were merged in 1980.9 Torture at  the pre-trial and interrogation stages was a common 
strategy to extract self-incriminating confessions on the basis of which convictions and 
sentences would be pronounced by tribunals.10
 However, the reform of the criminal process is not as easy  in practice as it may seem 
on the books. The same institutions infamously associated with the repressive apparatus 
(such as the police, prosecution, courts, prison administration) also have to be relied on to 
maintain public order and enforce the law after the change of regime. As a result, significant 
elements of structural continuity  are the lot  of most transitions.11 In South Korea, not only 
the former institutions in charge of repression were not purged - including special security 
agencies involved in investigation and surveillance, such as the Agency for National Security 
Planning  (‘‘kukka anjŏn kihoekbu’’) or the military  Defense Security Command (‘‘kukkun 
kimu saryŏngbu’’) - but some of the legal instruments exemplary of the old regime’s 
oppression stayed in place. This resilience is most prominently embodied by the National 
Security Act, used for decades by non-democratic governments to suppress dissent, but 
whose maintenance after 1987 was justified in the name of the security concerns which 
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endure on the divided Korean peninsula. The ideological conversion policy is another 
example of the numerous repressive tools which survived in the fabric of South Korean 
criminal law after 1987. This pattern of strong continuity does not mean that the notion of 
enmity has been left entirely intact in post-transitional South Korea, but its redefinition has 
only amounted to a partial displacement.
The redeployment of security instruments against pro-democracy activists
 As soon as the transitional process is set in motion and efforts directed at undoing the 
repressive policies of the former regime (amnesty  of political prisoners, protection of habeas 
corpus rights, etc.), limits can appear in the redefinition of enmity. In his comparative study 
of prison policies after political change, Pierre Lascoumes notes that the broad amnesty 
measures adopted in post-transitional Turkey, Russia, and South Africa were often restricted 
in practice by ‘‘domestic policy concerns (the struggle against groups identified as terrorists 
in Turkey) and the blurriness of the frontiers between common criminality and political 
actions (individuals convicted for economic motives in ex-USSR and nationalist groups from 
South African townships).’’12 Similar dynamics have been at stake in South Korea, where 
repressive instruments were revived against the continued mobilization of the forces 
advocating further political and social change after the transition: the people’s movement 
groups (‘‘minjung undong tanch’e’’), principally  composed of ‘‘blue-collar laborers, 
peasants, the urban poor, anti-regime politicians, and students.’’13 In particular, reunification 
between the two Koreas was a core claim of associations such as the National Alliance for 
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Democracy and Unification of Korea (‘‘minjujuŭi minjok t’ongil chŏn’guk yŏnhap’’ or 
‘‘chŏn’guk yŏnhap’’), founded in December 1991 as the result of a merger between twenty-
seven pro-democracy organizations.
 From the mid 1980s, reunification was considered as important as democratization, 
 but the main focus was on democratization. Social movement groups generally 
 believed that bringing about democratization would facilitate the discussion of 
 reunification and other issues. After  the June democracy movement in 1987, the 
 breakdown of the authoritarian regime created a relatively  free political atmosphere 
 and thus encouraged social movement groups to engage in movements with a variety 
 of issues. Students first displayed the courage to speak for reunification. By 
 participating in ideological debates regarding democracy  for the Korean peninsula 
 throughout the 1980s, they had realized that genuine democracy was impossible 
 without overcoming national division and reunifying North and South Korea. As the 
 territorial and ideological division had provided an easy justification for authoritarian 
 rule, it was imperative to bring peace to the peninsula in order to further democratize 
 Korean society.14
 However, while reunification imposed itself as one of the major issues after 1987, 
those promoting it very soon became targets of repression under the National Security Act. 
Indeed, although the relevance of the security  legislation was ‘‘publicly debated right after 
the establishment of the Roh [Tae-woo] government,’’ the National Security  Act was fully 
‘‘reinstated when Mun Ik-hwan visited North Korea in April 1989.’’15  Reverend Mun Ik-
hwan, a longtime pro-democracy  and human rights activist, traveled to North Korea with 
two other persons in the spring of 1989 in order to meet with Kim Il-sung and discuss the 
issue of reunification. As their visit had not been authorized by the South Korean 
government, they were arrested upon their return for violating the National Security Act, 
whose article 6 forbids to ‘‘infiltrate from’’ (‘‘chamip’’) or ‘‘escape to’’ (‘‘t’alch’ul’’) 
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‘‘territory under the control of an anti-state organization’’ (‘‘pan kukka tanch’eŭi chibaehae 
innŭn chiyŏk’’). 
 Throughout the security legislation, the expression ‘‘pan kukka tanch’e’’ stands for 
‘‘anti-state organization’’ but actually  refers to North Korea. The designation of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as an ‘‘anti-state organization’’ in the National 
Security Act expresses the vision harbored in article 3 of the constitution since 1948 that the 
territory of the Republic of Korea consists of the entire Korean peninsula. As a result, North 
Korea is not characterized as an ‘‘enemy country’’ but as a mere ‘‘anti-state organization’’ 
which ‘‘claims to be a government.’’ Since the South’s sovereignty extends to the northern 
part of the peninsula de jure, this portion of the national territory is described as being de 
facto ‘‘under the control of an anti-state organization.’’ Therefore, article 6 criminalizes 
visiting North Korea by punishing ‘‘infiltration from’’ or ‘‘escape to territory under the 
control of an anti-state organization’’ by up to ten years of imprisonment. 
 Immediately  after Mun Ik-hwan’s unauthorized visit to North Korea, the Roh 
administration set up the Public Security Investigations Headquarters (‘‘kongan susa 
ponbu’’) in order to coordinate the work of police, intelligence, and national security 
agencies and crackdown more effectively on the anti-state activities criminalized under the 
security legislation.16
 This organ, which was in existence from early April through late June 1989, 
 investigated  student union groups, dissident organizations, and an antigovernment 
 newspaper, eventually arresting more than 500 persons [...] under the broad terms of 
 the National Security Act. The [Public] Security  Investigations Headquarters was 
 disbanded in June under pressure from the National Assembly. Public prosecutors 
 and the Agency for National Security Planning, however, continued making arrests 
 and pursuing investigations into a variety of political activities on national security 
 grounds. There also was a resumption of the quasi-legal or illegal practices common 
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 in national security cases before 1988: breaking into the campaign 
 headquarters of an opposition candidate in a by-election in July; publishing lists of 
 banned ‘‘anti-state’’ books even after a civil court ruling that  such a ban was illegal; 
 arresting people for reading or possessing books considered to be pro-North Korean; 
 arresting an antigovernment journalist for planning unauthorized coverage of North 
 Korea; and ignoring court orders to allow arrested political detainees to meet with 
 their attorneys. By the end of 1989, all people who had traveled to North Korea 
 without authorization had been convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.17
 This included not only Reverend Mun Ik-kwan, but  also Lim Su-kyung (Im Su-
gyŏng), ‘‘a fourth-year undergraduate French major at  the Hanguk Foreign Language 
University  in Seoul, who traveled secretly  and illegally  to North Korea’’ in order to attend 
the Thirteen World Festival of Youth and Students (WFYS) held in Pyongyang in the 
summer 1989.18 While the number of individuals prosecuted under the National Security  Act 
had dropped from over 400 in 1987 to about 100 in 1988, statistics peaked again in 
1989-1990 to reach their pre-transitional level.19  Post-1987 repression centered on any 
activity connected to North Korea, even if it was obvious that the incriminated acts - such as 
a newspaper coverage on the country - did not pose a danger to national security.20 The high 
number of people arrested in the early 1990s not only indicated a broad construction of the 
notion of ‘‘anti-state crimes’’ on the part of the government, but it also reflected that the 
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confrontational relation between the state and the forces involved in the democratization 
movement persisted after 1987. 
 Rather than being a legacy of the old regime, the resilience of repressive patterns thus 
appears as an outcome of the transition and of democracy’s institutionalization by  elites to 
the exclusion of the actors, demands, and alternative ‘‘national’’ imaginary  of the popular 
democratization movement. As the continued mobilization of people’s movement groups has 
been answered by successive elected governments through the security instruments inherited 
from the authoritarian years on the ground of their radicalism,21 constitutional adjudication 
has become invested by such groups as one of the only available sites where to contest the 
boundaries of enmity in contemporary South Korea. Far from being spontaneous and 
systematic, this strategic resort to the legal and constitutional stages has been made possible 
by the mediation of associations such as ‘‘Lawyers for a Democratic Society’’ or 
‘‘Minbyun.’’ 
 For Minbyun and the interests that it represented, challenging the construction of 
enmity has not only  implied to undo its effects in the present, but  also to address the issue of 
past wrongdoings and wrongdoers. Indeed, a political transition does not imply that the 
pillars and supporters of yesterday’s regime automatically  turn into enemies. This is 
particularly obvious for transitions which are negotiated and where the former ruling elite 
remains a regular actor of the new process (through an institutionalized political party for 
instance) and can stay in power if it  wins elections (as was the case in South Korea with the 
presidential victory of ex-General Roh Tae-woo). Moreover, even where the temptation to 
treat the leaders and partisans of the old regime as public enemies exists, at least from certain 
segments of the population, the realization of this desire is likely to be incompatible with the 
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very legal principles that the new democratic regime tries to uphold, such as the requirement 
that no crime be punished as a result of retroactive legislation.22 The South Korean path to 
transitional justice - characterized by the reluctance of political elites to come to terms with 
the past and by the mobilization of civil society  to put it on trial - illustrates how the 
definition of enmity has remained a deep object of contention in the post-transition period 
and how the role played by the constitutional court in relation to it has been central but 
ambivalent. 
 
Anticipated punishability and the ‘‘criminal law of enmity’’
 An interesting feature of the National Security Act is the dual continuity  that it 
embodies. Indeed, the law not only  survived the 1987 transition to democracy  but originally 
derives from the security legislation established during the colonial era by the Japanese 
authorities. More specifically, it was based on the Peace Preservation Law enacted in 1925 
against ‘‘radical social movements,’’ namely socialism, communism, and anarchism, which 
were not only active in Japan but fueled resistance in its colonies. As a result, the law was 
also ‘‘applied to Korea, Taiwan, and Karafuto through an imperial edict.’’23 
 The 1925 security  legislation was not without precedent in Japan, but it  was the first 
one to incorporate the notion of ‘‘kokutai’’ into law (that is to say, the idea of ‘‘national 
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essence’’), thus punishing ‘‘anyone who has formed a society  with the objective of altering 
the national polity [‘‘kokutai’’] or the form of government or denying the system of private 
property’’ as well as ‘‘anyone who has discussed the execution of matters’’ relating to these 
three objectives.24  Under this framework, ‘‘anti-kokutai’’ activities not only  encompassed 
behaviors endangering the institutions in place but also crimes of ideological deviance 
against the ‘‘spirit’’ of the nation.
 In the 1930s and early 1940s, the Japanese government and colonial authorities 
 waged total war against such heretical thought trends and tried to secure the spiritual 
 unity  of the empire by  combining ideological indoctrination, various forms of social 
 control, and criminal justice.  One characteristic of social and ideological control in 
 this period was that the state was not satisfied with controlling behavior but was 
 obsessed with mastering the minds of the subject as well.25 
 The German legal scholar Günther Jakobs has evoked the notion of ‘‘anticipated 
punishability’’ to describe these measures which punish by  anticipation a likely deviance 
from the law, instead of punishing by  reaction a realized offense. Taken as a whole, they 
shape what Jakobs calls the ‘‘criminal law of enmity,’’ in which the criterion of 
dangerousness associated with the enemy  replaces the criterion of culpability  associated with 
the ordinary criminal. This displacement allows to justify the imposition of sanctions aimed 
at preventing a probable harm rather than punishing an accomplished act.26 While it is highly 
questionable whether these measures should exist in democratic states since their existence 
contravene some of the fundamental principles of the rule of law, it cannot be contested that 
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such measures have already been inserted in the fabric of various legal orders, both 
procedurally and substantially.27 
 Procedurally, the ‘‘criminal law of enmity’’ comprises curtailments of personal liberty 
which are not imposed as a form of retributive sentencing but on the basis of a presumption 
of dangerousness. They include security surveillance and preventive confinement, to which 
individuals can be subject before they are tried or after they  have served their time in jail. 
Substantially, the ‘‘criminal law of enmity’’ comprises restrictions on civil liberties such as 
the freedom of expression or association in order to impede the realization of serious 
infractions. For instance, support to or membership in a ‘‘criminal association in relation to a 
terrorist undertaking’’ is criminalized in France, which ‘‘allows the authorities to intervene 
with the aim of preventing terrorism well before the commission of a crime.’’28  These 
provisions can be defended as sanctioning behaviors which are grave and dangerous enough 
to be considered as infractions on their own, whether or not they lead to the perpetration of 
acts of violence. According to Günther Jakobs, this justification however amounts to 
concealing the logic of ‘‘anticipated punishability’’ behind restrictions which limit free 
speech and association to preempt the realization of further offenses. It is important to note 
that South Korea’s 1987 constitution authorizes a preemptive use of criminal law within the 
frame of its article 12, section 1:
 No person shall be punished, placed under preventive restrictions or subject to 
 involuntary labor except as provided by Act and through lawful procedures.
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 As a result, preventive restrictions per se cannot be, and never were, found contrary 
to the constitution by the Constitutional Court of Korea. Yet, the scope and the procedures 
surrounding them have been deemed excessive and inadequate on several occasions. 
Punishment by anticipation is not a resource used against designated national security 
enemies only. As underlined by Jakobs, it is also widely  deployed against those who are 
identified as dangerous in the social sphere, such as certain categories of sexual offenders 
and recidivists. 
 In South Korea, the 1980 Social Protection Act (‘‘sahoe pohopŏp’’) was for instance 
enacted at the onset  of Chun Doo-hwan’s authoritarian regime, to impose preventive 
confinement (‘‘poho kamho’’) on vagrants and repeat criminals, who were to be sent to the 
Samch’ŏng re-education camp created the same year. Article 5 of the Social Protection Act 
prescribed two forms of preventive custody: mandatory (i.e., under certain circumstances, 
judges were required to sentence to a ten-year period of preventive confinement, regardless 
of the likelihood of recidivism) and discretionary (i.e., judges could sentence to a seven-year 
period of preventive confinement if they found a likelihood of recidivism). In one of its 
earliest cases, the constitutional court unanimously ruled mandatory preventive confinement 
unconstitutional, while discretionary confinement was upheld by a majority of seven 
judges.29  A blanket provision comparable to mandatory preventive confinement under the 
Social Protection Act could be found after 1987 in the Security Surveillance Act (‘‘poan 
kwanch’alpŏp), which made it impossible for anyone subject to a security  surveillance 
measure to order an injunction against it.
 
 A security surveillance disposition is issued against persons who committed such 
 crimes as espionage or who violated certain statutes of the National Security  Act. A 
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 person subject to security surveillance is required to report one’s principal activities 
 for a three-month period, contents of meeting or communications with other persons, 
 also subject to security  surveillance, and matters relating to trips, and if the individual 
 fails to report the aforementioned matters or does not  follow the limitations imposed 
 by the authority, he or she would be subject to criminal prosecution.30
 On April 26, 2001, the court concluded to the unconstitutionality of the absolute ban 
in a unanimous decision. While security surveillance itself was never called into question, 
the court reasoned that ‘‘an absolute ban on injunction was adopted not because it was 
inevitable, but rather because priority  had been given to administrative convenience and 
efficiency in legislating the Act.’’31 
 The National Security Act can also be read as displaying important elements of South 
Korea’s criminal law of enmity, both substantially (through article 7 which criminalizes the 
expression of any form of support to an ‘‘anti-state organization’’) and procedurally (through 
article 19). Article 19 of the security legislation extends the maximum length of detention 
pending criminal charges from thirty to fifty  days for individuals suspected of having 
engaged in anti-state activities. In the ordinary criminal process, suspects can be detained by 
the police for up to ten days before formal charges are filed, and then for up  to ten days by 
the prosecutors’ office before it determines whether or not to indict. This ten-day period can 
be renewed upon a request made by the public prosecutor to a court. In the case of national 
security suspects, custody  can be extended by  ten days for police investigation, and another 
ten days for prosecutorsʼ investigation under article 19 of the security legislation.
 Contrary  to the ordinary criminal who is sanctioned for an instance of non-conform 
behavior based on his culpability, the enemy is he who is expected to have a durable non-
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conform behavior, justifying his punishment on the basis of a mere expectation or 
presumption of dangerousness. Jakobs’ definition of enmity is therefore restricted to the idea 
that society considers as enemies the individuals who cannot be presumed to be willing to 
abide by the law. This operation of identification is illustrated by South Korea’s conversion 
policy which required national security offenders to demonstrate their will to respect the 
legal order - through a confession until 1998, and through an oath until 2003 - in order to be 
released. As a result, he who did not pledge to abide by the existing laws - including the 
National Security Act - remained considered as dangerous and could not be freed.
 In the 1990s, South Korean jails were therefore still holding a number of political 
prisoners sentenced before the transition, usually  in the absence of due process and on the 
basis of dubious evidence (such as confessions extracted through torture). Not only had their 
convictions never been reviewed but many of them were excluded from the amnesty 
measures periodically and selectively granted by post-1987 governments. As a result, the 
world’s longest-serving political prisoners could be found in the South at the end of the 
1990s. They included Kim Sun-myung (Kim Sŏn-myŏng), released in 1995 after 45 years 
spent behind  bars, and Woo Yong-gak (U Yong-gak) liberated in 1999 in the wake of a 42-
year long stay in prison.32 
 Their prolonged detention was attributed to their status as ‘‘pijŏnhyang changgisu,’’ 
that is to say, ‘‘unconverted long-term prisoners.’’ As these detainees refused to comply with 
the ideological conversion policy and recant their belief in communism, their liberation was 
postponed until they  reached the year of their 70th birthday. Some of the ‘‘unconverted 
prisoners’’ were serving time for crimes, such as espionage, which they  always denied 
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committing, and refused to submit conversion statements for beliefs they claimed to have 
never held. That was for instance the case of Cho Sang-rok (Cho Sang-nok), one of the 
detainees who challenged the conversion system before the constitutional court in 1998 and 
whose complaint is analyzed in chapter six.33
 The fate of the ‘‘pijŏnhyang changgisu’’ illustrates some of the deep ambiguities of 
the human rights situation under the presidency of Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003). On the one 
hand, Kim Sun-myung, Woo Yong-gak, and sixty-one fellow prisoners claiming loyalty to 
the North Korean government were repatriated to Pyongyang on September 2, 2000, in the 
wake of the summit meeting held between the two Koreas.34 As symbolic and unprecedented 
as this dual crossing of the 38th parallel was (by the Kim Dae-jung in June, and by sixty-
three ‘‘unconverted long-term prisoners’’ in September), it did not seal the end of South 
Korea’s politics of enmity. By 2000, individuals sentenced under the National Security Act 
were still subjected to a revised version of the conversion policy, transformed into a 
requirement to pledge obedience to the laws of South Korea in 1998. Moreover, the use of 
the National Security Act did not wane under the administration of Kim Dae-jung. Despite 
two prisoner amnesties in March and July of 1998 which liberated over 150 political 
detainees, 360 of them still remained incarcerated by  the end of the year, including 270 
individuals held under the NSA.35
  Those who have called for the abolition of the security legislation since 1987 do not 
deny the existence of security concerns justifying adequate legal instruments to deal with 
them. However, they contend that the law cannot fulfill such a purpose given the extensive 
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definition of anti-state crimes that it allows and which has been made advantage of by 
surveillance and investigation agencies even in the post-transition period. This does not 
mean that anti-state threats have been inexistent and entirely fantasized by the actors in 
charge of thwarting them. At the time of the transition alone, their realness could not be 
doubted: on November 29, 1987, exactly  a month after the revised constitution was adopted, 
two North Korean agents for instance succeeded in planting a bombing device on board of 
the Korean Air Flight 858, making the aircraft explode in mid-air on its way to Seoul and 
killing all its passengers.36 
 While the democratic transition made neither threats from North Korea nor 
problematic uses of national security fade away, the change of regime has however entailed 
that such uses can no longer go entirely  unchecked. Indeed, one of the major impacts of the 
transition is the contention that it has unleashed around defining the contours of enmity, 
leading to the investment of constitutional adjudication as a site where to challenge the ways 
in which the boundaries of what counts as ‘‘national’’ or ‘‘anti-national’’ are drawn and 
implemented. 
The investment of constitutional justice as a site of contestation against the non-
inclusive bias of the transition
Human rights lawyers and the court’s empowerment from below 
 Courts are neither initial nor primary actors in any policy issue, as conception and 
enforcement rest in the hands of the political branches. Moreover, the control exercised by 
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constitutional courts is reactive, triggered by  other actors requesting judicial review. Indeed, 
courts can solely pronounce themselves on matters that are brought before them. In the 
context of post-1987 South Korea, constitutional justice can be activated as a result of a 
request from the ordinary tribunals or by  a direct petition from anyone who claims that one 
of his or her basic rights guaranteed by the constitution has been infringed. When introduced 
in the 1988 Constitutional Court Act, these mechanisms (and in particular direct 
constitutional complaints which account for 80% of the cases received by  the court) were not 
destined to encounter the success which has accompanied them. As this dissertation 
contends, the strength of judicial review was not predetermined by political elites’ 
calculations at the time of the court’s design. Instead, the court’s empowerment has 
proceeded from the investment of constitutional adjudication as a site of contestation by the 
forces politically marginalized in the post-transition era. 
 This claim is for instance supported by the work of Patricia Goedde on public interest 
lawyering,37 a term which she prefers to the concept of ‘‘cause lawyering’’ to describe the 
‘‘[use of] legal skills to pursue ends and ideals that  transcend client service - be those ideals 
social, cultural, political, economic, or, indeed, legal.”38 In South Korea, the strategic resort 
to law to further democratization after 1987 has been the deed of a minority  of actors among 
the legal profession, whose two main traditional characteristics can be identified as ‘‘state 
service and elitism.’’39 
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Table 10. The evolution of the Korean legal profession.




1971 32,139,000 387 350 748 1,485 21,642
1976 35,860,000 482 386 819 1,697 21,131
1981 38,693,000 571 409 1,013 1,993 19,414
1986 41,568,000 837 557 1,483 2,877 14,448
1990 42,869,000 1,124 787 2,742 4,653 9,213
1995 45,093,000 1,374 987 3,731 6,092 7,402
2000 47,008,000 1,724 1,287 4,699 7,710 6,097
2003 47,925,000 1,912 1,514 5,915 9,341 5,131
Source: Dae-Kyu Yoon, ‘‘The Paralysis of Legal Education,’’ p.41.
 If the former trait - state service - has been subject to change with the increasing 
number of attorneys practicing in private firms (from 1,000 individuals in 1981 to almost 
6,000 in 2003), the second feature - elitism - remains largely unaltered. According to Yoon 
Dae-kyu, 
 One unique characteristic of Korea is that judges, prosecutors, and attorneys share a 
 ‘‘guild  mentality.’’ Along with the fraternities formed by the standardized education 
 under the JRTI [Judicial Research and Training Institute], the fact that  most judges 
 and prosecutors join the bar before their retirement reinforces this esprit de corps.40
 
 As underlined by  Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, the deep ties of the Korean legal 
profession are intensified by the importance of alumni relations nurtured in the country’s top 
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universities (such as Seoul National University, Koryo, and Yonsei),41  and which will 
probably  continue to structure the closed community  of South Korean legal elites despite the 
introduction of a law school system adopted in 2007.
 In the late 1980s, South Korean counted no more than 1,500 licensed attorneys. Out 
of them, a group of fifty-one ‘‘human rights lawyers’’ (‘‘inkwon byŏnhosa’’) active under the 
authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1987) 
founded in 1988 the association ‘‘Lawyers for a Democratic Society’’, or ‘‘Minbyun,’’ in 
order to advocate the cases of democracy activists sanctioned for their continued 
mobilization in the aftermath of the transition.42  According to the association’s own 
narrative, Minbyun was indeed established ‘‘during one of Korea’s most repressive regimes - 
the Roh Tae-Woo dictatorship of the Sixth Republic. This era was marked not only  by a 
repression of basic human rights, but also by violence against those who publicly criticized 
the government.’’43 
 In this context, Minbyun ‘‘was immediately inundated with requests for legal defense, 
including the high profile torture-to-death case of Park Jong-Chul [Pak Chong-ch’ŏl], the 
sexual-torture case of Kwon In-Sook [Kwŏn In-suk] at Bucheon Police Station, and the 
unapproved visit to North Korea taken by Lim Soo-Kyung [Im Su-gyŏng] and Rev. Moon 
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Ik-Hwan [Mun Ik-kwan].’’44  Minbyun’s lawyers also ‘‘defended a number of clients who 
violated the National Security  Act, including the Socialist Workers Alliance of Korea, a 
group committed to creating a socialist society, and the Seoul Social Science Research 
Institute, which produced research on both Marxism and socialism.’’45 Thus,
 Minbyun’s main area of focus was human (or civil) rights protection, especially 
 defending those the government abused under the pretext of the National Security 
 Law or laborers who  protested their working conditions. Between 1988 and 1994, 
 forty percent of Minbyun’s cases (over 580 in total) dealt with the National Security 
 Law or the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations. On the whole, these lawyers were 
 an anomaly  within the legal profession. Representing political prisoners or laborers, 
 these lawyers were stigmatized as troublemakers or even pro-communist  by the state. 
 Furthermore, despite the transition to democracy in the late 1980s, the “misfit” label 
 lingered well into the early 1990s [...].46 
 
 It is in the context of Minbyun’s mobilization to represent the forces politically 
marginalized from the post-transition order that constitutional adjudication came to be 
construed as a ‘‘center stage’’ 47  in the dispute over the boundaries of enmity after regime 
change. The empowerment of the constitutional court from below contradicts the argument 
which has been made that the introduction of a strong mechanism of judicial review was 
desired by all South Korean political parties in light of the electoral uncertainty  that they 
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faced in 1987.48 What the new institution would be and do was indeed very  indeterminate for 
most actors in the course and immediate aftermath of the constitution-making process, as 
contended in this dissertation’s chapter two. Rather than elites’ calculations, the strategy  of 
human rights lawyers to invest the site of constitutional adjudication in order to challenge 
the uses made of national security, supported by the court’s liberal construction of the rules 
governing cases’ admissibility, have contributed to turn the institution into an actor most 
prominently  involved in reforming the politics of enmity. This does not however imply that 
the Constitutional Court of Korea has necessarily lived up to the hopes of litigants as did its 
American counterpart in the 1960s. 
The ambivalence of the court’s response
 Following Charles Epp’s famous thesis, the ‘‘rights revolution’’ consecrated by the 
United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the 1960s should not be attributed to the 
activism of its judges but, instead, to the successful rights advocacy  of civic groups. This 
strategic use of litigation was premised upon the development of an appropriate ‘‘support 
structure for legal mobilization, consisting of rights-advocacy organizations, rights-advocacy 
lawyers, and sources of financing, particularly government-supported financing.’’49 
 This support structure has been essential in shaping the rights revolution. Because the 
 judicial process is costly and slow and produces changes in the law only in small 
 increments, litigants cannot hope to bring about meaningful change in the law unless 
 they  have access to significant resources. For this reason, constitutional litigation in 
 the United States until recently was dominated by the claims of powerful businesses; 
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 they  alone commanded the resources necessary to pursue claims with sufficient 
 frequency, acumen, and perseverance to shape the development of constitutional law. 
 And for this reason, too, constitutional law and the courts largely ignored the 
 potential constitutional rights claims of ordinary individuals. The rights revolution 
 grew out of the growing capacity  of individual rights advocates to pursue the forms 
 of constitutional adjudication perfected by organized businesses, but for very 
 different ends. The growth of the support structure, therefore, significantly 
 democratized access to the Supreme Court.50
 In South Korea where access to constitutional adjudication has been facilitated by 
mechanisms such as direct constitutional complaints and the strategic advocacy of 
associations like Minbyun, the court has however embraced its role as guardian of the 
constitution in a double way. Its jurisprudence has yielded important gains for litigating 
forces, but  only partial ones: while setting limits on the permissible uses of national security, 
the court’s rulings have also fundamentally consolidated the mechanisms of exclusion 
enforcing the non-inclusive bias of the transition as will be discussed in the rest  of this 
dissertation. 
 Similarly  ambivalent dynamics have been described in other contexts, such as Israel. 
In his article on lawyering in the West Bank and Gaza, George Bisharat for instance 
introduces a distinction between the immaterial legitimation costs incurred by Palestinians 
when resorting to Israeli military  courts in the Occupied Territories, and the tangible benefits 
achieved by lawyers for the cause of their clients.51  Overall, ‘‘although the victories of 
lawyers representing Palestinians have been decidedly modest, and their work has had some 
legitimation effects, nonetheless the benefits of their work have likely outweighed the 
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costs’’ given the concreteness of the gains obtained for the concerned individuals, such as a 
reduced length of detention, or protection against torture.52
 In post-transition South Korea, the disagreement over the meaning of what  counts as 
‘‘national’’ and ‘‘anti-national’’ which security instruments have policed and suppressed in 
the public sphere has, instead, unfolded on the site of constitutional justice. Yet, the 
Constitutional Court of Korea has contributed to both stage and interrupt the political dispute 
over the boundaries of enmity in the democratic era. The trajectory of the institution 
therefore illustrates the part  of contingency and absence of predestination that judicial 
empowerment can involve. Put differently, even if interests pervade constitutional and 
institutional design, they do not necessarily shape them in a causal way.
 What has most contributed to empower the Constitutional Court of Korea is less the 
will of the elites who fashioned it  than the investment of constitutional justice by politically 
marginalized forces to contest the mechanisms enforcing the non-inclusive legacy  of the 
transition. Constitutional adjudication has been an important, yet limited, arena of 
contention. This dual logic is for instance exemplified by  the repeated challenges to the 
National Security Act which the court has received since 1989 and settled in ways which 
have imposed constraints on the security  legislation while also affirming its post-transition 
validity and relevance. 
 All cases but two (90Hun-Ma82 on article 19, decided in 1992, and 2002Hun-Ka5 on 
article 13, rendered in 2002) resulted in decisions of constitutionality, limited 
constitutionality, rejection, or dismissal. As underlined in chapter two, a decision of partial 
constitutionality does not create an obligation for the legislature to amend the incriminated 
provisions but merely specifies the correct interpretation which has to be made of them.
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Table 11. Challenges to the National Security Act before the Constitutional Court of Korea between 
1989 and 2009.
Decision number Decision date Provisions of NSA 
under review
Outcome of the 
decision








90Hun-Ma82 April 14, 1992 Article 19 unconstitutionality
90Hun-Ka11 June 25, 1990 Article 7 provision 5 limited 
constitutionality
90Hun-Ba23 April 14, 1992 Article 9 provision 2 constitutionality
92Hun-Ba6 January 16, 1997 Article 4 provision 1 ; 
Article 6 provision 1 ; 
Article 7 provisions 1, 3, 




92Hun-Ba26 January 16, 1997 Article 4 provision 1 ; 
Article 6 provision 1 ; 
Article 7 provisions 1, 3, 




93Hun-Ba34 January 16, 1997 Article 4 provision 1 
section 2 ; Article 7 
provisions 1, 3, 5 ; 




93Hun-Ba35 January 16, 1997 Article 4 provision 1 
section 2; Article 7 
provisions 1, 3, 5 ; 




93Hun-Ba36 January 16, 1997 Article 4 provision 1 
section 2 ; Article 6 
provision 1 ; Article 7 
provisions 1, 3, 5 ; 




95Hun-Ka2 October 4, 1996 Article 7 provision 1, 3, 
5 
constitutionality
96Hun-Ka8 June 26, 1997 Article 19 constitutionality
96Hun-Ka9 June 26, 1997 Article 19 constitutionality
96Hun-Ka10 June 26, 1997 Article 19 constitutionality
96Hun-Ma48 August 21, 1997 Article 19  rejection 
96Hun-Ba35 July 16, 1998 Article 10 constitutionality
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97Hun-Ba85 August 27, 1998 Article 6 provision 2 limited 
constitutionality
98Hun-Ba29 April 29, 1999 non specified, totality of 
the text
dismissal
99Hun-Ba12 April 29, 1999 non specified, totality of 
the text
dismissal
99Hun-Ba27 April 25, 2002 Article 6 provisions 1, 2 ; 
Article 7 provisions 1, 3, 




99Hun-Ba51 April 25, 2002 Article 6 provisions 1, 2 ; 
Article 7 provisions 1, 3, 




2000Hun-Ba33 May16, 2000 Article 13 rejection
2000Hun-Ba45 June 2, 2000 non specified, totality of 
the text
dismissal
2000Hun-Ba62 August 23, 2000 Article 4 provision 1 
section 2
dismissal
2000Hun-Ba66 May 15, 2003 Article 8 provisions 1 
and 3
constitutionality
2002Hun-Ka5 November 28, 
2002
Article 13 unconstitutionality
2003Hun-Ba85 August 26, 2004 Article 7 provisions 1 
and 5
constitutionality
2003Hun-Ba102 August 26, 2004 Article 7 provisions 1 
and 5
constitutionality
2004Hun-Ma839 November 16, 
2004
Declaration to abolish 
the NSA
dismissal
2004Hun-Ba28 July 31, 2008 Article 3 provision 1 
section 2
dismissal
2005Hun-Ma109 February 15, 2005 Declaration to abolish 
the NSA
dismissal
2009Hun-Ma121 March 31, 2009 non specified, totality of 
the text
dismissal
 Following the constitutional court’s 1990 landmark judgment on the limited 
constitutionality of article 7 (89Hun-Ka113), several parts of the security legislation were 
amended by  the National Assembly  on May 31, 1991. This revision has not, however, put an 
end to the post-transition dispute over the construction of enmity, and the National Security 
Act has continued to be repeatedly challenged. Since 1991, the constitutional court has 
mostly  contended itself to admit  the presence of ‘‘remaining ambiguities in the new law’’ in 
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general, and its article 7 in particular, without pronouncing it invalid. On two occasions only, 
the court concluded to the straight unconstitutionality of certain provisions: first, in relation 
to article 19 of the National Security  Act extending the period of authorized detention from 
thirty to fifty  days to investigate anti-state crimes; and second, in connection to article 13 on 
aggravated punishment.53 Yet, no legislative correction has been brought to the sanctioned 
elements by the parliament. 
 This resistance illustrates that constitutional courts do not have the last  word over the 
issues that they settle. Indeed, their rulings may be final but they are not ‘‘self-executing.’’ 
They  have to rely  upon other institutions to be enforced, a dependency which led Alexander 
Hamilton to portray the judiciary  at ‘‘the least  dangerous’’ branch of government in 
Federalist Paper 78:
 Whoever attentively  considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, 
 in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the 
 nature of its functions, will always be the least  dangerous to the political rights of the 
 Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The 
 Executive not  only  dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The 
 legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by  which the duties 
 and rights of every  citizen are to be regulated. The  judiciary, on the contrary, has no 
 influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of 
 the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It  may truly be 
 said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
 depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.54 
 In the wake of Hamilton’s comments, several scholars have called into question the 
ability  of constitutional courts to produce change. In its seminal 1957 article on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Robert  Dahl argued that the court, as a policy-maker, is by itself, ‘‘almost 
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powerless to affect the course of national policy.’’55  Indeed, ‘‘the Court is least effective 
against a current lawmaking majority - and evidently  least  inclined to act’’ because its policy 
choices are likely to be reversed by congressional action.56  In the early 1990s, Gerald 
Rosenberg articulated a general theory of judicial efficacy - or lack thereof. Given that 
‘‘legal victories do not automatically  or even necessarily produce the desired change’’ while 
judicial action cannot be assumed to be completely ineffective, the aim of Rosenberg’s study 
is to identify the conditions under which courts can successfully  bring about social reform.57 
Rosenberg thus demonstrates how a number of institutional and structural constraints have to 
be overcome for change to take place.58  Consequently, courts are but unconstrained and 
isolated institutions free to shape policies as they wish. As pointed by Ran Hirschl,
 Once a system of constitutional review is put in place, powerful political stakeholders 
 continue their quest to control the composition of courts and to ensure jurisprudential 
 support for their agendas. And when, occasionally, courts issue rulings that threaten 
 to alter the political power relations in which they are embedded, the political sphere 
 responds to quell unfavorable judgments or to hinder their implementation. As the 
 recent history of comparative constitutional politics tells us, recurrent manifestations 
 of unsolicited judicial intervention in the political sphere in general - and unwelcome 
 judgments concerning contentious political  issues in particular - have triggered 
 significant political backlashes aimed at clipping the wings of overactive courts. [...] 
 Overactive courts and judges do learn the lesson. A wide array  of empirically 
 grounded studies suggest that harsh political responses to unwelcome activism or 
 interventions on the part of the courts, or even the credible threat of such a response, 
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 can have a chilling effect on judicial decision-making patterns. [...] The boundaries of 
 judicialization are captured by what has been termed ‘‘relative autonomy.’’59
 
 The rulings of the Constitutional Court of Korea which have most heavily  sanctioned 
the National Security  Act did meet such resistances, not only from the political branches but 
also from law enforcement agencies, as will be described in chapter five. Although the court 
has embraced its role as guardian of the constitution in a double way, its efforts at reforming 
and constraining the uses made of national security  have therefore been less efficient than 
the effects produced by  its jurisprudence when it comes to reinforcing the relevance of 
security tools. Yet, this imbalance has not discouraged the forces contesting the non-
inclusive legacy of the transition from resorting to the constitutional stage. If their 
mobilization to invalidate the repressive instruments deployed in the name of national 
security has failed to date, the pressures that they have exerted over the issue of transitional 
justice in the mid-1990s have been crowned with greater success. 
The popular demand for judging the past
Missed opportunities for transitional justice before 1987
 The role of the Constitutional Court of Korea in recasting enmity has not been 
limited to the review of repressive laws inherited from the authoritarian regime. The court 
has also been centrally involved in the issue of how to deal with past wrongdoings, a 
question which was constantly raised, but frustrated, following episodes of political 
liberalization in South Korea. In 1948, a majority  of representatives in the first parliament 
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was in favor of holding accountable those who had acted in support of, or benefited from, 
Japanese colonial rule. The Special Act on Punishing Anti-National Conducts was 
consequently passed and a corresponding committee set up to investigate the acts committed 
by pro-Japanese collaborators. However, the political configuration supported by the United 
States in the wake of Korea’s independence and the de facto division of the peninsula instead 
led to the permanence of administrative colonial structures and personnel in the late 1940s. 
Indeed,
 The Rhee government, which was established under the protection and guidance of 
 the United States, had a policy of re-hiring officials who previously  worked with the 
 Japanese colonial government. In order to strengthen their political position in Korea, 
 the United States and the Rhee government employed pro-Japanese officials rather 
 than punishing them for their past  wrongdoings. As a result, the committee’s 
 activities were hindered, and they were eventually disbanded by the Rhee 
 government. This allowed bureaucrats, policemen, and military officials who 
 cooperated with Japanese colonialism to maintain their power and influence 
 during the Rhee government and through the subsequent military regimes.60 
 In addition, President Rhee Syngman and the anti-communist conservatives gathered 
around him conspired to eliminate politically, if not physically, the ‘‘progressive’’ 
nationalists who not only advocated the liquidation of the colonial past, but also promoted 
peaceful reunification between the two Koreas, such as Kim Ku, a preeminent leader of the 
independence movement assassinated in 1949. At the onset of the Korean War, Rhee 
Syngman did not hesitate to order the execution of alleged leftists held in prisons, for fear 
that they might be liberated by the invading North Korean army and join its ranks. As the 
ROK’s forces were retreating southward, large scale massacres were not only directed 
against prisoners but also members of the National Guidance League or ‘‘Bodo 
190
60 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the Republic of Korea,  Truth and Reconciliation. Activities of 
the Past Three Years, Seoul: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the Republic of Korea, 2008, p.6.
League’’ (‘‘kungmin podo yŏnmaeng’’). As described in a 2008 report by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Korea (‘‘chinsil hwahae rŭl wihan kwagŏsa chŏngni 
wiwŏnhoe’’ or ‘‘chinsil hwahae wiwŏnhoe’’), established in December 2005 to investigate 
‘‘past incidents’’:
 Immediately  after the start of the Korean War, between the end of June and the 
 beginning of July 1950, the Korean government arrested, detained, and executed 
 members of the Bodo League. The year prior, in June 1949, the Korean government 
 organized the Bodo League with the intention of encouraging those associated with 
 the leftists to turn themselves in so that they  could be loyal ROK citizens. Around 
 300,000 people across the nation applied for membership  at this time. The Korean 
 government set  a target quota for recruitment in each region, which led to many 
 people applying for membership  without ever having had any relations with leftists 
 or leftist activities. With the start of the Korean War however, the  government began 
 arresting and killing Bodo League members, fearing that they  may collaborate with 
 the North.
 The Bodo League massacres were the largest mass killings during the Korean War 
 period. Most of the Bodo League massacres occurred simultaneously  across the 
 nation. According to  the Commission’s investigation result to date, each incident  
 seemed similar in terms of the procedures and the chain of command. For this reason, 
 the Commission investigated the massacres to determine whether the government 
 was involved in the systematic and  intentional massacre of civilians. The scale, 
 planning, and organization of the massacres reveal the Korean government’s 
 systematic policy to remove Bodo League members, potential enemies’ life.61
 While a special investigation committee on the civilian massacres which occurred 
before and during the Korean War was created by  the National Assembly of the short-lived 
parliamentary  Second Republic (1960-1961), the coup d’état of General Park Chung-hee 
quelled the demands for exposing the history of state repression under Rhee Syngman which 
had erupted after his regime’s collapse. At the founding of the Second Republic,
 [T]he cry for identifying and punishing those responsible for rigged elections, 
 corruption, and misappropriation of public property  was overwhelming. The National 
 Assembly responded by revising the constitution to provide constitutional grounds 
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 for ex post facto penalties and the creation of a special tribunal and special 
 prosecutor, and then enacted laws necessary to ensure these offices were afforded the 
 powers they would require. However, the post-Rhee parliamentary  government of the 
 Second Republic of Korea, headed by Prime Minister Chang Myon, was fragile and 
 reluctant to proceed. It made little progress in its investigations. There were also 
 strong demands to uncover the truth about civilian massacres committed during 
 Rhee’s rule, including during the Korean War. But investigations broke off suddenly 
 after Prime Minister Chang was ousted by a military  coup led by Army General Park 
 Chung-hee in  May 1961.62
 The decades of military  rule under Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan 
(1980-1987) did not only leave unaddressed the issue of how to deal with the wrongdoings 
committed by  pro-Japanese collaborators or the Rhee government; they  also added their 
share of abuses to this dismal record. According to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, over 800 democratic activists died in the process of democratization, a number 
which includes the victims of the Kwangju uprising as well as the targets of ‘‘death 
sentences, assassinations and torture, and those who performed self-immolation to protest 
against the government.’’63 While deathly methods were part of the repertoire used by  the 
authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun, they  made a relatively small proportion of victims 
compared with the state’s main repressive strategy during these years: arrest and custody on 
a very large scale. 
 As a result of these arrests, approximately 6,000 individuals were prosecuted under 
the National Security  Act and the Anti-Communist Act between 1970 and 1987.64  In 
particular, the making of espionage cases was a common ploy. This tactic required 
investigative agencies such as the Defense Security  Command or the Korean Central 
192
62  Dae-kyu Yoon, Law and Democracy in South Korea.  Democratic Development since 1987, Seoul: 
Kyungnam University Press, 2010, pp.173-174.
63 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation, p.7.
64 Gi-Wook Shin, Paul Chang, Jeun-eun Lee, Sookyung Him, South Korea’s Democracy Movement, p.90.
Intelligence Agency (‘‘chungang chŏngbopu,’’ renamed the Agency for National Security 
Planning in 1981) not only to fabricate false charges against targeted individuals, but also to 
manufacture evidence of guilt in order for courts to pronounce prison sentences. Such 
evidence usually rested on confessions obtained through torture. The practice of illegal 
detention did not merely imply that innocents would spend years in prison for security 
crimes that they had not committed and had been forced to admit through coerced 
statements. An additional device ensured that national security convicts could not be 
automatically released at the end of their time in jail. This program was known at the 
ideological conversion policy and originated in the Japanese administration’s struggle 
against ‘‘thought criminals’’ during the colonial era.65 It is one of the security instruments 
which, like the National Security Act, have actually  survived not one, but two transitions, 
illustrating the limits of South Korea’s decolonization and democratization processes in the 
mid-1940s and late 1980s respectively.
Elites’ delay to confront the authoritarian past after the change of regime
  
 In 1987, regime change was triggered by mass mobilization against the Chun Doo-
hwan government but the transition process itself was vey much handled by the incumbent 
elite, led by  Roh Tae-woo, through negotiations with the opposition forces of Kim Young-
sam and Kim Dae-jung. With the victory of Roh in the first direct presidential election, it 
should come as no surprise that the challenge of confronting past abuses for which Roh and 
Chun could be held responsible was not met. At the beginning of Roh’s term, Chun Doo-
hwan still retained an influential position in national politics as a member of the Democratic 
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Justice Party  and as chairman of the Advisory Council of Elder Statesmen (‘‘kukkawŏnno 
chamunhoeŭi’’). This office was designed by  article 90 of the 1987 revised constitution to be 
occupied by  the former president, thereby ensuring that  Chun would continue to be involved 
in state affairs.66 
 The parliamentary  elections of April 1988 however upset this equilibrium based on a 
strong continuity with the previous regime. While remaining the largest party  in the National 
Assembly with just 34% of the vote (which translated into 125 seats out of 299), the 
Democratic Justice Party lost its absolute majority. Its representatives could even be 
outnumbered by the combined forces of the two main opposition parties, the Peace 
Democratic Party  of Kim Dae-jung (with 70 seats for 19.3% of the vote) and the 
Reunification Democratic Party of Kim Young-sam (with only 59 seats for 23.8% of the 
vote). 
 In the wake of the elections, the opposition prompted the holding of fact-finding 
hearings on the uprising which took place in the city of Kwangju in May 1980 to protest 
against the nationwide imposition of martial law by the newly installed military junta, led by 
Chun Doo-hwan.67  The uprising ended in the killing of at least  200 protesters after Chun 
ordered the military troops to suppress the insurrection. During the constitutional 
negotiations of August 1987, the ruling party  of Chun and Roh, who held prime 
responsibility for the massacre, and the opposition camp had agreed that ‘‘neither the Fifth 
Republic [1980-1987] nor the Kwangju struggles would be cited, and the preamble would 
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convey  the people’s right to resist by invoking the April 1960 revolution.’’68  With this 
balance of power being altered in the spring of 1988, Chun Doo-hwan was forced to 
apologize to the nation and to resign from both the Advisory Council of Elder Statesmen and 
the ruling Democratic Justice Party. He subsequently  retreated to a Buddhist temple for two 
years. On March 1990, a special law was enacted to compensate those involved in the 
Kwangju uprising but this measure did not alleviate the demand for a full investigation of the 
incident and the punishment of the officials liable for the massacre. 
 Civil society’s mobilization to put  the past on trial became instrumental after Kim 
Young-sam won the December 1992 election, thus becoming the first civilian president of 
South Korea in three decades. His victory  marked a major, yet incomplete, rupture with the 
previous administration. Indeed, in order to ensure his electoral success against his rival Kim 
Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam - whose entire political career had been in the opposition - allied 
with Roh Tae-woo’s ruling party to form the main conservative Democratic Liberal Party.69 
As a result of this merger, Kim resisted the idea to formally  bring Chun Doo-hwan and Roh 
Tae-woo to justice. 
 In its inception, the Kim Young-Sam government was hesitant  to pursue punishment 
 against the two former presidents because he entered the Blue House with support 
 from many politicians with military origins. Although President Kim strongly 
 criticized the military   leaders and praised the May  18 Uprising of 1980, he was 
 reluctant to resort to criminal punishment, ‘‘arguing that the truth should be reserved 
 for historical judgment in the future.’’70
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 In 1993 however, a complaint for treason was submitted to the Seoul District 
Prosecutors’ Office (‘‘sŏul chibang kŏmch’alch’ŏng’’) against Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-
woo, and other leading generals, by petitioners who claimed to be victims of the 1979 coup 
d’état through which the military junta seized power. In line with the new administration’s 
official position, the Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office decided in 1994 not to indict the 
leaders of the 1979 military coup. ‘‘Although it  recognized that the December coup  of 1979 
involved crimes of mutiny, insurrection, and murder, and [that] the suppression of the May 
18 Uprising of 1980 constituted treason and murder,’’ the prosecutors reasoned that ‘‘a 
victorious coup  should not be punished after a substantial lapse of time’’ since ‘‘legally 
speaking, the democratic-civilian government was a legal successor to the previous Chun 
and Roh governments.’’71 The decision not to indict was appealed by the petitioners to a 
higher prosecutors’ office, where it was denied, leading them to file a complainant before the 
Constitutional Court of Korea on the ground that the non-prosecution of the leaders of the 
military coup violated the victims’ basic rights. 
The ambiguous intervention of the constitutional court
 Procedurally, the initiative did not stand out  since an overwhelming majority of the 
constitutional court’s docket consists of complaints against abuses of state power (80% of all 
cases), and especially against prosecutors’ decisions to indict  or not. Substantially, the 
judgment delivered by the court on January 20, 1995 was the first of a series of three major 
cases responding to the intertwined issues of whether the perpetrators of the December 1979 
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military coup and of the violent suppression of the Kwangju uprising could be punished.72 In 
its ruling of January 1995, the Constitutional Court of Korea concluded that the prosecutors’ 
decision not to prosecute Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, and other members of the military 
junta for their involvement in the coup of December 1979 was not arbitrary. This position 
was reached after the court weighed ‘‘two countervailing sets of facts’’ for which there could 
be no easy balancing in its eyes: 
 On the one hand, the Court recognized the importance of the reasons for prosecution, 
 i.e., rectifying the past, deterring similar acts in the future, restoring justice, and 
 fulfilling the people’s prevailing sense of justice. On the other hand, the Court did not 
 treat lightly the reasons for non-institution of the prosecution such as avoiding 
 prolonged social confrontation and polarization, saving national resources, and 
 preserving national pride.73 
 Despite its attention to the social polarization (‘‘sahoejŏk taerip’’) and conflict 
(‘‘kaltŭng’’) surrounding the issue of the 1979 military coup, a majority  of the court 
therefore deemed the prosecution’s choice justifiable. Yet, consensus itself rarely  prevails 
within the institution as exemplified in this case by  the separate dissenting opinions of 
Justices Cho Seung-hyung and Koh Joong-suk. Both found that  the decision not to indict 
should be cancelled, respectively considering that it deviated from the reasonable scope of 
the prosecutionʼs discretion and that the reason not to prosecute was not based on objective 
grounds, thereby infringing upon the petitioners’ right to due process and equal treatment 
before the law. 
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 Rather than bringing an end to the controversy over how to confront the past, this 
episode fostered the anger and determination of civic groups committed to make change 
happen through legal channels. As a second petition to prosecute the individuals behind the 
violent suppression of the Kwangju uprising was rejected by the Seoul District Prosecutors’ 
Office, the human rights lawyers of Minbyun appealed again to constitutional justice. As the 
association ‘‘continued to dispute the government’s handling of past  atrocities’’ through the 
courts, it ‘‘was concurrently promoting the passage of the Special Act on the May 
Democratization Movement, which suspended the statute of limitations for those who led the 
massacre against the protesters.’’74  
 On December 15, 1995, the Constitutional Court of Korea examined the complaint 
filed against the decision of the Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office not to prosecute the 
persons responsible for the repression of the Kwangju rebellion. The judgment released by 
the court is unusual in so far as a majority of justices decided to terminate the proceedings 
after the petitioners chose to withdraw their constitutional complaint. The complainants’ 
retraction was motivated by  President Kim Young-sam’s announcement that a Special Bill on 
the May 18th Democratization Movement would be proposed before the legislature in order 
to remove the statute of limitations for the criminal acts committed in the course of the 
repression. Indeed, whether the statute of limitations had already expired or not for acts 
carried out more than fifteen years earlier represented a crucial issue in the debates of the 
time. 
 While President Kim Young-sam proved at first  reluctant to let former presidents 
Chun and Roh be criminally  punished, his attitude shifted following the revelation of the 
colossal amount of money amassed by them through their respective slush funds (nearly 
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$900 million for Chun and $650 million for Roh).75  As the proposed special law was 
pending in the National Assembly, the complainants before the constitutional court withdrew 
their petition to prevent a possible interference between the court’s upcoming decision and 
the announced retroactive legislation. As a result, a majority  of justices ruled that the 
proceedings should be terminated whereas four others dissented, arguing that judicial review 
was not about the ‘‘subjective protection of complainants’ rights,’’ but the objective defense 
and protection of the constitutional order. Furthermore, the dissenting opinion of Kim Chin-
woo, Lee Chae-hwa, and Cho Seung-hyung made clear that, before the proceedings were 
terminated, a prevailing number of justices had agreed that:
 Even if a successful coup makes it practically impossible to punish the perpetrators 
 during  their incumbency, they can always be punished whenever the legitimate state 
 institutions recover their proper function and thereby regain the de facto power to 
 punish them. However, if treasonous activities were the means to create a democratic 
 civil state and to restore the peopleʼs sovereignty  previously  suppressed and excluded 
 under a feudal autocratic regime or a dictatorship, they  can be justified before or after 
 the fact by the will of all people.76
 
 In essence, the court recognized the possibility to either punish the perpetrators of the 
coup or justify  their ‘‘treasonous activities’’ ‘‘by the will of the people.’’ The first path was 
eventually taken with the Special Act on the May 18th Democratization Movement (‘‘5.18 
tʻŭkpyŏlpŏp’’) being enacted on December 21, 1995. This law provided that the period for 
prosecution of the crimes committed between December 12, 1979 (the military coup) and 
May 18, 1980 (the Kwangju massacre) was to start in February  1993, that  is to say, at the 
time when Kim Young-sam replaced Roh Tae-woo as president. The constitutionality  of the 
special legislation was immediately  challenged by the accused, on the basis that the 
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suspension of the period of limitation from 1979 to 1993 constituted a form of ex post facto 
legislation. 
 Enacting ex post facto, or retroactive, criminal legislation is indeed in contradiction 
with a fundamental principle of the rule of law, namely the prohibition that there be a crime 
without a law (‘‘nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege’’). This principle not only  implies that 
‘‘no person shall be arrested, detained searched, seized or interrogated except as provided by 
Act,’’77  but it also ensures that ‘‘no citizen shall be prosecuted for an act which does not 
constitute a crime under the Act in force at the time it was committed.’’78  The passage of 
retroactive legislation to prosecute the crimes of the former regime is always a problematic 
move for new democracies because it undermines the very principles upon which they  claim 
to be based, such as legal security. In the case at hand, the constitutional court was split on 
the issue of whether ex post facto legislation could be validated. On the one hand, all the 
justices agreed that the Special Act on May 18th would be constitutional if the period of 
limitations had not expired at the time of enactment. On the other hand, 
 Four justices, Kim Chin-woo, Lee Jae-hwa, Cho Seung-hyung, and Chung Kyun-sik, 
 stated  that they would still uphold [the law] even if the period had expired at the 
 time of enactment. Five other justices, Kim Yong-joon, Kim Moon-hee, Hwang Do- 
 yun, Koh Joon-suk, and Shin Chang-on, stated that they would find it 
 unconstitutional to a limited extent in that case.79
 The issue of whether the statute of limitations had already expired at  the time of the 
law’s enactment was not decided by  the constitutional court, but instead left to the ordinary 
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tribunals to settle. The constitutional ruling nonetheless signaled that a supermajority of six 
justices (the necessary quorum for a decision of unconstitutionality) could not be gathered 
against the validity  of the act if the ordinary tribunals were to find it retroactive. Indeed, four 
justices out of nine were ready to defend that ‘‘although genuine retroactive legislation is 
prohibited in principle by the rule of law, it can be allowed exceptionally’’ when there is ‘‘a 
public interest overwhelmingly  more important’’ than protecting criminals’ expectation of 
legal certainty.80 In the wake of the judgment, sixteen persons were arrested and prosecuted, 
including Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo. The two former presidents were respectively 
sentenced to death and a twenty-two-and-a-half-year prison sentence in August 1996, after a 
four-month televised trial at  the Seoul District Court. Their sentences were later commuted 
to life imprisonment and seventeen years of imprisonment by an appellate court, and 
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Korea in April 1997. On December 22 of that same year, 
Chun and Roh were both released after Kim Young-sam granted them a presidential pardon 
before he retreated from office, a gesture which was agreed to by his successor Kim Dae-
jung two days after his election.81
 The three above-mentioned decisions highlight major features of the Constitutional 
Court of Korea’s subtle and often divided approach to the issue of transitional justice. In 
each case, the jurisdiction engaged in a balancing of interests in which competing reasons 
were given serious consideration. While the overall position of court evolved through the 
three cases, no precedent was overturned. The court did not shift  from opposing to allowing 
the punishment of Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, and their accomplices. Its first  ruling 
found compelling reasons both in favor and against their prosecution, and therefore did not 
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judge arbitrary  the public prosecutor office’s decision not  to indict the accused. By the time 
of its third decision a year later, the court was presented with a piece of legislation meant to 
lift  all legal obstacles (namely, the statute of limitations) preventing Chun, Roh, and other 
military officials, from being tried. 
 In the meantime, the climate surrounding the issue of punishment had clearly 
changed under the pressure of civil society’s heightened mobilization. The Special Act on 
the May  18th Democratization Movement was proposed by  President Kim Young-sam in 
response to the growing popular outrage over the abuses committed by  the two former 
presidents. The fact that  the law’s validity was challenged before the constitutional court by 
the very perpetrators of the coup and of the Kwangju massacre made it very risky for the 
court to hold the legislation unconstitutional. Only  a minority of four justices however went 
as far as to accept distorting the rule of law to satisfy the demand for substantive justice 
through retroactive criminal punishment. Yet, this minority  would have been sufficient to 
uphold the constitutionality of the special legislation had the ordinary tribunals found the 
statute of limitations already  expired at the time of the enactment - a matter of statutory 
interpretation that the constitutional judges deferred to the judiciary. 
 The court’s prevailing minority position and general cleavage on the issue of 
retroactive justice can be contrasted with the firmly  legalistic stance of judicial institutions 
such as the Constitutional Court of Hungary  after the transition from communism or the 
German tribunals in the wake of reunification. In 1990, the first elected Hungarian 
parliament passed a law providing that the statute of limitations for criminal offenses such as 
treason, voluntary manslaughter, and infliction of bodily  harm resulting in death, committed 
between 1944 and 1990, would start again on May 2, 1990, the date when the new 
legislature took office. The law was immediately  referred by President Göncz, a former 
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regime opponent, to the constitutional court. This institution was a product of the Roundtable 
negotiations between the communist elite and the opposition, and, as a result, its members 
represented almost all the different political factions present in the parliament. Yet, the 
court’s concordance and unity on the matter were entire.  
 The Constitutional Court in its unanimous decision, 11/1992 (III.5) AB h., struck 
 down the parliament’s first  attempt at  retroactive justice as unconstitutional for most 
 of the reasons that Göncz’s petition identified. The court said that the proposed law 
 violated legal security, a principle that should be guaranteed as fundamental in a 
 constitutional rule-of-law state. [...]  The basic principles of criminal law - that there 
 shall be no punishment without a crime and no crime without a law - were clearly 
 violated by retroactively  changing the statute of limitations; the only sorts of changes 
 in the law that may apply retroactively, the court said, are those changes that work to 
 the benefit  of defendants. Citing the constitutional provisions that  Hungary is a 
 constitutional rule-of-law state and that there can be no punishment without a valid 
 law in effect at the time, the court  declared the law to be unconstitutional and sent it 
 back to the president.82
 In the process of reunifying the Federal and Democratic Republics of Germany, the 
prohibition against  retroactive legislation also took on an important, yet slightly different, 
dimension. The emphasis did not primarily lie on the fact that crimes for which the statute of 
limitations had expired could not be prosecuted, but on the requirement that only those acts 
which constituted crimes under East German law could be punished.  
 The architects of German unity were so attentive to this prohibition on ex post facto 
 lawmaking that they deliberately incorporated the principle into the Unification 
 Treaty of 1990. The accord expressly stipulated that crimes committed before the 
 date of national unification could be adjudicated only according to the East German 
 penal code.83
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 While this precaution was by no means a guarantee, it  was made effective by  German 
judges’ ‘‘adherence to the stricture of the Basic Law’’ and their consequent exclusive 
reliance on codified East German law to settle the cases before them.84  In doing so, the 
courts contributed to construe ‘‘the forty-year history of the GDR in more exacting terms 
than those allowed by the ambiguous concept of the Unrechstaat,’’ that is to say, East 
Germany envisioned as a lawless state.85 This effect of judicial intervention is also verified 
for the Constitutional Court of Korea in its approach to the former authoritarian regime, 
recognized as constituting a coherent institutional and legal order of its own. As once stated 
by the court,
  Whether to a small or large extent, whether to our liking or not, the order established 
 during  that time became an integral part of our history and formed the foundation of 
 the present political, economical, and social order.86
 
 
 Moreover, the fact that four justices of the constitutional court were inclined to find 
the Special Act on the May  18th Democratization Movement valid even if it represented 
retroactive legislation did not imply that those same judges would have been ready to extend 
this exception to other cases. As a matter of fact, further efforts to enact broad ex post facto 
provisions in order to prosecute past  crimes were undertaken in 2002 (with the Bill for 
Revision of the Criminal Procedure Code) and 2005 (with the Special Bill for Statutory 
Limitations to the State Crimes against Human Rights), but they  both failed to pass in the 
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 Procedural legality is required even to punish those who violated human rights under 
 the authoritarian-military  rule. If the new democratic regime weakens procedural 
 legality to serve substantive justice, it may  satisfy the popular demand but undermine 
 the new regime’s commitment to the rule of law. This is the academic reason why the 
 two bills to cease or  exclude the application of the statute of limitations did not  
 pass. Ironically, procedural legality, which grew in Korean society after 
 democratization, prevented the retrospective punishment of the perpetrators under the 
 old regime after the limitation period had already  expired. The National Assembly 
 was not sure if such an act could pass constitutional review by the Constitutional 
 Court. As a result, it was hesitant to fully  advance retroactive justice in criminal 
 cases.87
 Although the Constitutional Court  of Korea has been centrally involved in the 
process of making possible the criminal punishment of two former presidents, this episode 
does not exhaust the ways in which the Republic of Korea sought to ‘‘rectify  past wrongs.’’ 
From 2000 onward, the emphasis shifted from the prosecution of a small number of prime 
wrongdoers to the broad rehabilitation of victims, as exemplified by the 2000 Act for 
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation 
for Them, the 2000 Special Act on the Cheju April 3rd Incident to Restore the Reputation of 
Victims, the 2004 Special Act to Restore the Reputation and Compensate the Victims of the 
Samch’ŏng Re-education Camp, and the 2004 Special Act to Restore the Reputation of 
Nogŭn-ri Victims.88  In parallel, special laws were enacted to ‘‘uncover the truth’’ about 
particular categories of abuses, as illustrated by the 2000 Special Act to Investigate 
Suspicious Deaths or the 2004 Special Acts to Investigate Forced Mobilization and Pro-
Japanese Collaboration Under Japanese Rule. The ensuing proliferation of ad hoc 
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committees to investigate wrongdoings and compensate victims resulted in the establishment 
of the comprehensive Framework Act  on Clearing up Past Incidents for Truth and 
Reconciliation in May 2005. It led in turn to the founding of an independent  Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in December of that year.
 From 2005 to 2009, the commission’s work embodied a non-judicial approach to 
dealing with the past, as its truth-finding activities could only lead it  to recommend remedies 
to the government on the basis of its investigations. After President Lee Myung-bak from the 
conservative Grand National Party (‘‘hannaradang’’) came to power in February 2008, the 
activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as well as all the other special 
committees largely came to a halt. In particular,
 The effectiveness of the TRCK [Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea] was 
 particularly compromised, it is said, by President Lee’s nomination of a new 
 chairperson and other commissioners who were less enthusiastic about the 
 commission’s activities. Not only the military and police, but also state officials, 
 became uncooperative with TRCK requests for the documents. The TRCK also had 
 its budget for the last year cut significantly by the government [...].89
 As a result of the commission’s disempowerment, the responsibility to settle the past 
seems to have shifted back to the Constitutional Court of Korea in recent years. For instance, 
the court delivered an important ruling in August 2011 on the issue of ‘‘comfort women,’’ 
forced to serve as sex slaves for the Japanese army during the Pacific War. The court held 
that the government’s lack of effort to resolve their compensation claims was an 
unconstitutional non-exercise of state power, infringing upon the dignity of victims.90  In 
particular, the court found that the ‘‘disruption of diplomatic relations’’ with Japan ‘‘cannot 
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be viewed as a national interest that must be considered seriously,’’ while it  reasoned that the 
issue had to be addressed urgently given the advanced age of the victims ‘‘making recovery 
impossible in the event of a delay.’’91 
 In March 2013, the court ruled three emergency decrees of Park Chung-hee’s era 
(Emergency Decrees No.1, 2, and 9) unconstitutional, a decision which intervened after the 
accession of Park’s daughter - Park Geun-hye - to the presidency a month earlier.92  As 
pointed  out by Marie Seong-hak Kim,
 In the Emergency Decree cases, both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court 
 ruled  that the Decrees mandated by Article 53(4) were unconstitutional because 
 they  conflicted with other constitutional articles grounded on superior norms. The 
 two courts’ treatment of the Emergency  Decrees as well as the Yusin Constitution 
 revealed their shared belief that the validity of legal norms could not only be judged 
 by superior positive law - constitutional law - but also by the consideration of the 
 fundamental ‘‘constitutional order of liberal democracy’’ that underlies the evolving 
 languages of the written constitutions. This position reveals a growing activist 
 tendency of the judiciary. Judicial emphasis on fundamental rights tends to 
 place the subjective criterion of justice over legal certainty; in this framework, legal 
 validity  is to be tested by  certain minimum standards of justice, presumably by the 
 court.93
 From the late 1980s up to date, constitutional adjudication has been invested as a site 
where to dispute the construction of enmity, in relation to both the democratic present and 
the authoritarian past of South Korea. While the constitutional court has come to adopt an 
active stance in the latter arena, its position was not initially  the one that the institution 
embraced in the mid-1990s. Moreover, the ‘‘constitutional order of liberal 
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democracy’’ (literally, ‘‘the basic order of free democracy’’ or ‘‘chayuminjujŏk kibonjilsŏ’’) 
which its jurisprudence has  recently referred to as a ground for invalidating a number of 
decrees from the Park Chung-hee regime should not be understood as expressing the court’s 
absolute commitment to fundamental rights. Instead, the concept has also been deployed by 
the constitutional court to justify  the resilience and relevance of mechanisms of exclusion 
such as the National Security Act, as will be explored in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE
Reviewing How the Enemy is Defined
‘‘The National Security Act still has value, so should exist 
independently. [...] It will be necessary for the National Assembly 
when it  deals with the security law issue to reflect on public opinion 
and the constitutional court’s ruling.’’
The Constitutional Court of Korea, August 26, 2004
‘‘Just  because there are exchanges and cooperation between the two 
Koreas, the Supreme Court  cannot  see that North Korea’s anti-state 
character has disappeared and that the National Security Act  has lost 
its legal power. [...] Under such conditions, we must  be careful not  to 
disarm ourselves.’’
The Supreme Court of Korea, September 3, 2004
‘‘The National Security Act  has been used mostly to oppress people 
who opposed the government rather than to punish those who 
threatened to throw the country into crisis. During this process, 
tremendous human rights abuses and inhumane acts have been 
conducted. It  is part of Korea’s shameful history and an old legacy of 
dictatorships which we are unable to use now. [...] The National 
Security Law should be abolished and provisions necessary for 
national defense addressed by revisions to clauses of the criminal 
code.’’
President Roh Moo-hyun, September 5, 2004 
‘‘The abolishment of the National Security Act  as a symbol and 
practical stronghold of the free democratic system would shake the 
national identity and deliver a serious blow to the national security 
and economy. Thus, it  is sufficient to revise some laws of concern that 
may infringe on human rights and there is no reason for voluntary 
disarmament.’’
The Grand National Party, September 7, 2004
‘‘South Korea has entered on a state of ideological civil war over the 
National Security Act.’’ 
Tong-A Daily, September 7, 2004
 This chapter interrogates how the notion of enmity has been reshaped by  the 
Constitutional Court of Korea in the aftermath of the transition, focusing on rulings 
delivered in relation to the National Security Act. The analysis revisits the traditional 
understanding made of these decisions as landmarks of the court’s commitment to protect 
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fundamental rights. While the court has indeed sanctioned abusive interpretations and 
excessive clauses of the National Security Act, its jurisprudence has also profoundly 
enhanced the post-transition relevance and legitimacy of the law by construing it as a means 
to confront not only the activities which threaten the state, but also those endangering the 
‘‘basic order of free democracy.’’ The debate over the abolition of the National Security Act 
which erupted in 2004 has provided the court with the opportunity to strongly  reaffirm its 
position in support of the legislation and the non-inclusive bias that it enforces.
 
‘‘Anti-state organization’’ as a resilient category of enmity: continuities and changes 
behind it
 
Formation in the context of the two Koreas’ conflictual political foundation 
 The core legal notion of South Korea’s politics of enmity is the category of ‘‘anti-
state organization’’ (‘‘pande kukka tanch’e’’), enshrined in the National Security Act. The 
expression itself did not appear in the first version of the NSA, enacted on December 1, 1948 
and directed against ‘‘groups which violate the national constitution (‘‘kukhŏn’’) by claiming 
the title of government or by having the purpose to disrupt the state (‘‘kukka’’).’’ On June 10, 
1960, these same groups were defined as ‘‘anti-state organizations,’’ a category  which has 
remained in place throughout all the subsequent revisions of the National Security Act. In 
1980, the description of ‘‘anti-state organizations’’ was refined by making reference to both 
external and internal enmity, as encapsulated in the expression ‘‘groups and associations 
from inside and outside’’ (‘‘kuknae oeŭi kyŏlsa ttonŭn chiptan’’). As of today, an ‘‘anti-state 
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organization’’ is thus a group or association which operates within or outside South Korea 
for the purpose of ‘‘assuming the title of government’’ or ‘‘disrupting the state.’’ 
 The anti-state organization claiming the title of government designates North Korea, 
which is denied the status of sovereign state in the National Security Act and is, therefore, 
never openly mentioned. This is in conformity with the original spirit of article 3 of the 
constitution, construing the Republic of Korea’s territory as encompassing the whole 
peninsula instead of its southern half. In turn, the portion of the country north of the 38th 
parallel is depicted as ‘‘territory  under the control of an anti-state organization’’ by article 6 
of the NSA, which criminalizes escaping to, or infiltrating from, such area. The congruence 
between both texts stems from the fact that the first versions of the constitution and the 
security legislation were adopted at the time of the two Koreas’ conflictual political 
foundation.1
 In 1948, the formation of the two separate states was not only contentious because of 
their respective claims to represent the only  legitimate Korean government along 
antagonistic ideological lines. Each regime was also born in a context of domestic unrest and 
violence. In the southern half of the peninsula, socialism was a particularly powerful force 
after 1945 as a result  of the social transformations brought about by the colonial era and the 
war. On the one hand, Korean communists, despite their factionalism, had formed the 
principal resistance movement against Japanese rule since the 1930s and therefore ‘‘planted 
a deep core of Communist influence among the Korean people, particularly the students, 
youth groups, laborers, and peasants.’’2  On the other hand, the colonial and wartime 
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experiences of these groups also drew them to support socialism.3 For instance, millions of 
peasants had been pushed away from the countryside in the late 1930s and forced to take 
part in Japan’s mobilization of labor for total war effort  after 1941. They returned home 
hoping for a redistributive land reform and sweeping decolonization process, the two being 
intimately  connected since the Korean landlord class had largely collaborated with the 
colonial regime to defend its own interests and privileges. 
 Both demands - land reform and decolonization - were supported by the grassroots 
people’s committees formed under the Committee for the Preparation of Korean 
Independence (‘‘chosŏn kŏn’guk chunbi wiwŏnhoe’’) in the immediate aftermath of the 
Liberation (August 15, 1945). As the peninsula was partitioned by the joint military 
occupation of Soviet  and American forces in the following weeks, the committees were only 
recognized in the North, which proceeded to the advocated reforms. The transition to 
communism forced ‘‘all Korean social elements that might either have sought the 
perpetuation of the old or the obstruction of the new system’’ to seek refuge in the South, 
where they numbered 1,800,000 by 1948.4 There, the authority of the people’s committees 
was dismissed by the USAMGIK (the United States Military  Government in Korea), and 
none of the desired structural reforms carried out. More specifically, ‘‘the process of ousting 
the people’s committees in the Korean countryside [...] was long and painful. It took a full 
year to eliminate them, and it was not without major violence.’’5  In this struggle, 
212
3 ‘‘Given contemporary South Korea’s staunch anti-Communism, it is hard to imagine socialism’s popularity in 
the 1940s Korea. But in the period after the Liberation, socialists drew tremendous support from the landless, 
intellectuals, and factory workers.’’  Michael Robinson,  Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey, Honolulu: 
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5 Ibidem, p.107.
conservative elements of society such as landlords and businessmen could be relied upon, as 
well as the colonial repressive apparatus, whose institutions and Korean personnel largely 
remained in place in the absence of decolonization process.6 
 By the time of the Republic of Korea’s founding in August 1948, ‘‘the leftist groups 
capable of challenging the regime were driven underground,’’7  but contestation was still 
strong and even turned into rebellion in regions such as South Chŏlla and Cheju Island. 
Between September 4, 1948 and April 30, 1949, 89,000 arrests were reportedly conducted by 
the government of Rhee Syngman.8 It is in this tumultuous context that the National Security 
Act ‘‘was rushed through the Assembly’’ and promulgated on December 1, 1948. By the 
spring of 1950, the new law had been used to imprison some 58,000 individuals.9 Since its 
inception, the security legislation has therefore embodied more than the reality of the 
national division. Its genealogy highlights how the division itself has given birth to a more 
insidious line of separation than the 38th parallel, a division not only between both Koreas, 
but inside each. In the South, 
 The real or presumed existence of an enemy, ubiquitous and unrelenting, was not 
 geographically specific or bound. [The] discourse of anticommunism and national 
 security was projected not only toward the ‘‘real’’ enemy, the north, but  also toward 
 anyone who harbored the notion of a radical transformation of society, in other 
 words, toward all progressive elements in South Korea. The progressive and non- 
 cooperative elements of society were thus made into enemies of the state through 
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9 Ibidem, p.150.
 legal measures such as the NSL [National Security Law] and the Anti-Communist 
 Law.10 
 
 According to political scientist Choi Jang-Jip, part of this non-inclusiveness still 
endures in contemporary South Korea given the ‘‘conservative path’’ of its democratization 
process. Indeed, ‘‘one of the most notable characteristics of Korean democracy is the 
estrangement between the forces that  dismantled the old system, on the one hand [such as 
students and workers], and those that institutionalized democracy, on the other [the elites of 
the ruling and opposition parties].’’11  As this dissertation contends, it  is in the context of 
these two sides’ asymmetric confrontation and disagreement over what counts as ‘‘national’’ 
and ‘‘anti-national’’ that the groups marginalized by the transition have resorted to the site of 
constitutional adjudication as an arena where to question and challenge the mechanisms of 
exclusion (such as the National Security Act) deployed against them by successive 
democratic governments.  
In the name of the state: ‘‘kokutai,’’ ‘‘kukhŏn,’’ ‘‘kukka’’
 Like most of South Korea’s repressive apparatus, the National Security  Act finds its 
roots in the colonial era. More specifically, the law enacted in 1948 was modeled after the 
Peace Preservation Law which was passed in Japan in 1925, and extended to Taiwan and 
Korea. The Peace Preservation Law was not the first security legislation adopted in Japan, 
but it became a notorious element of its interwar politics. Article 1 provided that:
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 Anyone who has formed a society with the objective of altering the national polity or 
 the form of government or denying the system of private property, and anyone who 
 has joined such a society with full knowledge of its object, shall be liable to 
 imprisonment with or without hard labor for a term not exceeding ten years. Any 
 attempt to commit the crime in the preceding clause will [also] be punished.12
 The law remains famous for its articulation of the new expressions ‘‘national 
polity’’ (‘‘kokutai’’) and ‘‘form of government’’ (‘‘seitai’’). Their introduction was 
interpreted as signaling that the Peace Preservation Law was not only aimed at protecting the 
security of the state but also the spiritual unity  of the nation, supposedly  threatened by the 
radical ideologies of anarchism, socialism, and communism which had all developed in early 
20th-century Japan. As such, the legislation was part of a broader apparatus of ‘‘thought 
control’’ which was progressively  elaborated during the 1930s to repress ‘‘ideological 
crimes.’’ Therefore, ‘‘the new peace law was only  one of the tools utilized by the state to 
control its opponents. In addition to this law, the government devised a complex and 
interesting system for the conversion of ideological criminals; once they were sufficiently 
purified they were permitted to reenter the imperial tent.’’13 
 Such tools were not only replicated in colonial Korea, where the domestic 
independence movement was mostly composed of communist insurgents after the failure of 
moderate nationalists in the late 1920s14; they  also survived Japanese rule. In 1945, the 
conversion policy (‘‘tenkō’’ in Japanese, ‘‘sasang chŏnhyang’’ in Korean) was abolished by 
the U.S. provisional government in Japan but maintained in South Korea, albeit not formally. 
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It was again institutionalized in 1956,15  and later became an integral part of Park Chung-
hee’s Yusin system (1972-1979). With the enactment of the 1975 Social Security  Act (‘‘sahoe 
anjŏnpŏp’’), ‘‘those who had refused to convert even under torture’’ were systematically kept 
in detention while ‘‘those who had been released’’ could be monitored and even preventively 
confined again.16  The institutional isomorphism therefore seems robust between Japan’s 
1925 Peace Preservation Law and South Korea’s 1948 National Security  Act, each 
complemented by the system of ideological conversion. However, their resemblance does 
not entail that both sets of mechanisms were actually operating in the same manner. 
 In fact, Japanese authorities controlling Korea and post-1945 South Korean 
governments alike appear to have been more concerned with the coercion of ‘‘subversive’’ 
elements, rather than the reform of ideological deviance. In a sense, the conversion policy as 
deployed in Korea was never about ideology, but violence.17 Both in the colonial and post-
colonial eras, it was never intended to truly redeem ‘‘thought criminals’’ and reintegrate 
them in the social body, but was more abruptly meant to break down anyone labeled as such. 
This reality  is confirmed by the motivation behind the program’s intense reactivation in the 
1970s, which was not to reincorporate leftists in the fabric of society, but  to prevent the 
looming release of some 500 individuals whose long-term prison sentences were coming to a 
close.
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 The reason why the government reinforced the ideology  conversion project was that 
 the majority  of leftist  prisoners were due to be released upon expiration of their 
 sentences, in the mid-1970s; almost all of such long-term prisoners arrested during 
 the [Korean] war were sentenced to life imprisonment, but their sentences were 
 reduced to 20 years’ imprisonment just after the April Revolution of 1960, making 
 them due to be released in the middle of the 1970s.18
 
 The conversion policies implemented in Japan during the interwar years and in Korea 
before and after 1945 therefore appear to have operated in distinctive ways. Similarly, the 
two countries’ security legislations present important nuances despite their kinship. Indeed, 
the 1925 Peace Preservation Law was largely a response of the powerful Japanese state to 
radical movements which were otherwise politically  weak.19 It  criminalized their activities 
for being ‘‘anti-kokutai,’’ that is to say, for endangering the spirit of the nation more than the 
security of the state. As a result, leftists were only  one of the law’s targets, the other being 
the emperor’s subjects to which the government addressed a moral message.20  No such 
loaded word could be appealed to in the 1948 National Security Act, where the notion of 
‘‘altering the national polity’’ (‘‘kokutai’’) was replaced by expressions such as ‘‘violating 
the national constitution’’ (‘‘kukhŏn’’) or ‘‘disrupting the state’’ (‘‘kukka’’).21 In the context 
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of the contentious formation of the South Korean state, both within the South and in the 
scheme of the inter-Korean division, the National Security  Act did not primarily  focus on 
defending an essence of the Korean nation. Instead, it professed to safeguard the national 
constitution, itself tied to the existence and permanence of a doubly  contested political 
entity: the Republic of Korea.
 The rhetoric of ‘‘anti-communism’’ which the new state adopted had been deployed 
since 1945 under the auspices of the U.S. military government, but its construction as the 
core of South Korean national identity only fully intervened with the eruption of the Korean 
War in 1950: ‘‘Whereas before the war, the South Korean state had a weak local base of 
support, the war gave the state an ideological basis for building its legitimacy. 
Anticommunism, articulated and experienced in everyday life, became the premier motif for 
ideological legitimization of the South Korean state.’’22  The ‘‘anti-communist’’ motto and 
project of the South, which remained ‘‘vague’’ and ‘‘symbolic’’ under Rhee Syngman 
(1948-1960), were institutionalized through the Anti-Communist Act in force between 1961 
and 1980,23 after which the law was fused with the National Security Act. 
 The radicalization of anti-communism as a national discourse and policy  under the 
Park Chung-hee regime (1961-1979) has to be seen in light  of its efficacy at the service of 
the state’s goal of economic growth, to which civil society in general, and labor in particular, 
have been harshly subordinated. As underlined by Hagen Koo,
 From Park’s Yushin [Yusin] period (1972-1979) to the end of the Chun era 
 (1980-1987), the state’s consistent policy was to forestall the emergence of any 
 independent union movement outside the government-controlled union structure, and 
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 to prevent the development of any connections between labor and opposition 
 movements. Thus any sign of organized resistance was ruthlessly repressed, allowing 
 no channel for the release of the mounting tensions and resentments on the shop 
 floor. The Korean state’s labor control had been more repressive than corporatist, 
 more direct and physical than bureaucratic or ideological, and more blatantly  anti- 
 labor than subtle and disguised.24
 As will be explored later in the chapter, labor’s participation in politics has remained 
illegal until 1998, when the Kim Dae-jung government formally allowed its integration in 
exchange for large concessions in the context of South Korea’s economic depression, 
prompted by  the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. In spite of this process, the National 
Security Act has continued to be intensively resorted to under the Kim administration to deal 
with labor struggles. Therefore, it appears that an important and resilient meaning of what 
constitutes ‘‘anti-stateness’’ remains tied to the preservation of a certain ‘‘national’’ 
trajectory, premised for decades on the ‘‘link between political stability and economic 
development,’’ and therefore the domination rather than incorporation of participating social 
forces.25
The National Security Act, informal constitution of South Korea?
 It is interesting to note the close parallelism between revisions of the National 
Security Act and the political ruptures recorded in the text  of the constitution. Not only were 
both documents originally drafted in 1948, but they  were subsequently  and concomitantly 
amended in: 1960, in the wake of the uprising which ousted Rhee Syngman from power and 
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brought about the short-lived Second Republic; 1962, after the coup d’état of Park Chung-
hee leading to the establishment of the Third Republic; 1980, with the founding of the Fifth 
Republic presided by Chun Doo-hwan; and eventually 1987, coinciding with the transition to 
procedural democracy. The 1987 revision of the security  legislation was however minor, and 
the law was further amended in 1991. The synchrony between the two texts presents another 
exception, as the National Security Act was not amended in 1972, when Park Chung-hee 
hardened his rule under the motto of ‘‘revitalization’’ with the passage of the Yusin 
constitution. The fact  that the National Security Act was then left unaltered may indicate the 
reliance of the regime on other repressive tools, such as the Anti-Communist Act in force 
since 1961, and the various emergency decrees issued in the mid-1970s. 
 Throughout the 1970s, the number of prosecutions under the Anti-Communist  Act 
(around 3,200 between 1970 and 1980, including 500 for 1972 alone) exceeded those under 
the National Security Act (less than 1,100).26 These figures do not reflect the more intense 
pattern of arrests conducted under the two laws, leading tens of thousands of protestors, 
dissidents, and labor activists to be detained from several hours up to thirty days before 
being released without having charges leveled against them.27 Until the 1980s, the security 
legislation did not explicitly define anti-state activities and organizations in relation to 
communism. The abolition of the Anti-Communist Act in 1980 led to the integration of its 
provisions into the framework of the National Security Act. In addition to groups claiming 
the title of government and aiming at disrupting the state, internal and external entities 
politically  affiliated with communism were now considered anti-state organizations as well. 
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The Anti-Communist Act’s punishment of ‘‘any person who has praised, encouraged, or 
sided with anti-state organizations or members thereof on foreign communist  lines or 
benefited the same in any way through other means’’28 became article 7 of the NSA. As a 
result, ‘‘students engaged in ideological debates regarding how to carry  out the democracy 
movement based mainly on Marxist  ideas’’ became a privileged target of the security 
legislation in the 1980s and many of them were arrested for ‘‘simply organizing a small book 
club for the discussion of Marxist [materials].’’29 
 The mention of communism did not disappear in 1987 but 1991, when it was 
completely erased from the National Security  Act alongside other significant revisions. As a 
result, the law ceased to prohibit ‘‘contact with communist organizations or governments in 
countries other than North Korea. Provisions of Article 6, 7 and 8 which provided penalties 
for people praising or communicating with communist parties or governments were also 
repealed, so that contacts with communist countries are now permitted, except with North 
Korea.’’30  In addition, a rhetorical safeguard was introduced in the first article, providing 
that ‘‘the interpretation and application of this law shall be confined to the minimum extent 
necessary  to achieve its purpose. The law shall not be loosely interpreted or otherwise 
misapplied to unreasonably restrict the basic human rights of citizens.’’31 This reform of the 
text intervened after a ruling of limited constitutionality  was delivered by the Constitutional 
Court of Korea on article 7 of the NSA in April 1990. This landmark judgment was highly 
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critical of the abuses made of the provision, denouncing the risk that a literal reading would 
‘‘merely intimidate and suppress freedom of expression without  upholding any public 
interest in national security.’’32 
 The ruling can be seen as an attempt by the constitutional court to disentangle two 
possible interpretations of the law which have been confused since its birth: one limited to 
the activities which endanger the security of the state, and the other encompassing all the 
activities deemed to threaten the stability of the socio-political and economic order. In trying 
to provide a correct and restrictive understanding of the National Security Act, the 
constitutional court has nonetheless reframed the concept of enmity in ways which have also 
contributed to consolidate it. In particular, the court’s efforts to restrain the scope of the 
security legislation have paradoxically resulted in transforming the NSA into a militant 
instrument for protecting the ‘‘basic order of free democracy’’ and, in its name, some of the 
most entrenched non-inclusive arrangements of the post-transition period. 
 
Old and new distortions in defining enmity
 
 From 1948 to 1987, only three leaders have succeeded one another at the head of the 
Republic of Korea: Rhee Syngman (1948-1960), Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), and Chun 
Doo-hwan (1980-1987), if one excludes the short-lived Second Republic under Premier 
Chang Myon (1960-1961). Throughout these decades, the amalgamation between anti-state 
and anti-regime activities was remarkably  strong and supported by the National Security 
Act’s broad criminalization of groups acting from outside or within South Korea to disrupt 
the state. Since its very inception, the National Security Act has therefore been deployed for 
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a dual purpose: defending the state’s security and, in its name, uprooting opposition against 
the regime in place. From the 1960s onward, national security has also become inseparable 
from the project of modernizing the nation through state-led industrialization, i.e., of 
building ‘‘a wealthy and (militarily) strong nation as the embodiment of modernity.’’33 
 The process of mass mobilization required by  this transformation called for both men 
and women to participate in it as ‘‘dutiful nationals,’’ albeit differentially: while men’s 
military mobilization through conscription and economic mobilization as the primary labor 
force in the industrializing economy were ‘‘intimately intertwined,’’ ‘‘this combination 
contributed to the consolidation of the modern gender hierarchy, organized around the 
division of labor between man as provider and woman as housewife.’’34 In the meantime, the 
entire national security apparatus was reshaped and made to play an integral part in the 
process of economic development, as illustrated by the functions of the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency founded in 1961.
 In fact, in Park [Chung-hee]’s regime, the role of the national security organizations 
 was as  absolute in the economic policy area as it was in other policy areas. The 
 authoritarian state security organizations did more than simply play the role of 
 watching and suppressing labor and anti-government activities in the name of 
 economic stability. They were the core decision-makers in major policy decisions. It 
 was the national security agents who controlled the vast set of bureaucratic rules and 
 regulations instituted by the regime; they became an extension of the president, 
 allowing him to rule effectively as the chief commander of state authority. 
 Furthermore, as Korean companies expanded their businesses overseas, the security 
 agencies provided information on overseas investment conditions to individual 
 companies, prepared in advance the terms of investments, and supported these 
 business activities. In this way, they played a broad spectrum of economic roles.35
223
33 Seungsook Moon, Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea, Durham, London: Duke 
University Press, 2005, p.2.
34 Ibidem, p.12.
35 Jang-Jip Choi, Democracy After Democratization, p.66.
 Security instruments have therefore always been irreducible to the threat of North 
Korea and the national division, displaying political and socio-economic functions of their 
own in the Southern context. Indeed, to be labeled as ‘‘anti-state,’’ South Korean groups still 
need less than material political ties with the North. Instead, alleged kinship with its 
‘‘chuch’e’’ ideology has been a sufficient ground for repression and a category  under which 
anything from being critical of the South Korean government to rejecting capitalism, 
advocating peaceful reunification and accommodation between the two Koreas, or 
condemning the policy of the United States in the peninsula, could be falling. 
 The intentional confusion of activities threatening the security  of the state and 
challenging the existing political or socio-economic order has been a fundamental 
characteristic of South Korea’s politics of enemy since 1948. In this respect, the democratic 
transition of 1987 has not coincided with a clear redefinition nor a thorough shift in the 
definition of enmity. In early July of that year, 562 political prisoners were liberated as a 
result of the amnesty  promised by Roh Tae-woo in his Eight-Point  Declaration, but 1,300 
others remained incarcerated.36  In addition, ‘‘political arrests during the first eighteen 
months of Roh’s rule - even adjusted for increased arrests for violence - exceeded those for 
the Chun Doo Hwan years.’’37 Importantly, this trend extended beyond the initial phase of 
Roh Tae-woo’s presidency: the number of persons prosecuted under the National Security 
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Act was higher between 1988 and 1992 (reaching 1,529) than it was between 1980 and 1986 
(1,093).38 
 The sustained use of the National Security Act under the presidency of Roh and 
beyond does not imply that the politics of enmity remained entirely  unchanged in the 
aftermath of the transition. In a sense, the post-1987 period can be said to have made the 
apprehension of enmity not clearer but more complex. On the one hand, the Inter-Korean 
Exchange and Cooperation Act (‘‘nambuk kyoryu hyŏmnyŏk-e kwanhan pŏmnyul’’) was 
enacted in August 1990 to enable contacts between the two halves of the Korean peninsula, 
making it  possible for South Korean citizens to visit the North and meet with North Koreans 
upon receiving the approval of the government. On the other hand, the legal framework 
prohibiting these very contacts and reducing North Korea to an ‘‘anti-state organization’’ 
was maintained. The contradictory  nature of this definition was reinforced after the 
concurrent accession of both Koreas to the United Nations General Assembly, where they sit 
as two separate sovereign member states since September 1991. Yet, ‘‘joint  membership in 
the United Nations [...] did not change the enemy status of North Korea until the summit 
meeting in June 2000,’’ held in Pyongyang between between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-
jung.39  If North Korea is now recognized as a partner of reunification, the peninsula 
continues to be technically in a state of war, and emphasis on one aspect to the detriment of 
the other has varied depending on the orientation of the administration in power. 
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 The common picture of South Korea’s political landscape is that of a successful 
democratization process. The elections of December 1992 and 1997 successively brought to 
power Kim Young-sam, the first  civilian president in thirty years and former opposition 
leader whose party merged with the ruling Democratic Justice Party of Roh Tae-woo in 
1990, and Kim Dae-jung, a longtime dissident whose victory coincided with the first 
political alternation - the key test of democracy when defined as a system in which parties 
lose elections. In the context of the utmost prevalence of regionalism in South Korean 
politics, Kim Dae-jung was also a figure from the Chŏlla province, the southwestern part of 
Korea, ‘‘systematically  discriminated against throughout  the entire process of 
industrialization under the preceding authoritarian regime.’’40 
 This trajectory was however not predetermined, but rather surrounded with 
uncertainties at the time of the transition and the beginning of the Constitutional Court of 
Korea’s operations in September 1988. Moreover, espousing a teleological vision of the 
country’s political path obscures the reality conveyed by the enforcement patterns of the 
National Security  Act after 1987. A decade after the change of regime, high levels of arrests 
and convictions persisted under the security  legislation. These trends were not confined to 
the presidency  of Roh Tae-woo but endured under the administration of Kim Young-sam 
and, maybe more surprisingly, of Kim Dae-jung, a former victim of state repression. His 
appointment of Kim Jong-pil, founder of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, as prime 
minister in 1998 immediately betrayed hopes of a radical rupture with the past.
 The mid-1990s were even accompanied by a period of deterioration of the human 
rights situation, a process which continued through the end of the decade marred by  the East 
Asian financial and economic crisis. As a result, the South Korean context presents us with a 
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contrasted picture, that of a consolidating electoral democracy still heavily resorting to the 
National Security Act as a political resource by the late 1990s, that is to say, even after the 
alternation of political forces in power. The numerical continuity between the pre- and 
post-1987 eras does not however imply that the uses made of the security legislation during 
each period were congruent. Rather than being a legacy of the authoritarian era, the 
resilience of the law’s application for more than a decade after the change of regime appears 
as an outcome of the transition and of democracy’s institutionalization by political elites to 
the exclusion of the popular democratization movement. Throughout the 1990s, both the 
political and business spheres, as well as the conservative mass media and part of civil 
society itself (the moderate ‘‘citizens’ movement groups’’ or ‘‘simin undong’’), have 
continued to show intolerance toward the claims, mobilization, and alternative ‘‘national’’ 
imaginary  (or ‘‘minjung’’ narrative) of the ‘‘people’s movement groups,’’ portrayed as 
‘‘radical’’ and violent.
 In fact, the state publicly and consistently  demonstrated a strong negative view about 
 people’s movements after the democratic transition. In May 1990, Prime Minister 
 Kang Young-Hoon reported to President Roh about people’s movements, arguing, 
 “the government should exercise its power to control illegal labour strikes and mass 
 protests” (Chosun Ilbo, May 4, 1990). President Roh also stated in a Cabinet meeting 
 that “it was necessary  to punish the violent forces who sought to destroy 
 democracy” (Chosun Ilbo, June 23, 1991), pointing at the anti-government 
 demonstrations that people’s movements organised after riot  police lynched and 
 killed a college student. The government’s media reports in the same period 
 emphasised that students and pro-democracy activists were subversive, 
 fundamentally  left-wing and  extremely violent (Bureau of Public Information 1993, 
 695).
 In addition, the conservative media supported the government’s view by  encouraging 
 citizens’ movements and denouncing people’s movements. Chosun Ilbo, which is one 
 of the most conservative newspapers in Korea, published an editorial about the 
 creation of the CCEJ, the harbinger of citizens’ movements. The editorial 
 recommended two strategies for its prosperity and public support: first, draw a line 
 between itself and the prior movements; second, exemplify peaceful movements 
 (Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 1989). In the early 1990s, similar threads of arguments kept 
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 appearing in the media, which openly promoted citizens’ movements as a better way 
 of engaging in activism. On the contrary, the conservative media heavily  criticised 
 people’s movements. An editorial denounced the student movement by  saying, “the 
 radical movement by some segment of students is not just a problem in each 
 college but  a problem of the whole nation” (Kukmin Ilbo, June 6, 1991). The media 
 condemned the pro-democracy groups as well, speculating that “most people have 
 developed a dislike for most of the pro-democracy activists” (Seoul Sinmun, 
 December 11, 1992). People’s movements were stigmatised as radical, violent and 
 anachronistic, which clearly mirrored the state’s perspective.41
 As demonstrated by Lee Jung-eun, the mobilization of ‘‘people’s movement groups’’ 
triggered repression no matter the tactics they  employed (violent or non-violent) and the size 
of their protests in the post-transition period. In other words, authorities tended to act upon 
their perceptions of ‘‘categorical traits of protest groups’’ rather than ‘‘situational aspects of 
protests’’ in policing differentially  the people’s and citizens’ movements.42  In this context, 
the National Security Act has remained a central tool in the hands of the state. Supposedly 
justified by the permanence of the security  dilemma in which the Korean peninsula is caught 
(a situation which did not manifest signs of betterment at the time of the transition, with the 
bombing of a civilian airplane in 1987 and the beginning of the nuclear crisis in the early 
1990s), the law has been consistently deployed to enforce the non-inclusive legacy  of South 
Korea’s transition to democracy. 
Disputing and enforcing the non-inclusive legacy of the transition
 The National Security  Act has remained a relevant instrument of policing in 
post-1987 South Korea. This first testifies to the conservative nature of the transitional 
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process. As pointed out by Charles Armstrong, ‘‘South Korean democracy  remains 
‘minimalist’ and conservative, not expressing the true range of political options and opinions 
among its citizens. [...] It may be precisely because of the conservative nature of democratic 
transition to date that civil society and social movement organization remain active and 
visible in South Korea.’’43  As a result, repressive trends and practices after the demise of 
authoritarianism cannot be studied in isolation from the resilient patterns of mobilization in 
civil society, which in turn have been fueled by the frustrating modalities and outcomes of 
democratization. While the change of regime was made possible by  the long-term 
mobilization of various social movements such as workers and students, their role was 
confiscated and their demands for structural reforms evaded in the process of negotiating the 
transition and institutionalizing procedural democracy.44  This process was instead 
monopolized by traditional political forces from both the ruling elite and opposition parties, 
sharing two common premises despite their dissensions: ‘‘Cold War anti-communism and 
development ideology.’’45   
 In reaction, mobilization endured from the parts of civil society  which, having been 
actively involved in challenging the authoritarian state before becoming marginalized in the 
elite-led political phase of the transition, did not see the promise of democracy fulfilled. 
 
 [A]fter the inauguration of Roh Tae Woo, civil society groups remobilized 
 themselves and resumed their pro-democracy  campaign with a vigor comparable or 
 even stronger than that during the 1985-1987 period. [...] To most  of the movement 
 groups that had led the ‘‘June Uprising’’ in 1987, the Roh regime was viewed as a 
 mere extension of authoritarian rule. Thus civil society groups often pejoratively 
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 characterized Roh as ‘‘Chun with a wig,’’ likening him to the previous military ruler 
 who was bald. At best, Roh’s regime seemed to be a liberalized authoritarianism 
 (dictablanda), and the need to continue the pro-democracy struggle appeared 
 vital. Furthermore the grand party  merger in 1990 offered glaring evidence that the 
 Roh Tae Woo regime was just a continuation of the past authoritarianism and that the 
 opposition parties were unreliable.46 
 In 1991, Amnesty International estimated that 200 national security prisoners, 
including 30 prisoners of conscience, were detained in South Korean jails, a number which 
had jumped to 500 by 1994, with 70% of them being incarcerated under the National 
Security Act.47 This clear deterioration of the human rights situation in the second year of 
Kim Young-sam’s term can first be attributed to the resurgence of mass mobilization which 
had abated after the election of Kim, the first civilian president in thirty  years, but was 
revived by  the national controversy which erupted ‘‘during 1994-1995 over one of the most 
difficult yet important issues of the consolidational politics - the ‘liquidation’ of the 
authoritarian past.’’48  This episode of confrontation between civil society and the 
government over making the former regime accountable for its crimes, in which the 
constitutional court was involved as analyzed in chapter four, led to an ambivalent outcome: 
former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo were arrested, prosecuted, tried, and 
respectively sentenced to death and life imprisonment, but subsequently  pardoned by Kim 
Young-sam before he left office. 
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 Meanwhile, hundreds of new arrests took place in 1996.49 Toward the end of the year, 
the ruling party  railroaded two controversial bills in the National Assembly  one early 
morning, in the absence of the parliamentary opposition. The bills included a labor reform to 
facilitate layoffs and an initiative to expand the investigative power of the Agency for 
National Security Planning, in charge of inquiring into alleged anti-state crimes. The two 
laws’ passage and the conditions of their adoption unleashed nationwide demonstrations and 
anti-government protests, especially from student organizations and labor unions. In 
particular, they ‘‘characterized the Kim Young-sam government as a civilian dictatorship and 
led a series of strikes, including a general strike in January 1997, the first such strike since 
the Republic of Korea was founded in 1948.’’50 The continued militancy  of these two groups 
in the aftermath of the transition should not however mask some of the transformations that 
South Korean civil society underwent after 1987, both in its modes of mobilization as well 
as modalities of discourse. 
 The dominant framework of the 1980s was the ‘‘minjung’’ ideology, where 
‘‘minjung’’ stands for the ‘‘common people’’ or ‘‘the masses.’’ Primarily articulated by  the 
student movement, the notion captured more than the political struggle against 
authoritarianism, encompassing the project to create an alternative social order emancipated 
from two additional sources of oppression: on the one hand, capitalism and the domination 
of conglomerates, that is to say, the forces behind the model of development promoted by the 
authoritarian state and seen as industrialization to the detriment of labor and the economic 
independence of the country in ‘‘minjung’’ lenses; on the other hand, the dictates of foreign 
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powers, particularly the United States, held responsible for the Korean division’s coming 
into being and permanence. 
 Construed as an artifact  imposed on a single nation and therefore frustrating its 
genuine aspirations, the division occupied a privileged place in ‘‘minjung’’ rhetoric, which 
embraced a reunification discourse dissenting from the South Korean state’s official policy. 
Under the authoritarian years, the ‘‘minjung’’ repertoire provided a platform for the student 
movement to form an alliance with labor, while fusing three types of challenges - or threats 
from the rulers’ point of view - to the existing order: against the political nature of the 
regime; against the socio-economic model of ‘‘corporatism without labor’’; and against the 
very legitimacy of the South as the only sovereign Korea.
 This triptych of claims however dissolved in the late 1980s. Within a few years 
following the transition, anti-government contestation largely  re-centered on the democratic 
deficiencies of the new political system, thereby being increasingly disconnected from the 
issue of the North-South division. Overtime, 
 [T]he discourse of unification has lost a great deal of its attraction within the South 
 Korean social and political movements of the post-democratization era. Whereas the 
 1960 ‘‘Student Revolution’’ that led to the downfall of Syngman Rhee upheld 
 ‘‘Unification Now!’’ as one of its key slogans, and North-South reconciliation 
 remained near the top of the agenda for many critics of the authoritarian regimes in 
 the South through the late 1980s, in the 1990s the South Korean social movements 
 have given relatively less priority to reunification as a major goal. Part of the reason 
 for this is the sobering lesson of German unification, which entailed a greater 
 financial and social costs than many had predicted.51
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 In other words, post-1987 South Korean civil society has experienced a ‘‘great 
paradigmatic shift from people (minjung) to citizen (simin),’’ from the revolutionary  struggle 
of the masses to the reformist and moderate advocacy of citizens’ movements.52 Fostered by 
the middle-class and educated segments of the population, citizens’ movements have been 
committed to the advancement of specific causes, such as environmental protection or the 
transparency of elections. Early on, they manifested ‘‘widespread fatigue and even disgust 
with the culture of dissent,’’ feelings which had generalized by  the late 1990s.53  This 
evolution of civil society ironically contributed to make mobilization and demands by 
groups such as students and workers even more marginalized than they already were after 
the regime change. 
  One of the main targets of the National Security  Act between 1998 and 2002 was 
indeed labor, and more specifically the union leaders or activists most involved in the wave 
of struggles which erupted in response to the recession of South Korean economy toward the 
end of 1997. To cope with ‘‘the worst economic crisis since the Korean War,’’ the exiting 
Kim Young-sam administration received from the International Monetary  Fund a rescue loan 
of $57 million, which was ‘‘accompanied by  a stringent financial and restructuring 
program’’ necessitating the cooperation of labor to be successfully implemented.54  As a 
result, a ‘‘Labor-Management-Government Tripartite Council’’ (‘‘no-sa-chŏng’’) was formed 
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early 1998 by the newly-elected Kim Dae-jung administration. This initiative formally 
enabled labor participation in politics for the first time in South Korea, in exchange for vast 
economic concessions.55  However, the role and bargaining power recognized to labor 
remained limited, and the agreement reached by the tripartite commission was soon 
contested. According to Choi Jang-Jip, 
 The exclusion of labor from party politics did not change under the Kim Dae-jung 
 government. The tripartite commission remains in name but not in function. 
 Participation of labor at the enterprise level, at the level of political representation, 
 and at the policy decision-making level has been closed off. Consequently, when it 
 became clear that the labor policy  under the Kim Dae-jung administration was 
 meaningful only  as an extension of neo-liberal economic policy, the mainstream 
 labor movement, the KCTU [Korean Confederation of Trade Unions], confronted the 
 government. The government responded to the situation only  as a matter of 
 maintaining law and order. In the process, the administration’s labor policy 
 regressed to that of the authoritarian regimes of the past.56
 Indeed, hundreds of labor union members were arrested for their militancy between 
1998 and 2002, for offenses such as organizing ‘’illegal’’ strikes or ‘‘obstructing company 
business.’’57 As pointed out by Bruce Cumings, 
 Kim Dae Jung has never been a radical, and has not had a strong base in labor for 
 two reasons: first, until 1998 it was illegal for labor to involve itself in politics; 
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 second, over the years Kim has been much more a champion of the southwestern 
 region and of small and medium business than he has of labor (and, of course, 
 supporting labor was ticket to political oblivion in Korea’s McCarthyite milieu). It is 
 true that he is more sympathetic to labor demands than previous leaders, and labor 
 clearly  prefers him to the past run of dictators. But that isn’t saying much, given the 
 harsh anti-labor environment of the past fifty years.58 
 Between 1998 and 2002, arrests were still numerous but levels of imprisonment 
under the security legislation eventually fell. Not only had all political long-term prisoners 
convicted before the change of regime progressively been liberated toward the late 1990s, 
but most trade unionists apprehended during these years were not criminally prosecuted.59 
Overall, a total of 990 people were arrested between February 1998 and July 2002 through 
the National Security Act but the number of prisoners held under the law had dropped to 39 
as 2002 was coming to a close,60 reflecting a shift in terms of the NSA’s enforcement - with 
still many arrests but fewer prosecutions and convictions. 
 Throughout the first decade of the new millennium, the number of people sentenced 
to imprisonment under the security  legislation has remained relatively low.61 After 2008 and 
the coming to power of a new conservative administration under Lee Myung-bak, 
investigations of suspected anti-state activities have however increased (46 in 2008, 90 in 
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2011),62 especially due to a stricter policing of the Internet.63 In 2011, no less than 106 were 
persons charged with violating the National Security Act, a trend which has attracted 
considerable criticism. The resurgence of concerns about undemocratic practices under Lee 
Myung-bak’s government extended to the state’s handling of the mostly peaceful 2008 
candlelight protests against U.S. beef imports, which highlighted the continued restrictive 
nature of current demonstration laws in South Korea.64 
 In post-1987 South Korea, the National Security  Act’s resilient deployment has not 
implied the regime’s struggle against any kind of social mobilization, but the use of the 
security legislation to contain the political demands and alternative ‘‘national’’ discourse of 
the forces contesting the channeled, and limited, modes of participation imposed by  the 
successive elected governments. As security tools have prevented this dispute about the 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in democratic South Korea from unfolding in the 
public sphere, constitutional adjudication has been invested as one of the only available sites 
where to contest, legally, the contours of enmity. Yet, although the court has tried to 
disentangle some of the ambiguities historically  attached to the notion of enmity, its 
jurisprudence has also contributed to fundamentally reinforce the relevance of the security 
legislation as a mechanism enforcing the conservative legacy of the transition. 
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The constitutional court’s contribution to the redefinition of enmity
The paradox of defending constitutionalism
 Since 1987, the Constitutional Court  of Korea has participated to the process of 
redefining who the enemy is. Although the institution has clearly  aimed at uncoupling and 
narrowing some of the constructs attached to enmity, its commitment has been circumscribed 
by important  internal limits. First of all, the court’s efforts have not borne on the National 
Security Act as a whole, but on individual articles of the security legislation only. For 
instance, a 2009 challenge against the integrality  of the law was dismissed on the ground that 
the complainant lacked a justiciable interest, failing to specify  which of his basic rights were 
concretely infringed, and how, by attacking the totality  of the act.65 This narrow filtering of 
cases has been an important resource used on the side of caution, but it does not entail that 
the court has been uncritical of the law and unwilling to shape its understanding. On the 
contrary, the constitutional court has endeavored early  on to restrict some of the possible 
interpretations which could be made of the notion of enmity. 
 In doing so, the court has however also contributed to duplicate the definition 
articulated in the National Security  Act, by introducing a new type of threat against which 
the legislation is directed: activities which not only endanger the safety of the state, but also 
the ‘‘basic order of free democracy.’’ The language of democratic militancy  which the 
constitutional court inserted in its 1990 ruling on article 7 of the NSA was later appropriated 
by the legislature, and generalized throughout the law following its revision in May 1991. 
By turning the security legislation into an instrument relevant for the preservation of the 
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democratic constitutional order, the court’s jurisprudence has contributed to the law’s 
consolidation, rather than to its undermining. 
 Moreover, it should be underlined that the reference to democracy is not absolutely 
neutral in the context of South Korea’s politics of enmity, both in the words of the 
constitutional court  and those of the legislature. On the one hand, such an emphasis can be 
interpreted as a way of reframing the ideological dimension of the struggle against the 
paradigmatic ‘‘anti-state organization,’’ i.e., North Korea. This displacement is manifest  in 
the court’s equation of the ‘‘activities impairing the basic order of free democracy’’ with the 
promotion of ‘‘one-person or one-party dictatorship,’’ which underscores the illegitimacy of 
the North Korean regime. In this perspective, the 1991 amendment of the National Security 
Act which generalized the language of democratic militancy throughout the law also 
coincided with the withdrawal of any explicit mention of communism from the text. 
 On the other hand, the fundamental values which the court has derived from its 
unpacking of the ‘‘basic order of free democracy’’ also have to be analyzed in light of the 
struggle about what counts as ‘‘national’’ and ‘‘anti-national’’ in post-transition South Korea. 
As highlighted by  Melissa Schwartzberg, leaving it to courts to define and shape such 
entrenched constructs as ‘‘democracy’’ and the ‘‘constitutional order’’ entails the double risk 
that judges may  solidify a particular and selective vision of them, in ways which cannot be 
altered through ordinary legislative change.66
 
238
66 Melissa Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007, p.22.
The exacerbation of ‘‘anti-state’’ enmity 
 In late 1989, the constitutionality of article 7, sections 1 and 5 of the National 
Security Act was challenged before a lower court (the Masan Local Court, located in the 
southeastern corner of the peninsula) by  three defendants prosecuted and tried ‘‘for 
possessing and distributing books and other expressive materials for the purpose of 
benefiting an anti-state organization.’’ Their request for review was granted by the president 
of the tribunal and referred to the constitutional court in accordance with the mechanism of 
incidental judicial review described in chapter two. The petitioners’ presumption of 
unconstitutionality was based on their claim that  article 7, sections 1 and 5 of the NSA was 
both ambiguous and excessively broad. 
 Under article 7, section 1, ‘‘any person who praises, encourages, sympathizes with, or 
benefits through other means, an anti-state organization, its members, or any person under its 
direction’’ could be punished by imprisonment for up  to seven years, while section 5 
criminalized ‘‘the production, importation, duplication, possession, transportation, 
distribution, selling or acquiring of a document, a drawing or any other expressive article’’ 
for the purpose of performing acts mentioned in section 1. No additional elements of context 
than this rudimentary information about how and why  the case reached the constitutional 
court are provided in the decision that the institution rendered on April 2, 1990. Indeed, it is 
a characteristic of the court’s rulings to expose only  briefly the facts which form the 
background of a given case and to examine the legal issues raised before it mostly  in the 
abstract, although this tendency seems to have slightly waned over the years.67
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judgment).  
 Sanctioning any  use of the freedom of expression deemed favorable to North Korea 
or domestic ‘‘anti-state’’ groups, article 7 has empirically served to imprison students or 
intellectuals acquainted with Marxist literature, people writing about the North Korean 
system even from a scientific or journalistic viewpoint, as well as anyone articulating ideas 
considered to belong to the ideological repertoire of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, such as criticizing the South’s capitalist  structures or the presence of the U.S. armed 
forced on its territory. At the time when the constitutional court’s ruling was delivered on 
April 2, 1990, it was clear that the charge of benefiting the enemy through expressive 
materials continued to be interpreted extensively by law-enforcing institutions - including 
the ordinary  courts - against  individuals whose activities were far from endangering national 
security, such as artists, publishers, and academics.68 
 The Constitutional Court of Korea was unanimously firm in denouncing such abuses, 
holding that if ‘‘interpreted literally,’’ article 7 would ‘‘merely intimidate and suppress 
freedom of expression without upholding any public interest in national security,’’ thereby 
‘‘infringing freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of science and arts, and 
ultimately  violating the principle of rule of law and the principle of statutory punishment.’’69 
Despite the acuteness of these criticisms, the court  did not however invalidate the provisions 
under review. Instead, it deemed them constitutional to the extent that  they  were construed 
narrowly, as covering and sanctioning only those expressive activities which pose a ‘‘clear 
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68  Amnesty International, Prisoners Held for National Security Offences,  ASA 25/25/91,  London: Amnesty 
International, 1991, p.6.
69  ‘‘The expressions such as ‘member,’ ‘activities,’ ‘sympathizes with,’ or ‘benefits’ used in the challenged 
provisions are too vague and do not permit a reasonable standard for ordinary people with good sense to 
visualize the covered types of conduct.  They are also overly broad to determine the contents and boundaries of 
their definitions. Interpreted literally, they will merely intimidate and suppress freedom of expression without 
upholding any public interest in national security.’’ 2 KCCR 49, 89Hun-Ka113, April 2, 1990, in The 
Constitutional Court of Korea, Twenty Years, p.215.
threat to the integrity and the security of the nation and the basic order of free democracy.’’70 
 On the one hand, this formulation forcefully  demonstrated the court’s intention to 
restrict the activities susceptible to be criminalized under article 7 by  introducing a ‘‘clear 
threat’’ standard reminiscent of the ‘‘clear and present danger test’’ found in U.S. 
jurisprudence.71 Yet, on the other hand, the addition of a reference to the ‘‘basic order of free 
democracy’’ had the effect to alter the scope of the National Security Act and of the concept 
of ‘‘anti-state organization,’’ converting them into militant instruments to protect not only 
national security, but the constitutional order. In doing so, it can be argued that the 
Constitutional Court of Korea did more than prescribe an understanding of the law which 
made it compatible with the constitution. It not only created a relation of compatibility, but 
of solidarity, between the National Security Act and the post-1987 constitutional order which 
the court has to defend. 
 When the court proceeded to refine the notion of ‘‘clear threat to the integrity  and 
security of the nation and the basic order of free democracy,’’ its reasoning highlighted both 
the distinction and intimate connection between threats against the security of the state and 
the stability of the constitutional order.
 The activities jeopardizing the integrity and the security of the nation denote those 
 communist activities, coming from outside, threatening the independence and 
 infringing on the sovereignty  of the Republic of Korea and its territories, thereby 
 destroying constitutional institutions and rendering the Constitution and the laws 
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70 Ibidem, p.216.
71  The ‘‘clear and present danger test’’ was introduced in American jurisprudence by the Schenck v. United 
States decision of 1919. In this case, Justice Holmes famously wrote for the unanimous court that: ‘‘The most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such 
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has 
a right to prevent.’’ Interestingly, the Constitutional Court of Korea did not choose to resort to the more recent 
standard elaborated by the U.S. Supreme Court in its Brandenburg v. Ohio ruling of 1968, which makes 
restrictions on the freedom of speech only possible in the event of an ‘‘imminent lawless action.’’
 inoperative. The activities impairing the basic order of free democracy denote those 
 activities undermining the rule of law pursuant to the principles of equality and 
 liberty and that of people’s self-government by a majority  will in exclusion of rule of 
 violence or arbitrary rule: in other words, one-person or one-party  dictatorship  by an 
 anti-state organization. Specifically, they are the efforts to subvert and confuse our 
 internal orders such as respect for basic rights, separation of powers, 
 representative democracy, multi-party system, elections, the economic order based on 
 private property and market economy, and independence of the judiciary.72
 The definition of ‘‘activities impairing the basic order of free democracy’’ owes much 
to the one articulated by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in the 1952 Socialist 
Reich Party case. The ‘‘basic order of free democracy’’ was then described ‘‘as an order 
which excludes any form of tyranny or arbitrariness and represents a governmental system 
under a rule of law, based upon self-determination of the people as expressed by the will of 
the existing majority  and upon freedom and equality. The fundamental principles of this 
order include at least: respect for the human rights given concrete form in the Basic Law, in 
particular for the right  of a person to life and free development; popular sovereignty; 
separation of powers; responsibility of government; lawfulness of administration; 
independence of the judiciary; the multi-party principle; and equality  of opportunities for all 
political parties.’’73 
 The Constitutional Court  of Korea’s definition of the threats which endanger the 
‘‘basic order of free democracy’’ is more tortuous, encompassing ‘‘those activities 
undermining the rule of law,’’ as well as ‘‘the efforts to subvert and confuse our internal 
orders’’ (‘‘naebu ch’ejae’’ in the original text, which is also translatable as ‘‘internal 
system’’ or ‘‘structures’’). The institutions which support this ‘‘internal system’’ are however 
clearly  differentiated from their antithesis, ‘‘the rule of violence or arbitrary rule’’ which 
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72 2 KCCR 49, 89Hun-Ka113,  April 2, 1990, in The Constitutional Court of Korea, Twenty Years, p.216. 
73  2 BVerfGE 1 (1952), in John Finn, Constitutions in Crisis. Political Violence and the Rule of Law, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p.190.
characterizes ‘‘one-person or one-party dictatorship by an anti-state organization.’’ The 
notion of anti-state enmity articulated by the constitutional court thus appears both restricted 
and exacerbated at the same time. If fewer activities are defined as endangering the state in 
accordance with the clear danger test, a new category  of threats is also introduced, 
comprising the activities which jeopardize the institutions upon which the democratic 
constitutional order is premised - including the ‘‘economic order based on private property 
and market economy’’ absent from the German definition. 
Justice Byun’s dissenting opinion: divergences and commonalities with the majority
 The 1990 judgment rendered by the court on the limited constitutionality  of article 7 
was not unanimous. Justice Byun Jeong-soo dissented arguing that ‘‘the provisions of the 
law [were] so clearly unconstitutional [that they] cannot  be cured merely  by  interpreting it 
narrowly and should simply  be stricken down.’’74 Byun was the one judge recommended by 
Kim Dae-jung’s opposition party  (the Peace Democratic Party) among the three nominees 
chosen by  the parliament in 1988. Even though Byun and the majority diverged on the 
adjudication outcome that should be adopted by the court, their respective opinions also 
shared a lot in common, starting with how they interpreted the ongoing inter-Korean conflict 
and the threat that it poses to the South’s safety.
 From a comparative perspective, courts usually appear to formulate an uncontentious 
vision of the background security crisis under which they operate, unanimously recognizing 
its severity and intensity  - terrorism in countries like the United States and Israel, or the 
continued ‘‘hostility of North Korea’’ in the South Korean case. This neither implies that 
243
74 2 KCCR 49, 89Hun-Ka113,  April 2, 1990 (personal translation).
their common framing of the wider security context - common to the extent that  it is shared 
between majority  and dissenting judges, as well as with other state institutions involved in 
litigation - is undisputed in society  at large, nor that disagreements about the matter of 
review are precluded. In the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Korea, 
understandings of the national security  situation are strongly  uniform not only among the 
justices but  throughout the court’s twenty  five years of adjudication, all reaffirming the 
‘‘incomparability’’ of the Korean division and the extraordinary  plight that it  creates on the 
South. However, this uniformity  does not prevent divergences about how basic rights and 
national security have to be reconciled.    
 In the case at hand, the court’s nine justices concurred to recognize the excessive 
character of article 7 of the National Security Act while upholding the necessity  to protect 
South Korea’s national security. Justice Byun himself cited in his opinion the possibility to 
restrict basic rights when necessary  for national security, pursuant to article 37, section 2 of 
the constitution. Yet, it was clear to all in the present case that the challenged provisions, 
interpreted literally, did not serve ‘‘any  public interest in national security’’ while hurting 
alternative fundamental goods such as the freedom of expression, the rule of law, and the 
pursuit of reunification. In the end, what the majority  ruling and the dissenting opinion 
appear to have disagreed about was not a conflict of interpretation over article 7 of the NSA 
but different visions of the role bestowed upon the court and its jurisprudence. Indeed, 
Justice Byun stressed in his conclusion that it was the task of the institution to denounce as 
such provisions that it  found unconstitutional, arguing that  the ‘‘objective’’ interpretation of 
article 7 put forth by the court would not prevent investigative and law-enforcing agencies to 
persevere in their ‘‘subjective’’ and problematic understanding of the National Security 
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Act.75  On the contrary, the majority asserted its duty to interpret polysemic legislative 
provisions as being consistent with the constitution to the maximum extent possible. 
 As will be explored later in the chapter, neither the will of the court, nor the ensuing 
amendment of the National Security Act, has indeed been sufficient to make effective a 
restrictive interpretation of the law. The revision of the security legislation which was 
unilaterally  passed by  the ruling party on May 10, 1991 nonetheless brought about a variety 
of changes.76 First of all, the reference to the ‘‘basic order of free democracy’’ introduced by 
the court was adopted and generalized throughout the law. Second, a new provision was 
inserted in its article 1, guaranteeing that ‘‘the law shall not be loosely interpreted or 
otherwise misapplied to unreasonably restrict the basic human rights of citizens.’’ Third, the 
designation of all communist groups (including foreign parties and governments) as ‘‘anti-
state organizations’’ was withdrawn, alongside the provisions prohibiting to praise or contact 
them. Fourth, an intentionality requirement was inserted in several parts of the text, 
including article 7, to ensure that only an anti-state act committed ‘‘with the knowledge that 
it will endanger the nation’s security and existence, or the basic order of free democracy’’ 
could be punished. Finally, the vague crime of ‘‘benefiting an anti-state organization through 
other means’’ was suppressed. Yet, the notion of ‘‘clear threat’’ advocated by the 
constitutional court was not retained. As a standard of interpretation and safeguard against 
abuses, its adoption has not only been resisted by political elites but by institutions in charge 




76 The Constitutional Court of Korea, Twenty Years, p.217.
Consolidation effects through unconstitutionality decisions
 The Constitutional Court of Korea paradoxically contributed to further consolidate 
the National Security Act by declaring two of its features unconstitutional. This first  proves 
that the attitude of the court is not one of intrinsic deference or subservience when it comes 
to national security matters. Indeed, the court has been able to engage in more than 
prudential criticism, not  limiting itself to rulings upholding the validity of the security 
legislation. The two decisions of unconstitutionality  that it  rendered did not, however, 
contradict the fact that the court usually  acts with caution. Moreover, they  exemplify some of 
the consolidation effects which can be produced by constitutional intervention, even when it 
overturns existing policies. This finding importantly shows that the judicial outcome of a 
case merely tells a limited part of a broader story: not only  can rulings always be ignored or 
distorted by other actors, but they can also yield a variety of effects. 
 In 1992, South Korea’s constitutional court unanimously found article 19 of the 
National Security Act unconstitutional for offenses falling under articles 7 and 10 of the 
law.77 The point of article 19 is to extend the period of custody  when anti-state crimes are 
investigated. The regular length of detention provided for by the Criminal Procedure Code is 
thirty days, which means that the police and prosecution can hold a suspect in detention for a 
month, from the time when an arrest warrant is issued, until the moment when the concerned 
individual is indicted (i.e., formally charged with a crime) or has to be released. Within this 
period, the first ten days are dedicated to investigation by the police, followed by ten days 
for the prosecution, with the possibility  to prolong custody  by another ten days with a 
judge’s permission. 
246
77 4 KCCR 194, 90Hun-Ma82, April 14, 1992.
 Article 19 of NSA increases this period by another twenty  days for all the anti-state 
activities covered by  the law - ten supplementary  days for the police and ten for the 
prosecution, which brings the total length of custody  to fifty  days.78  This extension was 
considered excessive by  the constitutional court  for those offenses which it deemed ‘‘not 
particularly difficult to investigate,’’ such as ‘‘praising, encouraging or sympathizing with an 
anti-state organization’’ (article 7) and ‘‘failing to report’’ anti-state crimes (article 10).79 In 
doing so, the court however confirmed the legitimacy of the derogation for all the other 
offenses covered by the security  legislation, a position which was explicitly reaffirmed in a 
1997 ruling.
 The second unconstitutionality  decision invalidating a provision of the National 
Security Act was rendered in 2002, against article 13 on the special aggravation of 
punishment in case of recidivism.80  Article 13 upgrades the maximum penalty to capital 
punishment for any individual who, having been imprisoned for violating the NSA or other 
serious criminal statutes, commits a new offense against national security  within five years. 
In 2002, the court deemed the application of article 13 excessive when the crimes involved 
are the expressive activities covered by article 7, and article 7 only  (failure to report  crimes 
under article 10 was already excluded from the scope of this provision). The aggravation of 
punishment was therefore implicitly  validated for all the other offenses. Together with the 
1992 precedent on the authorized length of custody and the 1990 decision prescribing a 
restricted interpretation of the crime of ‘‘praising and encouraging an anti-state 
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78  As will be explored in chapter seven, the major actor actually involved in the investigation of activities 
falling under the NSA is the once omnipotent Agency for National Security Planning, formerly known as the 
KCIA (1961-1981) and, since 1999, as the National Intelligence Service.
79 9-1 KCCR 578, 96Hun-Ka8, June 26, 1997 (personal translation).
80 14-2 KCCR 600, 2002Hun-Ka5, November 28, 2002.
organization,’’ this new ruling expressed the court’s concerns about the scope of article 7 and 
the various abuses which can result  from its broad construction on a par with other anti-state 
crimes. 
 However, by  adopting a form of narrow control focused on article 7, the three 
judgments also had the effect to validate the rest of the security legislation. This anticipates 
the pattern which will be described in chapter seven for criminal rights, with the court’s strict 
review of the conditions in which they can be suspended implying a legitimation of the very 
possibility of their suspension. These dynamics of consolidation are not specific to the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Korea, although their forms and extent vary 
depending on cases. For instance, in its famous series of cases decided against the policies of 
the George W. Bush administration and Congress between 2004 and 2008, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has progressively  recognized the right of both Americans and foreigners detained at 
Guantánamo to have a fair opportunity  to challenge the basis of their confinement before a 
federal district judge, i.e., their very designation as ‘‘enemy combatant.’’81 In ruling so, the 
court reshaped the meaning of this disputed status, while also accepting its general validity 
and confirming the government’s power to detain individuals under it. 
 Those can be seen as underlying effects which accompanied, and maybe impaired, 
the ‘‘great  victory’’ celebrated by Ronald Dworkin in the wake of the 2008 Boumediene v. 
Bush ruling.82 They illustrate that judgments which overturn aspects of the policies designed 
by the political branches to confront enemies can also contribute to solidify the very 
constructs upon which the politics of enmity is premised, such as the category of ‘‘enemy 
combatant’’ and the related notion of ‘‘war on terror’’ in the American context. The 
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81 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v.  Bush,  542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
82 Ronald Dworkin, ‘‘Why It Was a Great Victory,’’ The New York Review of Books, August 14, 2008.
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Israel, which sits as High Court of Justice when it 
performs its functions of constitutional adjudicator, also fits this pattern. While the court is 
often described as activist, its decisions can be read as conveying a unilateral vision of 
Palestinian violence and as sustaining the occupation’s legality, even - or especially - when 
they set limits on the actions of military authorities in the West Bank and Gaza.83
 In the case of South Korea, the three rulings on the National Security Act analyzed in 
this chapter have also ultimately reinforced both the law and its article 7, despite - or through 
- the court’s own criticisms. In particular, the constitutional court  has contributed to 
strengthen the raison d’être of this provision by proclaiming its relevance not only to 
preserve the security of the sate but the integrity  of the ‘‘basic order of free democracy.’’ 
This actualization of the security legislation’s functionality  demonstrates that the law in 
general, and its article 7 in particular, cannot be reduced to being a legacy  of the 
authoritarian period, as portrayed by their detractors. 
 On the one hand, regulating the uses which can be made of the freedom of expression 
and punishing certain forms of advocacy is actually a practice permitted in most 
contemporary  democracies, albeit to varying degrees. On the other hand, the fact that the 
overwhelming majority  of the individuals prosecuted under the security legislation has been 
incriminated for violating article 7 (1,791 persons during the administration of Kim Young-
sam between February  1993 and February  1998; 971 under the government of Kim Dae-jung 
from February 1998 to February  2003) testifies to the centrality  of the law as a mechanism 
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83 See for instance David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice. The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied 
Territories, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002; Nimer Sultany, ‘‘The Legacy of Justice Aharon 
Barak. A Critical Review,’’ Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.48, No.43, 2007, pp.83-92; George 
Bisharat, ‘‘Courting Justice? Legitimation in Lawyering Under Israeli Occupation,’’  Law and Social Inquiry, 
Vol.20, No.2, 1995, pp.349-405.
of exclusion enforcing a certain distribution of what counts or not as permissible speech in 
the post-transition order.84   
 Eventually, the three above decisions have something else in common than the 
consolidation effects attached to them. They  also shared the fate of having been largely 
ignored by the actors involved in the defense of society. At first sight, the 1990 ruling of 
limited constitutionality  was conclusively followed by an important legislative revision of 
the National Security Act which appropriated the language of democratic militancy and 
introduced new safeguards. Yet, the court’s push for a narrow interpretation of the legislation 
was not sufficient to induce compliance from the very  law-enforcing institutions whose 
discretion the judgment explicitly condemned. Defiance has not only come from special 
investigators and prosecutors persevering in a broad understanding of the National Security 
Act, but also from the judiciary, and more specifically  from the Supreme Court of Korea. 
Resistance to NSA-related constitutional verdicts has been even more flagrant when it  comes 
to the two decisions of unconstitutionality  rendered in 1992 and 2002, for which no revision 
of the incriminated provisions ensued.
Resistances to the court’s redefinition
Hostility to unconstitutionality decisions from the political branches 
 The only two decisions of unconstitutionality ever delivered by the constitutional 
court in relation to the National Security Act have been disregarded by the political branches. 
As a result, article 13 on the aggravation of punishment and article 19 on the extension of 
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custody still apply to the offenses for which the court tried to nullify their effects. In other 
words, the crimes of ‘‘praising, encouraging, and sympathizing with an anti-state 
organization’’ (article 7) and ‘‘failing to report anti-state acts’’ (article 10) can be investigated 
for fifty days and any suspect be detained for that long before charges are leveled against 
him (by opposition to thirty  days as prescribed by the court), while recidivism within five 
years under article 7 can technically be punished by death.85  While both rulings were 
overlooked, their existence and substance are however mentioned at the end of articles 13 
and 19 in the official version of the National Security  Act to be found on South Korea’s 
official legal database.86 
 The political branches’ resistance to amend the elements of unconstitutionality  lodged 
in the security legislation cannot be easily interpreted as an adverse response to the court’s 
aggressiveness. On the contrary, the two decisions are very symptomatic of the court’s 
caution. Never has the Constitutional Court  of Korea considered the possibility to invalidate 
the totality of the Nationality  Security Act, not even to censure articles 13 and 19 in their 
integrality. The two provisions were only found unconstitutional in so far as they  applied to 
the expressive activities covered by article 7 and, in the case of article 19, to the additional 
act of not reporting anti-state crimes under article 10. Concretely, the court  mainly 
determined that an individual suspected of ‘‘praising, encouraging, or sympathizing with an 
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85 ‘‘The most recent executions in South Korea took place in December 1997. However,  at the end of 2011 at 
least 60 people were on death row and death sentences continue to be handed down. The death penalty remains 
applicable for a wide range of criminal and political offences under approximately 20 different laws. In recent 
years, most death sentences have been imposed for convictions of multiple murders. There is no official 
moratorium on executions and legislative moves to abolish the death penalty have come to nothing.’’  Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Concerns in the Republic of Korea. Submission to the UN Universal Periodic 
Review, ASA 25/0012012, 2012, p.5. As evoked in chapter three,  the Constitutional Court of Korea upheld the 
constitutionality of capital punishment in a 2010 decision: 22-1(A) KCCR 36, 2008Hun-Ka23, February 25, 
2010.
86 National Security Act, official legal database of the Republic of Korea. Accessed on May 14, 2013 at: http://
www.law.go.kr/lsSc.do?menuId=0&p1=&subMenu=1&nwYn=1&query=국가+보안법&x=0&y=0#liBgcolor0.
anti-state organization’’ through the production, distribution, or possession of supportive 
materials should not be held in custody  for more than thirty days before being indicted. 
Likewise, the court merely considered that the maximum penalty in case of recidivism 
should not be upgraded to the death penalty when the concerned anti-state crimes fall under 
article 7. 
 More than the court’s activism, these two decisions of unconstitutionality ironically 
illustrate the restraint displayed by judges on issues of national security, an attitude which 
equates neither quiescence nor subservience vis-à-vis the political branches. This apparent 
paradox may however represent a rule rather than an anomaly of judicial action. Indeed, 
elements of caution and deference are often present in rulings of unconstitutionality, even 
when they go far in contradicting the policy preferences of the executive and/or the 
legislature. This is for instance true of the U.S. Supreme Court’s concluding ruling on enemy 
combatants held at Guántanamo, in which the majority  warned that ‘‘this holding should not 
be read to imply that a habeas court  should intervene the moment an enemy combatant steps 
foot in a territory where the writ runs.’’87 In the case of the Constitutional Court of Korea’s 
two discarded decisions against the National Security  Act, constraints were first self-
imposed. In each decision, the parts invalidated only covered very limited aspects of the law, 
never a full article, let alone the totality of the legislation. Despite this moderation, the 
political branches overlooked the constitutional verdicts, both in 1992 and 2002, 
demonstrating a clear unwillingness to let the court shape further aspects of the security 
legislation after its 1990 judgment. 
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Refusing the ‘‘judicial duty to rectify names’’
 Although the decision of limited constitutionality rendered in 1990 over article 7 of 
the National Security Act was followed by a legislative revision of the law in 1991, the 
constitutional court has had no means at its disposal to ensure that the restrictive 
understanding it advocated would be respected in practice. As a matter of fact, the ways in 
which the National Security Act continued to be enforced in the 1990s demonstrated the 
resilience of the notion of anti-state enmity and its distortions. Importantly, resistance to a 
narrow interpretation of the legislation did not only come from the successive 
administrations in power and law enforcement actors such as the police, the Agency for 
National Security  Planning, or the prosecution, but also from the judiciary  - that is to say, 
from both the ordinary courts and the Supreme Court of Korea. 
 Despite the command of the constitutional court to construe the National Security Act 
as sanctioning only  those activities which pose a ‘‘clear threat’’ to the state’s security and to 
its democratic institutions, ordinary  courts initially turned down their ‘‘judicial duty to 
rectify names’’ and to distinguish real threats from symbolic ones. As underlined by James 
West and Edward Baker, the precondition for South Korean judges to engage in such 
rectification process was twofold: that  they neither experienced nor perceived any  cost in 
ruling impartially  in political cases, such as being labeled as ‘‘enemies’’ themselves when 
acquitting a defendant charged with anti-state crimes.   
 Democratization of the South Korean legal system entails a thoroughgoing 
 ‘‘rectification of names’’: Non-violent critics of the ruling party must no longer be 
 stigmatized as ‘‘impure’’ enemies of the state. The judicial duty to rectify  names can 
 be impartially discharged only if acquittals of political defendants no longer expose 
 judges to personal risks. Judicial perceptions of conceivable risks can be as effective 
 as unambiguous threats in distorting legal protections of civil and political rights. 
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 Past bias in the administration of justice has reflected an authoritarian scorn for the 
 basic principle that decisions of judges in a professional capacity  not only need not, 
 but ought not to, register judges’ personal choices among constitutionally permitted 
 political alternatives.88  
 During the authoritarian years, the personal risks incurred by the quest for judicial 
independence and fairness were known and felt by the legal profession. The latter consisted 
of a ‘‘closed and relatively  small fraternity’’ counting no more than 837 judges, 557 public 
prosecutors, and 1,483 licensed attorneys for a population of over 41 million by the late 
1980s, that is to say, a lawyer for about 27,000 inhabitants.89  The control and possible 
sanctions to which jurists were subjected made it  very difficult for them to challenge the 
political bias which characterized the administration of justice under the military regimes. 
 Compulsory political indoctrination of jurists, along with constant surveillance, have 
 contributed to an atmosphere of intimidation and self-censorship  within the 
 profession. Deference to authority is deeply ingrained in Korean society at large, and 
 in the legal profession the disincentives to dissent are compounded by the risk of 
 forfeiting a hard-earned niche in a highly privileged elite. [...] Protest resignations 
 have occurred and some individuals  have had their judicial careers cut short by 
 punitive non-reappointment because they  followed  their consciences. Other judges 
 have simply adapted and maintained a safe silence, even when adaptation meant 
 convicting political defendants based on confessions coerced by torture.90
 As judges were appointed for a fixed period of ten years and thus needed to have 
their tenure periodically  renewed, the threat or use of punitive non-reappointment was a 
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88 James West and Edward Baker, ‘‘The 1987 Constitutional Reforms in South Korea,’’ p.246.
89 Ibidem, p.245. By 2010, the ratio of lawyers to the overall population had improved to one per 5,178 South 
Korean inhabitants, a proportion which was still scarce compared to one to 265 in the United States, one to 326 
in Brazil, one to 401 in Britain,  or one to 593 in Germany. The Korea Herald, ‘‘Too Many Lawyers,’’ 
December 9, 2010. See also table 10 in chapter four.
90 James West and Edward Baker, ‘‘The 1987 Constitutional Reforms in South Korea,’’ pp.245-246.
major resource in the hands of the state to quell judicial independence.91 For instance, 52 
judges (or 18 percent of the profession) were dismissed in 1961, 56 (12 percent) in 1973, and 
37 (6 percent) in 1981.92  In this context, judges were strongly disinclined to perform their 
duties impartially in political cases, most of which were tried on the basis of confessions 
obtained through torture. This does not mean that  there have been no episodes of resistance 
from the judiciary throughout the authoritarian years. In the summer 1971 for instance, 151 
judges resigned en masse after arrest warrants were requested against two colleagues by 
prosecutors displeased with their handling of a National Security Act case.
 This clash intervened amidst growing tension between the courts and the increasingly 
repressive government of Park Chung-hee at the turn of the 1960s-1970s. Between 1969 and 
1972, ‘‘the courts on the whole went along with the executive branch, but sometimes they 
asserted judicial independence; and lived up to their proper role of curbing the executive 
branch.’’93 This attitude climaxed in 1971, when the supreme court rendered a rare decision 
of unconstitutionality against a legislative provision exonerating the state from compensating 
members of the armed forces and civilian employees of the military dead or injured in the 
performance of their official duties.94  Response came under the form of the Yusin 
constitution which stripped the supreme court  from its otherwise largely dormant power of 
constitutional review, bestowed this function upon an impotent committee, and opened an 
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Dae-Kyu Yoon, Law and Political Authority in South Korea, Boulder: Westview Press, Seoul: Kyungnam 
University Press, 1990, p.140. The system of fixed tenure and reappointment every ten years still exists, but has 
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era which weakened more than ever courts’ independence. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
the supreme court was particularly known for its conservatism and for overturning the 
rulings of lower courts whenever they contradicted the government’s wishes.
 The transition of 1987 and the general elections of April 1988 brought about changes, 
allowing the opposition parties to play a role in the composition of the supreme court. Since 
then, its jurisprudence has however reflected conflicting leanings. On the one hand, the 
supreme court and the constitutional court have allied in their struggle for enhanced 
procedural fairness throughout the criminal justice system. This movement has incidentally 
benefited the rights recognized to enemies as criminal suspects and defendants, a point 
which is elaborated in chapter seven. The two courts have, however, embraced rival 
positions over other matters relating to enmity, in particular over how much protection is due 
to the freedom of expression in relation to national security. For instance, the constitutional 
court has bitterly described how its 1990 decision on article 7 of the National Security Act 
was undermined by the jurisprudence of the supreme court.
 With this decision the [Constitutional] Court expected that the previous expansive 
 and unconstitutional interpretation of the National Security  Act would cease. 
 However, in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court which reviewed the trials 
 involving violations of the National Security Act, [the Supreme Court] merely recited 
 the above language to affirm  the equally broad interpretations of the statute, 
 substantially eviscerating the meaning of the decision of limited constitutionality.95
 
 This defiant attitude on the part of the supreme court was also espoused by lower 
tribunals, at least in the first years following the change of regime. From 1994 onward, ‘‘a 
notable change’’ however occurred as lower courts started to refer to the ‘‘constitutionally 
consistent interpretation’’ articulated in the 1990 ruling on article 7, and ‘‘began 
256
95 Ibidem, p.131. 
energetically  restricting abuses’’ of the security legislation.96  This led them to refuse arrest 
warrants unreasonably requested by prosecutors, or to acquit defendants charged with anti-
state crimes for which evidence was lacking.97 To do so, courts could also rely on the 1992 
dissenting opinion of three supreme court judges writing in favor of setting free suspects in a 
NSA case involving materials deemed to benefit  the enemy. The contents of the incriminated 
publications (two of which were entitled Basic Theory of Wage and America, America for 
Who?) were characterized by the supreme court’s majority as ‘‘active and aggressive 
expression threatening the security  of the state and the liberal democratic system, going 
beyond the limit of the freedom of expression.’’98  Three dissenting judges reasoned 
otherwise, distinguishing between the ‘‘symbolic’’ and ‘‘real’’ danger posed by expressive 
contents identified with North Korean ideology, such as anti-capitalism and anti-
Americanism.
 Even if a conduct is to praise, encourage, or align with the North Korean 
 government’s  propaganda which has been used as a method of the so-called policy of 
 indirect invasion of the South, it should not be held illegal if it may not be seen as a 
 conduct with a concrete and  possible danger of destroying the existence and security 
 of the Republic of Korea and the liberal democracy system. Fettered by  the fact that 
 it accords with the propaganda that North Korea has carried on, we must not 
 conclude it illegal expression because of the symbolic danger which the tabooed 
 materials of expression have. [...]. It  is true that  such expressions embarrass us. 
 However, such embarrassment results from the fact such kinds of expressions [...] 
 have been so thoroughly prohibited by  reason of guarantee of national security, that 
 the symbolic danger of the tabooed materials of expression is felt to us stronger than 
 their real danger. The right way of a liberal democracy  system is to remove the 
257
96  Kuk Cho, ‘‘Tensions Between the National Security Law and Constitutionalism in South Korea,’’ Boston 
University International Law Journal, Vol.15, No.1, Spring 1997, p.169.
97 The year 1994 indeed witnessed a deterioration of the human rights situation marked by the ‘‘extensive use 
of the National Security Law to detain prisoners of conscience.’’ Amnesty International, South Korea. Summary 
of Amnesty International’s Concerns, ASA 25/36/94, London: Amnesty International, 1994, p.1.
98  Supreme Court of Korea, 90 Do 2033,  1, May 31, 1992, in Kuk Cho, ‘‘Tensions Between the National 
Security Law and Constitutionalism in South Korea,’’ p.170. 
 symbolic danger by  daring to permit such expressions and making them go through 
 competition of ideas.99
 These early 1990s developments illustrate the complexity in which judicial dynamics 
are embedded, a complexity which stems from divergences between institutions - the 
constitutional court, the supreme court, and the lower courts have indeed adopted different, 
and at times rival, positions over how to interpret the scope of anti-state enmity under the 
National Security Act - and disagreements within each of them, as revealed by  splits among 
judges. The fact that the 1990 decision of the constitutional court was first defeated by the 
practice of ordinary courts, but later appropriated and reactivated by some of them, 
exemplifies the non-linearity and contingence of judicial processes. To be analyzed properly, 
the institutional contention between courts over the correct understanding and application of 
the National Security Act should neither be underestimated nor exaggerated. 
Strife between the supreme and constitutional courts
 The constitutional and supreme courts’ rivalry has not been limited to the issue of 
national security. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Korea has proved consistently  reluctant to 
abide by any decision of limited constitutionality, not solely the one related to article 7 of the 
security legislation. The constitutional court has been at a disadvantage in this confrontation 
since it cannot review the constitutionality  of judgments by ordinary tribunals. Indeed, these 
are explicitly excluded from the scope of constitutional petitions, and therefore from the 
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court’s jurisdiction, contrary to German practice as exposed in chapter two.100 In late 1997, 
the constitutional court however reaffirmed the binding force of all its unconstitutionality 
holdings.101 This ruling was pronounced after a complainant who was initially  favored by  a 
decision of limited constitutionality, but later sanctioned by the supreme court’s verdict in a 
taxation case, filed a constitutional petition against the validity of article 68, section 1 which 
prevents the constitutional court from reviewing the judgments of the ordinary courts.
 In its decision, the supreme court had explicitly argued that ‘‘a limited 
constitutionality decision does not bind on the ordinary courts because the decision merely 
specifies the meaning and scope of application of the provision and leaves intact the 
statutory language.’’102  In reaction to this affront, the constitutional court reasoned that 
article 68, section 1 could not be interpreted as prohibiting the review of judgments which 
continue to apply laws in a manner already censored as inconsistent  with the constitution. 
The institution strongly  asserted that ‘‘unconstitutionality decisions of the Constitutional 
Court could take such forms as unqualified unconstitutionality, limited constitutionality, 
limited unconstitutionality, and nonconformity to the Constitution, and [that] the decisions in 
all these forms are binding.’’103 This ruling was moreover justified as ‘‘unavoidable’’ ‘‘in 
light of other previous judgments by the Supreme Court that defied the decisions of the 
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Constitutional Court,’’ including the noncompliant interpretation of article 7 of the National 
Security Act.104
 The extent  of the two institutions’ antagonism over the security  legislation should 
not, however, be radicalized. Indeed, the courts have always remained tied by shared 
premises in the construction of enmity. Their disagreement over the interpretation of article 7 
and the kind of expressive materials which should be considered dangerous for the state 
cannot mask the constitutional and supreme courts’ convergence over construing the 
National Security Act as a valid and relevant instrument of South Korea’s post-transition 
order - not incompatible with constitutional values, but instead at  the service of their 
defense. 
 The two courts have actually sided together against the political forces in favor of 
abolishing the law during the intense debate prompted by President  Roh Moo-hyun in 2004. 
One of the arguments advanced by Roh in support of repealing the law was its continued 
misemployment for political purposes, rather than to address genuine security threats. If 
distorted uses of the National Security Act have indeed persisted beyond the 1987 change of 





The National Security Act in debate
The constitutional court’s apparent reversal
 Throughout the 1990s, while levels of arrest and imprisonment under the National 
Security Act remained high, the Constitutional Court of Korea had several occasions to 
review new challenges against the law.105  In particular, the justices were repeatedly 
presented with the possibility to reexamine the constitutionality of article 7 limiting the 
freedom of expression. The court  has consistently reiterated the provision’s validity, as long 
as it is conceived narrowly - that is to say, as punishing only those activities which pose a 
‘‘clear danger’’ to national security  or the ‘‘basic order of free democracy.’’ Leaving 
unaddressed the ordinary  tribunals’ non-compliant application of article 7, the constitutional 
court has found that the revisions introduced in the security  legislation in 1991 ‘‘made 
interpretations deviating from the legislative intent nearly impossible.’’106  Although it 
admitted the presence of ‘‘remaining ambiguities’’ in the amended law, the court reasoned 
that ‘‘terms such as ‘members,’ ‘activities,’ and ‘sympathizes with’ would no longer be 
vague when they are interpreted narrowly  as forming one element of the crime together with 
the revisions.’’107 
 In the immediate aftermath of the transition, the Constitutional Court  of Korea’s 
commitment to prevent abusive interpretations of the notion of anti-state enmity clearly 
positioned it at the vanguard of the necessary effort for regulating inherited mechanisms of 
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repression. By  the early  2000s however, the constitutional court could difficultly be 
described as belonging to the progressive side on the map of public attitudes about reforming 
the national security apparatus. In April 2002 for instance, a majority  of justices deemed 
valid the revised version of the conversion policy  requiring inmates sentenced under the 
National Security Act - and them alone - to pledge obedience to the laws of South Korea in 
order to qualify for parole review.108  The decision was nullified a year later, in July 2003, 
when the pledge was abolished by the Ministry of Justice (‘‘pŏpmubu’’) under the newly 
elected administration of Roh Moo-hyun. 
 This redistribution of forces appeared confirmed in 2004, when President Roh 
declared his support in favor of repealing the National Security  Act while its validity  was 
again upheld by the constitutional court. Although the court’s position over the security 
legislation seems to have evolved toward greater conservatism throughout time, the 
institution has in fact remained highly  consistent with its earlier jurisprudence. After all, 
even its most critical rulings (such as the 1990 decision of limited constitutionality on article 
7 and the two decisions of unconstitutionality  from 1992 and 2002) never challenged the 
continued relevance of the security legislation, nor its persistent characterization of North 
Korea as an anti-state organization. Instead, the court’s jurisprudence has overall contributed 
to consolidate, rather than undermine, major aspects of South Korea’s politics of enmity by 
construing the National Security Act as a relevant tool to preserve the state’s safety and 
democratic institutions’ stability - including ‘‘the economic order based on private property 
and market economy.’’   
 Without  proceeding from a radical shift of position, the constitutional court’s 
apparent conservative reversal has to be attributed to a reconfiguration of forces in the 
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political debate about the National Security Act. The fact that its abolition was fully 
endorsed in 2004 by  the administration in power was an unprecedented event. While Kim 
Dae-jung had denounced the ‘‘poisonous clauses’’ of the security legislation in the past,109 
the law had been heavily  relied upon by  the Kim government to deal with the mobilization 
of workers during the socio-economic crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s, demonstrating 
the resilient solidarity between national security and a certain model of development 
premised on growth-first policy and the political exclusion of labor. This dimension of the 
National Security Act was not however the one called into question by the Roh Moo-hyun 
administration. As pointed out by Charles Armstrong,
 [N]either the administration of Kim Dae Jung nor that of Roh Moo-hyun were as 
 ‘‘progressive’’ (the term favored by  the Korean left) as they initially have appeared. 
 In the  case of Roh in particular, there was an acute contradiction between his core 
 support base and political background on the one hand, and on the other, the 
 neoliberal economic agenda he advanced.110
  
 Roh Moo-hyun was indeed a former Minbyun attorney, the ‘‘Lawyers for a 
Democratic Society’’ group founded in 1988 which, as detailed in chapter four, has invested 
the site of constitutional adjudication as an arena to challenge the non-inclusive bias of the 
post-transition period. Once in office, ‘‘President Roh proceeded to fill top government posts 
with close colleagues who were also Minbyun lawyers, for example, Ko Yeong-ku [Ko 
Yŏng-gu] as head of the National Intelligence Service and Kang Keum-sil [Kang Kŭm-sil] 
as the first  female Minister of Justice, thereby drastically raising the profile of Minbyun.’’111 
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These nominations also had the effect to unleash a wave of conservative backlash within the 
National Assembly, as demonstrated by the 2004 motion voted to impeach Roh Moo-hyun 
for having violated the constitution. The debate over the abolition of the National Security 
Act thus intervened at a very  specific moment in the context of South Korean politics, after 
Roh Moo-hyun emerged victorious from this episode of intense confrontation with the 
parliament.
Cartography of forces and arguments in debating abolition 
 Roh Moo-hyun’s political win was double. On the one hand, the Constitutional Court 
of Korea had rejected the impeachment motion voted by  a majority  of representatives against 
the president in March 2004;112  on the other hand, Roh’s minority ‘‘Uri Party’’ (‘‘yŏllin 
uridang’’) had obtained a landslide share of the vote in the general elections of April. With 
less than 50 seats in the National Assembly before the elections, the Uri Party  now enjoyed 
152 seats, against 9 for its rival Millenium Democratic Party (‘‘sae ch’ŏnnyŏn minjudang’’) 
and 121 for the conservative Grand National Party.113  It was in this context of perceived 
political strength and large popular support  that Roh pushed for the debate over the abolition 
of the National Security Act. 
 The apparent transformation of the political landscape prompted by  these events 
should not be overestimated. The overall reforms advocated by the Roh administration did 
not mean a fundamental subversion of the narrow ideological base shared by South Korean 
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political parties. In other words, ‘‘the Uri Party has not internalized the notion of ‘economic 
democracy’; neoliberalism became the key economic policy of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
Moo-hyun governments [...]. These governments’ mantle of higher moral authority, relative 
to the previous regimes, has helped vindicate their embrace of neoliberalism.’’114 Under this 
consensus, the conflict between progressive and conservative forces in the political sphere 
has tended to crystallize on the ‘‘national question’’ in the context of the inter-Korean 
division.115 Framed in this sole light, the debate over the abolition of the National Security 
Act has been utterly divisive, without however putting into question the full scope of the 
mechanisms of exclusion deployed in the name of national security since the 1987 change of 
regime.  
 In early September 2004, President Roh Moo-hyun propelled such debate by  strongly 
arguing for the abolition of the law in an evening TV program of the popular MBC channel. 
Roh declared that the law altogether deserved to be relegated to a museum for having been a 
systematic tool of oppression against those who opposed the government, rather than an 
instrument to protect the state against actual threats.
 The National Security  Law has been used mostly  to oppress people who opposed the 
 government rather than to punish those who threatened to throw the country into 
 crisis. During  this process, tremendous human rights abuses and inhumane acts have 
 been conducted. It is  part of Korea's shameful history and an old legacy of 
 dictatorships which we are unable to use now [...]. The National Security Law should 
 be abolished and provisions necessary  for  national defense addressed by revisions 
 to clauses of the criminal code.116
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 The constitutional and supreme courts were highly involved in the controversy 
unleashed around the issue at the time, delivering a variety of rulings which reaffirmed the 
validity  and significance of the security legislation for contemporary South Korean society. 
In doing so, the courts not only  resisted the position of Roh but that of other institutions, 
such as the National Human Rights Commission.117  On August 26, 2004, the constitutional 
court confirmed the constitutionality of article 7 on the basis that  it could no longer be used 
to suppress activities such as academic research and artistic expression which do not pose a 
danger to the state and the constitutional order, thanks to the language introduced in the 1991 
revision of the National Security Act and carved by the court’s own jurisprudence. In 
addition, the court accompanied its decision by a press release warning lawmakers that ‘‘it 
will be necessary for the National Assembly  when it  deals with the security  law issue to 
reflect on public opinion and the constitutional court’s ruling.’’118 
 Beyond the freedom of expression, the status of North Korea and its very 
characterization as an ‘‘anti-state organization’’ were also at the heart  of the dispute about the 
contemporary  relevance of the National Security  Act. In the case adjudicated by the 
constitutional court, the complainants argued that the law could no longer be seen as a valid 
framework in the context of changing North-South relations and increased political, 
economic, and cultural exchanges between the two countries since the inter-Korean summit 
of June 6, 2000.119  The petitioners also claimed that the activities endangering national 
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security should be dealt with through new or existing provisions in the criminal code. This 
position was widely embraced by the abolitionist camp, demonstrating that its aim was never 
to disarm the South Korean state, but  instead to ensure its defense through other means than 
those inherited from the authoritarian years. 
 By contrast, the constitutional court estimated that ‘‘there was no clear sign that 
North Korea had renounced to overthrow our basic order of free democracy,’’ and that this 
‘‘basic order’’ being exposed to the menace of the North’s ‘‘great military strength,’’ the 
National Security Act could not be interpreted as violating the constitution.120 The supreme 
court adopted a very similar reasoning on August  30, 2004, a few days before Roh Moo-
hyun’s televised declaration. Its decision affirmed the necessity  of retaining the National 
Security Act by upholding the conviction of members from the student union 
‘‘Hanchongnyŏn,’’ an outlawed ‘‘anti-state organization.’’121 As of August 2004, at least six 
of the eleven prisoners detained under the NSA were affiliated with Hanchongnyŏn, 
considered an anti-state organization because it ‘‘adopts violent revolutionary policies 
commensurate with North Korea’s policy of reunification by communizing the South, 
thereby aiming to praise, encourage and publicize such activities and sympathize with such 
acts, and is therefore an organization benefiting the enemy as defined in Article 7 of the 
NSL.’’122 In 1997, the supreme court had confirmed the illegal nature of the organization but 
found it necessary that its characterization as ‘‘enemy benefiting’’ be reviewed every year 
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given that new representatives were elected annually.123 Since then, prosecutors have asked 
the courts to continue defining Hanchongnyŏn as an anti-state, and therefore illegal, entity.124 
 On August 30, 2004, the supreme court confirmed the conviction of two members of 
the organization, found guilty of praising North Korea and sentenced to thirty  months of 
imprisonment by  a lower court. Defending the contemporary relevance of the National 
Security Act, the supreme court strongly called into question the assumption that increasing 
contacts between the two Koreas, such as the inter-Korean summit of June 2000, meant a 
pacification of their relations.
 Just because there are exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas, the 
 Supreme Court cannot see that North Korea's anti-state character has disappeared and 
 that the National Security  Act has lost its legal power. [...] Under such conditions, we 
 must be careful not to disarm ourselves.125
 The supreme court’s statement was clearly perceived as a political gesture directed 
against the Roh Moo-hyun administration in the context of the debate over the National 
Security Act. One indicator revealing the intensity of the controversy can be found in the fact 
that the very constitutionality of Roh’s statements in favor of repealing the law was 
challenged before the constitutional court. A small bench of three justices however dismissed 
the case on the procedural ground that the position embraced by  Roh on TV did not 
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constitute an exercise of governmental power, and therefore did not represent a proper 
subject matter for review.126 
 The antagonistic positions articulated by  both  pro- and anti-NSA forces reflected not 
only the strong polarization generated by the issue, but also the boundaries of the discursive 
space in which arguments were exchanged. Debates were not confined to the political sphere 
but shaped by the intense mobilization of conservative elements in civil society, such as 
veterans’ associations, as well as powerful business groups and mainstream media’s 
opposition to the repeal. Despite Roh’s Uri Party  having a majority of seats in the National 
Assembly, months of bitter political conflict and pressure in and outside the parliament 
prevented the National Security  Act from being abolished. While the terms of the political 
debate about the repeal remained limited, the vast array  of interests galvanized to resist 
reform could be seen as the strongest evidence to the law’s continued significance. 
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CHAPTER SIX
Reviewing the Contours of the National Community
Article 2
(1) Nationality in the Republic of Korea shall be prescribed by Act.
(2) It  shall be the duty of the State to protect  citizens residing abroad as 
prescribed by Act.
Article 3  
The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean 
peninsula and its adjacent islands.
Article 4
The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and 
carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of 
freedom and democracy.
The Constitution of the Republic of Korea
 This chapter complements the analysis of how the Constitutional Court of Korea has 
redefined enmity by looking at the ways in which the contours of the national community 
have been delineated by is jurisprudence. The court has indeed reviewed a variety of laws 
which highlight criteria of inclusion in, and conditions of exclusion from, the collective body 
partly contradicting the National Security Act. This tensions arise from the fact that the 
constitutional negation of North Korea’s sovereignty yields another legal and political 
consequence than its designation as an ‘‘anti-state organization’’: it also implies that North 
Koreans are considered as belonging to the imagined community  of Korean nationals 
defined on the basis of ‘‘shared blood and ancestry.’’ While the contours of the national 
community  can thus be projected beyond the territory  of the South, the court’s decisions 
however indicate at least three challenges to this inclusiveness. 
 First, the theoretical incorporation of North Koreans in the national body  has not 
translated into full integration for the thousands of individuals which have successfully 
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relocated in the South. Second, the outward projection of the national community  is 
selective, extending to North Koreans in principle while discriminating against other groups, 
such as ethnic Koreans from China. Third, modes of insertion in and rejection from the 
collective body are also projected inward, as illustrated by  the ideological conversion policy, 
a mechanism of exclusion inherited from the colonial period by which those refusing to 
pledge allegiance to the definition of the ‘‘national’’ prescribed by  state authorities have 
remained identified and detained as ‘‘thought criminals’’ in the post-transition era. 
‘‘Us’’ in the mirror of ‘‘them’’
 Who a democratic regime designates as its enemies and how it confronts them are the 
most salient part of the politics of enmity - that is to say, the fundamental categories and 
means through which a given society commits to defend itself against perceived threats. The 
defense of society is however as much geared toward opposing a ‘‘them’’ as protecting a 
sense of ‘‘us.’’ Through the looking glass of enmity  can therefore appear the contours of the 
national body. The definition of the former and the delineation of the latter are indeed highly 
correlated. The comprehension of how enmity is construed can thus be enriched by  an 
analysis of how the national community is envisioned, and vice versa. Immigration and 
nationality laws are thus a site from which the politics of enmity can also be approached. 
 For instance, the most severe regulations of current national anti-terrorist  laws often 
deal with aliens, and some go as far as authorizing their indefinite administrative detention - 
i.e., arrest and internment without a trial - in case of security  concerns. Kent Roach has thus 
described Section 412 as ‘‘perhaps the most draconian provision in the Patriot  Act’’ enacted 
by the U.S. Congress in the wake of 9/11, resembling the ‘‘administrative detention schemes 
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used in Singapore, Israel, Canada, and the United Kingdom.’’1  In the UK, Part IV of the 
2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act indeed ‘‘provided for the indeterminate 
detention of non-citizens suspected of involvement in terrorism who could not be deported 
because of the United Kingdom’s international agreements or a ‘practical consideration.’ ’’2 
Part IV of the law represented a revival of the interment measures widely  used by the British 
government in Northern Ireland during the 1970s, while limiting their scope to foreigners. In 
2004, the House of Lords found the statute both discriminatory and disproportionate, 
therefore declaring it  ‘‘incompatible’’ - a decision which neither struck down the law nor 
released any of the detainees.3  
 The congruence between the tasks of defining the enemy and the national body is 
particularly reinforced when security threats are associated with a conflict of sovereignty, as 
the very boundaries of the state are put at  stake. In this case, if the enemy  is always 
constituted as ‘‘other,’’ he is not necessarily an ‘‘alien.’’ On the contrary, he can even be 
included in the contours of the national imaginary. This ambivalence is intensified in cases 
where two states claim to be the only  legitimate political incarnation of the entire but divided 
nation - as illustrated by the Northern Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the 
Southern Republic of Korea. In such a context, the making of enmity and identity is 
interrelated but  the two constructs can also be at odds. Their relation is characterized by 
convergences as well as contradictions: present and concrete enemies from the ‘‘other side’’ 
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provide a source of differentiation while also being potential and future fellow-members of 
the (re)unified national community. 
Membership and dangerousness beyond and below the 38th parallel
Inward and outward projection of enmity
 The legal conceptualization of North Korea as the paradigmatic anti-state 
organization does not exhaust the South’s construction of the division. From the viewpoint 
of the constitution, ambiguity is more pronounced than in the National Security  Act alone. 
Not only  is ‘‘peaceful unification’’ projected as a goal and desired horizon under article 4, 
but the Republic of Korea’s territory is defined as encompassing the whole peninsula in 
article 3.4 The contours of the national body which arise from this claim make the notion of 
enmity complex. Indeed, it  suggests a possible disjunction between two entities whose 
threatening character goes unquestioned under the security legislation which criminalizes 
any contact or relation with either of them: North Korea and North Koreans. The potentially 
equivocal status of North Koreans will be this chapter’s point of departure to interrogate, 
through constitutional jurisprudence, the way(s) through which the national community is 
imagined and circumscribed in the South. 
 In substance, the decisions of the constitutional court in relation to nationality laws 
reveal both the strength and limits of ‘‘Koreanness’’ - i.e., ethnic identification - as a factor 
of integration and solidarity in the political body of the ROK. Although ethnic homogeneity 
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of China (Taiwan). See Françoise Mengin, Fragments d’une guerre inachevée. Les entrepreneurs taiwanais et 
la partition de la Chine, Paris: Karthala, 2013, p.13. 
is considered as the substratum of Korean nationalism,5  constitutional rulings highlight 
selective patterns of inclusion and discrimination between different groups of ethnic Koreans 
living outside South Korea based on political, economic, and security  motivations. Likewise, 
being a citizen of the South does not  necessarily imply to remain embraced as a legitimate 
member of the national community.  
 In his study of Korean nationalism, Shin Gi-Wook formulates the argument that ‘‘in-
group identity is constructed not only in contradistinction to the out-group  but involves 
active suppression of differences within the in-group in the promotion of an overall positive, 
unitary identity.’’6 As a result, Shin argues that  both Korean states were born ‘‘wedded to a 
vision of ethnic unity in which the greatest  threat to that level of identity is not out-group 
members but internal ‘traitors’ (unlikeable in-group members, that is, Kim [Il-sung] and his 
Communist followers from the South Korean perspective, and Rhee [Syngman], Park 
[Chung-hee], and their supporters from the North Korean perspective).’’7 
 Within each regime however, ‘‘unlikeable in group-members’’ have not been solely 
associated with ‘‘traitors’’ from the other half of the peninsula, but also domestic groups. In 
the South, anti-communism has been the state’s central instrument to reject as enemies 
undesirable elements of society - many of whom have had no relation to North Korea, nor 
even to leftist ideology. According to Choi Jang-Jip, anti-communism has been - and still is - 
associated with the continuation of a certain model of development based on the state’s 
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pursuit of growth-first policy, the power of ‘‘chaebŏl’’ (South Korean conglomerates, whose 
first among all is Samsung nowadays), and the exclusion of labor.8    
 Since 1987, labor has not been the only  part of society discriminated against. In post-
transition South Korea, the security instruments inherited from the authoritarian period (such 
as the National Security Act and the ideological conversion policy) have primarily  remained 
deployed against the groups ‘‘which played a crucial role in facilitating the authoritarian 
breakdown and democratic transition.’’9 In the name of defending national security, security 
tools have thus operated in the defense of a non-inclusive and contentious way of 
envisioning the ‘‘national.’’ Construed as a site where to challenge the mechanisms enforcing 
the non-inclusive bias of the transition, constitutional adjudication has nonetheless produced 
ambivalent outcomes. Indeed, while conceptual distortions of the notion of national security 
have been denounced by  the court since the late 1980s, the full scope of their domestic 
effects has been left unaddressed. 
 Overall, a topography of membership and dangerousness irreducible to the frontier 
marked by  the 38th parallel will therefore emerge from this part of the research. First of all, 
the division between the North and the South does not appear insurmountable in 
constitutional jurisprudence. The court has reaffirmed that, in the eyes of the law, North 
Koreans are merely residents of the North - which is not treated as a different state but a 
territory upon which the South’s sovereignty extends; as a result, they  are not recognized as 
citizens of a foreign country but potential nationals. The ascription of enmity is therefore 
ambivalent: not only can North Korea simultaneously be a partner for reunification and an 
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9  Sunhyuk Kim, ‘‘Civil Society in Democratizing Korea,’’ in Samuel Kim (ed.), Korea’s Democratization, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.86.
anti-state organization, but North Koreans are both fellow nationals and individuals with 
whom contact is prohibited without governmental authorization under the National Security 
Act.10 These paradoxes have not been deeply affected by the shift in inter-Korean relations 
generated by the June 2000 summit held in Pyongyang between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-
jung. The official recognition by the two leaders of each Korea’s existence as a legitimate 
regime has been registered neither in constitutional law and jurisprudence, nor in the security 
legislation. 
 Second, the cases reviewed in this chapter show that the status of diasporic Korean 
populations is not fixed either. Their likely contribution to the pursuit of national interests - 
in terms of security  and economic prosperity - has justified the creation of discriminating 
categories between, and among, regional groups. These categories have been appropriated 
by the constitutional court, to expand or restrict the rights of the concerned groups. The court 
has for instance invalidated the differential treatment of ethnic Koreans from China 
(‘‘chosŏnjok’’ in Korean or ‘‘chaoxianzu’’ in Chinese), deprived from the employment and 
investment opportunities reserved to Korean migrants residing in Western countries (mostly 
in the United States, in which case they are referred to as ‘‘chae’mi kyopo’’ or ‘‘Korean-
Americans’’). The court has however confirmed that the inter-Korean division extends 
beyond the peninsula and has been displaced within the community of ethnic Koreans living 
in Japan (known as ‘‘chae’il kyopo’’ in Korean or ‘‘zainichi’’ in Japanese), presented in 1948 
with the choice of opting for the nationality of either of the two Korean republics, the ROK 
and the DPRK. According to recent constitutional jurisprudence, the rights susceptible to 
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those critical of government policy, to have such discussions with the North as disruptive and liable to favour 
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being enjoyed by those Korean Japanese identifying with the South, such as the right to vote, 
can legitimately be denied to the part of the community  affiliated with the North in virtue of 
security reasons.       
Table 12. Korean diaspora populations per region.
Region Country 2005 2007 2009 %
Sum Total 6,638,338 7,044,716 6,822,606 100
Asia, 
Oceania
Total 3,590,411 4,040,376 3,710,553 54.39
Japan 901,284 893,740 912,655 13.38
China 2,439,395 2,762,160 2,336,771 34.25
Other 249,732 384,476 461,127 6.76
America Total 2,392,828 2,341,163 2,342,634 35.65
USA 2,087,496 2,016,911 2,102,283 30.81
Canada 198,170 216,628 223,322 3.27
Other 107,162 107,624 107,029 1.57
Europe Total 640,276 645,252 655,843 9.61
CIS 532,697 533,976 537,889 7.88
Europe 107,570 111,276 117,954 1.73
Middle East Total 6,923 9,440 13,999 0.2
Africa Total 7,900 8,485 9,577 0.14
Source: Korean Ministry of Affairs and Trade.
 Third, the mechanisms of inclusion in - and exclusion from - the political national 
body are not only  projected onto groups living outside South Korea. They are also, and 
maybe more importantly, operating within. As will be analyzed through the constitutional 
court’s review of the conversion policy, not addressing the broader domestic functions of the 
security apparatus - namely its role in policing and enforcing a certain distribution of who is 
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recognized or denied a part in the post-transition order - has also meant for the court to leave 
security tools largely unreformed and even to reinforce their contemporary relevance. 
 
Imagining the ‘‘national’’: overview of the ambivalent effects yielded by constitutional 
rulings
 Two groups emerge from the Constitutional Court of Korea’s approach to defining 
the national body: ‘‘deterritorialized’’ ethnic Koreans (i.e., Koreans living outside South 
Korea) and disloyal Southern citizens. They are respectively associated with outer and inner 
projections of national identity, operating both outside and within South Korea’s physical 
boundaries. When it comes to the outer projection of national identity in relation to North 
Korea and North Koreans, the constitutional court appears to abide by - and thus to reinforce 
- the 1948 framework put in place at  the time of the two Koreas’ antagonistic founding. Its 
conception of North Koreans’ status is still premised on the principle that North Korea is not 
a state of its own, but an anti-state organization in the South, the only  sovereign and 
legitimate republic in the peninsula. This position has also been reiterated by the Supreme 
Court of Korea in its recent jurisprudence: 
 North Korea is a partner of conversation and cooperation for the peaceful unification 
 of our  country. Nonetheless, despite changes in the South/North Korea relationship, 
 it also has the  characteristic of an anti-government organization which plots to 
 overturn our system of free  democracy  while adhering to the line of unification by 
 communism. Thus, the Supreme Court’s established opinion holds that the power of 
 the National Security Act as the rule  regulating an anti-government organization, etc. 
 continues to be valid. And freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and the press, 
 freedom of academic research, and etc., are not without any restriction, although they 
 are fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.11 
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11 Supreme Court of Korea, 2007Do10121, December 9, 2010. 
 Both the supreme and constitutional courts thus contribute to maintain a vision of the 
division, with its related contradictions, from which the political leadership of each Korea 
has distanced itself since 2000. Beyond the issue of North Korea and North Koreans, 
constitutional jurisprudence also illustrates the many differentiation patterns permissible 
between, and among, various groups of overseas Koreans (in particular ethnic Koreans from 
China, Japan, and the United States) despite the belief in their ethnic commonality. Such 
patterns of selective inclusion and discrimination are diffused throughout concrete policies 
whose unequal outcomes - but  not legitimacy - have been sometimes contested by 
constitutional judges. 
 As for the inner projection of national identity, a major and underlying product of the 
court’s intervention is its narrow construction of anti-communism, which does not take into 
account the full mechanisms of exclusion generated in its name in contemporary South 
Korean society. In the 2002 pledge to abide by the law case reviewed below, the system of 
ideological conversion implemented against national security prisoners was treated by both 
the majority and dissent as if it only targeted genuine communist supporters. This 
problematic assumption was not even valid for the lead complainant in the case. If the 
constitutional court recognized in 1990 that scientific and artistic activities could be 
impaired by  too broad a construction of the National Security  Act, it has however failed to 
acknowledge the rest of the law’s extensive effects. This imperceptiveness is illustrated by 
the court’s very partial analysis of the conversion policy and its uses. 
 Both parts of the analysis - on nationality  cases and ideological conversion - thus 
draw a more subtle and complex picture of the division than that  of a fine line stretching 
along the 38th parallel. Indeed, the institutional mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion at 
work in the South are not limited to the inter-Korean border. Inclusion can be projected 
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beyond the frontier, albeit selectively, while certain forms of political exclusion are 
entrenched underneath it. The latter are probably more powerful than commonly thought and 
do not simply replicate the ideological division between the North and South. Their domestic 
effects have always exceeded containing the political threat posed by North Korea or 
indigenous leftists. As contended by this dissertation, security tools have also taken on a new 
efficacy and relevance of their own in the aftermath of the transition, enforcing the non-
inclusive legacy of democracy’s institutionalization by political elites. 
 In this perspective, the intervention of the constitutional court in construing what 
counts as ‘‘national’’ and ‘‘anti-national’’ should be understood as taking place in a contested 
field. Indeed, ‘‘although its ethnic base was taken for granted, the political notion of the 
Korean nation was hotly debated’’ throughout the 20th century.12  Since the 1980s in 
particular, contestation has taken place not only among the two Koreas, but also between 
South Korean state and society. In this process, conflict  has however remained framed within 
a fixed language: that of ‘‘us’’ (‘‘the true incarnation of the Korean nation’’) v. 
‘‘them’’ (fellow citizens but ‘‘the nation’s traitors’’). In this sense, the binary structuration of 
the real in terms of foe v. friend and the ‘‘culture of enmity’’ have not been monopolized by 
the state.13  Conflict over the definition of national identity has thus amounted to a 
‘‘mésentente’’ or disagreement in the sense defined by Jacques Rancière:
 Disagreement is not the conflict between one who says white and another who says 
 black. It is the conflict between one who says white and another who also says white 
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13 Namhee Lee, The Making of Minjung. Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2007.
 but does not  understand the same thing by it  or does not understand that the other is 
 saying the same thing in the name of whiteness.14
 Prompted to intervene in this underlying dispute by the very forces left at  a 
disadvantage by the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, the constitutional 
court has however discharged its role in a paradoxical way, contributing to both stage and 
interrupt the fundamental disagreement over who is recognized or denied a ‘‘part’’ in the 
order of the post-transition era.  
Enmity, territoriality, and ethnicity
 The primary  basis for defining enmity in South Korea seems to be a territorial one, 
materialized by the frontier that weaves along the 38th parallel.15 Things are however more 
complex as soon as the notion of enmity is measured against the way  in which the national 
community  is defined. In the context of the division and from the viewpoint of the supreme 
and constitutional courts’ jurisprudence, North Korea is both an anti-state organization and a 
partner of reunification. North Koreans therefore appear as figures of the other and the same, 
members of the imagined national community with whom communicating is nonetheless 
forbidden without governmental authorization. Indeed, North Korean nationality is not 
recognized by the South as a result  of its legal negation of the North’s statehood. This 
negation remains inscribed in article 3 of the constitution which equates the ‘‘territory of the 
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occupation, respectively under Soviet guidance (north of the 38th parallel) and American control (south of it). 
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line when the Armistice Agreement ending the Korean War was signed on July 23,  1953. Called the 
‘‘demilitarized zone,’’ this no man’s land is heavily guarded on both sides and its maritime outline is still 
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Republic of Korea’’ with the entire ‘‘Korean peninsula.’’ Yet, this claim has recently 
disappeared from the official discourse and position of both states on inter-Korean relations 
and unification. 
 Throughout the 1990s, the legitimacy of ‘‘the other’’ Korean state continued to be 
denied by  each government despite the two Koreas’ concurrent accession to the United 
Nations in 1991. Their mutual recognition only occurred with the joint  summit of the 
summer 2000 held in Pyongyang between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung. This illustrates 
that the constitutional framework does not capture the only  way through which North Korea 
can be envisioned in the South. Yet, constitutional law and jurisprudence still operate within, 
and reactivate, the 1948 approach to the division: North Korea not being construed as a 
sovereign state, North Koreans cannot be its citizens. This view has been reaffirmed by the 
constitutional court in a 2000 case on the Nationality Act (‘‘kukchŏkpŏp’’):
 Our Constitution has stated since the Founding Constitution, The territory of the 
 Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands 
 (Article 4 of the Founding Constitution; Article 3 of the current Constitution). The 
 Supreme Court  has ruled accordingly that  North Korea is part of the Korean 
 peninsula and therefore subject to the sovereignty  of the Republic of Korea, and 
 therefore that North Korean residency should not interfere with the acquisition of the 
 nationality of the Republic of Korea.16
 Historically, the view that ‘‘the other side was simply the northern half or southern 
half and a lost territory to be recovered’’17 has been coextensive with the right defended by 
each republic (the ROK and the DPRK) to ‘‘sole representation of the entire (ethnic) 
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community.’’18  Now that the two Korean states have politically proceeded to each other’s 
recognition, the belief in ethnic homogeneity and the idea that the people of both countries 
form a single nation sharing a common bloodline and ancestry  continue to inform the project 
of unification, but as a future and distant horizon rather than as an imperative to be 
accomplished soon and on unilateral terms.   
 Territoriality is not however irrelevant to the definition of this national imaginary 
supposedly encompassing anyone belonging to the Korean ‘‘race’’ (‘‘minjok’’). The primary 
frame through which the Korean nation is projected remains the peninsula, a conception that 
ventures beyond the 38th parallel but not outside its physical confines. The transcendence of 
the inter-Korean frontier is thus accomplished in the name of the common ethnic nation but 
in the space of the unified and sovereign Korean state which existed before its annexation by 
Japan in 1910. Ethnic nationalism is therefore a force of inclusion which overcomes the 
division, but largely remains territorially-based, confined to the peninsula’s boundaries. 
Ethnic Koreans located outside this frame are therefore not integrated in the national 
imaginary the way peninsular Koreans are. 
 Ethnic nationalism is captured by the term ‘‘minjok,’’ a term which conflates the three 
concepts of nation, ethnicity, and race.19 Although ethnic homogeneity is often treated as an 
inherent characteristic of Korea, Shin Gi-Wook has demonstrated how the ethnicization of 
the notion of nation has been the contingent result of particular historical processes. The first 
description of Korean national identity  through racial lenses is usually  attributed to the 
historian Shin Chae-ho (Sin Ch’ae-ho, 1880-1936). In his 1908 New Reading of Korean 




conventional dynastic histories which had prevailed until then. In their place, Shin told - and 
thus shaped - a narrative about the Korean nation as endowed with historical agency of its 
own, an enterprise which implied ‘‘rediscovering’’ the country’s particularistic origins.20 
 According to Shin, ‘‘the Korean people, despite repeated attacks on their national 
sovereignty by foreign powers, had nevertheless maintained an identifiable racial and 
spiritual ‘core’ that had been preserved intact throughout the ages ever since the founding of 
Tan’gun Chosŏn nearly 5,000 years ago.’’21  The ‘‘task of the historian’’ was therefore to 
restore this essence, ‘‘to unearth the true record of the Korean race, its origins, genealogy, 
and history of struggles so that  an autonomous, unique (racial) Korean identity (chuch’ejŏk 
chongjok) could be reestablished.’’22  Shin’s ideas appeared and found resonance in the 
specific context of the late 19th century, at a time when, ‘‘with the decline of China, rise of 
Japan, and increasing presence of the West in the East Asian region, Koreans were struggling 
with how to position their country vis-à-vis a rapidly changing regional and world 
configuration.’’23  The ethnic conception of nationalism formulated by Shin only  fully 
triumphed over competing categories of collective identity and accessed to prominence in 
the following decades of the 20th century, as a reaction to the experience of Japanese 
colonial rule and its assimilationist, yet discriminatory, policies. 
 In contemporary South Korea, both ethnicity and territoriality therefore appear 
relevant to the definition of membership  in the national community. Indeed, sharing the same 
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ethnic identity is only a selective factor of integration, which functions differentially 
depending on the regional origins and local characteristics of the Korean groups considered. 
Incorporation in the imaginary of the (Korean) nation, and inclusion in the socio-economic 
and political life of (South Korean) society  are also two separate matters. While North 
Koreans automatically  belong to the former, they are most obviously rejected from the latter 
as long as they reside across the frontier. The condition of those who have come to the South 
testifies to the difficulties of the conceptual and actual transition from one realm (the 
imagined nation) to the other (the realized community of South Korean citizens). In addition, 
North Koreans are not alone in being considered as a special and problematic category of 
ethnic Koreans - residents of Japan with pro-North Korean ties and Koreans from China also 
share this plight.
North Koreans: never fully belonging 
 Examining the construction of these ‘‘problematic’’ categories of Koreans calls for 
engaging with the Confucian task of ‘‘rectifying names,’’ for South Korean nationality and 
immigration laws abound with them. Citizens of the Republic of Korea (‘‘kungmin’’) are 
distinguished from ‘‘overseas Koreans’’ (‘‘chaeoe tongp’o’’),24 who can either be nationals 
residing outside South Korea, or Koreans with foreign nationalities. North Koreans are 
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considered as pertaining to the first category, that is to say as being nationals residing abroad 
- and not foreigners - as long as they remain outside the South (i.e., in North Korea or in a 
third country like China). They are fully recognized as citizens of the Republic of Korea 
after entering its territory and going through an intensive screening process. This territorial 
criterion is essential as argued by the government in the case on the Nationality  Act 
adjudicated by the constitutional court in 2000:
 Our country does not recognize the nationality of North Korea. Therefore, a resident 
 of North Korea can be considered as having our nationality. It may cause a 
 diplomatic problem with a third country if we recognize as our nationals those North 
 Koreans residing in the third country outside the reach of our effective control. There 
 is no diplomatic problem in recognizing the nationality  of a North Korean resident 
 who already entered our country.25
    
 When it comes to ethnic Koreans with foreign nationalities, these same ‘‘diplomatic 
problems’’ have been advanced by the South to justify that claiming to belong to the 
imagined realm of ‘‘Koreanness’’ does not imply a correlative right to automatic 
membership in the actual community of South Korean nationals. The immigration of ethnic 
Koreans from abroad is not welcomed by the government in the way that it officially is for 
North Koreans.26  In other words, North Koreans enjoy a special status not only  in the 
national imaginary of the South, but in the framework of its immigration laws. Sarah Son has 
pointed out that, ‘‘unlike the ethnic immigration policies of Germany and Israel which 
accepted ethnic Germans and Jews regardless of where they came from, defector settlement 
policy only applies to those of North Korean origin and excludes ethnic Koreans of other 
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origin, such as chosŏn-jok (ethnic Korean Chinese) and zainichi (ethnic Korean 
Japanese).’’27  By  contrast with those two countries, South Korea appears to practice a 
narrow understanding of the criteria of eligibility to become a national. 
 In Israel, the ‘‘Law of Return’’ enables not only  Jews from anywhere but, since 1970, 
‘‘a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and 
the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew’’ to resettle in the Hebrew state and be automatically 
entitled to citizenship.28  Yet Israel and South Korea are not fundamentally opposed if one 
takes into consideration that their immigration laws are tied in both cases to specific state-
building imperatives. Moreover, the nationality framework of Israel is but insensitive to 
security concerns. In 2003 for instance, the Citizenship and Entry in Israel Act was adopted 
to prevent the possibility of reunification between an Israeli Arab and his or her spouse or 
child living in the Occupied Territories under certain conditions of age, a scheme which was 
upheld by a majority of the Supreme Court of Israel in 2006.29    
 The family model, and its rupture, are frequently referred to as embodying the 
kinship ties upon which Korean national solidarity  is supposedly built, especially in the 
context of the division. The image of the two Koreas as a single but separated family is not 
merely a metaphor, as thousands of actual families were split by the Korean War 
(1950-1953) - before its eruption, the frontier was indeed relatively  porous. The lack of 
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reliable information makes estimates precarious, but according to James Foley’s research on 
the topic, there were 500,000 to 750,000 surviving members of divided families in 1990.30 
 In the romantic vision of reunification exalted by the dissident ‘‘minjung’’ movement 
of the 1980s, the two Koreas were often depicted as separated lovers (or more exactly a 
married couple whose unity had been forcibly broken), longing for reconciliation.31  This 
rhetoric conveyed a number of strategic implications: reversing the distribution of roles in 
the official narrative about the division (no longer blamed on the North, now a fellow victim, 
but on the United States, the new ‘‘evil power’’) and turning the two Koreas into 
protagonists - not ‘‘passive victims of history but active redeemers of it.’’32  Another 
recurring motif is the metaphor of brotherhood, captured by the emblematic iconography of 
the ‘‘Statue of Brothers’’ erected in the War Memorial of Korea.33  There, in this state-
sponsored but post-transition version of the division,
 The story of national reunification is written as a narrative of brotherly reunion. 
 Significantly,  the meeting between the two brothers - one strong and one weak, one 
 older and the other younger - is portrayed in such a way  that the genealogy of the 
 ancestral blood ‘‘line’’ was never questioned: South Korea is the oldest son, the 
 legitimate ‘‘heir’’ of Korea’s patriotic warrior tradition, whose forgiveness of his 
 weaker, wayward brother becomes the condition upon which North Korea is finally 
 allowed to return to the ‘‘arms’’ of the family/nation fold.34
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      The notions of shared bloodline and common ancestry do not necessarily fuel a 
vision of nationhood based on strict equality  as implied by the significant connotations of 
status based on gender and seniority  in the above-mentioned narratives. The condition of 
North Koreans living in the South provides another illustration of this reality. Upon arriving 
in the South, North Koreans are seldom treated as fellow nationals. They are first and 
foremost considered as escapees or refugees,35  and therefore subjected to both special 
security screening and adaptation programs. To be eligible to become full citizens of the 
South, North Koreans have to prove that they hold North Korean nationality according to 
North Korean laws. In other words, possessing a non-existing citizenship paradoxically 
represents the legal requirement to be stripped of it. 
 At the end of 2011, the Ministry of Unification (‘‘t’ongilbu’’) estimated that about 
23,000 North Koreans had defected to the South. While refugees numbered less than 1,000 
before 1998, the flow accelerated in reaction to the famine of the mid to late 1990s: ‘‘The 
number of North Koreans entering the South has increased steadily since 1998 and the 
aggregate number exceeded 10,000 in February 2007. In 2002, the number of women 
surpassed that of men for the first time and the number has increased rapidly. In 2007, 
women accounted for 78 percent of North Korean defectors.’’36 In addition, most of them 
come from the regions of North Korea neighboring China.  
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35 ‘‘The traditional term for a person fleeing North Korea is ‘defector.’ It is translated from gwi-sun-ja, literally 
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‘‘t’albukcha’’ (‘‘North Korean refugee’’  or ‘‘defector’’) after 2000. Brittan Heller, ‘‘Terms of Endangerment. 
Evolving Political and Legal Terminology for North Koreans,’’ Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration,  Vol.1, 
No.1, pp.14-15.
36 Ministry of Unification, ‘‘Settlement Support for Dislocated North Koreans.’’









02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 Total
Male 564 32 235 564 513 468 625 422 509 570 612 666 578 765 7116
Female 43 2 71 479 625 813 1269 961 1509 1974 2197 2261 1798 1767 15776
Total 607 34 306 1043 1138 1281 1894 1383 2018 2544 2809 2927 2376 2532 22892
% of 
women
7 6 23 46 55 63 67 69 75 78 78 77 76 70 69
Source: Ministry of Unification.
 Upon arriving in the South, refugees go through an intensive security screening 
process carried out by several state agencies, including the Ministry  of Unification, the 
National Intelligence Service (‘‘kukka chŏngbowŏn,’’ formerly the Agency for National 
Security Planning), and the National Police Agency (‘‘kyŏngch’alch’ŏng’’). In 1999, nine 
defectors were granted compensation for physical and psychological damage after having 
been tortured by  the intelligence agency  during their interrogations.37 Once examination has 
established that refugees are neither spies nor ethnic Koreans from elsewhere (particularly 
China), their custody  is transferred to Hanawŏn, the resettlement and support center for 
‘‘social adaptation’’ (‘‘sahoe chŏkyong’’) which has operated a twelve-week program of 
adjustment to life in the South since 1999.38  Many studies have however reported the 
difficulties encountered by North Koreans, especially in terms of socio-economic, rather 
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38 ‘‘The ultimate objective of the course is to instill confidence in the newcomers, narrow the cultural gap, and 
motivate them to achieve sustainable livelihoods in a new environment. The course has four blocks: 1) 27 hours 
on mental and physical health; 2) 130 hours of vocational training and counseling in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Labor; 3) 90 hours of education on the South's democracy and market economy; and 4) 33 hours on 
preparations for resettlement and moving out on their own. Furthermore, the government provides them with a 
variety of financial and non-financial support to assist them with resettlement. The newcomers receive, for 
example, an initial cash payment, incentives related to employment and education, medical support, and 
favorable terms for leasing apartments. The government also creates a new family registry as they are South 
Korean citizens with all rights and privileges under the Constitution.’’  Ministry of Unification, ‘‘Settlement 
Support for Dislocated North Koreans.’’
than political, accommodation. The socio-economic dimension appears to carry more and 
more weight not only in the orientation of support policies toward defectors, but in South 
Korean society’s approach to reunification in general. Attitudes about such prospect are 
strongly influenced by generational factors, with younger South Koreans perceiving the 
potential cost of the process as an unwanted burden. 
 According to Sarah Son, ‘‘negative collective identification has become a much more 
prominent tendency in the South Korean national narrative, as evidenced in policy 
discourses.’’39 Son’s analysis further identifies ‘‘two distinct varieties of negative collective 
identification evident in the policy discourses’’: 
 One sees North Koreans in the South as carrying undesirable, enemy characteristics 
 of the  North Korean regime, and they are thus untrustworthy members of the ‘‘other 
 side,’’ while the other sees them as culturally different strangers and somewhat 
 inferiors. Negative collective identification has had both positive and negative 
 repercussions for defectors: on the one hand it posits them as refugees in need of help 
 necessitating a generous package of settlement support, while on the other they are 
 viewed as foreigners who are deemed to pose a threat to societal security  in the 
 context of integration.40 
 Interestingly, the administrations of Kim Dae-jung’s and Roh Moo-hyun’s 
commitment to a policy of engagement with the North (known as ‘‘Sunshine Policy’’ from 
1997 to 2007) did not translate into favorable outcomes for refugees in the South.41 As far as 
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41  ‘‘The Sunshine Policy era from 1997-2007 was not the best time for defectors in policy, as the Southern 
government’s discourse of self-identification with the North was partly at the expense of the defectors 
themselves. A better solution to welcoming defectors, it was thought, was to help North Korea help itself,  and 
to stop the flow of defectors in the first place. In addition, the governments of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo 
Hyun were active in prohibiting defectors from giving press interviews and forming lobby groups. Yet despite 
conservative support for a defector voice and greater focus on helping defectors in preference to engagement 
with North Korea, the inception of the conservative government of Lee Myun Bak in 2008 did not mean a 
complete reversal in the previous government’s approach and there continues to be significant obstacles to 
reaching South Korea.’’ Ibidem.
this research is aware, no constitutional complaint alleging a violation of basic rights has 
ever been filed by North Korean defectors, which is not the case for one of the two other 
categories of ethnic Koreans construed as ‘‘problematic’’: chosŏnjok, that  is to say, ethnic 
Koreans from China.
Ethnic Koreans from China: amalgamation of security and economic reasoning
 Constitutional jurisprudence has established that a foreigner can be ‘‘the bearer of 
basic rights,’’ although some benefits and privileges can only be enjoyed by  a citizen, such 
as becoming a public official or having the right to vote.42 Many opportunities are however 
granted to ethnic Koreans with foreign nationalities who wish to come to the South to 
engage in economic activities. The scheme designed by  the National Assembly in 1999 to 
facilitate these activities, the Overseas Koreans Act (‘‘chaeoe tongp’opŏp’’), established a 
distinction between the Koreans who emigrated before the Republic of Korea’s founding in 
1948, and the ones who only left afterwards.43  Embedded in the choice of this temporal 
marker was the possibility to further differentiate between ‘‘ethnic Koreans living in China 
or the former Soviet Union’’ (most of whom emigrated before 1948) and ‘‘Korean 
Americans’’ (whose majority departed after 1948). 
 The constitutionality  of this provision was soon raised before the constitutional court, 
by complainants described in the case as ‘‘ethnic Koreans with Chinese nationality [who] 
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43 ‘‘The legislative purposes of Overseas Koreans Act regarding ethnic Koreans with foreign nationalities are as 
follows (Gazette of the Korean Government 8-9, September 2, 1999). The Act has been legislated to promote 
globalization of the Korean society by encouraging more active participation of ethnic Koreans living abroad in 
all spheres of the Korean society. The Act aims to encourage investment in Korea by simplifying regulations 
with regards to entry and exit,  acquisition of real estate, financial transaction, and foreign exchange dealings of 
ethnic Koreans.’’ 13-2 KCCR 714, 99Hun-Ma494, November 29, 2001, in The Constitutional Court of Korea, 
Constitutional Court Decisions. Volume I, p.688.
currently reside in the [People’s] Republic of China.’’44  They not only  argued that their 
human dignity, right to happiness, and right to equality  had been violated, but that granting 
special advantages to ‘‘those who emigrated after the establishment of the [1948] Korean 
Government [was] tantamount to negating the legitimacy of the Provisional Republic of 
Korea Government’’ or ‘‘taehanmin’guk imsijŏngbu,’’ which was formed in exile during the 
Japanese colonial era and operated in Shanghai after 1919.45 
 In response to the petition, counter-arguments were presented by the Minister of 
Justice who justified this discrimination for a number of reasons relating to national and 
economic security - two intertwined motifs in the defense of South Korean society. His 
opinion also contested the very  ability of the petitioners to challenge the contentious 
provision, alleging that ‘‘there is no evidence that the complainants are ethnic Koreans who 
emigrated to a foreign country or their lineal descendants (The only evidence regarding 
qualification of the complainants is a copy of passports proving that the complainants are 
Chinese nationals).’’46  This reasoning exemplifies the burden of proof which falls upon 
individuals claiming to belong to the community, and category, or overseas Koreans as they 
need to demonstrate that they, or one of their parents, once held South Korean citizenship. 
Alleging Korean lineage is indeed not sufficient for ethnic Koreans from foreign countries to 
qualify as overseas Koreans. 
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45 The provisional government in Shanghai (headed by future South Korean president Rhee Syngman between 
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46 13-2 KCCR 714, 99Hun-Ma494, November 29, 2001, in The Constitutional Court of Korea, Constitutional 
Court Decisions. Volume I, p.683.
 In the case at hand, the complainants’ inclusion in this very  category was contested 
by the government, which further defended that all ethnic Koreans are not entitled to an 
equal treatment given considerations of economic and national security. Granting to ethnic 
Koreans from China the same employment and investment opportunities as Korean 
Americans was defined as entailing three main risks: destabilizing the labor market due to an 
influx of low-waged workers; opening a new route of infiltration for North Korean agents; 
and engendering potential ‘‘diplomatic frictions.’’        
 Simplification of regulations on entry  and exit of ethnic Koreans who emigrated 
 before the establishment of the Korean Government could lead to an influx of ethnic 
 Koreans with Chinese nationality, relatively  low-waged workers, into the nation’s 
 labor  market and cause a significant number of social problems. Under the ongoing 
 South-North confrontation, there is also the risk of it being used by North Koreans as 
 a route for infiltration, thereby causing immediate security  threats. It is also very 
 likely that the State will face diplomatic frictions with China who is extremely 
 sensitive to nationalism among racial minorities within its border  if the Act were to 
 include ethnic Koreans who emigrated before the establishment of the Korean 
 Government as potential beneficiaries of the Act.47 
 
 These motivations were not  found to make discrimination against pre-1948 migrants 
reasonable according to six of the nine constitutional judges. The provision was actually 
deemed all the more unfair since the Koreans disadvantaged under the law already suffered 
from a dual misfortune: presently enjoying a lower socio-economic status than other 
diasporic groups; and having been ‘‘forced to leave their motherland’’ in the past.48 
Therefore, the majority held the law neither valid ‘‘from a humanitarian perspective’’ (i.e., 
from the standpoint of protecting vulnerable populations), nor from a ‘‘national’’ one (i.e., in 
light of the state’s duty vis-à-vis the ‘‘patriots’’ who have served its cause).
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 The State [is] requiring those ethnic Koreans who have emigrated before the 
 establishment of the Korean Government, mostly ethnic Koreans living in China or 
 the former Soviet Union who were forced to leave their motherland to join the 
 independence movement, or to avoid military  conscription or forced labor by the 
 Japanese imperialist force, to prove that they were explicitly recognized as Korean 
 nationals before obtaining foreign citizenship. Legislation of an act  discriminating 
 ethnic Koreans who were involuntarily displaced due to historical turmoil sweeping 
 over the Korean peninsula cannot be justified from a humanitarian perspective, let 
 alone from a national perspective, in the sense that  no country on earth has 
 legislated an act to discriminate against such compatriots, when it seems only 
 appropriate to  assist them. The public interest to be achieved by this legislation is too 
 minor compared to the injury inflicted on individuals being discriminated by the 
 Act.49
 Construing not only history, but the national narrative, is often a strategic resource 
and source of contention in constitutional intervention. From the viewpoint of the critical 
analysis that this dissertation undertakes, what is being staged as historical truth by courts 
appears as telling as what is being distorted or silenced by  them. South Korea’s 
constitutional discourse on the independence movement remains constrained by two blind 
spots: on the one hand, the refusal to acknowledge that resistance to colonial rule was only 
the deed of a minority of Koreans; on the other hand, the political impossibility to concede 
that the independence movement’s most active elements abroad and at home were leftists, 
especially after the 1920s.50 Instead, emphasis has been placed on the ‘‘Provisional Republic 
of Korea Government born of the March First  Independence Movement of 1919,’’ as 
expressed in the preamble of the constitution, thus obstructing unsettling historical realities. 
 This narrative can be seen at work in the court’s account of pre-1948 migrations. 
Koreans who left the peninsula during the colonial era are all inevitably described as 
opponents to Japanese imperialism, having either joined independence fighters abroad or 
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evaded military conscription and forced labor. This clearly  amounts to discounting the fact 
that most displacements took place as a result of Koreans’ mobilization under these two 
processes. In addition, the small portion of those who joined the independence movement 
did not necessarily  rally  the cause of the provisional government in Shanghai. The factions 
which operated in exile from other parts of China and the former Soviet Union largely 
identified with communism, such as the group which future North Korean leader Kim Il-
sung was heading in Manchuria. 
 The court’s affirmation that most ethnic Koreans who emigrated before 1948 were 
necessarily ‘‘patriots’’ and independence fighters is thus highly  dubious. Yet, it should not be 
inferred from our refutation of the court’s account that  the South Korean government had a 
legitimate basis to discriminate against  ethnic Koreans from China. Rather than drawing new 
jurisprudential conclusions, the point of the present analysis is to interrogate the type of 
‘‘national’’ narrative and imaginary which the constitutional court  has adhered to, deployed, 
and thus contributed to reinforce. In the case at hand, a progressive decision was reached 
based on a very conservative approach to colonial history. As a result of the ruling, 
 The National Assembly revised the OKA [Overseas Koreans Act] according to the 
 Constitutional Court’s mandate, and the revised version of the law, which discarded 
 the controversial “former nationality” criterion, was passed on February 9, 2004. 
 Even so, some key issues, especially the inclusion / exclusion of different overseas 
 Korean groups, have not been effectively and practically resolved and disagreements 
 surrounding the law still linger.51
 The problematic categories of ethnic Koreans dealt  with by the constitutional court 
do not only  include residents from North Korea and Koreans from China, both of whom are 
considered through the lenses of national and economic security  in policy-making. The 
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community  of Koreans residing in Japan also represents a group  apprehended with caution 
as the division of the peninsula is displaced within it. 
Ethnic Koreans from Japan: the division displaced 
 The status of ethnic Koreans from Japan was touched upon by  the constitutional court 
in 2007, when the justices reviewed the right to vote of nationals residing abroad. Similarly 
to Koreans with foreign citizenships, nationals living outside South Korea may be divided 
into subgroups to which selective rights and benefits can be differentially  attributed. Within 
this category, North Koreans are not the only ones under scrutiny. The Korean community 
from Japan is also suspiciously  dealt with. Indeed, the division of the peninsula finds another 
incarnation on Japanese territory. Like migrations to China, the settlement of Koreans in 
Japan has been anterior to 1945 and catalyzed by colonial dynamics. The 1910 annexation 
treaty turned all Koreans into subjects of Japan’s empire, even though they retained a special 
and inferior status as ‘‘chōsenjin.’’ By the late 1930s, Koreans were intensively  mobilized in 
order to contribute to Japan’s war effort through forced labor and conscription.52 
 In the wake of Japan’s surrender in 1945 and Korea’s subsequent liberation, ‘‘almost 
two-thirds of the over two million Koreans residing in Japan returned to the Korean 
peninsula.’’53  Those who stayed in the archipelago numbered approximately 600,000, 
constituting Japan’s largest minority. Having emigrated during the colonial era for social and 
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economic reasons rather than forced military displacement, they chose not to repatriate in 
1945 and were considered by Japanese authorities as ‘‘stateless’’ Korean nationals. In 1948, 
Koreans from Japan were faced with the choice to opt for the nationality  of the South or that 
of the North, exporting the division outside the peninsula.
 In debating whether to grant the right  to vote to nationals residing abroad, the 
constitutional court reasoned that security considerations - namely, ‘‘our special situation of 
continuing confrontation with the North’’ - justified to prevent North Koreans and pro-North 
residents in Japan from exercising such right. These two groups correspond to ‘‘nationals’’ of 
the Republic of Korea living overseas (and not ethnic Koreans with foreign nationalities), 
since both of them identify  with a citizenship that South Korea does not legally recognize. 
Contrary  to their counterparts in other countries or to pro-South residents in Japan, they do 
not hold passports. This was a major fact advanced by the court in countering the ‘‘vague 
and abstract danger’’ that North Koreans and Koreans from Japan affiliated with the North 
would be easily able to influence elections under false identities if the right to vote was 
given to other nationals living abroad. 
 [E]ven if we were to allow our nationals living abroad to enjoy the right to vote, in 
 our special situation of continuing confrontation with the North, it would seem that 
 certain restrictions on the right to vote of North Korean residents or the Koreans 
 residing in Japan aligned with the  General Association of Korean Residents in 
 Japan (Chae Ilbon Chosŏnin Ch’ongryŏnhaphoe or Joch’ongryŏn: hereinafter, ‘‘pro- 
 Joch’ongryŏn Koreans residing in Japan’’) will be acceptable. There is also concern 
 about North Korean residents or pro-Joch’ongryŏn Koreans residing in Japan 
 exercising the right to vote under false identities, but it is not impossible to 
 utilize the registration policy under the current ‘‘Registration of Korean Nationals 
 Residing Abroad Act’’ as well as the domestic domicile report system under the ‘‘Act 
 on the  Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans’’ to prevent such an event. 
 Also, as the Korean nationals residing abroad who are not North Korean residents or 
 pro-Joch’ongryŏn Koreans residing in Japan possess passports, unlike the North 
 Korean residents or pro-Joch’ongryŏn Koreans residing in Japan, it is possible to 
 differentiate the two. Therefore, the vague and abstract  danger of North Korean 
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 residents or pro-Joch’ongryŏn Koreans residing in  Japan affecting the elections 
 cannot justify depriving Korean nationals residing abroad of their right to vote 
 completely.54
  
 The ‘‘General Association of Korean Residents in Japan’’ (‘‘chae ilbon chosŏnin 
ch’ongnyŏnhaphoe’’ or ‘‘ch’ongnyŏn’’) mentioned in the above excerpt was organized in 
1955 in opposition to the pro-South ‘‘Korean Residents Union in Japan’’ (‘‘chae ilbon 
taehan min’guk mindan,’’ or ‘‘mindan.’’) Mindan was formed in 1946, after having made 
secession from the main ‘‘League of Koreans in Japan’’ (‘‘chae ilbon chosŏnin yŏnmaeng’’ 
or ‘‘choryŏn’’) created in October 1945 with leftist leanings - many of its leaders ‘‘were 
communist activists recently released from prison.’’55  Choryŏn naturally aligned with the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1948, a choice which was then supported by a 
majority  of the Korean community in Japan and has been perpetuated by its successor 
organization, Ch’ongnyŏn. 
 After the establishment of the two separate Korean regimes (South Korea, or 
 Kankoku in Japanese, and North Korea, or Kita Chōsen), Choryŏn declared its 
 solidarity with the DPRK and referred to the Rhee government established in the 
 ROK as an American puppet regime. Choryŏn’s position was most  likely consistent 
 with that of the majority of the Korean community. From the onset, the Japanese 
 government encouraged Koreans in Japan to change their existing Chōsen 
 nationalities to Kankoku because Chōsen now referred only to North Korea. 
 Nevertheless, as many  as two-thirds of the Korean population maintained their 
 Chōsen nationalities, which, by default, made them North Korean nationals despite 
 the fact that most first-generation Koreans in Japan had come from southern Korea. 
 Although some kept their Chōsen nationalities because they  did not support either the 
 North or South Korean government, for others, allegiance to North Korea was the 
 nationalistic choice.56
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 Throughout the 1970s and no matter their affiliation, Koreans from Japan fell prey  to 
security laws in the South and were one of the target groups of ideological conversion.57 It is 
estimated that ‘‘between April 1971 to February 1976, some thirty-six second-generation 
Koreans from Japan were arrested for their alleged links with the ‘pro-North Korean’ 
community  in Japan and for violating South Korea’s National Security  Law.’’58 The case of 
the Suh brothers is emblematic of this bias. In 1971, Suh Sung [Sŏ Sŭng] and Suh Jun-sik 
[Sŏ Chun-sik], two second-generation Korean residents in Japan, were arrested while re-
entering South Korea where they were pursuing their studies. The Suh brothers were 
detained until 1990 and 1988 respectively, in virtue of their refusal to ideologically  convert 
and renounce beliefs which they never held.59 The 1987 change of regime did not signify  the 
end of the conversion system, whose validity was challenged before the constitutional court 
in 1998. The verdict  rendered in 2002 sheds light upon the mechanisms of exclusion 
operating inside South Korea to reject as enemies members of its political community.
Constitutional lessons
 The constitutional cases reviewed above should not be read as a mere testament to 
the complexities of Korean history. Constitutional jurisprudence is not simply a reflection of 
the fact that markers of political inclusion and exclusion in the Korean peninsula are 
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irreducible to the national division. The constitutional court’s intervention should rather be 
seen in a dynamic perspective, as taking place in a field of contention and as advancing 
propositions which do not exhaust the various ways in which the national body can be 
envisioned - a variety which is however not infinite and grows out of shared postulates, such 
as collective identification on an ethnic basis. The latter is not incompatible with regimes of 
differentiation among ethnic Koreans depending on the imperatives of the existing South 
Korean state, in terms of national and economic security.
  While the jurisprudence of the constitutional court in nationality  cases can be 
described as rather progressive (against the discrimination of Koreans from China or for an 
extension of the right to vote to all nationals living abroad but  North Koreans and pro-North 
residents in Japan), it has also contributed to consolidate a number of conservative premises 
when it comes to defining who belongs or not to the national community. In construing the 
status of North Korea and North Koreans, the court’s jurisprudence has indeed reinforced the 
1948 antagonistic framework embedded in the constitution - a very approach to the division 
whose demise seemed announced by the inter-Korean summit of June 2000. By ruling in 
favor of equality in employment opportunities for ethnic Koreans with Chinese nationality  or 
for most citizens residing abroad to exercise their right to vote, the court has paradoxically 
confirmed the validity of differential categories of Koreans and the legitimacy of their 
selective activation in light of ‘‘national’’ interests. In framing the ‘‘national,’’ the 
constitutional court has moreover often relied on a conservative vision of history, especially 
in relation to the colonial era. 
 The cases reviewed above therefore emphasize both the potencies that characterize 
judicial action and the ambivalence with which the South Korean court has embraced its role 
as guardian of the constitution and of a certain way of envisioning the nation. 
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Enmity and ideology
Contesting the ‘‘pledge to abide by the law’’: from hunger strike to constitutional complaint
 In 1998, the Constitutional Court of Korea celebrated its first decade of adjudication. 
As of January  of that year, 3,720 cases had been filed since the beginning of its operations 
and 617 new requests reached the institution between January and December.60   Among 
them was a constitutional complaint challenging the ‘‘pledge to abide by the 
law’’ (‘‘chunbŏp sŏyakche’’), formerly known as the ideological conversion system, on the 
basis that it violated the freedom of conscience, right  to pursue happiness, and right to 
equality  of inmates sentenced under the National Security Act or the Assembly and 
Demonstration Act (‘‘chiphoe mit siwi-e kwanhan pŏmnyul’’). In 1999, two other separate 
cases were filed on similar grounds and all were consolidated under the title of ‘‘pledge to 
abide by the law case.’’61 
 Very  little about the complainants and their cases was recollected in the constitutional 
judgment. The facts that motivated the petitioners’ condemnations under the National 
Security Act were never mentioned, removing both the crimes and their authors from the 
scope of the ruling. Moreover, as is common practice in the constitutional court’s decisions, 
the names of the complainants were made anonymous by replacing their middle syllables 
with the letters ‘‘O/ㅇ’’: Cho O-rok (조ㅇ록), Cho O-won (조ㅇ원), and Lee O-chul (이ㅇ
철) whose last  petition was filed along with twenty-eight additional prisoners. This identity 
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erasure resulted in a very partial overview of the three cases challenging the pledge, 
summarized by the court as follows:
 (1) 98Hun-Ma425
 The complainant was detained for violation of the National Security Act on February 
 2, 1978, and a sentence of life imprisonment was finalized on December 26, 1978. 
 He was serving his term at Andong Correctional Institution when he was excluded 
 from parole release on August 15, 1998 for refusing to submit the pledge to abide by 
 the law. On November 26, 1998, the complainant filed a constitutional complaint 
 against Article 14(2) of the Ordinance for Parole Review requiring inmates 
 imprisoned for violation of the National Security Act to submit  the pledge to abide by 
 the law for parole review, alleging that the provision infringed on his freedom of 
 conscience, the right to pursue happiness, and the right to equality.
 (2) 99Hun-Ma170
 The complainant was detained for violation of the National Security  Act in February, 
 1993,  and received an eight year sentence. He was serving his term at Chunchon 
 Correctional Institution when he was excluded from parole release on August 15, 
 1998 and again on February 25, 1999 for refusing to submit the pledge to abide by 
 the law. On March 25, 1999, the complainant filed a constitutional complaint against 
 Article 14(2) of the Ordinance for Parole Review for the reasons cited in the above 
 case.
 (3) 99Hun-Ma498
 The complainants received one and a half year to five year sentences for violation of 
 the National Security  Act between 1996 and 1998, respectively. The complainants 
 were excluded from parole on February 25, 1999 for refusing to submit the pledge to 
 abide by the law. On August 24, 1999, the complainants filed a constitutional 
 complaint against Article 14(2) of the Ordinance for Parole Review for the reasons 
 cited in the above case.62
 This lack of factual texture is customary in the constitutional court’s rulings; yet, it 
also represented a revealing silence about the order of discourse in which the justices 
operated. Indeed, the issue to know who was subjected to ideological conversion in the first 
place, and for which crimes, was left entirely unaddressed by both the majority  and 
dissenting sides of the court, while the legitimacy of such categories as ‘‘thought criminals’’ 
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and ‘‘ideological enemies’’ was only partially called into question. The very circumstances 
surrounding the case which triggered the process of constitutional review posed, however, a 
deep  challenge to judges’ shared assumption that all the conversion’s targets were genuine 
communist believers and national security offenders.
 The first anonymous petitioner was in fact Cho Sang-rok (Cho Sang-nok), a national 
security inmate who received public attention in human rights circles after Amnesty 
International adopted him as a prisoner of conscience in the late 1990s. In 1999, the 
organization launched an appeal calling for his immediate and unconditional release. The 
letter of the appeal provided the following description of Cho’s case, which can be 
contrasted with the paucity of the overview given by the constitutional court.
 Cho Sang-nok, aged 53, was arrested in January 1978 by the Agency for National 
 Security and Planning (South Korea’s intelligence service) and held for 17 days 
 without access to a lawyer or his family. During this time he says he was subjected to 
 electric shocks, water torture and beatings in order to force him to confess to charges 
 of espionage. He was convicted under the National Security Law of passing ‘‘state 
 secrets’’ to North Korean agents in Japan and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
 Amnesty International believes the charges were politically  motivated and that the 
 main evidence used to convict him was his own confession, extracted under torture. 
 In spite of many  appeals by  Amnesty International and other human rights 
 organizations, the South Korean authorities have provided no concrete evidence to 
 substantiate the charges of ‘‘espionage.’’ He was excluded from a recent prisoner 
 amnesty because he refused to sign an oath pledging respect for the law in South 
 Korea (including the National Security  Law). Cho Sang-nok is held in solitary 
 confinement and is reported to be in poor  mental and physical health following a 
 series of hunger strikes staged to protest against the law-abiding oath and to 
 demand an investigation into past human rights abuses.63
 Cho Sang-rok’s story was but an accident, illustrating hundred other cases of political 
imprisonment justified by the rhetoric of national security, but  motivated by alternative 
concerns. In 1970s authoritarian South Korea, Cho’s fate was exemplary  of an entire 
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subclass of incidents in which South Koreans who visited Japan for study, business, or 
family meetings were arrested after returning home and accused of having been in contact 
with North Korean agents and pro-North Korean organizations during their stay  abroad. As 
evoked earlier, the same was true for ethnic Koreans from Japan traveling between the two 
countries. Cho’s case was therefore but one of the many cases of espionage fabricated during 
the regimes of Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1987). Sentenced 
for the most serious offense under the National Security Act, spying, Cho and other fellow 
victims were subjected to the ideological conversion policy while fostering no belief in 
communism.
 This paradoxical reality highlights the deep  ambiguity  that has characterized South 
Korean governments’ use of national security  and anti-communism before, as well as after, 
the country’s transition to procedural democracy: the threat of North Korea, no matter its 
intensity, has consistently been mobilized to broadly construe enmity  and to include in it 
individuals or activities that did not endanger the safety of the state. The breadth of national 
security’s domestic uses and anti-communism’s effects appears as a blind spot of the 
constitutional court’s decision on the pledge to abide by  the law. Indeed, the judges’ 
reasoning rested on the consensual premise that South Korea’s conversion policy only 
targeted very  ‘‘real enemies’’ against which the country still ought to protect itself in the 
early 2000s - such consensus did not however prevent disagreements over the means 
necessary  to realize this end. An additional source of implicit convergence can be found in 
the silence reigning over the colonial genealogy of the conversion system, an attitude 
characteristic of the conservative nationalist narrative embraced by the constitutional court. 
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Colonial origins and authoritarian reactivation of conversion
 As exemplified by the pledge’s origins, Korea’s experience under Japanese rule has 
produced institutional legacies which have endured after 1945. Acknowledging and 
analyzing the colonial roots of Korea’s ‘‘modernity’’ still represent a challenge in light of the 
‘‘relentless politicization of the historical record that emerged after the division.’’64 Indeed, 
the complex dynamics inherent to the colonial situation cannot be subsumed under the 
dichotomy of ‘‘colonial repression and exploitation versus Korean resistance’’ deployed in 
the linear and teleological flow of nationalist narratives, North and South. To them, 
colonialism and modernity are bound to be mutually exclusive, assuming that ‘‘colonial rule 
either destroyed or distorted Korea’s effort to modernize.’’65  
 The notion of ideological deviance and the correlated conversion program designed 
to reeducate ‘‘thought criminals’’ (‘‘sasang pŏmch’oeŭi’’) were introduced by  Japanese 
authorities in the mid-1920s, both at  home and in colonial Korea. In Japan, they  served to 
counter the radical movement which had developed in the second decade of the 20th century, 
emphasizing the necessity of its anarchist, socialist, or communist partisans’ reintegration in 
the ‘‘national body’’ (‘‘kokutai’’) of subjects loyal to the emperor.66 Those mechanisms were 
exported to Korea around the same time, and in the process transformed, to confront the 
domestic independence movement, which was mostly composed of leftists after the failure 
of the pacific strategy  of the ‘‘March First  Independence Movement’’ (‘‘samil undong’’) in 
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1919 and the dissolution of the united front between radicals and gradualist moderates in the 
early 1930s.67 
 The instrument designed to oppose resistance in Japan and colonial Korea, the 
conversion policy, can be described as a technology of coercion, surveillance, and discipline 
of real or so-called left-wing political activists which operated in and outside prisons. 
Officially aimed at making them recant and profess their obedience to the existing 
institutional and legal order, the system worked in Korea through subjugation by  a tailored 
and rationalized exercise of state violence. The inability of the independence movement to 
reproduce itself in prison - an ordinary site of recruitment, formation, and propagation for 
dissidence in other contentious contexts - testifies to the effectiveness of the device and of 
the larger apparatus in which it was deployed.68     
 In 1945, the conversion policy was abolished by the U.S. provisional government in 
Japan but was maintained in South Korea, albeit not formally.69 Again institutionalized in 
1956 through a regulation order of the Ministry of Justice, the system of ideological 
conversion only became an integral part of the state repressive apparatus under Park Chung-
hee’s Yusin system (1972-1979), a period of exacerbated social mobilization and repression 
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under the motto of ‘‘revitalization’’ and anti-communism. In 1973, ‘‘ideological conversion 
task forces’’ were set up in the five prisons were approximately 500 unconverted prisoners 
were being kept (Taejŏn, Kwangju, Ch’ŏngju, Taegu, and Mokp’o).70 
 Rather than being motivated by ideological concerns, the revival of the conversion 
policy in the 1970s coincided with the regime’s determination to prevent the looming release 
of national security offenders whose long-term prison sentences were coming to a close.71 In 
this respect, reinsertion in the fabric of society  was never the system’s objective. On the 
contrary, the Social Security Act was enacted in 1975 to strengthen the conversion program 
and authorize public prosecutors to prolong the custody of individuals deemed dangerous, 
even if they had signed a conversion statement.  
 The conversion policy was based on the classification of prisoners (both political and 
non-political) into four categories to which a differential treatment was associated.
 Class A includes the prisoners who can be rehabilitated; Class B includes the 
 prisoners whose rehabilitation is considered difficult; Class C includes prisoners 
 whose rehabilitation is deemed very difficult, including recidivists and political 
 prisoners who have ‘‘converted.’’ Political prisoners who have not converted belong 
 to Class D and are not entitled to the benefits granted to the other classes. According 
 to testimonies of former political prisoners, in order to show that they had 
 ‘‘converted’’ they  were required to write a statement explaining (a) how they became 
 communists, (b) the activities they carried out to promote communism, (c) the 
 reasons why they wanted to give up communism, and (d) what they proposed to do in 
 the future. The prisoners then appeared before a committee of prison officials who 
 decided whether to accept the statement as evidence of a true ‘‘conversion.’’
 Released political prisoners have testified that during the 1970s and 1980s many 
 prisoners were tortured to force them to ‘‘convert.’’ At present, however, the main 
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 pressure on prisoners  is said to be a psychological one, including the denial of early 
 release on parole. Prisoners who have not ‘‘converted’’ are also reportedly unable to 
 receive and send regular correspondence, to meet visitors without guards being 
 present, to have extra items of furniture in their cells, to work, watch television or to 
 attend religious worship.72
 Out of the 500 detainees subjected to the conversion program in the 1970s, those who 
refused to recant came to be known as ‘‘pijŏnhyang changgisu’’ - literally, the ‘‘unconverted 
long-term prisoners.’’ Numbering close to a hundred, most of them remained in detention 
until the 1990s, and sometimes until the very end of the decade like Cho Sang-rok, the lead 
complainant in the pledge to abide by the law case. Although the prison conditions and 
method of ideological conversion started to evolve in the mid-1980s,73 the policy  endured 
through the first decade of South Korea’s transition to democracy. It was substituted with the 
pledge to abide by  the law in July 1998. This very same year, the issue of the pledge’s 
constitutionality was raised before the Constitutional Court of Korea. No mention of the 
colonial origins of the program, neither by the majority  opinion nor the dissenting camp, was 
made in the court’s 2002 verdict which upheld the validity  of the pledge. The echo of this 
historiographical silence resonated all the stronger since the ruling could be read as a divided 
judgment on the conversion system’s history, albeit framed in a limited way. 
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Majority ruling and minority opinion: divergences within a shared order of discourse
 The constitutional issue addressed in the decision was framed as twofold: firstly, 
whether requiring inmates imprisoned for violation of the National Security Act or the 
Assembly and Demonstration Act  to submit  a pledge to abide by the national laws of the 
Republic of Korea before they could be considered for parole release violated the freedom of 
conscience guaranteed by article 19 of the constitution; and secondly, whether the 
differential treatment introduced by the obligation that those inmates alone sign the pledge 
violated their right to equality. Yet, what the majority and dissent actually engaged in 
through their respective reasonings was a judgment on the history of the ideological 
conversion system itself: Had sufficient change been introduced to legitimize its resilience 
after the 1987 political transition, or had excessive continuity  prevailed and therefore 
compromised the nature of South Korea as a ‘‘free democratic society’’? 
 The fact that the pledge neither imposed a ‘‘standardized form of expression’’ nor an 
actual conversion statement was presented by  the majority as a decisive element of its 
compatibility with the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the constitution. 
 Contents of the pledge to abide by the law required by the instant provision [Article 
 14 of the Ordinance for Parole Review] include the ‘‘vow to respect the national legal 
 order of the Republic of Korea.’’ An inmate needs to fill out  his name, Korean 
 identification number, convicted crime, circumstance of conviction as well as 
 sentence, pledge to abide by  the established legal order of the Republic of Korea, 
 future life plan, and other statements if desired. There is no standardized form of 
 expression for the pledge, and in practice, most inmates simply  write that ‘‘they will 
 abide by the laws of Korea.’’74
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  As the majority recalled, the pledge to abide by  the law was precisely introduce to 
‘‘silence criticism on the past ideological conversion program’’ and to neutralize the charge 
that it violated the freedom of conscience of national security offenders. By requiring them 
not to explicitly abjure their belief in communism but only to state their commitment to 
respect the laws of South Korea, the pledge was construed by the judges as distinct enough 
from the pre-1998 device. Indeed, the act of submitting the pledge was described as merely 
‘‘reconfirming the duty to abide by the law that is duly required of all citizens,’’ thereby 
neither intruding on the domain of conscience nor injuring the right  to equality of anti-state 
criminals.75 
 Among the complainants are some long-term prisoners who have refused to renounce 
 their beliefs in communism. They may be convinced that the contents of the National 
 Security Act are contrary to their political beliefs or that the free democratic regime is 
 against their ideologies, and their such beliefs may be known to others. However, as 
 long as the contents of the pledge used for parole review require nothing more than 
 what has been described above, such pledge does not touch upon the domains of 
 conscience. Basically, the Constitution does not protect anyone's right to overthrow 
 the existing legal order or a free democratic order using such unconstitutional means 
 as force or violence with vehement disrespect for the Constitution or other laws of 
 the land. Requiring submission of a pledge to abide by the existing legal order or to 
 respect the extant constitutional regime does not violate any constitutionally 
 protected freedom or right, including the freedom of conscience.76
 On the contrary, two dissenting justices, Kim Hyu-jong and Choo Sun-hoe, argued 
that the formal difference between the new pledge and the old conversion system only 
masked the underlying continuity existing between them, since ‘‘both are used to effectively 





led the minority to raise the fundamental issue of the means available to democratic societies 
in order to protect their existence without betraying their principles.
 In a free democratic society, the rights of even opponents of free democracy are 
 protected; only  their specific actions can be restrained when they are deleterious to 
 the public interest. The government must protect itself against extremists trying to 
 overthrow the government via violence and force. In a free democratic society, 
 however, the government can only penalize  the opponents of democracy for their 
 ‘‘actions’’; it  should not force them to renounce their ideology or make them pledge 
 to abide by the law against their beliefs using any form of  direct or indirect means of 
 coercion. This is what distinguishes a free democratic society from a communist 
 regime.78
 The dissenting judges therefore identified a dual process of differentiation for South 
Korea to qualify as a ‘‘free’’ or ‘‘liberal’’ democratic regime (‘‘chayu minjujuŭi’’): 
differentiation from its authoritarian past, and differentiation from a communist regime - 
namely, North Korea - in which not only political acts, but thoughts, are likely to be 
criminalized. Even in its rejection of the pledge, the minority nonetheless adhered to the 
postulates assumed by the rest of the court: that contemporary South Korea’s national 
security apparatus is used to confront real ideological enemies, that  is to say, individuals who 
oppose both the existence of the state and of its democratic order. These individuals are 
unquestionably identified as communists, although both the minority and majority 
recognized that they need not be affiliated with North Korea. 
 North Korea still endeavors to bring about the communist revolution in the entire 
 peninsula, and to protect  itself against such external threats, the government of South 
 Korea has no choice but to defend against North Korea’s attempts at radical 
 revolution in South Korea. Illegal activities by individuals aiming to disturb the basic 
 order of free democracy or overthrow the government, either in alliance with the 
 North Korean government or through independent decision of [their] own, have 
 largely been dealt with either by  the National Security Act or by the Assembly  and 
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 Demonstration Act because of the nature of such activities. It is under such 
 circumstance that the parole review board examines, in addition to things ordinarily 
 taken into consideration to determine eligibility for parole, whether inmates 
 imprisoned for violation of the National Security Act or the Assembly  and 
 Demonstration Act are willing to observe the national laws once released on parole. 
 Thus, differential treatment of such inmates is not without a reasonable basis, and is 
 appropriate as a means to achieve the policy objectives.79
 The critical analysis of the limits associated with constitutional discourse does not 
entail that the South Korean court has always been blind to the misuses of security laws. In 
its landmark 1990 decision on the partial constitutionality  of the National Security Act, the 
court recognized multiple abuses which could be made of the legislation if interpreted too 
broadly.80  It consequently indicated that the security legislation could only  apply to those 
activities clearly endangering the state or the ‘‘basic order of free democracy.’’ As revealed 
by subsequent cases which confirmed the validity of the law thus understood, one of the 
main concerns of the court in the 1990s was to prevent the National Security Act from being 
used in order to restrict  ‘‘the freedom of science and arts’’ (‘‘hakmun /yesul chayu’’), that is 
to say academic research and artistic creativity.81 
The full scope of exclusion
 If the constitutional court has been able to conceptualize some misuses of the 
National Security  Act, it has been beyond its reach so far to analyze their full extent. Indeed, 
the distortions of notions such as security  and anti-communism cannot be viewed as 
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accidental, or as the mere product of law-enforcing actors’ discretion. These distortions have 
instead been embedded in the functionality of repressive tools, whose scope appears wider 
than is even recognized by South Korean political forces in favor of abolishing the National 
Security Act. For instance, when President Roh Moo-hyun defended the repeal of the law in 
2004 because of its tarnished legacy as a tool of oppression against dissidents, his discourse 
amounted to a limited recognition of the range of effects, past  and present, produced by the 
security legislation. 
 While the National Security Act is still in force, the pledge to abide by the law was 
withdrawn in 2003, during Roh’s presidency. This reform does not mean that individuals 
convicted under the law are now treated on an equal footing with other criminals. In 
particular, being released does not absolutely clear former national security convicts from 
suspicion. For instance, the Security  Surveillance Act, which was enacted in 1989 to replace 
the 1975 Social Security  Act, transformed prosecutors’ prerogative to prolong inmates’ 
custody for security reasons into the power to place them under surveillance, without 
confinement. Surveillance therefore applies to people convicted for security offenses ‘‘in 
order to prevent the danger of their recommitting crime and promote their return to normal 
sound social life, and thereby to maintain national security and social peace.’’82 Surveillance 
measures take the form of an obligation to periodically report one’s schedule to a local police 
station, which includes providing detailed information about ‘‘political activities, meetings, 
trips and other matters as deemed appropriate by the police station chief,’’ and they  can also 
entail the prohibition from having contacts with former fellow inmates and from 
participating to certain events or demonstrations.83 
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 This dissertation’s investigation into the National Security Act’s enforcement patterns 
since 1987 has demonstrated a clear correlation between the law’s deployment and the post-
transition mobilization and discourse associated with certain segments of society, such as 
students, ‘‘progressive’’ intellectuals, and workers. Such evidence corroborates Choi Jang-
Jip’s analysis about anti-communism’s persistence in contemporary  South Korean politics as 
the expression of a consensus around a form of ‘‘conservative democracy,’’ in which the 
masses are socio-economically mobilized by  the state but excluded from substantial political 
participation.84 According to Choi, this exclusion means that underlying cleavages in society 
- most fundamentally ‘‘the interests and demands of the poor and the working class’’ - are 
not politically  represented in South Korea’s party  system, which is ‘‘conservatively 
biased.’’85 
 The constitutional court, which has the power to dissolve political parties whose aims 
or activities are incompatible with the democratic order, did not contribute to ‘‘liberalize’’ 
this arena - in the sense of introducing more plurality in it. On the contrary, the court for 
instance ruled in 2006 against  the registration of the minor Socialist Party (‘‘sahoedang’’) by 
upholding the requirements set by the Political Parties Act (‘‘chŏngdangpŏp’’), originally 
enacted in 1962. These requirements prescribe that a political party, to qualify as such, must 
commit to ‘‘democratic organization and activities’’ and ‘‘procure an organization sufficient 
to participate in people’s political will-formation’’ by having local representation in at least 
five cities or provincial branches, and no less than 1,000 members in each of them.86 In a 
very short and unanimous decision rendered in 2006, the court assimilated the Socialist Party 
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to a regional organization which could be legitimately denied the status of a political party 
for failing to meet the above conditions.
 Representative democracy under our Constitution, in order to function properly, 
 requires a stable majority in the parliament. Therefore, there is a legitimate interest in 
 exclusion of minor parties. One may contest the legitimacy of excluding regional 
 parties. However, exclusion of regional parties representing the political wills of only 
 certain regions cannot be said to be of an illegitimate purpose under the Constitution 
 when party politics depending excessively on regional affiliation has become 
 problematic in our political reality.87
 According to Choi Jang-Jip again, construing regionalism as a fundamental cleavage 
in South Korean politics - which the court did - is in itself a symptom of the structural 
distortions affecting political representation. Indeed, ‘‘regionalism emerged as the dominant 
element in party politics after the democratic liberalization and as a result  of the political 
representation system modeled largely  by Cold War anti-communism,’’ because ‘‘political 
competition based on the expression and mobilization of professional, class, or any other 
conflicts, interests, or passions was difficult.’’88 Rather than regionalism,
 The most serious problem of democracy  in Korea is the ideologically  narrow base of 
 political representation, which in fact represents only conservatives. In substance, 
 this structure of conservative bias has only  become reinforced after democratization, 
 despite changes in the overall political landscape. When a nation is ideologically 
 fettered, that is to say, when Cold War anti-communism still functions as the 
 dominant language of the nation’s politics, democracy  does not become a mechanism 
 for building consensus to solve the various problems that the nation faces as a 
 society. Instead, it  serves to justify vested interests and special privileges ‘‘in the 
 name of democracy.’’89
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 In a 2001 case, the constitutional court  recognized that ‘‘there is little, if any, 
difference between the existing political parties in their ideologies, policies, and party 
platforms,’’ and that, as a result, ‘‘many voters assert  that they  do not support any political 
party.’’90  The court has not however ventured into the causes or consequences of this 
diagnosis. In the political sphere, this uniformity particularly translates into an absence of 
dissensus over socio-economic policies, subordinated to the ‘‘national’’ objective of pursuing 
a neoliberal growth-first and pro-chaebŏl strategy.  
 The fact that South Korea’s politics of enmity has been rooted in more than the 
division could be a source of optimism and skepticism alike: on the one hand, the 
dismantlement of resilient mechanisms of exclusion does not appear completely premised on 
the collapse of the North Korean regime, implying that further democratization of the 
political sphere could maybe be achieved independently from this prospect; on the other 
hand, reunification on South Korean political and socio-economic terms would not 
necessarily be a guarantee of profound and structural change. Furthermore, if greater 
inclusion in the South’s democratic order is only bound to come from within, the possibility 
that the constitutional court will be resisting rather than prompting its advent cannot be 
easily discounted.
Enmity as a shared modality of national imagination
 According to Lee Namhee, the discourse of enmity articulated by the South Korean 
state since its founding has penetrated the fabric of society in at least two ways. On the one 
hand, anti-communism became largely internalized among Southern nationals with the 
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experience of the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, and through the state-sponsored 
campaigns of education and mobilization which were initiated in the 1960s.91 As a result, not 
only a majority of the population, but most of the pro-democracy movement until the 1980s, 
adhered to a construction of enmity which was thus both ‘‘official’’ and ‘‘hegemonic.’’ On 
the other hand, even when such construction started to be contested, the representational 
strategies through which it  was challenged did not subvert  the notion and language of enmity 
itself. In other words, the actors who were apparently reversing the paradigm imposed by the 
state to think the division - thereby turning the United States into a foe and North Korea into 
a friend - continued to operate within the demonizing logic and binary terms structuring the 
discourse of the forces that they opposed. 
 Moreover, if state institutions were the major motor in creating and perpetuating a 
shared sense of anti-communism in South Korean society, especially through educational 
policies, additional groups contributed to its diffusion and entrenchment. Indeed, ‘‘anti-
communism in South Korea has been promoted and sustained not only by  the state but also 
by the mass media, Christian and veterans’ organizations, and various civil groups.’92 
Conservative interests continue to assume this role in contemporary  South Korea, as 
demonstrated by their mobilization during the debate over the abolition of the National 
Security Act. In particular, the press has been ‘‘the fortress of Cold War anti-communism’’ 
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since the transition, a function which was first imposed upon it  during the 1970s but which it 
has subsequently served voluntarily.93 
 Anti-communism’s deep internalization during the authoritarian years was for 
instance expressed in the hostile feelings fostered toward any  individual suspected or 
convicted of an anti-state crime under security  laws - as well as toward his or her family 
members, who would become ‘‘subjected to life-long scrutiny and harsh treatment by the 
state and society.’’94 In addition, ‘‘human rights advocates have long argued that the public at 
large accepted torture as necessary when applied to North Korean agents and political 
prisoners who had violated the National Security  Law. When Park Jong-chul, a third-year 
Seoul National University  student, died as a result of torture in 1987, some journalists 
reporting the incident suggested that the detective who tortured Park must have been 
confused about whether Park was involved in a national security  incident (kongan sakŏn) or 
in a more common antigovernment protest (siguk sakŏn). The implication was that torture 
would have been less controversial if Park had violated the NSL.’’95 
 This general hostility was not only confined to ordinary  people but also shared by 
regime opponents and pro-democracy activists, for whom not being labeled as ‘‘pro-
communist’’ could be a matter of survival. As analyzed by Lee Namhee, ‘‘the rhetoric of 
anti-communism’’ embraced by  the student movement (or ‘‘undongkwŏn’’) until the 1980s 
‘‘might have been a strategic ploy’’ to avoid the irreversible consequences of such accusation 
for one’s life and family. Yet, their desire for separation went as far as to extend to prison 
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life, where ‘‘through the 1970s and into the mid-1980s, some undongkwŏn political prisoners 
avoided talking to the long-term political prisoners and refused to share the same cell, and 
some even refused to share with those prisoners the privilege of a two-hour exercise time for 
which they had fought.’’96
 These long-term political prisoners were the inmates which the ideological 
conversion program was targeting through a variety of means - seclusion from other 
prisoners and any prison activity  (labor, reading, correspondence, visits, etc.), physical 
mistreatments, pressures to convert by family members, and above all starvation as their 
portion sizes could be reduced by half. Because ‘‘it  was dangerous for individuals or groups 
to support  those with a presumed connection to North Korea, regardless of the nature or the 
extent of such connection,’’ long-term political prisoners remained invisible in the public 
realm until the late 1980s.97  By then, the pro-democracy movement’s longtime solidarity 
with anti-communism had nonetheless been undone. 
 According to Henry Em, ‘‘it was the 1980 people’s uprising in Kwangju [...] and the 
massacre perpetrated by government troops, which broke the state’s ideological hold over 
the democratic movement.’’98  The discursive shift undergone by the movement was 
characterized by widespread anti-Americanism (the United States being seen as an 
accomplice of the military junta in the Kwangju massacre) and enthusiasm for North Korea’s 
‘‘chuch’e sasang’’ (or ideology of self-reliance). Challenging anti-communism amounted to 
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a reconfiguration of the ‘‘national’’ imaginary, one in which the ‘‘minjung’’ (the ‘‘masses’’ or 
‘‘common people’’) became the true incarnation of the nation against the adverse forces 
forcibly maintaining its division - that is to say, the United States and South Korean 
authoritarian regimes. What took place in this process of contestation was however a mere 
inversion in the ascription of enmity, rather than an overcoming of its logic. 
 The South Korean minjung movement’s construction of itself as a counter-public 
 sphere  involved the establishment of ‘‘new norms and hierarchies’’ that consigned all 
 other forces  considered to be inimical to minjung as anti-minjung, antidemocratic, 
 and antinational. The strategy of dichotomization, exalting the minjung while 
 ‘‘othering’’ and at times demonizing the state, corporate conglomerates, and foreign 
 powers, served to shore up their oppositional identity.99
 The South Korean pro-democracy  movement’s failure to escape the paradigm of 
enmity did not merely rest on its inability to think outside dichotomies (which may be 
impossible given that  identity may hardly  be conceived without alterity), but on its inability 
to envision itself outside certain prescribed forms of identification and otherness. In this 
respect, its espousal of the categories of ‘‘national’’ and ‘‘anti-national’’ appears as 
fundamentally problematic. As argued by Henry Em or Shin Gi-Wook, the notion of nation 
is not condemned to produce exclusion. It  can instead carry a liberating and subversive 
potential, as it has in Korean history in the late 19th century or during the colonial era. While 
both authors call for contemporary South Korean nationalism to revive this dimension, a 
precondition to its reactivation may be abandoning the idea that  a genuine incarnation of the 
nation exists - an idea that  the ‘‘minjung’’ movement instead contributed to reinforce and 
which will continue to haunt the concept of ‘‘minjok’’ (or the nation as race) as long as the 
belief in its true essence remains.
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Democracy and loyalty in comparative perspective
 The concern with the ‘‘loyalty’’ of citizens expressed in the pledge to abide by the 
law case, and the broader project to determine who can be counted in the political 
community, have not been specific to the case of South Korean democracy. For instance, a 
Public Servant Loyalty  Decree or ‘‘Berufsverbot’’ was implemented in West Germany in 
1972 to ban ‘‘radicals’’ from becoming civil servants.100 The adoption of this controversial 
measure intervened in the context of the anti-terrorist struggle against the Red Army  Faction. 
While German courts upheld the Berufsverbot, the European Court of Human Rights’ 1995 
jurisprudence found disproportionate the dismissal of a public secondary school teacher who 
had joined the German Communist Party in the 1970s.101 
 More infamous than the Berufsverbot is the American precedent set by Executive 
Order 9066 of February 1942, commanding that all Japanese Americans on the West Coast, 
regardless of their citizenship, be confined in internment camps due to fears of ‘‘espionage’’ 
and ‘‘sabotage’’ in the wake of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The 
successive measures directed against citizens and residents of Japanese ancestry (curfew, 
evacuation, and confinement) were challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court in a series of 
cases: Hirabayashi (1943), Korematsu (1944), and Ex parte Endo (1944) - the last two 
having been decided on the same day. The issue of loyalty - and how to verify  it - was at the 
heart of these rulings.102  In Korematsu, the most notorious of these three cases, the 
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government argued that the impossibility to administer individual loyalty tests to the entire 
suspect population (which involved approximately 112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, 
including 70,000 American citizens) made it necessary  to first evacuate all of them from the 
West Coast, place them in detention centers, and only  release afterwards those whose 
allegiance to the United States could not be doubted. 
 This approach was validated by  the court but rejected by  three dissenting justices, 
who each called into question the majority’s reasoning from a different angle. However, 
none of them challenged a number of postulates which thus delineated the court’s order of 
discourse: the basic dichotomy between what is allowed in times of peace and permissible in 
times of war; the necessary deference due to military authority in the latter context; and the 
possibility - if not legitimacy  - of preventively detaining individuals whose loyalty  would be 
found wanting. In this perspective, one of the most fervent critics of the measures inflicted 
upon Japanese Americans, Justice Frank Murphy, was particularly  attached to stress the need 
to differentiate between individual and group disloyalty, whose confusion he equated with 
the ‘‘abhorrent and despicable treatment of minority groups by the dictatorial tyrannies 
which this nation is now pledged to destroy.’’
 No one denies, of course, that there were some disloyal persons of Japanese descent 
 on the Pacific Coast  who did all in their power to aid their ancestral land. Similar 
 disloyal activities have been engaged in by  many persons of German, Italian and 
 even more pioneer stock in our country. But to infer that examples of individual 
 disloyalty prove group disloyalty  and justify discriminatory action against the entire 
 group is to deny that, under our system of law, individual guilt is the sole basis for 
 deprivation of rights. Moreover, this inference, which is at  the very heart of the 
 evacuation orders, has been used in support of the abhorrent and despicable treatment 
 of minority  groups by the dictatorial tyrannies which this nation is now pledged to 
 destroy. To give constitutional sanction to that inference in this case, however well 
 intentioned may have been the military command on the Pacific Coast, is to adopt 
 one of the cruelest of the rationales used by our enemies to destroy the dignity  of the 
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 individual and to encourage and open the door to discriminatory actions against other 
 minority groups in the passions of tomorrow.103
 The split  and government-oriented Korematsu ruling has been considered quite 
difficult to reconcile with the unanimous and rights-oriented Ex parte Endo decision 
delivered on the same day and ordering the immediate release of Mitsuye Endo, an American 
citizen of Japanese ancestry, from the ‘‘war relocation center’’ where she was detained. The 
two cases however shared important underlying commonalities. Read together, they  illustrate 
the full meaning and consequences of the court’s consensus over the possibility of preventive 
confinement based on loyalty. While the majority  in Korematsu did not argue for the 
indefinite administrative detention of all Japanese Americans, the dissenting camp did not 
disagree with the confinement of those whose disloyalty could be established - provided that 
their loyalty would be tested ‘‘on an individual basis by holding investigations and hearings 
to separate the loyal from the disloyal, as was done in the case of persons of German and 
Italian ancestry.’’104 As a result, Ex parte Endo unanimously conceded that  loyal citizens of 
Japanese ancestry  evacuated from their places of residence on the West Coast could not be 
legitimately kept in detention and prevented from returning home. 
 Highlighting the two decisions’ common discursive order does not amount to 
contending that disagreements within the court were minor or merely  a matter of 
technicality. Important principles were articulated and clashed in the cases reviewed above; 
yet, antagonisms were not absolute. Instead, they  were largely  premised on shared 
understandings about war necessities - including the need to ‘‘separate the loyal from the 
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disloyal’’ elements of society - and about the court’s role in such circumstances: even if 
military discretion ought to be wide, it cannot be entirely  left without restraint; although civil 
liberties can be curtailed, they cannot be so arbitrarily, that is to say, without a reasonable 
basis. 
 These axioms of judicial action are largely  self-referential, leaving it to the court to 
determine what qualifies as excessive in one case and reasonable in the other. From this 
perspective, the opinion that went the furthest  in subverting the order of discourse in which 
the court operated can be attributed to Justice Robert  Jackson. Jackson argued for the court 
to altogether abstain from reviewing the constitutionality of the challenged actions. His 
position was not articulated out of deference for the executive or the military authorities, but 
out of fear for the power of legal rationalization that can be unleashed by judicial opinions. 
 A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military 
 emergency. Even during that period, a succeeding commander may revoke it all. But 
 once a  judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the 
 Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution 
 sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial 
 discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The 
 principle then lies about like a loaded weapon, ready  for the hand of any  authority 
 that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds 
 that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes. 
 All who observe the work of courts are familiar with what Judge Cardozo described 
 as ‘‘the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic.’’ A military 
 commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if 
 we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the 
 Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be 
 in its own image. Nothing better illustrates this danger than does the Court’s opinion 
 in this case.105
 Jackson’s opinion exposes a fundamental part of the dynamics at work when courts 
intervene: the fact  that constitutional discourse produces strong consolidation effects and 
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carries transformative power, such as turning a mere rationale into a legal principle. Mark 
Tushnet has inferred from this point that ‘‘it is better to have emergency powers exercised in 
an extraconstitutional way, so that everyone understands that the actions are extraordinary, 
than to have the actions rationalized away as consistent with the Constitution and thereby 
normalized.’’106 Jackson’s and Tushnet’s argument for leaving emergency measures outside 
the realm of constitutional discourse however largely presupposes that emergency is 
contained in time and that a clear separation can be drawn between regular seasons of peace 
and temporary days of crisis. 
 The desirability and risks of abstaining from judicial review in contexts which 
experience a protracted security crisis thus deserve to be interrogated. In his analysis of the 
Supreme Court of Israel’s rulings about the Occupied Territories, David Kretzmer raises the 
issue of whether the restraint imposed by  judicial scrutiny on the actions of military 
authorities has not paradoxically contributed to perpetuate the occupation by making it more 
acceptable: 
 Is it possible that in the medium or long term, the very lack of restraint  that would 
 have resulted from the absence of judicial review would have made the occupation 
 less palatable for Israeli elites, and that the pressure to end the occupation by political 
 settlement, which began after the Intifada started in 1987, would have been felt 
 much earlier?107 
 Although the present analysis’ approach to constitutionalism in South Korea is 
similarly  critical, it does not entail a normative assessment about what the court should have 
done. One of the reasons why the research refrains from this judgment stems from our belief 
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that courts such as the South Korean one and its Israeli counterpart may not have had the 
possibility to act much differently  than they did. Ultimately, the Constitutional Court of 
Korea indeed appears constrained by  the very nature of the paradox in which it has been 
caught: that of defining and defending the constitutional order when the foundations that it 
sets institutionalize a durable bias against certain segments of society. Undoing such bias 
alone may be, and remain, beyond the court’s reach. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Reviewing How the Enemy Is Treated
 Article 12
(1) All citizens shall enjoy personal liberty. No person shall be arrested, 
detained searched, seized or interrogated except as provided by Act. 
No person shall be punished, placed under preventive restrictions or 
subject to involuntary labor except  by Act  and through lawful 
procedures.
(2) No citizen shall be tortured or be compelled to testify against  himself 
in criminal cases.
(3) Warrants issued by a judge through due procedures upon the request 
of a prosecutor shall be presented in case of arrest, detention, seizure 
or search [...].
(4) Any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right to prompt 
assistance of counsel. When a criminal defendant  is unable to secure 
counsel by his own efforts, the State shall assign counsel for the 
defendant as prescribed by Act.
(5) No person shall be arrested or detained without  being informed of the 
reason thereof and of his rights to assistance of counsel [...]. 
(6) Any person who is arrested or detained, shall have the right  to request 
the court to review the legality of the arrest or detention.
(7) In a case where a confession is deemed to have been made against  a 
defendant’s will due to torture, violence, intimidation, unduly 
prolonged arrest, deceit or etc., or un a case where a confession is the 
only evidence against a defendant in a formal tribunal, such a 
confession shall not be admitted as evidence of guilt, nor shall a 
defendant be punished by reason of such confession.
The Constitution of the Republic of Korea
‘‘A democratic, freedom-loving society does not accept that  investigators use 
any means for the purpose of uncovering the truth [...]. At  times, the price of 
truth is so high that  a democratic society is not prepared to pay it. To the 
same extent  however, a democratic society, desirous of liberty seeks to fight 
crime and to that  end is prepared to accept  that an interrogation may infringe 
upon the human dignity and liberty of a suspect provided it is done for a 
proper purpose and that the harm does not exceed that  which is necessary 
[...] Our concern, therefore, lies in the clash of values and the balancing of 
conflicting values.’’
The Supreme Court of Israel, 1999
 This chapter is dedicated to the special procedures - or lack thereof - deployed 
against national security  suspects and defendants in the criminal justice process. The rulings 
delivered by the Constitutional Court of Korea in this area illustrate the firmness of its 
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commitment to impose the rule of law and to dismantle several of the authoritarian legacies 
associated with the criminal handling of national security, whose invocation is not construed 
by constitutional jurisprudence as a justification in front of which the rights of suspects and 
defendants always and automatically have to bend. Such activism demonstrates that the 
constitutional order which the South Korean court has sought to define and defend after 
1987 did not  amount to the preservation of the arbitrary  and discretionary practices 
associated with law enforcement institutions. The court’s attempt to undo these practices 
therefore complements our analysis of the paradoxical way in which it has embraced its role 
as guardian of the constitution: trying to reform some of the old regime’s remains, while 
reinforcing the non-inclusive bias of the transition to democracy.
Do enemies also have rights?
 Policies are usually administered far away from the place where they  were conceived 
and elaborated. As a result, they are not only  shaped by general rules and guidelines, but also 
by the local practices without which they would never be implemented. The actors to whom 
policy enforcement is delegated always enjoy some discretionary power, whether there exist 
or not effective mechanisms to ensure their compliance. The present chapter ventures into a 
variety of sites where the state’s power to punish operates locally and concretely: in 
interrogation rooms, police stations, and detention centers. These are the sites where 
essential aspects of the politics of enmity are effected through the actual encountering of two 
unequal parties: on the hand, state actors - such as investigators from intelligence agencies, 
police officers, public prosecutors, or prison staff - confronting; on the other hand, an 
individual suspected, accused, or convicted of national security offenses. 
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 The materiality of this encounter is almost palpable, taking place in a concrete space 
between particular actors whose relation is characterized by an imbalance of power. Its 
physicality  is reinforced by  the deprivation of liberty experienced by one of the two sides. In 
a democratic society, a defendant or culprit  however remains a person, that is to say, a 
subject endowed with rights. These rights constitute some of the guarantees meant to redress 
the asymmetry of power that marks the criminal process. They  are principally  enumerated in 
articles 12 and 27 of the South Korean constitution, affirming the right of habeas corpus (i.e. 
the right to have the legality of one’s arrest and detention reviewed), the presumption of 
innocence, the prohibition against torture, the right to counsel, the right to trial, as well as the 
obligation for all criminal procedures to be legal and lawful (i.e., the principles of rule of law 
and due process). Yet, the same constitution also permits that any  of the ‘‘freedoms and 
rights of citizens’’ be restricted ‘‘when necessary for national security.’’1  Therefore, the 
contours and limits of the criminal rights granted to suspected national security enemies are 
not clear, with South Korean law-enforcing actors having assumed the possibility of a 
systematic departure from common rules as soon as potential anti-state offenses are 
involved. Since the early 1990s, the Constitutional Court of Korea has played a critical role 
in clarifying the rights that apply ‘‘even for’’ or ‘‘except in’’ national security circumstances. 
The conditions and limits of the court’s activism against abuses of state power by  law 
enforcement institutions are the object of the present chapter. 
 In essence, the institution’s commitment to make the criminal process more fair, even 
for enemies, belongs to what this study identifies as the paradox of the court’s role since the 
1987 change of regime: while its jurisprudence has reinforced the post-transition relevance 
of inherited mechanisms of exclusion such as the National Security Act and the ideological 
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conversion policy, its decisions have also strived to undo a variety  of authoritarian legacies. 
This effort  has however met a fundamental obstacle, as the actors traditionally involved in 
the criminal process have constrained the effectivity of constitutional rulings. To understand 
the nature of the court’s relationship with the institutions in charge of confronting enemies, 
an overview of law-enforcing agencies’ development after the transition will first be 
provided.
Cycles of continuities at the level of national security actors
 In the South Korean constitution, the first constitutional guarantee against the state’s 
power to punish lies in its subordination to the rule of law and respect of due process 
throughout the criminal justice system. This obligation commands that ‘‘no person shall be 
arrested, detained, searched, seized or interrogated except as provided by Act’’ and following 
lawful procedures (article 12, section 1). As a result, ‘‘any  person who is arrested or 
detained, shall have the right to request the court to review the legality of the arrest or 
detention,’’ which forms the essence of the right of habeas corpus (article 12, section 6). 
Moreover, the burden of proof does not rest on the defendant but on the prosecution, which 
implies that ‘‘the accused shall be presumed innocent until a judgment of guilt has been 
pronounced’’ (article 27, section 4). In addition to these procedural safeguards, criminal 
defendants are recognized the right to be promptly  assisted by  counsel and the right to be 
informed that  they are entitled to receive such assistance (article 12, sections 4 and 5). The 
reason why an individual is arrested or detained also has to be communicated to him and his 
family, who ‘‘shall be notified without delay of the reason and time and place of the arrest or 
detention’’ (article 12, section7).  
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 A cardinal protection enshrined in the South Korean constitution is the prohibition 
against torture, which serves as a buffer between the state’s power and the individual’s body. 
It is aimed at preventing that  a suspect be coerced to commit self-incrimination: ‘‘No 
citizens shall be tortured or be compelled to testify against himself in criminal cases’’ (article 
12, section 2). This prohibition echoes how far the successive authoritarian regimes went in 
the depersonification of suspected or convicted criminals. The imbalance of power that 
characterizes the criminal process was then primarily manifested through an imbalance of 
forces. Although ‘‘the state did not adopt a ‘Chilean solution’ towards internal opponents, 
namely the physical liquidation through extra-judicial means of generously defined 
subversives,’’ its security  services were known for widely resorting to physical and 
psychological abuse.2  More specifically, mistreatments were part  of a quasi-systematic 
strategy to extract confessions on the basis of which sentences for violating security laws 
would be pronounced. As a result, the revised South Korean constitution contains detailed 
provisions about the use of confessions: 
 
 In a case where a confession is deemed to have been made against a defendant’s will 
 due to torture, violence, intimation, unduly prolonged arrest, deceit or etc., or in a 
 case where a confession is the only  evidence against a defendant in a formal trial, 
 such a confession shall not be admitted as evidence of guilt, nor shall a defendant be 
 punished by reason of such a confession.3
 
 In the aftermath of the transition, these lines could not be merely  read as a symbolic 
reminiscence of the abuses committed by the state and its agents in the past, but also as a 
horizon to urgently concretize. Indeed, political ruptures - such as South Korea’s 1987 
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democratization - do not usually  translate into immediate or momentous institutional change. 
The reform of institutional practices is always slow and difficult, a fortiori when they  are 
associated with law-enforcing actors embedded in the old regime’s repressive order and 
staying in place after the transition. In many respects, the type of change introduced by the 
enactment of new constitutional safeguards is only  superficial. It does not ensure that further 
legal reform will automatically ensue, as was for instance the case in Italy  where ‘‘fascist 
police laws remained on the books until the mid-1950s, effectively  obstructing legal popular 
protest and facilitating a wide range of police interventions.’’4 
 Even when legal reform takes place, it can prove incomplete and/or insufficient in 
prompting change. In South Korea, the Criminal Procedure Code (‘‘hyŏngsa sosongpŏp’’) 
was amended as soon as 1988 but still contained various legacies from the former regimes 
whose constitutionality  was subsequently challenged before the Constitutional Court of 
Korea. After 1987, core mechanisms of the authoritarian politics of enmity  were not 
abolished but only partly modified, such as the 1948 National Security  Act (revised in 1991 
following a decision of partial constitutionality), the 1975 Social Security Act (replaced in 
1989 by the Security  Surveillance Act and reviewed by the court in 2001), or the 1980 Social 
Protection Act (amended in 1989, a few months before some of its old provisions were found 
constitutionally invalid). The security apparatus itself did not undergo any  major 
transformation until 1994, when the National Security Planning Agency  Act (‘‘kukka anjŏn 
kihoekpu pŏp’’) was enacted following six years of tensions and negotiations between the 
opposition and the government.5
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The Agency for National Security Planning
 
 The Agency  for National Security  Planning (ANSP) was founded in 1981 in 
replacement of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), itself established in 1961 to 
centralize both domestic and international intelligence.6  In 1988, the Agency for National 
Security Planning was forced to remove its agents from a variety of public facilities, 
including the National Assembly, the Seoul Criminal Court, and the Supreme Court of 
Korea.7  Yet, the ANSP has remained deeply involved in domestic politics following 
democratization. Indeed, ‘‘the political imperative of controlling the transition in the 
interests of conservatives led to excessive ANSP involvement in the political process,’’ 
through collecting political funds in favor of the ruling party or heavily  intervening in its 
1992 presidential candidate selection process by pressuring unfavored aspirants.8 The reform 
of the agency in the mid-1990s aimed at better containing its role, and the ANSP was 
eventually transformed into the National Intelligence Service in 1999. Its functions still 
include ‘‘investigation into the crimes of insurrection and treason under the Criminal Act, 
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crimes of mutiny and illegal code use under the Military Criminal Act, crimes prescribed by 
the Military Secret Protection Act, and crimes provided for by the National Security Act.’’9 
The power to investigate crimes falling under the security  legislation’s article 7 (praising or 
sympathizing with an ‘‘anti-state organization’’) and article 10 (failing to inform the 
authorities of certain anti-state activities) was briefly withdrawn from the competences of the 
agency in 1994, before being reintroduced in late 1996.10
The National Police Agency
 When it comes to other law-enforcing actors, the ‘‘political impartiality of public 
officials’’ has been constitutionally guaranteed since 1960,11 but post-transition institutions 
have been seriously criticized for falling short from this ideal. In 1991, the National Police 
Agency did replace the National Security Headquarters (‘‘ch’ian ponbu’’), but the Police Act 
failed to realize the new organization’s complete structural autonomy from the Ministry of 
Interior (‘‘naemubu’’). As a result, 
 The chief of police was still a political appointment and the Korean police remains 
 susceptible to political pressure. Furthermore, citizens’ confidence in the police did 
 not improve because of the continuing police corruption and violations of citizens’ 
 civil rights. In a 1999 public opinion survey, more than one-half of the citizens 
 recognized police as the most corrupted organization.12
 
335
9 Article 3, section 1 of the National Intelligence Service Act. 
10 Jonathan Moran, ‘‘The Role of the Security Services in Democratization,’’ p.18.
11  Dae-Kyu Yoon,  Law and Political Authority in South Korea,  Boulder: Westview Press, Seoul: Kyungnam 
University Press, 1990, p.40.
12  Sanja Kutnjak Ivković and Wook Kang, ‘‘Police Integrity in South Korea,’’  Policing: An International 
Journal of Police Strategies and Management, Vol.35, No.1, 2012, p.77.
 Serious efforts to improve the police’s image and accountability  were only 
undertaken more than a decade after the change of regime. In 2000, a separate and 
independent unit, the Office of Hearing and Inspection (‘‘ch’ŏngmun kamsagwan’’), was 
established to investigate citizens’ complaints and reported acts of police misbehavior, 
implementing a zero-tolerance policy on corruption. Indeed, 
 Taking bribery, embezzlement of funds, and illegal arrest are the examples of 
 misconduct that would result in dismissal. The value of the item taken or accepted is 
 not relevant; officers disciplined for bribe acceptance are fired automatically, even if 
 the bribe amounts to a single dollar. There is a well-known case of a police officer 
 who took a bribe worth the equivalent of 5 dollars for not issuing a ticket. Once 
 officially processed, he was dismissed and arrested.13 
 Other highly symbolic, but less effective, initiatives were subsequently  promoted to 
enhance public trust  in the police, such as the 2005 creation of the Human Rights Committee 
of Police (‘‘kyŏngch’alch’ŏng inkwŏn wiwŏnhoe’’) and the Civilian Review Committee 
(‘‘min’gan simŭi wiwŏnhoe’’): ‘‘While the HRCP is entrusted to supervise police work 
related to human rights, such as arrest and confinement, the CRC is expected to investigate 
potential misconduct by  highly-ranked officers.’’14  The two are, however, mere advisory 
bodies lacking investigative capacities of their own. 
 One of the disputed issues around which police reform still gravitates comes from the 
institution’s claim for more autonomy vis-à-vis the prosecutors. Since 1954, prosecutors are 
legally  empowered to investigate crimes by directing the work of the police or conducting 
their own investigation. Contrary to judges, prosecutors are not independent from the 




hierarchical ties: ‘‘The prosecutor, functioning within the executive branch, is under the 
direct control of the Prosecutor General, through whom political pressure may  be applied.’’15 
As in most civil law jurisdictions, prosecutors and judges are however recruited through the 
same channel, a national judicial examination (‘‘sapŏp sihŏm’’), whose successful candidates 
have to attend for two years the Judicial Research and Training Institute (‘‘sapŏp 
yŏnsuwŏn’’) run by the Supreme Court of Korea. Until recently, Korean attorneys were also 
selected and trained through the same process, although traditionally a law student would 
first pass the judicial exam, serve as a judge or prosecutor, and then turn to private practice 
as an attorney.16
The prosecution
 Historically, prosecutors occupy a central place in the Korean criminal justice 
system: ‘‘The duties of prosecutorial office cover not only criminal investigation and 
indictment, but indeed the execution of a sentence as adjudged - a comprehensive power 
over criminal justice. Police in charge of criminal investigation are required by law to 
operate under the supervision of the prosecutor.’’17 This relation of subordination contrasts 
with the American system in which prosecutors can request that a crime be investigated but 
hold no authority  to monitor the investigation. In European civil law jurisdictions where the 
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criminal justice system is ‘‘inquisitorial,’’ by opposition to the ‘‘adversarial’’ system of the 
common law tradition, public prosecutors are actively involved in discovering the truth. 
However, the judicial investigation can either be ultimately supervised by an ‘‘investigating 
judge,’’ who also controls the judicial police for the search of evidence (as in France), or by 
a prosecutor who is absolutely independent (like in Italy).18 
 The diversity of prosecution systems is the product of singular historical trajectories 
weighing heavily  on both institutional structures and professional attitudes. In South Korea, 
law-enforcing actors were crucial supports of the repressive colonial and authoritarian orders 
for most of the 20th century. Since the democratization process started, the prerogatives of 
prosecutors have fallen precociously and consistently under the scrutiny of the constitutional 
court, in relation to national security crimes as well as ordinary  cases. This visibility of the 
prosecution in the court’s jurisprudence reflects the hegemony granted to prosecutors in the 
criminal process for decades. 
 The rulings of the court manifest  two types of concerns with the strength of 
prosecutorial powers: preventing their arbitrary  use against individual rights, and restoring 
the role of independent judges. Indeed, several post-1987 provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Act  still permitted prosecutors’ decisions to prevail over the authority of ordinary 
tribunals, thereby  undermining a number of principles associated with the fairness of 
criminal justice. Until 1992, if a first trial court or an appellate court determined to release a 
defendant, the person proven innocent could still be detained until the supreme court’s 
verdict, provided that the prosecutor had demanded the death penalty, a life sentence, or a 
prison sentence of at least ten years. Consequently, ‘‘many defendants used to live in 
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captivity until the Supreme Court’s final decision even after they  were acquitted or received 
suspension of punishment in the lower court,’’ which the Constitutional Court of Korea 
considered an excessive restriction of their freedom.19  Likewise, prosecutors could 
immediately challenge a judge’s decision to release an accused on bail until 1993, when the 
statute authorizing this form of prosecutorial ascendancy was struck down by  constitutional 
justices.20 
 Twenty-five years after South Korea’s change of regime, the reproduction of certain 
continuities can be attributed to particular organizational arrangements - such as 
prosecutors’ conspicuous lack of independence in sensitive cases - which cannot solely be 
‘‘broken by a complete generational turnover.’’21  Such continuities have been regularly 
denounced by constitutional jurisprudence. The possibility of resilient abuses, including 
torture, is registered in several of the court’s decisions. This potentiality is not merely 
theoretical as illustrated by  the 2002 case of a murder suspect who was tortured to death 
during his interrogation at the Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office. Indeed, as long as 
obtaining confessions remains a central method of investigation, the risk that law-enforcing 
actors resort to intimidation or violence will irreducibly  persist according to constitutional 
judges: 
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 As obtaining the confession of a suspect through interrogation is utilized as an 
 important method of investigation, there is an increased possibility that the human 
 rights of the suspect might be infringed during such process.22 
 Disagreements however exist within the court about whether the existing 
constitutional safeguards (prohibition against  torture and self-incrimination, right to counsel, 
etc.) and the current legislative framework represent a sufficient and effective protection 
against potential abuses. These very concerns over violence by government officials in 
general, and the use of confessions in particular, are far from being specific to the context of 
post-1987 South Korea or transitioning societies in general. Similar issues were for example 
at stake before the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1960s. In its notorious Miranda v. Arizona 
decision of 1966, the court held that confessions obtained during police interrogation are not 
admissible in a trial unless the suspect has been ‘‘clearly informed’’ of his right to remain 
silent and be assisted by a lawyer. 
 The person in custody  must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the 
 right to remain silent, and that  anything he says will be used against him in court; he 
 must be clearly  informed that he has the right to consult  with a lawyer and to have 
 the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be 
 appointed to represent him. [...] If the individual indicates in any manner, at  any  time 
 prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must 
 cease. [...] If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must 
 cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an 
 opportunity to confer with the attorney  and to have him present during any 
 subsequent questioning.23
 
 This ruling was part of a series of cases mostly decided by the Warren Court - thus 
named after Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953-1969) - and described as having engendered a 
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‘‘criminal rights revolution’’ in the American legal system. Change indeed spread in four 
directions: tightening the rules for police’s search and seizure,24 while defending the rights of 
criminal defendants,25 juvenile defendants,26 and prison inmates.27 This so-called court-led 
‘‘revolution’’ was not however solely  the deed of nine justices. The sites which came under 
the scrutiny  of the court were brought before it as the result of strategic litigation, especially 
due to the activism of mobilized civil society groups.28 In South Korea, corresponding sites 
(interrogation rooms, police stations, prison facilities) have also reached the constitutional 
court since it began to operate in the late 1980s. One mechanism in particular appears to 
have been associated with this accessibility and activated by associations such as Minbyun 
(‘‘Lawyers for a Democratic Society’’) in national security cases: the opportunity for anyone 
who claims that his or her basic right has been infringed to file a direct constitutional 
complaint.
From interrogation rooms, police stations, and prison cells to the constitutional court
 The existence of protective constitutional provisions does not guarantee that a 
criminal defendant will be treated as a person endowed with rights, especially when it comes 
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to national security  cases. This is not only because general rules and local practices always 
diverge, but because most constitutions provide that  the rights they recognize may be 
restricted when justified. Article 37, section 2 of the South Korean constitution establishes 
the ground for such limitation: 
 The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by Act only when necessary for 
 national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare. Even when 
 such restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be 
 violated. 
 In practice, derogations from the ordinary  criminal process have been extensive in 
South Korean national security cases. Since the early  1990s, the constitutional court has been 
importantly involved in shaping the contours and limits of the rights that individuals can 
claim when they are suspected, accused, or convicted of crimes against the state. The court’s 
activism on this issue has been part  of a broader jurisprudential trend toward strengthening 
the protection of individual rights against violations taking place in interrogation rooms, 
police stations, and detention facilities. Before outlining the main patterns of South Korea’s 
constitutional approach to the means available against enemies, it is necessary to consider 
how such cases were able to reach the court in the first  place, a prerequisite for its role to 
unfold.    
 As described in chapter two, the main channel for cases to be brought before the 
Constitutional Court of Korea consists of the mechanism of constitutional complaints. Its 
workings were however only progressively elaborated, demonstrating that institutional 
design rarely proceeds through a straightforward path that would be laid out in advance, 
once and for all. This echoes the argument that institutional outcomes seldom are the 
intended product of reforms, which is one of the core lessons drawn by Gretchen Helmke 
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and Julio Ríos-Figueroa from their comparative study of courts in Latin America. The 
unanticipated success of the Constitutional Court of Korea in general, and of its mechanism 
of direct complaints in particular, appears analogous to the trajectory of the Constitutional 
Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court analyzed in Helmke and Ríos-Figueroa’s 
volume by Bruce Wilson. Indeed,
 [A]lthough the powers granted to Costa Rica’s new Constitutional Court in 1989 
 would prove to be among the most far reaching for any Latin American high court, 
 Wilson argues that at the time, no one, including the politicians who passed the 
 reforms, comprehended their magnitude. Very quickly, however, the court came to 
 occupy  a central role, both in moderating interbranch conflict and in advancing 
 individual rights. Among the most important institutional changes underpinning this 
 rights revolution were the chamber’s operating rules for standing. As we mentioned 
 earlier, that anyone at  any time can file a claim before the constitutional chamber 
 created, in Wilson’s language, a significant new legal opportunity for multiple actors 
 to turn to the court to resolve conflicts.29 
 A comparably  broad legal opportunity also exists in South Korea, where it was 
gradually consolidated by the constitutional court rather than granted from the beginning. As 
a matter of fact, the revised constitution of 1987 only nominally introduced constitutional 
complaints in the jurisdiction of the new court, without specifying any details about the 
scope of the procedure.30 This gap was partly filled by section 5 of the 1988 Constitutional 
Court Act, which regulates the adjudication of constitutional complaints and outlines both 
the causes for request and conditions for admissibility. Following article 68, section 1 of the 
Constitutional Court Act,
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 Any person who claims that his basic right which is guaranteed by the Constitution 
 has been violated by  an exercise or non-exercise of governmental power may file a 
 constitutional complaint, except the judgments of the ordinary courts, with the 
 Constitutional Court: Provided, That if any relief process is provided by  other laws, 
 no one may file a constitutional complaint without having exhausted all such 
 processes.
 Several requirements therefore condition the admissibility  of a request. First of all, a 
complaint must have an admissible cause, that is to say, be based upon the infringement of a 
basic right by ‘‘an exercise or non-exercise of governmental power,’’ notions left  undefined 
and therefore potentially  open to various interpretations. Second, a ruling by an ordinary 
court cannot be construed as an ‘‘exercise or non exercise’’ of state power which can be 
challenged through a constitutional petition. Third, a complaint must only be filed after all 
available remedies have been exhausted. Taken together, these last two constraints ‘‘led 
many to believe that in reality  the range of state power amenable to constitutional complaints 
would be extremely limited.’’31 An additional procedural requirement is to abide by the time 
frame fixed in article 69, section 1 of the Constitutional Court Act: a complaint must be filed 
‘‘within ninety days after the existence of the cause is known, and within one year after the 
cause occurs,’’ or, if other remedies have to be exhausted, ‘‘within thirty  days after the final 
decision in the processes is notified.’’ Eventually, counsel has to be appointed for a written 
request to be addressed to the court.32 Failing to meet one of the above conditions technically 
leads to the immediate dismissal of the case. 
 Practically, a constitutional complaint can be filed and deposited at the court’s 
‘‘Public Service Center’’ (‘‘miwŏnsil’’) - where request forms are available and staff 
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assistance is provided - or online since 2002. The relative simplicity of the filing process is 
part of a sustained effort by the court to make constitutional justice more accessible. This 
effort is reflected in the institution’s expansive construction of the justiciable interests 
admissible for constitutional complaints. Indeed, the opening section of the court’s rulings is 
always dedicated to reviewing whether the legal prerequisites of the case are fulfilled, which 
includes confirming the existence of a justiciable interest. An important dimension of this 
phase is to check that  the petitioner ‘‘directly’’ and ‘‘presently’’ suffers an infringement of 
his or her own basic right.
 Since the early 1990s, the court  has however considered it possible to review the 
constitutionality of a situation which no longer exists, provided that the issue raised by the 
complaint is critical for the defense and maintenance of the constitutional order, and that the 
alleged violation is likely to recur. As a result, the court uses variations of the following 
standard formula to review complaints challenging past infringements of basic rights :
 [A] constitutional complaint has not only  a subjective function of providing relief but 
 also an objective function of defending and maintaining the constitutional order. 
 Even if the subjective justiciable interest has evaporated during the review, when the 
 infringement on the basic rights is likely to repeat and its resolution has an important 
 meaning for the defense and maintenance of the constitutional order, our Court has 
 by precedent recognized the justiciable interest.
 The substance of the above reasoning was first articulated in a 1991 minority opinion 
written by Byun Jeong-soo, the judge in favor of declaring article 7 of the National Security 
Act unconstitutional a year before, and Cho Kyu-kwang, president of the constitutional court 
at the time. The case in which they dissented together was triggered by  the constitutional 
complaint of three suspects detained in police custody for violating the National Security 
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Act.33 Their complaint was filed on the ground that investigators from the judicial police and 
the Agency  for National Security  Planning, in charge of investigating crimes falling under 
the NSA, had prevented them from meeting with a lawyer in the course of their detention. A 
majority  of justices dismissed the request, holding that the right of a suspect or defendant in 
custody to meet with his attorney was not a matter for constitutional review. 
 On the contrary, President Cho and Justice Byun affirmed that the right at stake was 
constitutionally  protected. Moreover, they defended that the case should be reviewed even 
though the infringement had ceased, given the significance of clarifying the scope of the 
right to counsel and the ‘‘danger that its violation would be repeated’’ (‘‘panbok 
wihŏmsŏng’’).34 The arguments then put forth by the minority to permit the review of past 
abuses have since become the common justification for the court to adjudicate complaints 
challenging infringements on basic rights committed in police stations, interrogation rooms, 
or detention centers, but only  reported after the concerned individuals were no longer held 
by law-enforcing actors.
 Early on, the court has thus adopted a broad conception of justiciable interests for 
complaints, thereby contributing to the accessibility  of constitutional justice in post-
transition South Korea. The institution has also affirmed itself in this direction by 
progressively  determining and extending the scope of the violations defined as ‘‘an exercise 
or non-exercise of governmental power.’’ While judgments rendered by ordinary tribunals 
are statutorily  excluded from this scope, the court has included in it a variety  of executive or 
administrative decisions and behaviors. For instance, the justices ruled in 1989 that  they 
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could declare unconstitutional a prosecutor’s arbitrary  decision not to indict a suspect.35  In 
1992, the court considered a proper subject of review the conduct of six agents from the 
Agency for National Security Planning who attended a visit between a suspect and his 
attorney, an issue which had been dismissed a few months earlier.36 This 1992 ruling is both 
a generative and illustrative case, shedding light upon the Constitutional Court of Korea’s 
approach to the means used by law-enforcing institutions to confront enmity, and 
highlighting the contours and limits of the rights recognized by the court to suspected anti-
state criminals.  
Contours and limits of enemies’ criminal rights: a case-study of the right to assistance 
of counsel, even for national security suspects
National security left in the background 
 One of the fundamental issues that the constitutional court has had to resolve since its 
creation has been to clarify  the rights recognized to criminal defendants and convicts, and on 
several occasions to determine whether these rights also applied in national security cases. 
The matters on which it has pronounced itself over the years include the right to counsel 
(1992 and 2004), the authorized length of police and prosecutorial custody (1992 and 1997), 
the right to access criminal records (1997), or the use of physical restraints during 
interrogation (2005). These rights are closely tied to the investigative practices of 
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prosecutors and officers from the Agency for National Security Planning (renamed the 
National Intelligence Service in 1999).  
 On June 14, 1991, a suspect arrested for violation of the National Security Act and 
detained in a police station received a one-hour visit from his wife and attorney. The meeting 
was attended by  six agents from the Agency for National Security Planning, who not only 
listened to the conversation but took notes and pictures during the exchange. The lawyer 
objected to their conduct, and demanded that the visit stopped being attended and recorded, 
to which the ANSP agents responded that he and his client should feel free to talk as much as 
they  wanted. Upon being released, the former suspect filed a constitutional complaint on the 
ground that the agents’ behavior had infringed on his right to be assisted by  counsel, which is 
protected by article 12, section 4 of the South Korean constitution. His case was brought 
before the court and defended by attorneys from Minbyun, including Lee Seok-tae [Yi Sŏk-
tae], one of the founders of the association and its secretary-general at the time.37 
 A few months later, the constitutional court rendered a decision which is considered a 
landmark of its jurisprudence on the protection of citizens’ criminal rights. Contrary to their 
majority  verdict in an earlier ruling, the nine justices agreed this time that the issue raised 
was of constitutional nature and that the petition could be reviewed. Although the right 
allegedly violated was no longer being infringed upon, they  derived the existence of an 
‘‘objective justiciable interest’’ from the risk that the violation be repeated and the 
importance of clarifying the right to counsel for the constitutional order. Judging on the 
merits, the court unanimously  held that the presence of investigators from the Agency for 
National Security  Planning, or any other ‘‘government agent’’ (‘‘kongmuwŏn’’), at a meeting 
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taking place between a lawyer and his or her detained client was an unconstitutional exercise 
of state power.
 The right to assistance of counsel guaranteed by Article 12 Section 4 is intended to 
 protect the suspects and defendants, presumed innocent, from various evils arising 
 out of the fact of incarceration and to make sure that the incarceration does not 
 exceed the scope of its purposes. Therefore, assistance of counsel means sufficient 
 assistance. The indispensable content of right to assistance of counsel is the 
 detainee’s right to communicate and visit with his attorney. In order to provide 
 sufficient guarantee of that right, the confidentiality  of the contents of the 
 conversations must be completely protected, and the detainee and attorney must be 
 allowed to freely  converse with each other free of any limitation, influence, coercion, 
 undue interference. Such free visit will be possible only when it takes place outside 
 the presence of a correction officer, an investigator, or any concerned government 
 agent.38
 The court derived from this reasoning the momentous conclusion that national 
security  could not be invoked to restrict the right of a suspect or defendant held in custody 
to freely meet with his or her lawyer.
 This right to free visit with his attorney is the most important part of a detainee’s 
 right to assistance of counsel and cannot be restricted even for reason of national 
 security, maintenance of order or public welfare.39
 In the ten-page long Korean version of the ruling, the above fragment appeared 
twice.40 No other mention of national security was made throughout the text, except when 
the judgment referred to the Agency for National Security  Planning, which was also the 
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respondent in this case (seven mentions), and the National Security Act, for the alleged 
violation of which the petitioner was held in custody (two mentions). The above conclusion 
therefore masked that national security was only  marginally  evoked in the reasoning, even 
though the case stemmed from the complaint of a former suspect detained under the National 
Security Act. 
 In other words, the ruling did not primarily  rest on balancing the constitutional 
interest in protecting national security versus the basic right to counsel. The two were not 
explicitly weighed against each other as the former was largely  ignored throughout the 
decision. This led to the creation of a paradoxical legal stage, one on which an issue raised in 
a national security context was extracted from its original background to be considered in a 
more neutral light. 
The case’s significance
 A major implication resulting from the decision was that even individuals who have 
potentially committed anti-state crimes should be presumed innocent and protected from the 
‘‘various evils arising out of the fact of incarceration’’ identified by the constitutional court. 
While some of these ‘‘evils’’ (‘‘p’yehae’’) were treated as unavoidable - such as experiencing 
‘‘psychological disorders’’ (‘‘anxiety, fear, despair, worry’’) and suffering material or social 
costs (including a loss of income or having one’s reputation harmed) - the court reasoned 
that the risk of being tortured and coerced to make a confession could only be effectively 
prevented if the suspect or defendant was sufficiently assisted by counsel, that is to say, able 
to consult with his or her lawyer free of any state interference.41 
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 The significance of the case from the viewpoint of suspected national security 
offenders was not however the one upon which the constitutional court insisted in its ruling. 
The ‘‘focalization’’ it adopted was a much more inclusive one, encompassing all criminal 
suspects and defendants as the targeted beneficiaries of the judgment. National security was 
only dealt with marginally, as illustrated by  the extreme infrequency  of the term’s mention in 
the ruling. Instead, the perspective embraced by the court was the fairness of the criminal 
justice system in general, and not the rights of potential anti-state enemies in particular. 
 The lasting substratum of this 1992 ruling in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court of Korea is that  national security  considerations neither systematically  nor 
automatically outweigh individual basic rights. Yet, the two are not  openly balanced in most 
of the court’s decisions on issues related to the criminal process. In the case at hand, 
‘‘national security reasons’’ were left  unspecified. The anti-state crimes allegedly committed 
by the petitioner were also silenced in the court’s presentation of the case’s background. As a 
result, the focus of the reasoning was entirely shifted away from the issue of national 
security, while defining the rights of potential enemies appeared only construed as the 
discreet wellspring and veiled horizon of the ruling. 
 Making national security considerations irrelevant could nonetheless be in itself a 
strong message sent by constitutional judges to law-enforcing actors. It may have been the 
clearest possible refutation against their assumption that investigating anti-state activities 
mechanically fell outside the rules of the ordinary criminal system. Seen in this light, the 
justices’ priority was to undo the ‘‘national security  blanket provision’’ which has 
characterized South Korean authoritarian regimes, that is to say, the systematic resort to 
exceptional rules - or lack of - as soon as loosely defined ‘‘national security reasons’’ were 
invoked. In the case about the right to counsel, the judges essentially  considered national 
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security irrelevant and marginal to the issue of whether suspects and defendants could meet 
with their attorney free of governmental interference. 
 Still, while the right to meet with one’s attorney  without governmental interference 
cannot be restricted ‘‘even for’’ national security reasons, it  should not be deduced from it 
that other criminal rights may not be limited when such considerations come into play. For 
instance, the court held unanimously that the investigation of serious national security  crimes 
justified a possible extension of the period spent by a suspect in police and prosecutorial 
custody before being formally charged with a crime (the regular period is thirty days, the 
extended period under the National Security  Act reaches fifty days).42 Other criminal rights, 
such as the right to access one’s criminal records, can also be restricted under national 
security circumstances, but their limitation is not  permitted just because law-enforcing actors 
carry suspicions that an anti-state crime has been committed.43 
 Moreover, even rights supposedly insensitive to national security reasons cannot be 
considered as absolute and are instead susceptible of being curtailed. Such pliancy was 
demonstrated for the right to counsel by  a follow-up case to the initial 1992 ruling. This 
more recent ruling, decided in 2004, built on the 1992 precedent to extend the right  to 
counsel for suspects or defendants who are not in custody. However, the decision also made 
clear that there could exist circumstances under which the right of a suspect to be assisted by 
a lawyer would be limited: for instance, when consultation with the attorney ‘‘obstructs the 
suspect interrogation or divulges the investigatory secrets.’’44
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 The lessons which can be drawn from the judgment on the right to counsel are many 
and confirmed by a broader selection in the Constitutional Court of Korea’s jurisprudence. 
First of all, the case is useful to study the conditions under which the court has proved 
assertive, shaping the criminal rights of suspected national security  enemies against the 
practices of law-enforcing actors. The early and sustained assertiveness of the court in this 
area first needs to be analyzed in light of a broader scheme of interactions with other actors. 
Indeed, it is a core assumption of the realist  literature to see judicial action as bounded by 
important strategic constraints deriving from the fact that ‘‘constitutional courts and their 
jurisprudence are integral elements of a larger political setting.’’45  As a result, courts in 
general - and especially such a young institution as the Constitutional Court of Korea in the 
early 1990s - are expected to demonstrate caution and deference on issues salient for the 
political branches and likely  to ignite an adverse reaction if the court rules against the other 
powers’ preferences. Matters relating to national security policy are thought to 
paradigmatically fall within this category. 
 While defining the contours of enemies’ rights is always controversial, the 
Constitutional Court of Korea has largely displaced its jurisprudence away from this perilous 
ground. As a result, one of the factors behind the court’s activism could be its avoidance of 
the contentious potential of the cases it had to decide. Instead, the court has chosen to 
construe these cases as raising a set of general procedural challenges in the context of South 
Korean criminal justice’s post-authoritarian reform. In doing so, the constitutional court  has 
not acted alone but in cooperation with the rest of the legal profession (including national 
security suspects’ lawyers) and with the judiciary  (most importantly  the supreme court). Yet, 
and despite this alliance, a verdict is not sufficient in itself to make change happen, 
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especially when it comes to transforming the behaviors of law-enforcing institutions and the 
inertias inherent to the repressive apparatus.46  Resistances to comply with judicial rulings 
have therefore posed a major limit to the constitutional court’s ability to shape the criminal 
procedures deployed to deal with enemies. 
 Finally, constraints on judicial action are not only coming from relations between the 
court and other actors. The intervention of modern courts is also inherently  bounded by their 
commitment to protect both the constitutional and physical integrity of the state. This 
commitment does not preclude them from controlling the concrete policies and means 
through which enemies are confronted, but it does circumscribe the possibilities which are 
theirs in doing so. For instance, the Constitutional Court of Korea’s recognition that criminal 
rights do not necessarily recede for national security reasons does not imply  that basic rights 
are construed as limitless. On the contrary, the absence of rights’ absolutism constitutes a 
fundamental characteristic and invariant of judicial discourse, no matter the type of decisions 
examined. In other words, even rulings regarded as progressive jurisprudential landmarks 
operate within this discursive boundary and therefore bear ambivalent effects, such as 
consolidating the constitutional readiness to prevent rights from being used in the wrong 
way. 
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Premises and consequences of the court’s intervention 
 i. Conditions for assertiveness: reframing the stakes
 The 1992 ruling on the right to counsel highlights a number of conditions which have 
allowed the Constitutional Court of Korea to be assertive on procedural issues raised in 
relation to national security cases. Interestingly, these issues have not been construed as 
affecting the criminal rights of enemies - which they nonetheless did - but as concerning the 
general fairness of criminal justice in post-1987 South Korea. The court’s assertiveness 
seems to have been permitted by the relatively non-polemical nature of the claims thus 
framed, that is to say, removed from the ground of a debate about enemies. Instead, criminal 
rights were discussed in light of the necessity to realize the principles of rule of law and due 
process for all suspects, defendants, and offenders after the transition. This displacement did 
not mean that the issues at hand were absolutely uncontroversial - otherwise they would not 
have been the object of a judicial dispute to begin with - but it  apparently contributed to 
successful litigation in favor of protecting the criminal rights of anyone in South Korea. 
 It should be emphasized that the controversial or uncontroversial character of a given 
legal question does not stem from any essence that would be attached to it. Procedural 
matters are not ontologically consensual, or less contentious, than other legal issues or 
dimensions in the politics of enmity. For instance, the Guantánamo cases adjudicated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court between 2004 and 2008 were part of a deep struggle over the scope of 
the habeas corpus rights available to the ‘‘enemy combatants’’ detained in the camp. This 
struggle took place between the court and the political branches, within the judiciary, as well 
as among American society more broadly (or at least its academic and intellectual circles). 
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The supreme court  first faced the puzzle of deciding whether prisoners, held at  Guantánamo 
without charges, could have the legality of their detention reviewed. After having settled this 
question in the affirmative for both U.S. citizens and foreigners, the court also had to 
determine the appropriateness of the review process open for them to challenge their 
internment. Those were, and still are, procedural issues of a paramount political sensitivity.
 The issue of the legal treatment due to national security  suspects and offenders is a 
priori no less disputed in South Korea. As a result, the advances that  were promoted by the 
constitutional court against  the existing framework and the practices of law-enforcing actors 
were probably made possible because they were not claimed from the viewpoint  of enemies’ 
rights. On the contrary, the cases brought before the court by  individuals apprehended for 
alleged violations of the National Security Act were adjudicated from the standpoint of the 
overall fairness of the criminal justice system. As argued by  the court to justify its ruling on 
the right to counsel, ‘‘our practices, laws, and rules concerning investigation and execution 
of punishment have not reflected properly  the constitutional ideals in criminal 
procedures.’’47
 An important indicator of non-controversy displayed in this case was the unanimous 
vote of the justices. Of course, this absence of rift only concerned the court and not 
necessarily forces outside its walls. While unanimous decisions are far from being prevalent 
in the jurisprudence of the court, they have been quite frequent when it comes to distortions 
of due process principles: protecting the right to meet with one’s attorney, guaranteeing the 
presumption of innocence, or restoring the imbalance of powers between prosecutors and 
judges. A second, but maybe greater, indicator of non-controversy in these cases rests on the 
fact that  the constitutional court has not been acting on its own, but in alliance with the 
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supreme court. Here again, the convergence of both courts is not a rule governing their 
interactions. 
 On the contrary, the two have been more rivals than partners struggling for 
institutional preeminence throughout the 1990s. Moreover, the South Korean supreme court 
is not particularly known for being a progressive actor. For instance, it has long resisted the 
restrictive interpretation of article 7 of the National Security Act advocated by the 
constitutional court  in 1990. Despite these divergences, the two courts seem to have joined 
efforts in the interest of promoting the fairness of criminal justice - and, by  the same token, 
their role as relevant institutions in the new democratic order. By the time the constitutional 
court ruled against governmental interferences with a detained suspect or defendant’s right to 
freely meet with an attorney, the supreme court had already stepped in related matters on at 
least two occasions.
 In two National Security  Act violation cases [settled in 1990], the Supreme Court [...] 
 made landmark decisions, which may be called the Korean version of Massiah. In 
 these cases, the defendants requested to meet with their attorney when they were 
 detained but the National Security  Planning Agency officers rejected their request. 
 Then the defendants were referred to and interrogated by the prosecutor. The Court 
 held that ‘‘the limitation of the right to meet and communicate with counsel violates 
 the constitutionally  guaranteed basic right, so the illegally obtained confession of the 
 suspect should be excluded, and the exclusion means a substantial and complete 
 exclusion.’’48
 The very timing of these assertive decisions by both courts, rendered in the early 
1990s, probably acted as a source of judicial activism rather than restraint. Criminal rights 
represented an important, yet  limited, arena where to challenge some of the most 
conspicuous legacies of authoritarianism, sustained by the practices of law-enforcing actors 
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as well as unmodified legislative provisions. The national security  dimension of the cases 
before both the supreme and constitutional courts was largely eschewed, receding in the 
background of facts. As a result, the rulings became about criminal rights in general, 
allowing their incidental recognition ‘‘even for’’ those suspected of anti-state crimes under 
the National Security Act. This consequential effect was not dealt with frontally. A decision 
such as the one on the right to counsel featured no reasoning about the rights of enemies.  
 Such silence may  have been more than a form of strategic muteness on the part  of 
judicial institutions or a ruse to rule about enemies without saying so. Instead, it can be 
postulated that the courts actually pronounced themselves upon what they wanted to, namely 
persistent distortions of due process principles across the South Korean criminal system. 
Discarding national security was also in itself a strong response to law-enforcing and 
intelligence agencies’ own abuse of the notion. As will be explored later in the chapter, the 
courts’ assertiveness on certain criminal matters did not mean however that all pre-1987 
legacies were censored, nor that rights were now construed as worthy of absolute protection. 
It did not imply either that any issue related to reforming the past could be framed in a non-
controversial light. 
 Therefore, what the Constitutional Court  of Korea has done in relation to criminal 
rights illustrates the paradox in which the institution has been caught in playing its role as 
guardian of the constitutional order: although the court has reinforced the relevance and 
validity  of national security  tools, it has also tried to undo a variety of authoritarian legacies 
and reflexes attached to them. These two dimensions do not contradict each other. Indeed, 
constitutional jurisprudence’s effort to bring security  instruments into conformity with the 
requisites of the rule of law has contributed to ensure their compatibility with the new 
democratic order. The court’s attempt at uprooting some authoritarian remains has 
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nonetheless yielded an additional effect: that  of igniting adverse reactions from the law-
enforcing institutions.       
 ii. Limits in terms of enforcement: resistances to judicial verdicts
 The 1992 decision on the right to counsel did not merely  declare unconstitutional the 
behavior of the investigators from the Agency for National Security Planning, who attended 
a meeting between a detained national security suspect and his attorney. The ruling also 
struck down a provision of the Criminal Administration Act (‘‘haenghyŏngpŏp’’) permitting 
that a correction officer be present at the visits received by detainees pending appeals or trial. 
The provision was eventually revised by the National Assembly, but only  three years after 
the court’s verdict was pronounced and on a minimal basis.49 Both the constitutional ruling 
and the delayed legislative revision which ensued have however failed to put a close to the 
issue of defining the right to counsel’s scope. Indeed, neither of them has been interpreted by 
law-enforcing actors as implying that lawyers were authorized to participate in interrogation. 
 The momentum for reform in this direction was only  built after the 2002 revelation 
that a murder suspect had been tortured to death during interrogation in the Seoul District 
Prosecutors’ Office.50 In the wake of the ‘‘incident,’’ the Ministry of Justice introduced new 
regulations allowing counsel’s participation during interrogation, while providing for many 
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exceptions under which assistance could be refused. The opportunity was in particular 
denied to alleged offenders of the National Security Act, until the Supreme Court of Korea 
determined otherwise. In 2003, the supreme court recognized that the ‘‘right to have a 
lawyer present during interrogation’’ was nowhere to be explicitly found - neither in the 
constitution, nor in the Code of Criminal Procedure - but nonetheless concluded that the 
‘‘participation should be allowed from the standpoint of ‘due process’ principles.’’ In 
addition, the high court defined ‘‘much narrower exceptions not to permit counsel’s 
participation,’’ holding that restrictions should be only  possible ‘‘when there is probable 
cause that the counsel would ‘obstruct interrogation’ or ‘leak the secret of investigation.’ ’’51 
 According to Cho Kuk, this decision of the supreme court eventually implemented 
the Korean version of Miranda, the 1966 ruling which set the requirements for statements 
made during an interrogation to be admissible as evidence in a trial.52 Specifically, the U.S. 
Supreme Court determined in Miranda that statements made without the person under arrest 
being informed of his or her rights could not be used in a trial, in virtue of the Fifth 
Amendment’s prescription that no person ‘‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against  himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.’’53  While the South Korean constitution provides that statements obtained through 
‘‘torture, violence, intimidation, unduly prolonged arrest, deceit, or etc.’’ are inadmissible, 
the Korean supreme court added that such statements cannot be taken into account if a 
defendant has not been informed of his right to remain silent (1992) and to have an attorney 
present during interrogation (2003). 
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 Resistances by law-enforcing institutions to put into effect these protections, 
theoretically guaranteed even in national security  cases, have represented a major and 
enduring impediment to the post-transition efforts at reforming criminal justice. Yet, the 
possibilities of the courts to regulate the means used against enemies have also been limited 
in another way. Indeed, even decisions which uphold basic rights and define them 
expansively contribute to construe them as never being absolute.   
 iii. Limits in terms of discursive effects: no unlimited basic rights
 In 1992, the constitutional court upheld the right to assistance of counsel for a 
suspect or defendant  held in custody, no matter whether national security reasons could be 
invoked or not. In 2004, the justices were presented with the issue to determine whether this 
right also applied to a suspect or defendant interrogated without being in custody. A majority 
of six justices answered this last question in the affirmative, apparently consecrating an 
unlimited right to counsel for all suspects and defendants regardless of the case’s 
circumstances.54  While extending the reach of the right to counsel, the ruling did not 
however construe it as entirely absolute. This should not come as a surprise for it confirms 
that the absence of rights’ absolutism constitutes a fundamental characteristic and invariant 
of judicial discourse, no matter the type of decisions examined. In other words, even rulings 
regarded as progressive jurisprudential landmarks operate within this discursive boundary, 
accepting the premise that basic rights can always be restricted. In the context of this 
chapter, progressive decisions can be defined as strengthening procedural rights even for 
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national security defendants or criminals. Yet, such rights are not unlimited. Curtailment can 
always take place, provided that there is a strong justification for it. 
 Indeed, the more a right is protected, the stronger the justification has to be to alter it. 
In its 1992 and 2004 jurisprudence on the right to counsel, the Constitutional Court  of Korea 
argued that  the subsumption of a case under the category of ‘‘anti-state crime’’ did not 
constitute a sufficient justification for restricting legal assistance, including attorney’s 
participation to interrogation. Yet, the court never reasoned that enemies were strictly 
entitled to the same due process rights as ordinary suspects - which they are not.55 Moreover, 
the constitutional court  did recognize the possibility to restrict  attorney’s participation during 
interrogation. Following the standard defined by the supreme court, assistance is permitted 
unless ‘‘it obstructs the suspect interrogation or divulges the investigatory secrets.’’
 Here, even though the right to have an attorney present and to seek the advice and the 
 consultation of the attorney  during the suspect interrogation directly applies to the 
 criminal procedure as an essential content of the right to assistance of counsel, the 
 above advice and consultation is not permitted when it obstructs the suspect 
 interrogation or divulges the investigatory secrets. This is because the right to obtain 
 the assistance of counsel by  way of advice and consultation means the right to obtain 
 ‘‘lawful’’ assistance of the attorney, and not the right to obtain unlawful assistance as 
 well.56 
 Interestingly, the above 2004 ruling cannot be considered as the ‘‘repressive’’ 
corrective of the initial 1992 decision. Instead, both decisions firmly  contributed to advance 
the criminal rights of suspects and defendants. Still, they also exemplify  that  basic rights are 
never conceived as absolute, even by progressive decisions. The possibility of curtailment 
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may not always be explicitly  stated, but it is embedded in judicial discourse. This shared and 
invariant element of discursivity does not mean that there cannot be disagreements about 
rights’ scope, but it shifts the locus of where such disagreements occur. Indeed, while basic 
rights are never absolute, there can always be divergences about whether or not the concrete 
restrictions imposed on them are legitimate and reasonable.   
 Two methods of judicial reasoning can be used to formulate criteria to restrict basic 
rights: the determination of an exception to a rule (a method generally adopted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court) or the balancing between conflicting constitutional interests (a method 
prominently  used by the German constitutional court, the Israeli supreme court, or the 
European Court of Human Rights).57  As the Constitutional Court of Korea selectively 
borrows from different legal traditions (especially from both the European model, after 
which it  was shaped, and the influential American doctrine), it has alternatively  resorted to 
the two methods, although it now defines the systematic application of balancing - through 
the ‘‘proportionality test’’ - as a source of greater legal rigor.58 
 In the 2004 case on the right to counsel outside custody, the majority defended the 
possibility to restrict this fundamental right based on a ‘‘rule and exception to the rule’’ mode 
of analysis: the right is always guaranteed except if there is a risk of ‘‘unlawful 
assistance’’ (obstruction of the interrogation, divulgation of investigatory  secrets, etc.). This 
type of reasoning characterizes American jurisprudence. For instance, the Miranda decision 
of 1966 established that a suspect’s statements to the police or other investigative actors are 
not admissible as evidence in a trial if the suspect has not been warned prior to interrogation 
of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by a lawyer. In its New York v. Quarles ruling 
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of 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court however introduced a ‘‘public safety exception’’ to 
Miranda, permitting that unwarned statements be admissible as evidence in a trial when 
there exists an urgent concern for public safety  (a suspect can therefore be interrogated for 
48 hours before being ‘‘mirandized’’).59
 In contrast to the ‘‘rule and exception to the rule’’ method of reasoning adopted by a 
majority  of the Constitutional Court of Korea in 2004, two dissenting judges framed their 
argument in terms of balancing. Justices Song In-jun and Choo Sun-hoe, two former 
prosecutors, thus denied that the right to have an attorney  participate in the interrogation of a 
suspect not in custody was a legitimate and proportionate restriction given the public 
interests that it serves.
 Guaranteeing the right to have the attorney participate in the suspect interrogation 
 might cause difficulty  for the investigative authority in obtaining the confession from 
 the suspect, hindrance with the investigatory activities by the attorney beyond 
 defense activities, or hardship  in maintaining investigatory secrets demanded for the 
 purpose of the investigation due to the exposure of the investigation. That is, 
 permitting the participation of the attorney in the suspect interrogation might 
 undermine the investigatory activities by the investigative authority.60
 
 To be sure, each mode of reasoning (the formulation of an exception to the rule on 
the one hand, and the balancing of conflicting interests on the other hand) can accommodate 
any type of arguments, either progressive or conservative. Despite their idiosyncratic 
features, both techniques share the premise that basic rights are not unlimited and provide 
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methods to assess existing restrictions, or to formulate permissible ones. In the more recent 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Korea, proportionality has been used to control 
excessive bodily searches by the police (2002), as well as the use of physical restraints 
during detention (2003) and interrogation (2005). It is a tool which has allowed the court to 
be assertive and to criticize the practices of law-enforcing actors in the specific 
circumstances of a case, without however invalidating such practices’ overall legitimacy. 
This type of ‘‘tailored’’ reasoning therefore represents both a strategic resource for, and limit 
to, the court’s activism, as it involves only a form of narrow contestation of the policies 
designed and implemented to deal with enmity. 
  
Premises and consequences of the court’s intervention beyond the right to counsel
Depoliticizing and judicializing procedural issues in other national security cases
 The context in which the Constitutional Court of Korea upheld a number of rights 
even for suspected anti-state criminals differs from the situation of courts in democratic 
societies where a debate about the scope and extent of enemies’ rights arises while a well-
established criminal justice system, with effective guarantees, is already in operation. In 
post-1987 South Korea, this configuration was somewhat reverse. Procedural cases initially 
brought before the court against a national security backdrop  were not framed as engaging 
with the issue of whether enemies were entitled to the process due to ordinary criminals. As 
a matter of fact, neither the court nor the complainants and their lawyers framed the matters 
under review in such a way, which appears to have been the key to litigation successes. 
Consequently, most of the court’s jurisprudence on procedural rights cannot be read as 
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directly  questioning the legitimacy  of deviations from common criminal law and ordinary 
practices in the name of national security. On the contrary, the point of departure of the court 
seems precisely to have been that derogations to due process were the rule rather than the 
exception across the entire Korean criminal justice system, and not only for anti-state 
criminals. 
 As mentioned earlier, this approach was probably less a stratagem than the result  of a 
genuine prioritization of interests on the part of the court. In the aftermath of the transition, 
distortions and abuses of the ‘‘constitutional ideals’’ protected by the court were prevalent in 
criminal justice. Moreover, building a fair system was a horizon susceptible of rallying 
support, within and outside the court. In concrete terms, promoting fairness in the criminal 
system meant two principal tasks upon which jurists (not only judges, but all legal 
practitioners) could easily agree: on the one hand, redressing the imbalance between the 
state’s power to punish and the protection of individual rights; on the other hand, 
counterbalancing the supremacy vested in the prosecution to the detriment of independent 
judges. 
 The assertiveness of the Constitutional Court of Korea can therefore be described as a 
movement to ‘‘bridge the gap’’ between ‘‘constitutional ideals’’ and the existing framework, 
and one around which a variety of legal interests could coalesce. As a result, it should come 
as no surprise that the court was able to act early on, capitalizing on an opportunity activated 
by constitutional litigation from below, especially under the pressure of actors such as 
Minbyun, whose role has been described in chapter four. Indeed, ‘‘between 1988 and 1994, 
forty percent of Minbyun’s cases (over 580 in total) dealt with the National Security Law or 
the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations.’’61 By  framing the debate on procedural rights 
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from the standpoint of the overall fairness of criminal justice, and not national security, these 
lawyers succeeded in putting the arguments of law-enforcing actors at a plain disadvantage. 
 Still, concerns such as investigative efficiency were never discarded by the 
constitutional court and have instead been importantly recognized as possibly justifying 
restrictions on rights when necessary. The court has however made clear that the 
demonstration of this necessity  created a burden of proof which fell on law-enforcing actors, 
and not suspects or defendants. The court’s jurisprudence thus gave early signals to the 
Agency for National Security  Planning and public prosecutors that investigating alleged anti-
state activities did not authorize any conduct on their part. 
 For instance, the constitutional court determined in 1997 that the right to access one’s 
criminal records (which usually  include interrogation transcripts, witnesses’ affidavits, and a 
suspect’s confession) could be restricted if there was ‘‘a danger of leakage of national 
security secrets, tampering of evidence and witnesses, breach of privacy, or any hindrance to 
the investigation.’’62 The court provided however that such risks had to be established. In the 
national security case under review, a majority of justices held unconstitutional the decision 
of the prosecutor to limit access to the defendant’s criminal records because the motivations 
for his refusal had not been exposed.
 The decision on the right to access criminal records was an important ruling against 
prosecutors’ discretion on another account. Indeed, the court considered in it that 
constitutional complaints were likely to be the only available effective remedy against 
prosecutorial actions, thereby  upholding a major exception to the requirement that all prior 
processes be exhausted before a complaint could be admitted. 
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 Even if [a prosecutor’s decision] can be reviewed judicially under [the 
 Administration Litigation Act], the likelihood of relief is nil. Requiring exhaustion of 
 prior remedies to the complainant amounts to an unnecessary demand of detour. The 
 circumstances justify an exception to the rule of exhausting of prior remedies.63
 A similar exception to the requirement that prior remedies be exhausted can be found 
in a 1999 decision on the wearing of prison uniforms forced upon defendants during 
interrogation and trial. In this case, the court  deemed likely that the existence of a justiciable 
interest would be denied through administrative or judicial review, once more construing the 
mechanism of constitutional complaints as the only  available effective remedy. The issue 
under review was raised by defendants forced to wear prison uniforms in confinement as 
well as during investigation and trial by correctional officers. 
 One of the two petitioners was Suh Jun-sik, well-known to human rights 
organizations since the 1970s. Their reports have to be relied on to reconstruct the 
circumstances behind the case since the Constitutional Court of Korea usually gives a very 
parsimonious account of facts. In the early 1970s, Suh, an ethnic Korean from Japan arrested 
for espionage, had been adopted as ‘‘prisoner of conscience’’ by  Amnesty International. 
When he was released from jail in 1988 after seventeen years spent behind bars, Suh 
continued to promote human rights in South Korea. In 1997, he was arrested under article 7 
of the National Security Act after having organized a human rights film festival. According 
to a brief published by Amnesty International following his arrest,
 The main charges against Suh Jun-sik relate to a human rights film festival organized 
 by Sarangbang human rights group, of which he is the director. The organization had 
 refused to allow government censorship of the films shown and the authorities 
 declared that the screening of one film, ‘‘Red Hunt,’’ constituted a violation of the 
 National Security Law. This documentary  film, about mass killings on Cheju Island 
 in 1948, had been shown to at least one other festival without the organizers facing 
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 prosecution. Other charges against Suh Jun-sik include the possession of poetry 
 books alleged to ‘‘benefit’’ North Korea and failing to report to the police about his 
 overseas trips, including a visit to the International Secretariat of Amnesty 
 International in May 1997.64 
 
 As explored in previous chapters, patterns of enforcement of the National Security 
Act remained high well into the late 1990s, demonstrating the resilience of a narrow 
understanding of the activities permitted in post-transition South Korean democracy. In this 
context, the paradox of the case involving Suh Jun-sik and the wearing of prison uniforms 
was precisely that  its national security  dimension became completely eclipsed in the 
constitutional judgment. This could in part be attributed to the fact that the requirement to 
wear prison uniform during investigation, trial, and confinement applied to all detained 
defendants, although theoretically presumed innocent. Still, the court did not  accord any 
special or separate consideration to individuals accused under the security legislation, 
implicitly  considering the ‘‘human dignity’’ of potential enemies as worthy  of being 
protected as that of other suspected criminals.  
 The detainees, prevented from wearing plain clothes and forced to wear inmate 
 uniforms, will feel insulted and ashamed. Their free manifestation of individual 
 personality is suppressed, and their human dignity and worth is infringed.65 
 From the viewpoint of realizing a fair criminal justice system, protecting the rights of 
criminal defendants is not the only  necessary aspect. Another important dimension of 
fairness has been for the South Korean constitutional court to check the scope of 
prosecutorial powers. Since the late 1980s, the court has deemed unconstitutional a number 
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of powers granted to the prosecution at the expense of independent judges, such as the 
prevailing force given to a prosecutor’s decision to detain over a judge’s decision to release. 
Some of the invalidated measures favoring the prosecution unmistakably  had their roots in 
authoritarian attempts at distorting criminal justice. 
 For instance, the pretrial witness examination scheme (allowing a witness for the 
prosecution to be examined before the opening of a trial, therefore precluding the 
opportunity of cross-examination by the defense) was adopted in January  1973, in the 
aftermath of Park Chung-hee’s regime radicalization following the implementation of the 
Yusin constitution. In 1996, the constitutional court invalidated this practice on the ground 
that ‘‘it merely  facilitates investigative activities of the state.’’66 The same year, it  reviewed 
another legacy  from the Yusin period, the Act on the Special Measures for the Punishment of 
Persons Involved in Anti-State Activities (‘‘pankukka haengwijaeŭi ch’ŏpŏl-e kwanhan 
tŭkpyŏlpŏp’’). This law permitted to hold a trial in the absence of the accused, while his 
attorney was not authorized to participate in the proceedings and the court could only 
pronounce itself on the basis of the facts and arguments stated by  the prosecution. Although 
this law was designed and solely used against Kim Hyŏng-uk, a former director of the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency who had publicly criticized Park Chung-hee before 
vanishing in 1975, the constitutional court struck down the piece on the basis that it 
generally ‘‘contravened due process of law and the right to trial.’’67 
 It should not be inferred from the above decisions that issues about the past, and its 
‘‘liquidation,’’ are never a source of controversy at the Constitutional Court of Korea. On the 
contrary, they have fueled intense disputes as analyzed in chapter four and as illustrated by 
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the following conflict over the memory of the post-transition era. Let us recall that during 
the early 1990s, ‘‘civil society groups continued their prodemocracy campaign with a vigor 
comparable to or stronger than that which characterized the 1985-1987 period,’’ demanding 
substantive reforms and denouncing the continuity with the former regime embodied, in 
particular, by the Roh Tae-woo administration.68 
 In the course of a confrontation between police forces and student protesters at  Dong-
eui [Tong-ŭi] University  in May 1989, five policemen were kidnapped and locked in the 
university library building, which was set on fire by the students when more riot police 
members were sent to rescue their colleagues, making a total of seven police victims. While 
the leaders of the student group  were convicted of homicide in the wake of the event, the 
government’s Review Committee for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement 
Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them (‘‘minjuhwa undong wallyŏnja myŏngye 
hoebok mit posang simŭi wiwŏnhoe’’) decided in 2002 to acknowledge them and some forty 
fellow students as ‘‘democratization movement involvers.’’69 
 The family members of the deceased officers appealed to the constitutional court, 
claiming that the initiative of the review committee infringed upon their right to pursue 
happiness. A majority of the court dismissed the case, arguing that the objective of restoring 
the honor and compensating those involved in the democratization movement aimed at 
‘‘enabling a conciliatory, future-oriented and positive understanding of the sad history  of 
Koreaʼs recent past’’ and, therefore, ‘‘does not (and is not intended to) cast any negative 
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judgment on the policemen who died in the line of duty.’’70  Three justices, Kwon Seong, 
Kim Hyo-jong, and Choo Sun-hoe, however responded with a virulent dissent, which 
contested the possibility to designate as democracy activists the students responsible for the 
policemen’s death without debasing the reputation of the officers and the legitimate nature of 
their duties. 
 In short, the committee’s decision has made it  no longer possible for the petitioners to 
 maintain their dignity and identity  as ‘‘family members of law enforcement officers 
 who gave their lives to protect law and order.’’ They  must now suffer the disgrace of 
 being labeled ‘family members of instruments of illegitimate state power who 
 oppressed democracy movement.’’ 71
 Rifts over judging history have divided the Constitutional Court of Korea on several 
occasions. The consensus that could prevail in the 1990s (from a unanimity or majority of 
justices) over issues of criminal procedure did contribute to undo many legacies from the 
authoritarian years, but it was not primarily achieved from the standpoint of putting the past 
on trial. 
Consistent alignment with the Supreme Court of Korea
 One of the indicators that various legal interests converged over improving the 
fairness of criminal justice in the post-transition era is the alignment between South Korea’s 
constitutional and supreme courts on procedural rights. This solidarity is all the more worthy 
of attention since the two institutions have been in a sustained relation of rivalry over the 




unconstitutionality for at least a decade.72  When it comes to the practices of law-enforcing 
actors, a jurisdictional conflict could have deleteriously  opposed the two courts, as ‘‘the 
Supreme Court at first insisted that it had the ultimate authority to review the 
constitutionality of rules and regulations.’’73 By contrast, the constitutional court held firm 
onto its assertion that constitutional complaints were likely to provide the only  effective 
remedy against such law enforcement procedures and behaviors as prosecutors’ decisions, 
even when other review processes were available.
 Despite these jurisdictional skirmishes, both institutions have largely converged in 
their rulings on criminal rights’ scope and content. Indeed, several of the procedural issues 
dealt with by the constitutional court were also reviewed by the supreme court, sometimes in 
the first  place. For instance, as early as 1990 did the supreme court rule on the 
inadmissibility of a national security suspect’s statements ‘‘made while he was not allowed 
to consult  with an attorney,’’ thereby ‘‘curbing the police’s prevalent, illegal practice of not 
permitting communication with counsel.’’74 In 1992, the court held that ‘‘statements elicited 
without informing [the suspect] of the right to silence in interrogation are illegally  obtained 
evidence, and so should be excluded, even if they are disclosed voluntarily.’’75
 The supreme court’s early 1990s criminal jurisprudence clearly  went against the grain 
of its traditional role. The high court was particularly  known to be a conservative institution 
under authoritarian rule - in contrast to some lower courts, which proved more progressive. 
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On the eve of the transition, its position was still to exculpate any use of violence and 
brutality  by  the police during interrogation. In a 1987 suit filed against police officers 
accused of torture, the supreme court determined that law-enforcing actors were expected to 
respect human rights, but that the incriminated officers should be excused for abuses 
committed out of their ‘‘devotion’’ to serving the state.
 True, we acknowledge that the police used means which were not legal in their 
 investigation. In consideration of their lengthy intelligence services and their 
 devotion to the state, we feel it was proper for the prosecution to have acquitted the 
 police.76
 
 The court’s radical change of mindset  between this 1987 decision and the rulings 
made in the early  1990s can be attributed to the judiciary’s move toward greater 
independence after the regime change. This regeneration was largely prompted from within, 
with one-third of South Korean judges demanding in June 1988 the resignation of the 
supreme court’s chief justice, Kim Yong-ch’ol, tainted by his support for the old regime.
 Two weeks after the chief justice resigned in disgrace, the two major opposition 
 parties abstained from the National Assembly  vote to confirm Roh [Tae-woo]’s first 
 choice for the vacancy, thereby  causing the nomination to fail. This action resulted in 
 the nomination of Yi Il-kyu, a more independent-minded figure known for not 
 bending to political pressure. A Supreme Court justice during the Chun presidency - 
 until his appointment was not renewed in 1986 - Yi had won wide public respect for 
 overturning lower court rulings in political cases. Yi’s appointment as chief justice 
 led to the National Assembly approval of thirteen new Supreme Court justices and a 
 major reshuffle of the judiciary in July that affected some thirty- five senior District 
 Court and High Court judges.77
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 In the 1990s, the supreme court became a proactive element of the ‘‘criminal rights 
revolution’’ in which various legal actors joined forces to advance the overall fairness of the 
South Korean criminal system, plagued by important distortions of the rule of law and due 
process principles. In theory at least, national security suspects and defendants benefited 
from this movement, often being at  the source of litigation while receding from the locus of 
argumentation. This marginalization of procedural issues’ national security dimension may 
have been what permitted advances to take place. Conversely, both the supreme and 
constitutional courts have proved very  cautious on questions restricted to anti-state crimes 
and enemies, with the former showing itself more conservative than the latter. When the 
national security  dimension of an issue could not be diluted into the general fairness of the 
criminal system, constitutional assertiveness has therefore been more difficult, either 
negatively responded to by the supreme court or not pursued by a majority of constitutional 
judges.  
Assertiveness through ‘‘tailored’’ reasoning in recent cases
 The activism of the Constitutional Court of Korea against the practices of law-
enforcing actors has not been limited to its first ten years of adjudication. With the coming of 
the 2000s, new sites have been brought to the court’s attention, all the way to the lavatories 
of police detention facilities whose ‘‘open structure’’ was deemed incompatible with human 
dignity by a unanimity of justices in 2001.78 In most cases, the court seems to have displaced 
the ground of its criticisms compared with its 1990s rulings, now reviewing whether or not 
the incriminated behaviors were excessive in the specific circumstances of the case rather 
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than in the abstract. This technique has permitted the institution to maintain a firm stance 
against law enforcement actors’ wrongdoings, while also limiting the scope of its decisions. 
In essence, the control of constitutionality exercised by the court over abuses of state power 
now appears to be less about the general legitimacy  of a given type of conduct or measure, 
and more about  its appropriateness and proportionality in light of the particular context of a 
given case. 
 This ‘‘tailored’’ approach was for example deployed in rulings involving corporeal 
intrusions by  the police (through bodily search), public prosecutors (using physical restraints 
during interrogation), as well as prison wardens (resorting to physical restraints in 
detention). Two of these cases were settled unanimously by the court, and all of them were 
solved on the basis that  they coincided with an excessive restriction of petitioners’ basic 
rights in the instance before the judges, and in this instance only. As a result, none of the 
verdicts deemed unconstitutional the general possibility of thoroughly searching or imposing 
restraints on the body of a suspect, defendant, or convict.   
 In the police search case, the complainants were two women ‘‘arrested as flagrant 
offenders in violation of the elections laws’’ and subject to a comprehensive bodily  search by 
a female officer, during which they  had to pull their clothes and underwear up to their 
armpits and down to their knees, while repeating the process of squatting down and standing 
up three times. Although the court recognized that so detailed a bodily search could be 
allowed ‘‘when it is likely  that the inmate would hide and carry  dangerous materials such as 
deadly weapons or other disallowed goods in their inner body,’’ it held that conducting such 
procedure was not justified in the particular circumstances of the case.
 Forcing the complainants to repeat the process of squatting down and standing up 
 with their clothes off damaged the sense of honor and self-respect of the 
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 complainants. Such bodily search is obviously out of the limits permitted under the 
 Constitution, and it brought insult and humiliation to the complainants.79 
 
 Similarly, the court reviewed in 2003 and 2005 the use of physical restraints by 
prison wardens on inmates and by prosecutors on suspects during interrogation. While 
employing devices such as binding ropes and handcuffs was recognized as having a 
legitimate purpose and being an appropriate means to prevent flight, violence, or suicide, 
their use was not found constitutional in the specific context of the two complaints. The first 
request came from an inmate detained at Kwangju Prison and maintained under constant 
handcuffing for 392 days, thereby being impeded from ‘‘perform[ing] daily life in a normal 
fashion, as the complainant was forced to eat, excrete and sleep under such state.’’80 As a 
result of its excessive nature, the prolonged and unchecked act of the prison warden was 
unanimously deemed a violation of the petitioner’s human dignity  by the constitutional 
court.81 
 In 2005, the court reviewed the petition of a ‘‘sociology professor residing in 
Germany’’ and arrested for violation of the National Security Act upon his return to South 
Korea in 2003. Although the name of the complainant  is made anonymous through the 
erasure of its middle syllable, it  is not difficult to identify ‘‘Song O Yul’’ as being Song Du-
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Korea, Twenty Year, p.576.
yul (Song Tu-yul) due to the international mobilization inspired by his arrest and trial. As 
usual, the court appeared little concerned with the facts that were not directly  relevant to the 
matter of review. The national security  charges raised against Song were thus left 
unmentioned and have to be reconstituted from other sources. Song was accused by the 
prosecution of ‘‘acting as a non-standing Politburo member of the North’s ruling Workers’ 
Party, which he has consistently  denied, spreading North Korean ideology abroad and 
visiting the communist state on more than 20 occasions since 1973 [when he exiled himself 
from South Korea] on orders from Pyongyang.’’82 
 Rather than these facts, the court  concentrated its attention on the conditions of 
Song’s interrogations at the Seoul District Prosecutors’ Office, where his body was 
constantly restrained by handcuffs and ropes during each episode of questioning. The court 
found that this treatment could only be justified in the event of ‘‘exceptional situations.’’
 In principle, when prosecutors interrogate suspects in their interrogations rooms, 
 suspects should be allowed to exercise their right of defense without feeling 
 pressured physically or emotionally, and the use of restraints should be allowed only 
 in exceptional situations when a clear and concrete risk of flight, violence, 
 disturbance, self-injury or suicide is present.83
 On the one hand, the court did not  contest that the use of physical restraints could be 
authorized in certain circumstances, but, on the other hand, the justices disagreed about 
whether such extraordinary context was met in the case at hand. While a majority of justices 
reasoned that  the complainant had been inappropriately maintained ‘‘into a substantively 
unequal position in responding to interrogation,’’ with his right to defense therefore being 
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infringed upon, Justices Song In-jun and Choo Sun-hoe dissented. They  invoked that 
employing handcuffs and ropes was justified since ‘‘they were used on a petitioner 
interrogated on charges of National Security Act violations, the allegations of which were 
being hotly disputed.’’84 The dissent of Song and Choo, who started their judicial career as 
prosecutors, however appears to have been less motivated by national security per se, than 
calling attention to the hardships faced by public prosecutors in doing their work.  
 There was a dire need for the use of the restraints in order to prevent unpredicted 
 events such as flight or self-injury, protect the petitioner’s and other’s lives and 
 limbs, and maintain order within the facilities. In light of the inadequacy in personnel 
 and equipment available in prosecutorial interrogation rooms, the respondent had to 
 supervise, restrain and protect the complainant using ropes and  handcuffs.85 
 Recognizing the legitimacy of given practices while controlling the adequacy of their 
use in light of each case’s circumstances represents a resource and condition of assertiveness 
for the Constitutional Court of Korea, but  also a limit to its intervention. The court is far 
from being the only institution caught in this apparent contradiction.86 The Supreme Court of 
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Commander of the Israel Defense Forces in Judea and Samaria. HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. 
Government of Israel (2004). 
from grounding their progressive rulings in a similar case-by-case or ‘‘tailored’’ control of 
excessiveness, while leaving intact the validity of general policy choices.
Persistent practical challenges from beneath
! Concerning the ‘‘criminal rights’ revolution’’ supported by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
police stations, courtrooms, and prisons, Gerald Rosenberg pessimistically  concluded that 
the court was ‘‘unable to achieve its stated goals’’ even when the political branches did not 
resist them. Indeed, ‘‘what was overlooked was that organizations, be they prison systems, 
police department, or lower courts, are often unwilling to change.’’87 Rosenberg’s analysis 
uncovers a fundamental obstacle to the effectivity of judicial intervention. Even 
constitutional rulings which are not opposed by the political branches can be defeated by 
institutional inertia. 
 The records of the Constitutional Court of Korea reveal that concerns about abuses in 
interrogation rooms and prison cells still existed almost two decades after the transition, 
despite the ban on torture and the inadmissibility of statements made unwillingly or without 
a suspect being informed of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by  a lawyer.88 In a 
2005 case which was referred to the constitutional court by a lower tribunal questioning the 
credibility of prosecutor-made interrogation dossiers, the lower court for instance argued 
that: 
 The easy but powerful admissibility  of the protocol prepared by prosecutor, 
 acknowledged by the Instant Provision, induces prosecutors to conduct investigations 
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 and public prosecution to particularly  focus on obtaining confessions at the 
 investigation stage, and it is highly probable that, in the actual process, they  violate 
 the Constitutional ban on torture, the right to remain silent and the defendant’s right 
 to life and bodily freedom.89 
 By contrast, the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutors’ Office recognized that 
‘‘cruel treatments’’ might still be happening in the course of interrogation, but contended that 
‘‘the possibility of human rights infringement such as torture is comparatively low.’’90 
Overall, change has therefore been slow to come. On many issues, the criminal reforms 
advocated by the constitutional court came late or partially. Moreover, even when the 
political branches have encouraged the type of change promoted by the judges, their support 
has not guaranteed that the sites where the power to punish is effected through the discretion 
of law-enforcing actors were affected. 
 In the 2000s, the executive and legislature took an active stance in favor of a greater 
protection of individual rights in the criminal process. The National Human Rights 
Commission was created in 2001 upon the recommendation of the United Nations, and its 
activities included conducting field investigations in correctional and detention facilities. 
The years under the administration of Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) were characterized by a 
proliferation of committees to stimulate a broad renovation of the law-enforcement 
apparatus: the Police Reform Committee under the Korean National Police Agency  was 
established in 2003; the Advisory  Joint Committee to Adjust the Investigative Power 
between the Prosecutors and Judicial Police was created in 2004 under the Supreme 
Prosecutors’ Office (‘‘taegŏmch’alch’ŏng’’) and the National Police Agency; the Committee 
for Investigative System and Practice to Respect Human Rights was set in 2004 under the 
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Supreme Prosecutors’ Office ; the Judicial Reform Committee was founded in 2003 under 
the Supreme Court of Korea before a subsequent task force organization, the Presidential 
Committee on Judicial Reform, took over in 2004.91 As a result, a number of amendments 
were introduced in the Criminal Procedure Code and Criminal Administration Act, reflecting 
ongoing concerns with human rights violations in the different places where the state’s 
power to punish secludedly operates.92
The subtleness of courts’ discursivity 
 Predictably, the decisions of the Constitutional Court  of Korea do not provide a 
comprehensive solution to the issue of how potential enemies should be treated throughout 
the criminal process, from interrogation rooms to prison facilities. The court’s interventions 
are located on a much narrower and concrete scale, producing an apparent multiplicity of 
outcomes. The contours and limits of the rights recognized ‘‘even’’ to national security 
suspects or offenders only make sense if the court’s rulings are not treated as definitive and 
exhaustive answers to a unique question. Indeed, the overriding issue of how democracies 
should confront their enemies is never treated as such by constitutional courts. On the 
contrary, their mode of action is confined to reviewing dispersed fragments of wider security 
policies which are themselves plural and may never exist as a coherent whole. 
 Therefore, the mapping of courts’ security jurisprudence in general, and of enemies’ 
criminal rights in particular, can only be an impressionistic one. The issues that reach 
constitutional courts through concrete a posteriori review are not only segments of a larger 
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policy framework, they are also wrapped in facts. As mentioned earlier, the contextual 
specificity of each case can be both a resource and limit for judicial assertiveness. In 
addition, courts’ answers are themselves dispersed, and a single ruling can hardly  be 
approached as totalizing the jurisprudence which may exist on a given issue. Often, clusters 
of precedents have to be taken into account in order to properly  restitute the position of a 
court. For instance, the security  jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court is often reified to 
one prominent decision for each period of crisis (such as its Korematsu ruling upholding the 
constitutionality of detaining Japanese Americans from the West Coast during World War II), 
but this monism rarely exhausts the intricacies of the court’s case law.
 Positions can also be complex, not only within the jurisprudence of a single court, but 
also at  the level of judges’ individual votes. The patterns of dissent at the Constitutional 
Court of Korea reflect how uneasy  simplifications are. For example, Justice Choo Sun-hoe, a 
former prosecutor, dissented with the court’s majority  on several issues between 2001 and 
2007. Choo was in favor of: limiting the right to counsel for suspects or defendants not in 
custody; considering that  policemen killed in the course of their duties were disgraced by the 
designation of the students responsible for their death as ‘‘democratization activists’’; or 
ruling that physical restraints were justified during the interrogations of Song Du-yul. Yet, 
Choo also filed in 2002 a momentous dissent against the requirement that national security 
prisoners be forced to submit a pledge to abide by the law prior to their release, holding that 
this measure infringed upon their freedom of conscience. This apparently  highly 
conservative judge was therefore the one who defended that even the rights of those who 
oppose the constitutional order ought to be protected in a free democratic society.93 
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 Engaging with enemies’ rights was precisely  avoided by both the court and litigants’ 
lawyers in most cases about the procedural guarantees due in criminal justice. On a few rare 
occasions, the national security dimension of issues could not, however, be evaded. This 
happened with article 19 of the National Security Act  extending the period of custody  from 
thirty to fifty days before a suspect be released or charges pressed against him, as discussed 
in chapter five. On the one hand, the court deemed in 1992 that extending the period of 
custody up to fifty days was unconstitutional for the anti-state offenses which are not so 
difficult to investigate, that is to say, praising or sympathizing with an anti-state organization 
(article 7) and failing to report  national security crimes (article 10).94 On the other hand, the 
court ruled in 1997 that the prolongation was justified for the more serious violations falling 
under articles 3 to 6 and 8 to 9 of the security legislation, such as ‘‘creating, joining, or 
inducing to join an anti-state organization,’’ ‘‘infiltrating from or escaping to territory  under 
the control of an anti-state organization,’’ or ‘‘communicating with its members.’’95 
 Both the 1992 and 1997 rulings on article 19 of the National Security Act were 
decided unanimously by the constitutional court. This illustrates the absence of radical 
camps in the process of weighing basic rights against national security. Even when 
disagreements take place, their occurrence does not materialize the struggle between an 
absolute pro-state and national security side diametrically opposed to a pro-rights faction. 
Such crystallization of forces would actually be structurally  impossible, not only at the 
Constitutional Court  of Korea but throughout corresponding institutions in other democratic 
societies. Indeed, a fundamental invariant of judicial discourse is that basic rights are not 
unlimited. This assumption shared by all decisions - whether ‘‘progressive’’ or 
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‘‘conservative’’ - expresses that judicial intervention is never aimed at weakening the state, 
although different definitions of where its ultimate strength resides may be articulated and 
compete. 
 In conformity  with this dissertation’s interpretive approach, the present chapter has 
tried to identify underlying sources of agreement and disagreement in the Constitutional 
Court of Korea’s discourse - or silence - over enemies’ criminal rights. A discursive premise 
shared by all decisions is the absence of rights’ absolutism, or the postulate that basic rights 
are not unlimited, which is neither circumscribed to the South Korean court nor to security 
issues. Although rights can always be restricted, an additional source of jurisprudential 
concord rests on the agreement that limitations are only  permissible if necessary. Since the 
late 1980s, necessity has been narrowly interpreted by constitutional justices. Indeed, it no 
longer corresponds to the broad national security exception invoked by authoritarian regimes 
to construe as threats against the state any  activity not tolerated by the government in place. 
Yet, a third element characterizing the court’s discursive order is its recognition of the 
continued abuses committed by law-enforcing actors in their handling of suspected enemies 
since the transition, which testifies not only to the political but institutional limits of the 
1987 change of regime.     
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Reviewing the Rights and Duties of Citizens vis-à-vis War and Peace
Article 5
(1) The Republic of Korea shall endeavor to maintain international peace 
and shall renounce all aggressive wars.
(2) The Armed Forces shall be charged with the sacred mission of 
national security and the defense of the land and their political 
neutrality shall be maintained. 
Article 39
(1) All citizens shall have the duty of national defense under the 
conditions as prescribed by Act.
(2) No citizen shall be treated unfavorably on account of the fulfillment 
of his obligation of military service. 
Article 10
All citizens shall be assured of human dignity and worth and have the 
right  to pursue happiness. It  shall be the duty of the State to confirm and 
guarantee the fundamental and inviolable human rights of individuals.
Article 19
All citizens shall enjoy freedom of conscience.
The Constitution of the Republic of Korea
 This chapter analyzes the role of the Constitutional Court of Korea in cases calling 
into question the exigencies of national defense. The dispute over the ‘‘national’’ which 
constitutes the subtext of the court’s intervention has indeed led various South Korean 
military initiatives (such as the 2004 participation to the war in Iraq or the annual conduct of 
joint operations with the United States) to be constitutionally challenged on the ground that 
they  represented aggressive and unfavorable behavior towards North Korea and the 
perspective of reunification. While these issues reflect that  constitutional adjudication has 
been increasingly  invested as a site of political contention, they also highlight how the court 
has prevented a dispute about competing ‘‘national’’ imaginaries from unfolding on its stage. 
Indeed, the court has either refused to recognize as justiciable the claims articulated by 
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litigants in military cases, or confirmed the relevance of censoring modes of contesting the 
‘‘national’’ such as conscientious objection to the mandatory military service, thereby 
reinforcing the functionality  of conscription as one of the central mechanisms of 
mobilization and discrimination in modern South Korean history.
The constitutional possibility of war and peace
 Some constitutions’ pacifist vocation is reinforced by an expressed renouncement to 
maintaining a standing army, like in the 1949 Costa Rican text1  or the 1947 Japanese 
document.2 By contrast, South Korea’s principled commitment to peace does not obstruct its 
constitutional readiness for war, as expressed by the basic norm’s fifth article where both 
possibilities coexist. National defense is construed by the constitution not only  as a ‘‘sacred 
mission’’ entrusted to the armed forces, but also as a fundamental duty  which falls upon all 
citizens (article 39). The latter is one of the few obligations explicitly recognized in the text, 
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of this country as a sovereign state.’’ The Supreme Court of Japan, 1959(A)No.710 (1959), in Alfred Oppler, 
‘‘The Sunakawa Case.  Its Legal and Political Implications,’’  Political Science Quarterly, Vol.76, No.2, June 
1961, p.247.
along with compulsory education, the duty to work, and the duty to pay taxes. Article 39 is 
considered to provide the ground for the mandatory military service which all South Korean 
males have to perform between 18 and 35 years of age. 
 South Korea’s active military  forces number more than 600,000 soldiers, making it 
one of the largest armies in the world.3 War powers are principally  vested in the President, 
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, who can ‘‘declare war and conclude peace.’’4 
Yet, the National Assembly is endowed with ‘‘the right to consent to the declaration of war, 
the dispatch of armed forces to foreign states, or the stationing of alien forces in the territory 
of the Republic of Korea.’’5 This framework nonetheless conceals how matters of war and 
peace in South Korea seldom are a determination of national policy  alone. South Korea’s 
security is indeed closely connected to its military alliance with the United States, dating 
from the aftermath of World War II and reinforced in the wake of the Korean War 
(1950-1953). Since the armistice which ended the conflict was signed, American troops have 
remained stationed in the southern half of the peninsula. In return, South Korea has assisted 
the United States in most of the theaters where its military was deployed, prominently  in 
Vietnam, between 1964 and 1973 (where more than 300,000 South Korean soldiers served), 
and Iraq, from 2003 to 2008 (where approximately 20,000 troops were sent). 
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war and conclude peace’’ and ‘‘The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces under the 
conditions as prescribed by the Constitution and Act’’ (Article 73 and article 74, section 1 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Korea).
5 Article 60, section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea.
 The frontier between the two Koreas and heavy  American presence in the region are 
often referred to as the last vestige of the Cold War. This depiction obscures the significance 
of domestic forces irreducible to international politics which contributed to make possible 
not only the division, but  its permanence. The post-1945 Korean frontier thus deserves to be 
understood and analyzed beyond the paradigm of the Cold War. Its dynamics did have an 
immense influence, but as far as they  interacted with interests and processes otherwise 
homegrown. The political and ideological forces underlying the division were not imported 
and transplanted on the peninsula by the U.S. and Soviet  Union during their respective post-
war occupation. Instead, violently  antagonistic interests (between property  owners v. 
peasants and the working class, between pro-Japanese v. nationalists, between conservatives 
v. revolutionaries) were formed throughout the decades preceding the liberation, thus being 
deep-rooted in the profound societal changes and contrasted experiences born of the colonial 
era (1910-1945). If the fixation of rival left-right forces into two separate states north and 
south of the 38th parallel was a product of the struggle between the two superpowers, these 
forces’ own coming into being originated in the unfolding of Korean history  during the first 
half of the 20th century.6 
 Seen beyond the lenses of international dynamics, the resilience of the inter-Korean 
division no longer appears as a legacy which anomalously survived the Cold War era. It may 
be better understood as a continuation of the separate process of state-building in which each 
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Narrative Strategies in Recent South Korean Historiography,’’ positions: east asia cultures critique, Vol.1, No. 
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Korea engaged after 1948, and that the Korean War contributed to solidify, providing both 
regimes with an enduring source of legitimacy. Indeed,
 Whereas before the war, the South Korean state had a weak local base of support, the 
 war gave the state an ideological basis for building its legitimacy. Anti-communism, 
 articulated and experienced in everyday life, became the premier motif for 
 ideological legitimization of the South Korean state. For this reason, no other event 
 comes close to the Korean War in terms of its determining force on the establishment 
 of that  relationship. The Korean War transformed the South Korean state from an 
 extremely unstable and fragile anti-communist state into a powerful bureaucratic one 
 ruled by an authoritarian regime. This regime, in turn, was supported by a military 
 force that was huge relative to the population and the size of the economy. The size 
 of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army grew from a mere 150,000 before the war, to 
 over 600,000 at the time of the cease-fire.7 
 Because no peace treaty was concluded after the armistice, the peninsula remains in a 
de facto state of war. As the present chapter will explore, this factor is not  however the only 
relevant one to understand how the rights and duties of South Korean citizens are negotiated 
when it comes to the necessities of national defense. The jurisprudence of the constitutional 
court appears instead preoccupied with a dual concern: not only the disintegration of the 
state - which implies to be ready for war in order to guarantee both peace and the existing 
institutional order; but also the disintegration of the national community, that  is to say, the 
community  of citizens recognized as loyal members whose unity  may be threatened by 
alternative ways of envisioning the nation.    
390
7 Jang-Jip Choi, ‘‘Political Cleavages in South Korea,’’  in Hagen Koo (ed.),  State and Society in Contemporary 
Korea, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p.22.
Overview of the military cases before the court
 The plurality  of values present in the constitution, including its ambivalence between 
the language of war and peace, has fueled various challenges to South Korea’s military 
policies before the constitutional court. On several occasions, petitioners argued that some of 
the state’s choices - such as participating to the war in Iraq in 2004 or conducting joint 
military exercises with the United States - frustrated its engagement to ‘‘contribute to lasting 
world peace’’ (preamble) and to ‘‘renounce all aggressive wars’’ (article 5), as well as 
contradicted the constitutional responsibility  to ‘‘formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful 
unification’’ in the peninsula (article 4). South Korea’s involvement in foreign conflicts like 
Vietnam and Iraq (the two post-1945 U.S.-led wars to which it most heavily cooperated) has 
indeed had resonance in the context of the Korean division - Vietnam was part of the South’s 
struggle against communism, while the invasion of Iraq followed its designation by the 
George W. Bush administration as forming an ‘‘axis of evil’’ with Iran and North Korea. 
 The validity  of South Korea’s defense policy has also been questioned in terms of its 
compatibility with basic rights such as the freedom of conscience (article 19), the right  to 
happiness (article 10), or the right to peaceful livelihood whose existence has been under 
debate. Contrary to the German basic law,8  the South Korean constitution does not 
acknowledge the right to conscientious objection. Those who refuse to serve in the military 
following the dictates of ‘‘the powerful and earnest  voice of one’s heart’’ (as conscience is 
described by the Constitutional Court  of Korea) expose themselves to imprisonment for up 
to three years. In practice, hundreds of young men are annually condemned to spend 
eighteen months behind bars for declining to enlist - the vast majority  of them being 
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the constitutional right to conscientious objection. They are reproduced later in the chapter.
Jehovah’s Witnesses; while a minority  of privileged ones goes unpunished for dodging the 
draft. Both issues have been carefully addressed by the court and demonstrate that the 
burden of national defense, being embedded in dynamics proper to South Korean society, 
carries meaning independently from the division.   
 In theory, reviewing matters of national security  and defense policy, including 
reversing military  orders or overturning such a momentous political decision as going to war, 
is not beyond the possibilities of judicial action. By contrast, making the state weaker and 
more vulnerable is outside the discursive order of courts’ intervention. Even judgments 
which seemingly restrain the state’s capacity to take certain military steps are envisioned by 
courts as acting in the state’s interests rather than against them. The potential which exists 
for judicial resistance is therefore not  infinite. Moreover, its existence does not entail its 
realization. Courts have instruments at their disposal to review military issues or to avoid 
doing so. Rulings by the Constitutional Court of Korea over matters of war and peace 
epitomize a strong inclination for the latter. In the present chapter, cases typical of this 
attitude deal with the dispatch of South Korea’s armed forces to Iraq, the relocation of an 
American military base on the national territory, and the conduct of a joint military  exercise 
between the U.S. and ROK armies. The complaints challenging them were dismissed as non-
justiciable by  the constitutional judges, thereby  preventing the alternative ‘‘national’’ 
imaginary  articulated by litigants from fully accessing to the constitutional stage. Yet, none 
of the above-mentioned military initiatives was completely left without blame by the 
constitutional court. 
 This form of prudential criticism is not confined to war-related matters. The court is 
also circumspect as soon as controversies of societal magnitude come to the fore, as revealed 
by its rulings upholding capital punishment, the criminalization of adultery, or the outlawing 
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of abortion. The issue of mandatory  conscription appears at the crossroads of both military 
and societal interests given its significance in contemporary South Korea. The cases 
associated with it  illustrate how the constitutional court’s deference vis-à-vis the political 
branches does not manifest an absolute subservience on its part. For instance, a majority  of 
justices reviewing the compulsory military  service system demanded that  the parliament 
seriously consider the possibility  of creating an alternative service to conciliate the duty  of 
national defense and the freedom of conscience. In the end, the court nonetheless recognized 
the continued relevance of the ban on conscientious objection, not because of the security 
necessities brought about by  the division of the peninsula, but given the risk of social 
disintegration associated with the tolerance of minorities potentially endangering South 
Korea’s prescribed ‘‘national’’ narrative.
Judgments on war and peace
Military operations on and off trial: a comparative perspective
 Constitutional courts are not particularly known for reviewing the national security 
decisions of the political branches and the armed forces critically, especially when such 
decisions touch upon resolutions about the making of war and peace. The ability to intervene 
in military  matters is not however inherently outside the possibilities of judicial action, as 
exemplified by the 2004 ruling of the Sala IV, the constitutional chamber of Costa Rica’s 
supreme court, which declared unconstitutional the country’s support to the war in Iraq. The 
activism of the Costa Rican court is far from being an isolated exception. In the United 
States, ‘‘the notion that courts are poorly suited to decide issues of war power and foreign 
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affairs [did] not emerge until after World War I,’’ when a legal literature on the limits of 
‘‘judicial cognizance’’ over matters of foreign policy, war, and peace started to develop.9 
Until then, courts had not particularly construed their role as limited by these issues’ very 
nature. The first war-related questions decided by the American supreme court involved the 
so-called ‘‘Quasi-war’’ which took place, undeclared, between the United States and France 
from 1798 to 1800. According to Louis Fisher, 
 At no time from [its initial 1800] decision to the Civil War did the Court express a 
 reluctance to handle these cases, either because of a lack of competence or a fear that 
 in deciding such disputes it might collide with the other branches. The cases involved 
 such sensitive questions as deciding whether France was an ‘‘enemy,’’ conflicts 
 between presidential war proclamations and statutory policy, suspension of the writ 
 of habeas corpus, calling forth the militia, annexing territory  as the result of military 
 conquest, and protecting American lives and property abroad. Those cases came to 
 the courts and were decided there.10 
 This first national security  crisis also coincided with the creation of instruments to 
confront ‘‘enemies’’ from within which were in fact directed against  the political opposition. 
A series of four bills known as the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed in 1798 and 
‘‘quickly became weapons to silence Thomas Jefferson’s emerging pro-French Republican 
Party.’’11 They were repealed in the wake of the 1800 election which brought Jefferson to the 
presidency.
 In the contemporary world of constitutional politics, Israel’s supreme court  embodies 
a renowned exception to the idea that  courts cannot interfere in military  matters. Since the 
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Israeli state took control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip  as a result of the Six-Day 
War fought against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967, the supreme court has reviewed orders 
of the military in the Occupied Territories. First petitioned by Palestinian residents of these 
areas in the early 1970s, the court has come to recognize that its writ  ‘‘extends to reviewing 
the legality of all acts and decisions of governmental authorities, including the IDF [Israel 
Defense Forces], wherever they may be performed.’’12
 In South Korea, issues of war-making have largely  been dismissed by the 
constitutional court. Rulings which decline to decide a case are however no less ‘‘positive’’ 
and telling than the judgments which strike down or validate legislation. Alexander Bickel 
has thus famously described the American supreme court as wielding a ‘‘threefold power’’: 
censoring, legitimating, or abstaining. This last role corresponds to ‘‘the point at which the 
Court gives the electoral institutions their head and itself stays out of politics’’ and it is 
precisely ‘‘where the Court is most a political animal’’ according to Bickel.13 To withhold its 
constitutional judgment, the supreme court has developed over time an ‘‘inexhaustible 
arsenal of techniques,’’ including the political question doctrine following which issues of a 
political rather than legal nature fall outside the scope of judicial review.14 
 A lot can therefore be learned from the Constitutional Court  of Korea’s decisions to 
abstain, and in particular from its justifications for why the military  issues raised before it  - 
South Korea’s participation to the war in Iraq, the relocation of a U.S. base on the national 
territory, the conduct of an annual joint  military exercise with the American army - were not 
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found justiciable. No consistent  set of arguments has been used by the court to dismiss these 
cases. For instance, a version of the political question doctrine was invoked by  a majority of 
justices on only one of these three occasions. While reviewing military  matters is not 
inherently  beyond the possibilities of judicial action, the Constitutional Court of Korea has 
used various tools to decline doing so on a number of occasions. 
 The reluctance or inclination to decide issues of war and peace differ from one court 
to another, as exemplified by the comparison between the Sala IV’s and Constitutional Court 
of Korea’s respective rulings on Iraq; but they  also vary  throughout time as illustrated by  the 
evolution of American jurisprudence. The Israeli case duly demonstrates that the existence of 
an intense and prolonged national security threat does not take away the likelihood of 
reviewing military  issues. Israeli judges have repeatedly  contended that the ‘‘security  of the 
state’’ is not a ‘‘magic word’’ which makes judicial review disappear.15  This does not 
however entail that the supreme court construes the security plight of the nation differently 
or less seriously than the political branches or the defense forces. On the contrary, its 
judgments have consistently recognized how ‘‘ever since it was established, the State of 
Israel has been engaged in an unceasing struggle for its security - indeed, its very 
existence,’’ while ‘‘terrorist organizations have set Israel’s annihilation as their goal.’’16 
 Contrary  to the common view that jurisprudence on cases from the Occupied 
Territories has been critical of governmental action and rights-minded,17 some authors have 
insisted on the legitimizing effects produced by the supreme court’s rulings. According to 
David Kretzmer, the institution’s ‘‘dominant narrative holds that the state is being attacked, 
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the authorities are trying to protect it, and the ultimate duty of the Court is to assist them in 
this task.’’18 As argued in chapter three, this type of discourse is not in contradiction with the 
raison d’être of constitutional courts, as the possibility  of enmity and the correlative 
necessity to defend society  are embedded in the constitutional order of contemporary 
democracies. 
 In that general sense, courts are not neutral arbitrators of the politics of enmity. Yet, 
they  are also not neutral in a second and more specific way which varies depending on 
contexts. As argued by  Stéphanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle, ‘‘constitutionalism is 
ultimately  about envisioning the state. And rightly  or wrongly, every  polity  envisions its 
particular ‘state’ as a distinct phenomenon, one whose identity  and character are uniquely of 
its own.’’19 Yet, the vision of the state and the ‘‘national’’ which constitutionalism articulates 
is not specific to every polity in virtue of the cultural mold that fashions it, but because it is 
politically  shaped in each instance by particular and selective forces. The Israeli case 
demonstrates the role played by the court’s perception of the unique ‘‘identity  and 
character’’ of the state thus conceived in its constitutional jurisprudence.  
 Central to that perception is the notion of Israel as the state of the Jewish people. 
 Although the Court has dismissed claims of a contradiction between this notion and 
 the democratic principle, particularistic elements involved in the Zionist ideology of 
 a Jewish state or state of the Jewish people are entrenched in its jurisprudence. The 
 interests of the Jewish collective are seen as synonymous with the public good, or the 
 interests of the state itself. These judges cannot be neutral in a case involving any act 
 perceived as challenging these interests.20 
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 Similarly, the Constitutional Court of Korea operates within an order of discourse 
where politics of enmity and politics of identity are deeply intertwined, with their respective 
ambiguities and possible contradictions. While the court can be seen as less assertive than 
some of its counterparts when war and peace are involved, its refusal to review a series of 
challenges to South Korea’s military policies can also be interpreted as amounting to the 
projection of a certain ‘‘national’’ imaginary, by preventing competing ones from unfolding 
on the site of constitutional adjudication. 
Going to Iraq: whose political judgment is to be trusted?
 In 2003, a constitutional complaint  was filed against the executive’s decision to 
dispatch South Korea’s armed forces to Iraq. It emanated from a single petitioner assisted by 
a court-appointed lawyer, since being represented by  counsel is a prerequisite to any 
proceeding before the Constitutional Court of Korea.21 Notwithstanding the significance of 
the stake, the request was characterized by a strong lack of organizational support behind the 
petitioner’s claim. The court  even found itself forced to reformulate the subject  matter raised 
by the complaint, which was not viewed as appropriately framed. Indeed, the petition 
originally  challenged the ‘‘decision of the National Security Council of October 18, 2003 to 
dispatch private soldiers to Iraq,’’ mainly  on the ground that this initiative violated article 5 
of the constitution by which South Korea ‘‘shall renounce all aggressive wars.’’22  As the 
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National Security  Council (‘‘kukka anjŏn pojang hoeŭi’’) is no more than ‘‘the advisory 
organization established by the Constitution for the President to consult in forming foreign 
policies and military policies concerning national security,’’ the court reasoned that its 
resolutions were not legally binding. It instead deemed the president’s decision to send the 
national armed forces to Iraq as the proper matter of review in the case.23 
 The inadequate formulation of the issue was not the reason why the court declined to 
review the request. While all the justices were in favor of its dismissal, they diverged over 
the justification of their common position. A minority of judges held that the complainant 
lacked ‘‘self-relatedness,’’ not having any of his basic rights directly  infringed upon. Indeed, 
‘‘the complainant is, as the complainant admits himself, not a party concerned who will be 
dispatched due to the detachment decision at issue in this case, nor is the complainant 
presently or is scheduled to be in military service.’’24  This procedural, and potentially 
surmountable, obstacle was not the one however identified by the rest of the court. Instead, 
the majority did not find the court qualified to settle the issue raised by the complaint in the 
first place. Claiming that ‘‘a decision to dispatch Armed Forces requires a resolution of 
highly  political nature based upon the consideration of total circumstances concerning 
domestic and international political relations,’’ most justices reasoned that ‘‘such a decision 
is to be made by the institution representative of the constituents therefor, by way of prudent 
decision-making through an expansive and extensive deliberation with the experts in the 
relevant field.’’25
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 In ruling so, the Constitutional Court of Korea seems at first to have completely 
deferred to the wishes of the political branches, and in particular of the executive. The Roh 
Moo-hyun administration then in power (2003-2008) had clearly warned the court against an 
undue exercise of judicial review through the opinion filed by  the Ministry of National 
Defense (‘‘kukpangbu’’), acting as respondent to the case. Its opinion affirmed that the 
decision to dispatch the armed forces to Iraq constituted an ‘‘executive prerogative action,’’ 
authorized by the constitution, premised upon ‘‘a determination of a highly political nature,’’ 
likely to receive the democratic legitimation of the parliament, and against which the 
constitutional court would have no means to enforce a decision of unconstitutionality. With 
this admonition, the government insisted on making the court aware that:
 [S]hould the above detachment decision obtain the consent of the National Assembly, 
 it would be inappropriate for the Constitutional Court, which is not on par with the 
 legislative branch in terms of democratic legitimacy to determine the constitutionality 
 of the above decision; and, should there be a decision holding the above decision 
 unconstitutional, there is no legal method to enforce such a decision. As the judicial 
 review over an executive prerogative action or political question should be restrained, 
 the constitutional complaint in this case is unjustified.26
 A majority of justices conceded that ‘‘an utmost deference’’ was owed to the elected 
political branches in the case at  hand, provided that the executive’s decision received the 
consent of the National Assembly. The court underlined that parliamentary approval was 
required by the constitution in order to ‘‘prevent arbitrary  warfare or dispatch of Armed 
Forces by  mandating prudence in exercising the prerogative of supreme command of 




than earlier jurisprudence on the necessity  of reviewing ‘‘executive prerogative action,’’28 it 
nonetheless made reference to the possible arbitrariness of a decision taken by the 
presidency alone. 
 This was not the only source of criticism infused by the justices in their ruling. On 
the one hand, the court did not manifest much confidence in the capacity of any  of the 
political branches to make the right judgment about the nature and consequences of the war. 
On the other hand, it confessed that the verdict which it could itself deliver on the matter was 
unlikely to ‘‘assertively  be more right or correct than that of the President or the National 
Assembly’’ given the ‘‘limited materials and information’’ at  the court’s disposal. The court 
was also concerned that its judgment ‘‘may not securely receive public trust.’’ In these 
conditions, ‘‘whether or not the dispatch at issue in this case is in violation of the 
Constitution, that is, whether such decision will ultimately benefit the interest of the 
citizenry and the nation by  enhancing national security, and whether the war in Iraq is a war 
of aggression that is in violation of international norms, should be judged by the 
representative institutions of the President and the National Assembly, and may not be 
appropriately judged by this Court that is by nature in possession of no more than limited 
materials and information.’’29
  Rather than an optimal solution, this choice appeared as the lesser of two evils. The 
court did not respect the decision of the political branches because it trusted the soundness of 
their discernment, but out of doubt for its own capacity to make a better judgment and to 
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receive pubic support. In 2004, the year when the complaint  was dismissed, the court gained 
unprecedented visibility after nullifying the impeachment motion voted by the parliament 
against President Roh Moo-hyun.30 The impeachment case represented a turning-point as, 
‘‘upon seeing the Court adjudicate the fall-out between the two political branches of the 
government, many citizens for the first time were alerted to the tremendous influence it 
could have on the political scene.’’31  The case on the war in Iraq preceded the court’s 
decision on Roh’s impeachment by a few weeks, and while the court’s consideration for the 
public perception of its jurisprudence was not new, the salience that the institution enjoyed at 
the time could only reinforce its long-time concern for establishing itself as a non-partisan 
actor. 
 In the case about South Korea’s military participation to the war in Iraq, the court did 
not construe abstaining from judicial review as a desirable thing in itself, premised on the 
political nature of the issue under review. While the court was willing to trust neither the 
judgment of the political branches nor its own, it did identify one legitimate censor of the 
resolution to go to war: the electorate, who would eventually hold the responsible decision-
makers accountable at the ballot box.32  Towards the very end of the ruling, the court’s 
deference was also justified in comparative light as the majority  claimed that its position 
conformed to ‘‘judicial self-restraint over the matters concerning diplomacy and national 
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defense that require a resolution of highly political nature in other nations with a long 
tradition of democracy.’’33 
 While the U.S. Supreme Court was not explicitly  cited by  the South Korean judges, 
there is little doubt that their allusion to issues ‘‘of a highly political nature’’ made reference 
to the ‘‘political question doctrine’’ associated with American jurisprudence. According to it, 
courts are expected to eschew reviewing questions which are by essence political, and not 
legal. However, the doctrine appears more as a resource forged and used by courts than as a 
limit which actually constrains their jurisdiction. In the United States, ‘‘the record from 1789 
to the Steel Seizure Case of 1952 is replete with court cases that scrutinized presidential 
claims for emergency power and frequently  found them wanting. It was only with the 
Vietnam War that courts began to systematically avoid war power questions.’’34 Even after 
the jurisprudential turn of the Vietnam era, the courts did not completely  abstain from 
reviewing issues of warfare and foreign relations. They only  deferred to the decisions of 
authorities whenever they  found them constitutionally empowered, an attitude which ‘‘needs 
no special doctrine’’ to be described and has been pursued through other instruments than the 
idea of non-justiciable ‘‘political questions.’’35 This is evidenced by  the Constitutional Court 
of Korea’s own record of dismissing war-related matters without claiming that they  raised 
issues ‘‘of a highly political nature.’’ 
 Courts can intervene in issues which are politically loaded and sensitive in the field 
of war and peace, but  only  some actually do. Even through this difference, which is in itself 
significant, they all continue to operate within a shared order of discourse in which 
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possibilities are multiple, but not infinite. The limits met by courts which actively intervene 
in this policy area are not fundamentally different from those of the institutions which 
strategically  opt for being more cautious, as exemplified when comparing the 2004 rulings 
on Iraq delivered by  South Korea’s constitutional court and its counterpart in Costa Rica, the 
constitutional chamber of the supreme court or Sala IV. In both cases, the two courts 
reinforced a certain way of envisioning their respective states and national destinies.
Ruling on Iraq in Costa Rica and South Korea: from antithesis to mirror image
 The constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court  of Justice of Costa Rica was 
created in 1989, following a constitutional amendment, and it has since undoubtedly 
provided ‘‘the strongest, most consistent example of a court that regularly  engages in both 
types of constitutional control’’ - namely arbitrating interbranch conflict and enforcing rights 
- in Latin America.36 Its 2004 ruling against  the presidential decision to support the war in 
Iraq is usually cited as one of the most eloquent demonstrations of the court’s assertiveness. 
Contrasting the Sala IV’s judgment of unconstitutionality with the Constitutional Court of 
Korea’s dismissal importantly sheds light upon differences as well as commonalities 
between the constraints and possibilities of the two institutions. 
 Both countries first share a system of constitutional justice which is widely 
accessible, making it possible for individual complaints challenging the executive’s 
endorsement of the war in Iraq to have directly reached each court. The system leading to the 
Sala IV is even more open than its South Korean equivalent since ‘‘under the new chamber’s 
operating rules, anyone in Costa Rica (without regard for age, gender, or nationality) can file 
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a case with the Sala IV at any  time of day and any day of the year, without formalities, 
lawyers, fees, or an understanding of the point of law on which the claimant is appealing. 
Claims can be handwritten or typed on anything [‘‘this has previously included a case 
written on a paper used to wrap bread’’] and in any language, including Braille.’’37 
Moreover, the case on the war in Iraq reveals a broader conception of justiciable interests in 
Costa Rica than in South Korea when it comes to constitutional requests. While the Costa 
Rican constitution recognizes ‘‘the right to petition any  public official or State entity,’’38 no 
prerequisite such as a present and direct infringement on the complainant’s basic rights is 
necessary  for his or her request to be admissible. Argument about petitioners’ lack of ‘‘self-
relatedness’’ - as advanced by the minority in the South Korean ruling - would have been 
irrelevant for the Sala IV, which considers as justiciable any ‘‘interest which concerns the 
collectivity as a whole.’’39 
 The petition challenging the executive’s decision to support the war in Iraq was 
brought before the court by a coalition of individuals, including a law student, the 
representative of the Lawyers’ Association of Costa Rica, and the ‘‘Defender of the 
Inhabitants’’ - i.e., the country’s ombudsman. They  all alleged that the pacifist vocation of 
the country, affirmed in the constitution, was violated when the presidency  declared that the 
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obtain prompt resolution are guaranteed’’ (Article 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica).
39 Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Resolución 2004-09992. The judgment is available in 
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country  could not be neutral ‘‘in the conflict between peace and terrorism.’’40 Contrary to the 
claims of the complainants, the court did not find that the executive’s statements were 
tantamount to a war declaration against Iraq, but that they only expressed the 
administration’s moral support toward the United States and its allies. In ruling so, the court 
followed the prosecution’s argument that the executive never tried to deny that Costa Rica 
was constitutionally  committed to peace and incapacitated to be at war given its 
renouncement to the maintenance of armed forces. 
 The Sala IV did not sanction the administration’s support to the war in Iraq as a 
declaration of war violating the constitutional value of peace. Instead, its invalidation was 
pronounced in virtue of ‘‘the impossibility of our government to tie its foreign policy to 
belligerent actions outside or even parallel to the United Nations system - including of 
course those actions which consist in mere manifestations of ‘moral support’ - as the proper 
means to solve conflicts.’’41 In so far as military  actions in Iraq were taken outside the frame 
of the United Nations, the constitutional judges concluded that the administration could not 
support them and should therefore request the exclusion of Costa Rica from the list of 
countries part of the U.S.-led coalition. 
 As underlined by the constitutional chamber itself, no party in the case contested the 
existence of peace as a constitutional commitment and valid standard by which to ‘‘confront 
and judge’’ the acts of the state. The court was however the only one to stress that peace 
cannot be construed as an absolute value prevailing in all circumstances. Its verdict thus 
affirmed that Costa Rica’s fundamental vocation to pacifism ‘‘does not mean that the country 
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Moreover, in the conflict between peace and terrorism, we are not neutral.  Costa Rica is and will be a loyal, 
firm, and determined ally supporting those who search peace, freedom, democracy and the respect of 
international law.’’ Ibidem.
41 Ibidem.
is left with no possibility of defense, but instead that it has opted for the international system 
of institutions to provide the respect of its rights and its defense in case of necessity.’’42 If the 
possibility of war remains inscribed in the constitutional order, any action related to it - 
including mere moral support - is therefore unthinkable outside the frame of the United 
Nations upon which Costa Rica’s security is ultimately premised.
 In a sense, the South Korean context is the mirror image of this configuration. The 
country’s security  being historically anchored in its post-1945 alliance with the United 
States, participating to the war in Iraq was construed by the court as involving ‘‘various 
elements concerning national interest such as the relationship  with the allies,’’ itself tied to 
the perspective of an ‘‘amicable settlement of the nuclear situation in North Korea.’’43 The 
connection between Seoul’s role in the coalition and its strategy  towards Pyongyang was 
clearly  part  of the political and public debate about Iraq in South Korea. Roh Moo-hyun, 
who took his presidential functions in February 2003 and endeavored to sustain the 
‘‘Sunshine Policy’’ initiated by his predecessor Kim Dae-jung, saw no conflict between the 
two.44  On the contrary, Roh defended that ‘‘the operation serves the larger interests of a 
country  whose foreign policy is founded upon its alliance with the United States’’ and was 
associated with ‘‘signs of a softer line from America towards North Korea in talks aimed at 
dismantling Pyongyang’s nuclear-weapons program.’’45 
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45 The Economist, ‘‘South Korea and Iraq. Murder and Its Consequences,’’ June 24, 2004.
 In August 2003, a few months after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Six-Party Talks 
(‘‘6-cha hoedam’’) involving North Korea, the United States, South Korea, China (who 
hosted the negotiations), Japan, and Russia, had indeed been formally started in response to 
the crisis unleashed by the North’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 
January of the same year. The South Korean administration’s paradoxical construction of the 
country’s support  to the war in Iraq as potentially favoring ‘‘an amicable settlement of the 
nuclear situation in North Korea and the solidification of the South Korea - U.S. alliance’’ 
was insisted upon in the opinion which the Minister of Defense presented to the 
Constitutional Court of Korea, and which the institution largely endorsed.46
 Interpreted as emanating from the strategic and symbolic considerations given to 
each country’s ultimate alliances, the South Korean and Costa Rican rulings present a strong 
similarity, privileging the paradigm and structures which are eventually relied upon for 
national defense (the bilateral partnership with the United States on the one hand, the 
multilateral framework of the United Nations on the other hand). Discursively, the two 
decisions are also united by the relativity of peace as a constitutional value. Like any other 
fundamental interest  or right in the constitutional order of contemporary  democracies, the 
commitment to peace is prone to recede at  the point where its preservation may endanger the 
state. In the end, both verdicts also share a common sense of restraint vis-à-vis judging the 
nature of the war in Iraq. None engaged with the issue of determining the legitimacy  of the 
conflict, neither from a military point of view nor from the perspective of international law. 
Courts which intervene in military issues are always very cautious to define the confines, 
and correlative force, of their expertise. As contended by the Supreme Court of Israel in a 
different context,
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 Judicial review does not examine the wisdom of the decision to engage in military 
 activity. In exercising judicial review, we examine the legality  of the military activity. 
 Therefore, we assume that the military activity that took place [...] was necessary 
 from a military  standpoint. The question before us is whether this military  activity 
 satisfies the national and international standards that determine the legality  of that 
 activity. The fact that  the activity  is necessary  on the military plane, does not mean 
 that it  is lawful on the legal plane. Indeed, we do not substitute our discretion for that 
 of the military  commander’s, as far as it concerns military considerations. That is his 
 expertise. We examine the results on the plane of the humanitarian law. That is our 
 expertise.47      
‘‘If you want peace, and rights, prepare for war’’
 The idea that preparing for war may be a means for peace is a theme which 
permeates the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Korea. The constitution’s 
pacifism is not limited to a commitment in favor of ‘‘international peace,’’ but also includes 
the declaration that ‘‘the Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and 
carry  out a policy  of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and 
democracy.’’48  Yet, the attitude of the North is largely construed as one of ‘‘hostile 
opposition’’ by the constitutional court, and peace as remaining an unrealized horizon. The 
voice of the institution should not however be analyzed as if it  conveyed a metaphor or 
synecdoche for how South Korean society as a whole envisions the division. On the 
contrary, what cases before the constitutional court  precisely point at is the presence of a 
fundamental disagreement, not only about the meaning of current dynamics in the peninsula 
but about the very modalities of envisioning the ‘‘national.’’ 
 For instance, a complaint was filed in 2007 against the annual joint military  practice 
conducted between the United States and South Korea on the ground that it constituted a 
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military provocation toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.49 Contrary to the 
request made by an isolated complainant against the decision to take part in Iraq, the present 
petition was brought by some ninety-eight individuals represented by a variety  of law firms. 
Their request characterized the military exercise, operated once a year throughout the 
South’s territory, as a ‘‘preemptive attack practice’’ against North Korea which ‘‘increases 
the possibility of war in the Korean peninsula and threatens the peace of North Asia as well 
as the world.’’50  
 The complaint was unanimously dismissed by the constitutional justices, but on a 
different ground than its involvement of a question ‘‘of a highly  political nature.’’ The court 
first reasoned that the challenged practice could not be reviewed as an exercise of power by 
the South Korean government, thereby granting a special status to military initiatives with 
the United States but also, and paradoxically, reinforcing a vision of the state’s sovereignty 
as incomplete. By  contrast, the condemnation of the South’s dependence vis-à-vis the United 
States has been at the heart of the alternative ‘‘national’’ imaginary  promoted by the pro-
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50 Ibidem.
democracy  movement since the 1980s, which translated into the seduction exerted over 
activists by North Korea’s ‘‘chuch’e sasang’’ or ideology of self-reliance.51 Indeed,
 It was after the 1980 Gwangju [Kwangju] Democracy  Movement that anti-
 Americanism emerged as an enduring theme in South Korea’s social movements. In 
 contrast to the preceding decades, anti-Americanism loomed as a prominent issue in 
 the pro-democracy movement of the 1980s led by people’s movement (minjung 
 undong) groups (Henderson 1986). The anti-American movement in South Korea 
 began to assume a strong and volatile character. Widespread public perception and 
 suspicions that the United States had been involved in the consolidation of Chun 
 Doo-hwan’s authoritarian regime and the deadly suppression of the Gwangju 
 Uprising fueled the dramatic shift  of focus to anti-Americanism (Shin and Hwang 
 2003).52
 The post-transition period has remained characterized by waves of anti-Americanism, 
with peaks in 1988 (crystallizing around demands for an official investigation of Kwangju 
and for reunification in the wake of the regime change), 1995 (following the Seoul Public 
Prosecutors’ Office’s decision not to prosecute those responsible for Kwangju), 2002 (after 
two middle school girls were killed in a U.S. military armor vehicle accident), 2004 
(coinciding with the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s decision to dispatch troops in Iraq), and 
2006 (over the Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Korea).53  Over the years, 
protests have however morphed, with the ‘‘essential anti-Americanism’’ of the late 1980s 
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52  Sunhyuk Kim and Eun Sun Lee, ‘‘ ‘Dynamics of Contention’ in Democratic Korea. The Role of Anti-
Americanism,’’ Korea Journal, Vol.51, No.2, 2011, p.235.
53 Ibidem, p.238.
decreasing in favor of ‘‘policy-level and [military] base-related anti-Americanism,’’ the latter 
accounting for the majority of protest events in the early 2000s.54
 While the constitutional court eschewed the issue of the joint military  exercise’s 
potential negative impact on inter-Korean relations and peace in the Northeast Asian region, 
it nonetheless appreciated whether the petitioners’ right to peaceful livelihood was being 
infringed. Earlier in its jurisprudence, the court had unanimously consecrated such a right 
after local inhabitants challenged the relocation of a U.S. military base nearby their place of 
residence. Although ‘‘prior to South Korea’s democratic transition in 1987, social and 
environmental externalities derived from the U.S. bases attracted little attention from the 
public,’’55 mobilization started to coalesce in the 1990s against the relocation of a base near 
the city of Pyeongtaek (P’yŏngt'aek), which led to the filing of a constitutional complaint in 
2005.
 While the complaint  itself was dismissed in 2006, the existence of a right to live 
peacefully was nonetheless derived from the constitution on that occasion. 
 Today, being free from war, terrorism and violence are prerequisites for the 
 realization of  human dignity and value as well as for the pursuit of happiness. 
 Although there is no express  provision in the Constitution that states such 
 fundamental rights, it is necessary to protect such rights as the rights to live 
 peacefully, as we can draw from Article 10 and Article 37 Section 1 of the 
 Constitution. The basic contents of such rights is to ask the country for peaceful 
 livelihood which would not be forced upon by committing aggression.56
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 In 2009, a majority of justices decided to overturn this precedent and negate the right 
to peaceful livelihood, holding that the latter was not guaranteed by  the constitution and that 
the petitioners therefore lacked a justiciable interest to challenge the joint military practice.57 
Four justices concurred with the majority’s dismissal of the case but contested its repudiation 
of the right  to peaceful livelihood. Their discourse is interesting on several accounts. First of 
all, the right to live peacefully was defined as prohibiting ‘‘the state’s act of drafting citizens 
to an aggressive war and leaving them under the threat of terror.’’58  This reasoning 
demonstrates that making judgments about war and peace is not conceived as an 
impossibility  within the Constitutional Court of Korea and that, under the above 
circumstances, warfare could be found unconstitutional by at least a minority of justices. 
Second, it  is essential to note that this assertive position was never premised on construing 
peace as an absolute commitment. If it exists, the right to peaceful livelihood creates a 
number of obligations upon the state but does not imply an unconditional right to live 
without war.
 Of course, peace without war cannot be achieved only by an individual country’s will 
 and efforts and, thus, the right to peaceful livelihood does not mean the right to live 
 without any kind of war and the right to oppose any type of war operation and 
 military practice. The basic rights of citizens exist contingent upon the existence of a 
 state and its basic order of liberal democracy. Even for the citizens’ basic rights, it is 
 unavoidable to conduct a war and other military operation to protect land and citizens 
 and to defend liberal democracy. Therefore, a state is allowed to: 1) impose the 
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 military duty on its citizens; 2) organize and maintain military force; and 3) conduct 
 military practices for the above mentioned purpose.59
 The concept of readiness for war which emerges from these decisions is not only tied 
to preserving peace and the state, but also democracy and basic rights. As asserted by Kim 
Jong-dae in a separate concurring opinion to the ruling on the joint military practice, the 
existence of fundamental rights is conditioned by the permanence of a certain institutional 
order, without which civil liberties would never be effective.  
 The concept of basic right may not remain apart from the Constitution. The 
 Constitution is premised [on] the existence of a state and therefore the basic right 
 cannot be conceptualized apart from the existence of a state. Therefore, the existence 
 of a state is the basis of the basic right and it is the premise to the guarantee of the 
 basic right. The existence of a state is threatened when a war erupts. A war is the fight 
 for life against an enemy state (including anti-state organization or de facto state). 
 Depending on the result  of a war, the existence of a state and citizens’ basic rights 
 may  not be promised. [...] Therefore, a state should not be negligent in the 
 preparation of a war with continuous military practice.60
 This understanding of rights contrasts with the jus naturalist vision of them as being 
embedded in human nature rather than institutions. This divide somehow echoes the 
distinction between human rights and basic rights, the latter being institutionally guaranteed 
in the context of a state, through a constitution, and to citizens. It also illustrates the multiple 
possibilities of legal discourse depending on the place from which it emanates. The 
possibilities of a normative discourse on law are different from those of the institutionalized 





The domestic functionality of war-waking: an illustration with South Korea’s participation in 
Vietnam 
     
 Within the structural boundaries which all courts share and by  which their 
jurisprudence is being shaped, what courts actually do also depends on how strongly or 
weakly  their decisions are complied with by  other relevant  actors of policy-making. In this 
respect, a striking difference between the rulings of Costa Rica’s constitutional chamber and 
its South Korean counterpart rested on the reaction of the political branches. While the 
administration openly  warned the Constitutional Court  of Korea that ‘‘there is no legal 
method to enforce’’ its judgment if adverse to the executive and legislature’s policy  on the 
war in Iraq, the Sala IV’s activism has been characterized by  ‘‘a surprising lack of an 
effective political backlash’’ since 1989.61  Following the decision against the country’s 
backing of the war in Iraq, a diplomatic note was sent to the American Embassy in San José 
to request Costa Rica’s withdrawal from the list of nations supporting the operation. As 
commented by then Foreign Minister Roberto Tovar, ‘‘the court has ordered me to get the 
country’s name off that list, and that’s what I'm doing.’’62       
 By contrast, South Korean armed forces have participated to many of the military 
operations in which the United States has been involved in the past few decades. Most 
preeminently, South Korean troops were dispatched to Vietnam between 1964 and 1973. 
With more than 300,000 soldiers deployed, they represented the largest contingent after 
American forces.63 The experience of the Vietnam War, which was not allowed to surface in 
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South Korea’s public memory realm until the 1990s, deserves to be mentioned for what it 
highlights of the country’s military  culture and, to some extent, of its anti-communist politics 
of enmity. Memories of Vietnam remained confined to the private sphere until the center-left 
magazine Hankyoreh 21 published a series of articles on the topic in 1999,64  an endeavor 
which ‘‘was not only  the first large-scale journalistic treatment of the subject in Korea, but 
also the first Korean attempt to corroborate stories of ROK atrocities through investigation in 
Vietnam itself.’’65
 According to Charles Armstrong, a number of hypotheses can be explored in order to 
account for the crimes committed by the South Korean army in the course of the Vietnam 
War: its soldiers’ own experience, mainly as children, of the devastating conflict which 
ravaged the Korean peninsula between 1950 and 1953; the hatred for ‘‘Reds’’ inculcated to 
them through state-sponsored education at school and training in the military; as well as ‘‘the 
difficult interstitial position of Koreans in a war with such glaring racial divides.’’66  
 Most of the ROKs in Vietnam had been young boys during the Korean War and had 
 seen at close range the inhumanity  of that civil conflict. Educated all their lives to 
 consider ‘‘Reds’’ as less than human, such men were well-suited for an 
 anticommunist campaign of violence. The training of ROK frontline soldiers, partly 
 because of the South Korean military’s roots in the  Japanese military, was - and to 
 some extent remains - particularly harsh. Until recently  all  able-bodied South Korean 
 men, with very few exceptions, were required to serve in the military for nearly three 
 years, and basic training was a fearsome ordeal that could sometimes be fatal. It  is 
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 not difficult to imagine these young soldiers, in the confusing conditions of war far 
 from their homeland, few able to speak French or English (much less Vietnamese), 
 losing  their sense of discrimination and control in combat.67
  The ‘‘harsh’’ three-year military training which Armstrong alludes to has been 
reduced to two years but remains an obligation for all South Korean young men. 
Interestingly, both mandatory conscription and the Vietnam War can enrich our 
understanding of the intimate solidarity  between national security and a certain model of 
socio-economic development in South Korea’s post-war history. While this dimension of 
mandatory service will be analyzed in the next section, it can be pointed out for the Vietnam 
War that ‘‘the primary  motivation for ROK participation, and perhaps its greatest long-term 
benefit to South Korea’’ was indeed an economic one. 
 Vietnam was a goldmine for South Korea. A decade earlier, Japanese prime minister 
 Yoshida Shigeru had called the Korean War ‘‘a gift from the gods’’ for stimulating 
 economic development in postwar Japan; without the Korean War, it is unlikely that 
 the U.S. occupation would have ended as early as it did or that the Japanese economy 
 would have taken off as dramatically. Similarly, the Vietnam War spurred the South 
 Korean economy and helped  sustain the Park dictatorship. South Korea’s economic 
 takeoff in the mid-1960s would not   have been possible without the profits gained by 
 fighting for the United States in Vietnam. War-related income in the form of direct 
 aid, military assistance, procurements, and soldiers’ salaries amounted to over $1 
 billion. In 1967 alone war-related income accounted for nearly 4 percent of South 
 Korea’s GNP and 20 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. In particular, South 
 Korea’s emergent heavy industry sector - steel, transportation equipment, 
 chemical exports, and the like - was given an enormous and invaluable boost by the 
 Vietnam War. Major South Korean companies that took off during the war are now 
 household names, including Hyundai, Daewoo, and Hanjin, the parent company of 
 Korean Airlines. Park’s first  five-year plan for Korean economic development was 
 mapped out with Vietnam in mind; the war, for example, largely paid for the 
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 construction of South Korea’s first expressway, the Seoul-Pusan highway, built 
 between 1968 and 1970.68
 Beyond the Vietnam War, the general primacy accorded to national security under 
Park Chung-hee has been indissociable from the modernization project pursued by  the state 
since the 1960s and premised on the mass mobilization of Koreans, not only as workers but 
also as soldiers through mandatory conscription.
The duty of national defense
Discrimination, privileges, and social cohesion
 Chapter II of South Korea’s constitution is dedicated to the rights and duties of 
citizens, which include ‘‘compulsory education’’ (article 31, section 3), the duty to work 
(article 32, section 2), the duty  to pay taxes (article 38), and the duty  of national defense 
(article 39). Voting is only  construed as a right in article 24, not as an obligation. Each of the 
four fundamental responsibilities identified by the basic norm falls on ‘‘all citizens’’ of the 
Republic of Korea. However, the duty of national defense is effected through the 
requirement that all men between 18 and 35 years of age perform a two-year-long 
compulsory  military service. The issue of citizens’ equality  before this constitutional duty 
has been challenged on various grounds. Three types of differential treatment have been 




 As surveyed in chapter three, differential treatment based on gender came under the 
court’s scrutiny several times. On the one hand, women are not mandated to serve in the 
military, an exemption which was examined and confirmed by  the court in 2010.69 On the 
other hand, female students have successfully objected to the extra points that discharged 
soldiers received in hiring examinations for positions in the civil service or in public and 
private companies until the late 1990s.70  Differential treatment has also taken two more 
insidious forms than gender-based bias: a discriminatory  one, as conscientious objection is 
neither allowed on religious nor moral grounds; and a preferential one, since the members 
(and especially sons) of the political and business elites often evade the military  service, 
known for its severe conditions.71  These three phenomena are far from being unrelated, 
highlighting diverse shades of how South Korea’s national community is imagined and 
realized through the duty of national defense. 
 In particular, the exemption of women and the continued heavy criminalization of 
conscientious objection can be interpreted in light of South Korea’s prescribed ‘‘national’’ 
narrative, characterized by its masculinist imaginary and tendency to homogenization.72 In 
this respect, the constitutional court did not miss that reforming the military service directly 
raised the issue of South Korean democracy’s ability  to tolerate minorities, that is to say, of 
whether pluralism is conceived as a value or a threat to social cohesion. In this respect, the 
court’s reluctance to invalidate conservative legislation about conscientious objection, 
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adultery, or abortion does not simply highlight its caution vis-à-vis the political branches or 
public opinion. 
 Instead, this prudence illustrates the court’s fundamental ambivalence toward the 
desirability of enhancing pluralism. According to Choi Jang-Jip, ‘‘the absence of pluralistic 
values or uniformity’’ that characterizes South Korean society is an outcome of the country’s 
modern historical development, in particular of the hyper-concentration of political power 
and economic wealth that took place under the process of authoritarian industrialization in 
the 1960s-1970s, and which has been reinforced ever since.73  The ‘‘great homogeneity  in 
terms of ideology or value orientation’’ that this centripetal configuration has created 
between the political, bureaucratic, and corporate elites (all concentrated in Seoul) has also 
given rise to a system of special privileges and favors among them.74  The evasion of 
conscription can be treated as falling under such system. 
Variants of conscription and objection
 The length of conscription in South Korea depends on the branch of the military 
where service is performed. Since 2008, it  is undergoing a gradual reduction which is 
expected to be completed by 2016: from 24 to 18 months in the Army and Marine Corps, 
from 26 to 20 months in the Navy, from 27 to 21 months in the Air Force.75  Under the 
Military Service Act (‘‘pyŏngyŏkpŏp’’), punishment by up to three years of imprisonment 
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awaits those who do not perform the service ‘‘without any justifiable reason.’’ In addition, 
their employment opportunities are strictly restricted as they cannot become civil servants or 
be hired in a public or private company for five years. While a diagnosed physical or 
psychological disability  qualifies for accomplishing a non-active duty service lasting from 
24 to 36 months, refusal to enlist  for moral or religious reasons is not recognized as an 
acceptable justification. Since the 1990s, the number of imprisoned conscientious objectors 
has been dramatically  on the rise.  As of February  2011, ‘‘a total of 955 men nationwide 
were serving eighteen-month sentences for conscientious refusal to perform military 
service.’’76 Most of them are Jehovah’s Witnesses.
 
Table 14. Annual number of conscientious objectors imprisoned between 1992 and 2007.
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Number 220 277 233 427 355 403 474 513
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number 642 804 734 705 755 828 901 764
Source: Korea Solidarity for Conscientious Objection (KSCO).77
 Imprisonment has only started to replace coerced enrollment in the military since the 
1980s. It is estimated that 3,148 conscientious objectors served prison terms between 1980 
and 1993, 4,058 between 1994 and 2000, and 8,295 from 2001 to 2012.78  In 2009, the 
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Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths (‘‘taet’ongnyŏng sosok ŭimunsa 
chinsang kyumyŏng wiwŏnhoe’’) recognized that five Jehovah’s Witnesses forcibly 
conscripted during the 1970s and 1980s died as a result of the violence unleashed against 
them for refusing to take part in drills and to carry guns.   
 The results of the commission’s inquiry  are shocking even though the five men’s 
 deaths occurred 20 to 30 years ago, during the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan 
 regimes. Men who refused to bear arms were tortured ‘‘by repeatedly dunking their 
 heads in concrete water tanks,’’ and one witness even stated that at least one man was 
 ‘‘hit with a pickaxe for an hour and a half.’’ There was even an instance where one 
 man was ‘‘put in a drum can and made to roll downhill for hours.’’ The treatment was 
 horrific enough for one/some of them to have taken their own lives, though military 
 officials would write up their deaths with statements like ‘‘death during training’’ or 
 ‘‘suicide resulting from mental stress.’’79
 Jehovah’s Witnesses, whose missionaries arrived in the Korean peninsula in 1914, 
were first persecuted during the colonial period. In the late 1930s, ‘‘the Japanese police went 
on a veritable rampage of arrests that spanned across Japan, Taiwan and Korea,’’80 being 
directed at both men and women in the community for their anti-war proselytism and 
resistance to pray at Shinto shrines. Besides their consistent objection to serving in the 
military, Jehovah’s Witnesses are not otherwise marginalized in contemporary South Korea’s 
tolerant religious landscape, fragmented into myriad organizations affiliated with 
Christianity  - which entered Korea in the late 18th century - or Buddhism. Slightly more 
than half of South Koreans identify  themselves with a religion today, with 22.8% declaring 
themselves Buddhists, 18.3% Protestants, 10.9% Catholics, 0.2% Confucians, 0.3% Won 
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Buddhists, and 0.5% claiming another religious affiliation according to the 2005 census.81 As 
noted by the constitutional court, draft-dodging ‘‘has recently spread among the buddhists 
and the pacifists,’’ even though the figures are still scant - the court reported less than ten 
individuals objecting on the ground of their buddhist faith or pacifism between 2001 and 
2003. This paucity does not prevent detractors of the alternative service to greatly fear that 
evading the military service would become a widespread phenomenon on religious and 
moral grounds if conscientious objection was allowed.82 
  Rules shaping the military service - and correlated exemptions - are deeply embedded 
in national contexts. Since 1987, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has 
repeatedly called for states ‘‘to recognize that  conscientious objection to military  service 
should be considered a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion recognized by  the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.’’83  In the Federal Republic of Germany, where 
conscription ended in 2011, the right to conscientious objection has been inscribed in the 
basic law since 1949. According to article 4, section 3 dedicated to the ‘‘freedom of faith, 
conscience, and creed’’: 
 No person shall be compelled against his conscience to render military service 
 involving the  use of arms. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.
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 Article 12a, section 2 added that:
 Any person who, on grounds of conscience, refuses to render military service 
 involving the use of arms may be required to perform alternative service. The 
 duration of alternative service shall not exceed that of military service. Details shall 
 be regulated by a law, which shall not interfere with the freedom to make a decision 
 in accordance with the dictates of conscience, and which shall also provide for the 
 possibility of alternative service not connected with units of the Armed Forces or of 
 the Federal Border Police.
 The first statutes allowing conscientious objection were enacted in Switzerland, 
Norway, and Denmark around World War I. Such recognition has been ‘‘more difficult for 
the less pacific powers, which are under greater stress and involved in a more complex world 
of affairs,’’ but  all France, Britain, and the United States had come to adopt the right to 
conscientious objection by  the early 1970s.84 Since then, each country has also renounced 
mandatory conscription. In the United States, ending the draft  was a campaign promise of 
Richard Nixon and came into effect in 1973, after the U.S. army’s active ground 
participation in Vietnam was discontinued. Prior to it, the American supreme court had 
consecrated the legitimacy of conscientious objection for both religious and non-religious 
motifs,85 while ruling against selective objection to specific wars.86 
 In Israel, the military service is compulsory for both men and women above 18 years 
of age, but important  segments of the population are excluded from its scope. Citizens who 
are Christians, Muslims, Circassians (i.e., Sunni Muslims), as well as ultra-orthodox Jews, 
are not required to serve in the army and may only join it voluntarily. Practically, all Arab 
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citizens (who make up about 20% of Israel’s population) are exempted, excepting Israeli 
Druzes, who were recognized as a distinct ethnic and religious community after the 
establishment of the Israeli state. During their time in the Defense Forces, Druzes, who are 
Arabic-speaking citizens, often serve as translators, especially in the military court  system 
which operates in the West Bank and Gaza.87  Ultra-orthodox Jews (who represent around 
10% of the population) are also exempted, in virtue of the agreement established between 
religious and secular parties at the founding of the state.88  For the rest and majority  of the 
population, the conscript service obligation is long, lasting 36 months for enlisted men and 
21 months for women. Apart from the exemptions granted to the ultra-orthodox community, 
no conscientious objection is allowed for Jewish males. Those who refuse to enlist in the 
military or to serve in the Occupied Territories risk a prison sentence handed by a military 
tribunal. 
 In his analysis of U.S. national security jurisprudence, Seth Waxman has contrasted 
the deferential attitude of American judges in times of crisis with the more right-protective 
approach of their Israeli counterparts, highlighting how the latter’s service in the army could 
be a potential factor to understand why they ‘‘have been far less inclined to accept at face 
value claims of national security  necessity.’’89  Interestingly, students of South Korea’s 
Judicial Research and Training Institute, in charge of preparing future judges and 
prosecutors, only  undergo four weeks of military training after the completion of their 
studies at the JRTI. The case of one judicial trainee, Baek Jong-geon (Paek Chong-gŏn) 
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became publicized in 2011 after he refused, as a Jehovah’s Witness, to perform this abridged 
version of the draft, exposing himself to an 18-month sentence as well as an incapacity to be 
recruited as a judge or prosecutor, or to register as an attorney, for five years after his 
release.90 
 The existence of a conflict of sovereignty, as experienced by Israel and South Korea, 
is not however an insuperable hurdle to recognize the right to conscientious objection, as 
illustrated by the case of West Germany and more recently, Taiwan. Article 20 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China provides that ‘‘the people shall have the duty to render 
military service in accordance with law.’’ Conscientious objection was nonetheless made 
possible by legislation in 2000, when a civilian service was introduced as an alternative to 
the draft concerning all men between 19 and 35 years of age. As a result, Taiwan became 
‘‘the first Asian country with a compulsory military [service] to allow conscientious 
objectors a non-military option.’’91  At the time of the enactment, twenty-four Jehovah’s 
Witnesses were serving lengthy prison sentences. In 2010, Taiwan started its transition to an 
all-volunteer force and is expected to complete it by 2015.92 
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Areas of agreement and disagreement in the judgment on conscientious objection 
 On August 28, 2004, the Constitutional Court of Korea delivered its ruling on the 
constitutionality of article 88, section 1 of the Military  Service Act criminalizing the failure 
to enroll for active military service with no justifiable cause. The verdict intervened only a 
few months after the Seoul Southern District Court’s unprecedented decision to acquit three 
Jehovah’s Witnesses objecting to serving in the army.93 In its groundbreaking judgment, the 
tribunal argued that ‘‘the intention of the Constitution is a clear manifestation of not 
intervening in the inner freedom of individual conscience’’ and underlined that the right to 
refuse serving in the military was recognized in the international law of human rights.94 
Indeed, while the right to conscientious objection does not explicitly figure in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which South Korea joined in 1990, it was first  affirmed by  the UN Commission on Human 
Rights in 1987, and later derived from article 18 of both the UDHR and ICCPR in 1989.95
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(Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
 By the time the constitutional court rendered its decision, the verdict of the Seoul 
Southern District Court - the first judicial decision ever in favor of objectors to the 
compulsory  military service in South Korea - had however been overruled by the supreme 
court.96 It was in this heated context that the awaited constitutional clarification of the issue 
came. The 2004 constitutional decision consisted of a ruling endorsed by five members, the 
separate concurring opinions of two justices, and the joint dissenting opinion of another pair 
of judges. The majority’s judgment can be characterized as a deferent defense of 
conscientious objection, taking to heart  the meaning of the freedom of conscience and 
refusal to perform the military service, while not pronouncing the latter’s criminalization 
unconstitutional. Below the surface question of whether punishing conscientious objection 
was constitutional or not, a fundamental source of disagreement between the judges 
stemmed from their conflicting visions of the legislature’s responsibility and the court’s role 
in relation to this issue. 
 In this respect, the majority ruling appeared to have more in common with the 
dissenting opinion than with the two concurring contributions. Both the majority and dissent 
importantly emphasized the duty falling upon the legislative branch to reconcile the freedom 
of conscience and the necessity of national defense. Moreover, their approach to 
conscientious objection stressed how reforming the compulsory military service involved 
major challenges for South Korea as a democratic society, such as determining ‘‘whether our 
society is now mature enough to understand and tolerate the conscientious objectors.’’97 By 
contrast, Kwon Seong and Lee Sang-kyun, two parliament’s nominees, wrote separate 
opinions in which they concurred with the majority’s determination of constitutionality, but 
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denounced its recommendations to the legislature as inappropriate under the separation of 
powers - a condemnation which a fortiori applied to the dissent’s criticism and censure of 
the National Assembly’s attitude.
 While five justices upheld the constitutionality of the current system, they also 
declared their dissatisfaction with the heavy sacrifice imposed on the freedom of conscience 
and urged the legislature to seriously consider the possibility of creating an alternative to the 
present state of things. The dissent clearly  situated itself in the continuity of the majority’s 
reasoning, but advocated the invalidation of article 88, section 1 of the Military  Service Act 
on the ground that the National Assembly failed to even try solving the existing antagonism 
between the constitutional values at stake - on the one hand, the duty  of national defense 
provided for in article 39; on the other hand, the freedom of conscience consecrated in article 
19 of the constitution, but limitable like any other basic rights ‘‘when necessary for national 
security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare’’ under article 37.98  As 
written by the dissent,
 We agree with the majority opinion with respect  to the constitutional meaning and 
 importance of national defense and the political and social reality  of our nation. 
 However [...] we are of the opinion that the legislators have failed to make the 
 minimum of the effort that is necessary and possible notwithstanding the fact that  we 
 have reached the stage where we should search for an alternative for settling the 
 conflict between the constitutional values of the freedom of conscience of the 
 conscientious objectors and the duty of national defense.99
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 Ironically, both Kim Kyung-il and Jeon Hyo-sook, the two dissenting judges, were 
nominated by the chief justice of the supreme court, an institution whose stance against 
conscientious objection was strongly reaffirmed when the Seoul Southern District Court’s 
acquittal was overturned in 2004. Kim and Jeon’s opinion was first and foremost directed 
against the parliament, showing no indulgence for its ‘‘failure to make the minimum effort’’ 
in favor of a ‘‘necessary  and possible’’ alternative to conscription and sanctioning its 
negligence as an undue restriction of basic rights. The majority  agreed that ‘‘if the legislators 
do not present an alternative while an alternative may be presented without obstructing the 
public interest or the legal order, this may be unconstitutional as a unilateral compulsion of 
sacrifice upon the freedom of conscience.’’100  Yet, the five justices did not go so far as to 
assert that such alternative could be presented, finding arguments both in support and 
opposition to it. They made clear that the National Assembly  had a responsibility to debate 
the possibility of a reform, which it would nonetheless be free to adopt or reject. 
 The difficulties identified in relation to the implementation of an alternative service 
were multiple. Importantly, they were not confined to the national security puzzle posed by 
the continued ‘‘hostile opposition’’ between the two Koreas, as the court described the 
situation in the peninsula. Two other issues were raised by the majority  and dissent in 
relation to the meaning of recognizing conscientious objection in contemporary South 
Korean society: the protection accorded to the rights of minorities, and the demand for 
equality  in sharing the burden of national defense. By  addressing these questions, the 
constitutional court demonstrated that the duty  of national defense is irreducible to the 
division in several ways. 
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 Conversely, constitutional disagreements over conscientious objection remained 
premised upon a number of consensual postulates: that inter-Korean relations are 
characterized by the continued hostility between the North and the South, and that 
mandatory conscription itself is necessary and legitimate. This last viewpoint has been 
largely uncontested in society at large, including by the opponents to military rule under the 
regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. 
 Despite their vociferous opposition to the NSDC [National Student Defense Corps, a 
 government controlled student body organized as a paramilitary unit] and the 
 compulsory  military  training at school and at military bases for male university 
 students (known as chŏnbang ipso hullyŏn), protesting students remained silent about 
 military conscription. Under the Military Service Law of 1949, which became 
 effective in 1957, all South Korean men aged eighteen years or above, except for 
 those considered ‘‘physically or socially undesirable,’’ were required to serve in the 
 military. With the exception of a few Jehovah’s Witnesses and a very small number of 
 other individuals who refused to serve on religious grounds, no student 
 conscientiously  objected to the military service. Intense anticommunist  education, in 
 addition to the repeatedly emphasized notion that military was ‘‘men’s national 
 duty,’’ rendered the students unable to consider conscription in terms of individual 
 freedom or conscience. [...] The student movement was highly nationalistic and its 
 subculture - even as it opposed militarism in South Korean society - militaristic.101
 The military service is not only connected to ways in which the South Korean nation 
is imagined (as strong and manly), but concretized (as non-pluralistic and discriminatory). 
These projections’ compatibility  with basic rights and democratic values have been 
questioned by constitutional jurisprudence. The examination undertaken by the court has 
however remained superficial, leaving aside the processes in which intolerance and 
inequality are rooted. These blind spots of constitutional discourse overlap with the ones 
identified in relation to the sources and functions of anti-communism in South Korean 
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society. They  not only constrain the discursive order in which the court operates, but shape 
the nature and extent of the consolidation effects produced by its jurisprudence. 
Beneath upholding the ban: the court’s contribution to a certain way of envisioning the 
‘‘national’’
 First of all, it  has to be underlined that assessing the security predicament of the 
Korean peninsula does not constitute an object of dispute in constitutional jurisprudence in 
general, and in the decision over conscientious objection in particular. Two features are 
consistently put forth by the court to characterize the division: the continued hostility 
between the North and the South on the one hand; and the incomparability of their crisis 
situation on the other hand. As argued by the majority in 2004,
 Our nation is the only divided nation in the world that is under the state of truce, and 
 the South and the North are still in a hostile opposition state based upon extremely 
 strong military  powers accumulated through the arms races in the past. Under this 
 unique security situation, the duty of military service and the principle of equality in 
 allocating the burden of military service have an important meaning that is 
 incomparable to other nations. Although it is true that there has been a change in the 
 concept of national defense and the aspect of modern warfare, the proportion of 
 human military resources in the national defense power may still not be neglected, 
 and the natural decrease in the military resources due to the decrease of  birth-rate of 
 these days should also be taken into consideration.102 
 This depiction was agreed on by all the justices, including the dissenting ones. 
Consensus over construing national security did not prevent the existence of divergences on 
other grounds. Yet, never was conscientious objection defended at the expense of the state’s 
safety  - never could it  have been. As affirmed by Kim Kyung-il and Jeon Hyo-sook, ‘‘we do 
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not claim in this situation that the conflict [between the basic right to freedom of conscience 
and national security] should be resolved by choosing the side of the protection of 
conscience notwithstanding the debilitation of military  power or injury  to the equality  in the 
burden of military service.’’103 Not disarming the state is indeed part of the discursive order 
shared by all judicial institutions and rulings, whether they tend to be ‘‘conservative’’ or 
‘‘progressive.’’ Even decisions which seemingly  settle the balance between national security 
and basic rights in favor of the latter abide by this boundary of judicial action: no court 
intentionally  seeks to make the state more vulnerable. Different visions may compete of 
where its ultimate strength resides, but consolidating the state is a common horizon of 
judgements. The following eloquent formula from the majority encapsulates the epistemic 
solidarity articulated by constitutional courts between basic rights and the stability of 
institutional structures: ‘‘No freedom that is a fundamental right may serve as the ground for 
disintegrating the state and the legal order.’’104
 Neither the majority nor the dissent however reasoned that ‘‘peaceful coexistence’’ 
between the two Koreas was an absolute precondition for the legislature to adopt an 
alternative service system. Moreover, none identified inter-Korean relations as the only 
factor to be taken into consideration, illustrating that mandatory  conscription raises questions 
independently from the division. According to the majority, recognizing the right to 
conscientious objection first required vast acceptance in South Korean society ‘‘that 
permitting the alternative service will harm neither the realization of equality  in the burden 




understanding and tolerance of the conscientious objectors.’’105 As of 2004, such consensus 
and tolerance were not found to reign by most of the court. 
 The court did not  derive from this lack of social concord a source of legitimacy to 
rule against  both the political branches and the dominant public opinion. While a classical 
argument against constitutional review consists in describing it as a counter-majoritarian and 
therefore undemocratic force,106 it has also been argued that the limits which judicial review 
poses on majority decisions make its worth.107 In particular, courts can exercise a beneficial 
check upon the rule of the majority and ensure that it does not drift into tyranny against the 
rights of the minority. The Constitutional Court of Korea did not miss this dimension of the 
case on conscientious objection, but a majority of justices did not infer from it the authority 
to invalidate the current compulsory military system. 
 Eventually, the question of the guarantee of the freedom to exercise conscience is the 
 question of ‘‘how the state gives consideration to the minority of its citizens who think 
 differently and intend to act  differently from the decisions of the majority of the democratic 
 community,’’ the question of national and societal tolerance towards the minority, and the 
 question of ‘‘whether the state is capable of presenting an alternative that  is protective of the 
 conscience of the individuals while maintaining its existence and legal order.’’108
 While the majority expressed its hope that ‘‘our society is now mature enough to 
understand and tolerate the conscientious objectors,’’ it  did not envision its role as 
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precipitating change knowing that such an initiative would not command widespread 
acceptance. As will be evoked later in the chapter, this caution has so far characterized the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Korea on other issues of societal magnitude. At 
first sight, it seems that the institution may prefer to frustrate its own preferences and delay 
the realization of desirable but socially  contentious outcomes, rather than to risk appearing 
as an actor stirring up conflict and division. In doing so, it  could be said that the South 
Korean court has refused the responsibility  which Alexander Bickel has assigned to its 
American counterpart: ‘‘to be the ‘shaper and prophet’ of a system of enduring values, one 
that does not merely reflect an existing national consensus but articulates a moral vision to 
which we may legitimately aspire.’’109 
 This difference between the two institutions may not solely be a matter of choice or 
perception, each being shaped by contrasting visions and expectations about their role. 
Rather than being embedded in distinct ways of envisioning themselves, the divergence 
between the American and South Korean courts could also rest on the distinct ways in which 
each envisions its nation’s relation to pluralism. In that sense, the Constitutional Court of 
Korea’s prudential approach is neither purely attitudinal (expressing conservative values) nor 
strategic (aimed at avoiding confrontation with the political branches or public opinion). 
Instead, its caution reveals, and contributes to consolidate, a fundamental anxiety about 
diversity which institutionally permeates South Korean society.  
 The issue of the compulsory military  service is socially loaded on another ground 
than the tolerance of conscientious objectors as a ‘‘minority’’ voicing beliefs different from 
the majority. The particularly burdensome nature of the draft creates incentives for evasion 
which compromise the equality  of citizens before the constitutional duty  of national defense. 
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According to the Seoul District Public Prosecutors’ Office, which contributed an opinion to 
the case alongside other relevant parties, allowing conscientious objection through an 
alternative service would undoubtedly  make ‘‘the number of those voluntarily performing 
military service [...] decline, which will cause a serious threat to the existence of the 
nation.’’110  Likewise, the Ministry of National Defense and the Military Manpower 
Administration (‘‘pyŏngmuch’ŏng’’) argued that ‘‘in light of the reality of egregious service 
conditions in our Armed Forces, the adoption of the alternative military service would cause 
exponential increase of those evading military service.’’111 It is worth recalling that harsh 
conditions were also invoked by a majority  of the court to justify the exemption of women 
from the draft in a 2010 decision.112 
 As construed by the Constitutional Court of Korea, the risk associated with draft 
dodging is double-edged: it  not only imperils the security  of the nation, but also threatens to 
erode its cohesion. Highlighting ‘‘the past experience of our society that corruption and the 
trend to evade military service continued incessantly,’’ the majority decision warned that:
 In our society where the social demand for the equality in the burden of military 
 service is strong and absolute, should the equality in performing the obligation 
 become a social issue due to the permission of an exception to the duty of military 
 service, the adoption of the alternative service system might cause a serious harm to 
 the capacity  of the nation as a whole by crucially  injuring the social unification and 
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 might further destabilize the backbone of the entire military  service system based 
 upon the mandatory conscription of all citizens.113
 As stressed earlier, the debate over conscientious objection never led to call into 
question mandatory conscription itself, nor the values fostered by it in the South Korean 
context - such as manliness, the respect for hierarchies, and the primacy of state interests 
over individual ones.114  Rather than being naturally attributable to the cultural substrate of 
Korean Confucianism, such features can also be tied to concrete institutions which are 
embedded in history, such as the compulsory military training. Even arguments in favor of 
introducing an alternative service - as articulated by  the dissenting judges in the 2004 case or 
by Roh Moo-hyun during his presidential mandate - have not fundamentally challenged the 
militarism upon which the project  of building a strong and wealthy nation has been based 
since the 1960s.115 Moon Seungsook has advanced the notion of ‘‘militarized modernity’’ to 
capture the processes which have shaped South Korea’s socio-political and economic 
trajectory from 1963 to 1987: ‘‘the construction of the modern nation as an anti-communist 
polity, the making of its members as duty-bound ‘nationals,’ and the integration of the 
institution of male conscription into the organization of the industrializing economy.’’116 
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Military service has therefore been integral to the process of mass mobilization required by 
state-led economic development and nation-building in the second half of the 20th century.  
 Accordingly, men were called on to perform mandatory military  service and 
 encouraged to become the primary labor force in the industrializing economy. In 
 contrast, marginalized as a secondary workforce in the economy despite their 
 economic contribution, women were exhorted to carry  out birth control and the 
 ‘‘rational management of the household.’’117 
 This original function of conscription, as supporting the dual militarization of the 
nation and the labor market, illustrates how national security  in general, and the military 
service in particular, are irreducible to the issue of the division between the two Koreas. 
Although constitutional jurisprudence has left the domestic efficacy of this apparatus largely 
unaddressed, it importantly  stressed how the duty  of national defense connects to questions 
of social cohesion in post-transition South Korea. The solidarity  between the military  and 
economic mobilization of the masses also sheds light upon the system of special privileges 
which has permitted South Korean elites to evade conscription on a large scale up to date.
Dodging the draft: recognizing a social need for reform but resisting populist pressures
 The issue of how far society can go in its demand for equality  and transparency in 
relation to the duty of national defense reached the Constitutional Court of Korea in 2007. 
That year, the court adjudicated the complaint  of a public official forced to disclose the name 
of the disease that prevented him from performing active military duty  - in his case, the loss 
of vision in one eye. The requirement that public service personnels report information about 
their military  service was implemented by the parliament in 1999. The initiative was 
438
117 Ibidem. 
prompted by a nation-wide scandal over the extent of draft dodging among South Korean 
elites which erupted in the summer 1998,118  when ‘‘it turned out that many influential 
members of society [were] implicated in significant amount of frauds or unjust preferential 
treatment of military  duty.’’119  The Act on Report and Disclosure of Military Service 
Records of Public Personnels and Others was subsequently  passed by the National 
Assembly. It was expanded in 2004, when the obligation not only  to report one’s exemption 
from the draft, but the exact cause behind it (i.e., the name of the disease responsible for 
incapacitation) was introduced. These pieces of information were to be published in the 
official gazette and made accessible on the internet.
 The disclosure scheme was invalidated by  all the justices, despite divergences over 
the modalities of censure - the majority opted for an incompatibility decision leaving the 
unconstitutional provision temporarily applicable, while others judges argued for a decision 
of simple unconstitutionality or incompatibility with an immediate suspension of application. 
The various opinions were however united by their nullification of only part of the report 
system, the one concerning the divulgation of one’s disease. As for the requirement to 
provide information about whether one had served or not in the military, it was found 
necessary  and legitimate given the demand and need for transparency in relation to 
mandatory conscription in contemporary South Korean society. 
 The court recalled how ‘‘Korean people were shocked to find out the corruption 
scandals related to the duty  of military  service’’ in the late 1990s,120 and how such concerns 
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remained actual: ‘‘as the frauds and corruptions related to administration of the military 
service are not being rooted out, the society’s need to eradicate such frauds and corruptions 
and restore equality  in bearing the military  duty is great.’’121  In particular, the judges 
highlighted that ‘‘there is a growing national concern over the military  duty  of people in the 
leadership class such as high-level officials,’’122  conceding that ‘‘one can easily  admit, 
considering the reality  of ours, the social need of renovating the ill custom prevalent in 
serving the military duty.’’123 
 With unanimity reigning over this side of the issue, the idea that there should exist 
limits to how far the social demand for transparency could go also dominated. As a result, 
while reporting information about one’s service in the military  was deemed proper, being 
forced to disclose the name of the disease responsible for one’s disqualification was 
considered too strong a collision with the right to privacy  recognized in the constitution.124 
Still, the court did not invalidate such obligation for all public officials and maintained it for 
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Resistance to pluralism in controversies of social magnitude
 The caution displayed by the Constitutional Court of Korea on the military  issues 
analyzed in this chapter should not be seen as confined to this policy  area. Conversely, it 
should not be deduced from it either that the court  has been unable to prove assertive, which 
it has done on many occasions, for instance through its early  and sustained record of 
defending procedural fairness and basic rights in the criminal justice system. The court has 
also invalidated important policy choices closely associated with each of the political 
branches, censoring the National Assembly’s redistricting plans in 2001,126 or ruling in 2004 
against the construction of a new administrative capital city  outside Seoul, a project dear to 
President Roh Moo-hyun.127  In addition, the deference that the court has manifested on 
various matters, such as judgments of war and peace, is often not synonymous with 
quiescence or subservience. 
 On the contrary, what emerges from constitutional jurisprudence is a strong pattern of 
prudential criticism, in the continuity of the court’s ruling on the mandatory  military service 
system. In this case and others, the court has preferred not to impose change upon the 
legislature while urging it to consider reform. This attitude could be seen as strategic, that is 
to say, adopted because it  serves the court’s self-interest: avoiding confrontation with other 
policy actors, or bolstering its reputation as a non-partisan institution. On issues deeply 
divisive in South Korean society, self-restraint has indeed been construed by the court  as 
enhancing its credibility and legitimacy vis-à-vis public opinion. Yet, the caution of the 
Constitutional Court of Korea is also shaped by a deep  reluctance over opening society to 
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more pluralism and undoing the non-inclusive legacy of democracy’s institutionalization by 
conservative interests. 
 When it comes to social mores and practices, the court has not hesitated to rule 
against customs widely perceived as outdated, such as the ban prohibiting marriage between 
two individuals with the same surname and ancestral seat which the court lifted in 1997,128 
or dismantling the patrilineal house head system as discriminating against men and women 
while prescribing a certain kind of family model in 2005.129  In both cases, the court 
grounded its decision of unconstitutionality on the scope of changes affecting private 
practices. However, the court usually opts for maintaining the status quo rather than pushing 
for reform whenever identifying the existence of social consensus is more difficult. This 
attitude is for instance illustrated by its rulings on the criminalization of adultery, which was 
examined for the first time in 1990. That year,
 [T]he Court acknowledged that Article 241 of the Criminal Act punishing adultery by 
 imprisonment of up  to two years did restrict the people’s right to sexual self-
 determination derivable from Article 10 of the Constitution. The Court, however, 
 ruled that such restriction was justified by  the public’s interest  in sound sexual ethics 
 and maintenance of the system of marriage, and upheld the provision as not being an 
 excessive restriction on the individual’s sexual freedom.130
 The provision criminally punishing ‘‘adultery or fornication with a married person’’ 
was challenged again in 1993, 2001, and 2008. In this last instance, the case was formed by 
the consolidated requests of four lower tribunals demanding that the constitutional court 
clarified the issue anew. This growing pressure from below has also been accompanied by an 
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important evolution of the justices’ stance on the matter. In 1990, only one judge dissented 
on the ground that prohibiting adultery  itself was unconstitutional. In 2001, a majority of 
justices still pronounced itself in favor of upholding criminal punishment but ‘‘called for 
serious approach by legislators over retention or abolition of the ban on adultery.’’131  By 
2008, only three judges wrote an opinion confirming the constitutionality of the ban, which 
was joined by  the concurring opinion of a fourth one who called for ‘‘policy efforts to make 
remedies to relevant legislation based on positive and comprehensive consideration of the 
customs, social consensus, public legal awareness, etc.’’ By contrast, four judges pronounced 
themselves in favor of unconstitutionality, recognizing that the foundation for criminalizing 
adultery might not have completely crumbled but had nonetheless been ‘‘shaken to its roots 
to an extent that is no longer sustainable.’’132  They were joined by the incompatibility 
opinion of a fifth one, producing a plurality  in favor of the repeal, but falling short of the six 
votes necessary to render a decision of unconstitutionality.133
 The requirement that a super-majority of six judges be gathered to deliver a ruling of 
unconstitutionality is indeed a prudential mechanism embedded in the South Korean system 
of constitutional adjudication. A new challenge to the adultery  law was brought in 2012, and 
is already  characterized by a number of new features, such as the decision of associations 
formerly supportive of the ban not to take position before the court makes its new judgment 
known.   
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 While the law applies equally to men and women, it is ostensibly the latter that the 
 law was designed to protect. With no concept of alimony existing in Korea and many 
 married women -lacking financial independence, the criminalization of infidelity 
 theoretically provides protection against a spouse’s infidelity. But while the law 
 enjoyed the support of women’s rights advocates in the past, many have more 
 recently  turned against it, a shift  that  has coincided with more husbands bringing 
 charges against adulterous wives. While previously quoted in media as being in favor 
 of the law in recent years, The Korean Legal Aid Center for Family Relations told 
 The Korea Herald that it would not take a public position until after the 
 Constitutional Court had made its ruling. Likewise, Korean Women’s Association 
 United said it could not provide a unified stance on the issue in time for print as it is 
 composed of numerous different organizations. Sue Kang, the KWAU representative 
 that spoke to The Korea Herald, said that in her personal opinion, however, adultery 
 should not be criminalized, calling it a matter of ‘‘personal choice, which the law or 
 government should not be involved  in.’’134  
 This situation is interesting because it  puts to the test Charles Epp’s famous 
hypothesis about the support structure behind the rights revolution experienced by various 
common law societies. According to Epp, the growth of civil rights which is usually 
attributed to the activism of high courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1960s, was 
instead mostly impulsed from below, by the strategic rights advocacy of civic groups and 
associations providing multiple resources for litigation, such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union.135  Indeed, in systems where constitutional adjudication is decentralized and 
incidental, that is to say, where it can only be triggered in the course of a trial, litigation 
represents both a lengthly and costly process to go through. 
 In places like South Korea where constitutional adjudication is directly accessible to 
individuals, the necessary support structure identified by Epp may come into play  in a 
different way. A system of accessible constitutional justice indeed appears more open to 
being invested by social forces as a channel to advocate change, although it may not have 
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been conceived to that end. In post-transition South Korea, constitutional adjudication has 
largely been activated by the parts of civil society which the institutionalization of 
democracy  has marginalized, turning the constitutional arena into a site where to contest the 
mechanisms enforcing the non-inclusive bias of the transition: the National Security  Act, the 
ideological conversion system, and, as surveyed in the present chapter, mandatory 
conscription. 
 Yet, the Constitutional Court of Korea’s intervention in response to this demand has 
been paradoxical. The dispute over the ‘‘national’’ which constitutes the subtext of the 
court’s intervention in military issues in general, and over the ban on conscientious objection 
in particular, has not been permitted to fully unfold by the court, not because of the security 
necessities brought about by  the division of the peninsula, but given the risk of social 
disintegration associated with the tolerance of minorities potentially  endangering a certain 
way of imagining the nation.
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CONCLUSION
 Since the transition to democracy  which South Korea experienced in 1987, 
constitutional justice has been construed as an arena where the actors politically alienated by 
the elite-led change of regime have challenged the national security  instruments enforcing 
their exclusion. The Constitutional Court of Korea has consequently been preeminently 
involved in the struggle over the boundaries of enmity  opposing the state and parts of civil 
society in the post-transition era. Constitutional adjudication has, however, revealed itself as 
a site where this dispute has been both staged and interrupted. The court has indeed 
performed its role as guardian of the constitutional order in a dual way. While its 
jurisprudence has strived to control the procedural legality  of the security instruments 
inherited from the authoritarian period by  reforming their most arbitrary and discretionary 
features, the court’s decisions have also reinforced such tools’ relevance and legitimacy to 
perpetuate the non-inclusiveness embedded in the new democratic order. 
 As this research has argued, the excluding function discharged by security  tools after 
1987 has to be understood as a legacy of the transition itself, that is to say, of the restrictive 
modalities and interests through which democracy was institutionalized by political elites to 
the detriment of the popular democratization movement and of the alternative ‘‘national’’ 
imaginary  that it embodied. Although instruments such as the National Security Act, the 
ideological conversion policy, and the ban on conscientious objection have remained 
deployed in the name of protecting national security, they  have primarily served to enforce a 
non-inclusive and contentious way of envisioning the ‘‘national.’’ Throughout the 1990s, all 
administrations have indeed heavily  resorted to the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence to confront proponents of a discordant ‘‘national’’ narrative: the ‘‘minjung’’ 
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ideology articulated by so-called people’s movement groups, especially  students and 
intellectuals, mobilized against the conservative confines of the post-transition period. 
 In the context of this asymmetrical struggle between the state and civil society  forces, 
constitutional adjudication has been invested as a site where the boundaries of enmity 
enforced by security tools have been recurrently  challenged. Rather than instruments 
operating in the defense of national security, the various devices contested before the 
constitutional court can be conceptualized as mechanisms of exclusion participating to the 
distribution of who is recognized or denied ‘‘a place in the symbolic community of speaking 
beings’’ in contemporary South Korea.1  In this respect, the National Security Act and its 
article 7 criminalizing the act of ‘‘praising, encouraging, or sympathizing with an anti-state 
organization’’ represent central devices policing the partition of what counts or not as 
‘‘national,’’ and of what is sayable or not in the post-transition era. 
 Yet, the ability to speak has also been at  stake in all the other mechanisms of 
exclusion whose constitutionality has been called into question before the court: speech has 
been at the heart of cases not only filed against article 7 of the National Security Act, but 
against the ideological conversion policy, the criminal rights withdrawn from national 
security suspects and defendants, or the ban on conscientious objection to the compulsory 
military  service. These security instruments actually  amount to two distinct and 
complementary  ways of circumscribing the partition of the sayable in democratic South 
Korea: by sanctioning certain kinds of statements (such as allegedly pro-North expressive 
materials under article 7 of the National Security Act or any declaration of conscience 
objecting to conscription under article 88 of the Military Service Act), and by forcefully 
requiring the production of other forms of discourse (such as pledging to abide by the laws 
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under the conversion policy or making a confession in the course of a criminal 
interrogation). 
 Altogether, such mechanisms therefore correspond to two different  ways of 
devaluating a voice: by making it speak against its will, and by discounting as noise, or 
rather as threat, what it truly wishes to say. Challenging the distribution of the sayable 
enforced by security instruments has thus fully  given rise, in post-transition South Korea, to 
a disagreement in the sense defined by Jacques Rancière of ‘‘a dispute over the object of the 
discussion and over the capacity of those who are making an object of it.’’2 This conflict has 
gained access to the constitutional stage in so far as the mechanisms of exclusion preventing 
it from unfolding in the public sphere have been challenged before the Constitutional Court 
of Korea. Yet, constitutional adjudication has only represented a limited place of contention, 




 In the course of the enduring dispute which has opposed the state and parts of civil 
society over drawing the boundaries of enmity, the Constitutional Court of Korea has stood 
both as an arbitrator and as a party. Indeed, any constitutional court finds itself tied, as an 
institution, not only  to the defense of the state, but to the defense of a certain way of 
envisioning the ‘‘national.’’ In this sense, the possibilities available to courts may  be 
inherently  bounded. In the context of post-1987 South Korea where understanding the 
‘‘national’’ has been a deep object of contention, the constitutional court has been caught in a 
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paradox. Indeed, its commitment to safeguarding the constitution has not only entailed for 
the court to promote the rule of law and to protect basic rights, but also to reinforce the non-
inclusive foundations upon which the constitutional order has been built with democracy’s 
institutionalization by political elites. Ironically, it is by playing its role as guardian of the 
constitution that the court  has contributed to validate the mechanisms of exclusion enforcing 
the conservative legacy of the transition since the late 1980s. 
 The function which the constitutional court has come to embrace does not imply, 
however, that it was created for such a purpose. While the argument has been made that the 
introduction of a strong mechanism of judicial review was wanted by all South Korean 
political parties in the context of the electoral uncertainty that they  faced in 1987,3  there 
seems to be little evidence that the post-transition activism of the Constitutional Court of 
Korea was the result of interest-based calculations on the part  of its designers. What the new 
institution would be and would do was indeed very indeterminate for most  actors in the 
course and immediate aftermath of the constitution-making process. Although constitutional 
jurisprudence has since confirmed the validity and relevance of existing security tools and 
policies, the court’s intervention has been more resisted than encouraged by those who seem 
to have eventually benefited from its verdicts. 
 Contrary  to political elites’ liking, judicial review has largely been set into motion by 
the very forces which the institutionalization of democracy has marginalized. Under the 
impetus of human rights lawyers, constitutional litigation has thus become a site where to 
contest the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion after the regime change. The trajectory of 
the South Korean constitutional court therefore illustrates the part of contingency and 
absence of pre-determination that institutional design in general, and judicial empowerment 
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in particular, can involve. In other words, even if particular and selective interests pervaded 
the process by  which the court came into being, they did not  necessarily shape the path on 
which the institution embarked in a causal way. Conversely, although the court has 
ultimately  strengthened the excluding function of security  instruments and the non-inclusive 
legacy of the transition, its decisions have also contradicted the immediate preferences of the 
political branches of government and law-enforcing agencies in a number of ways. 
 This ambivalence captures the double-edged role played by  the court as guardian of 
the post-transition constitutional order, a role which was not preordained by the institution’s 
crafters but unfolded as the constitutional arena was invested from below as a site of 
contention. From the perspective of comparative constitutional politics where heightened 
attention has been drawn to non-Western contexts and new democracies in recent years, the 
monographic study of South Korea undertaken by this dissertation thus not only makes an 
important empirical contribution by documenting a case considered as a model for 
democracy  and judicial review in East Asia, but it also theoretically adds to the current body 
of knowledge in the field by critically  exploring the subtle rather than mechanistic and pre-
determined ways in which the South Korean court has not only safeguarded the 
constitutional order but, through its defense, has consolidated the non-inclusive legacy  of the 
transition to democracy.
*
 As revealed by  this dissertation’s interpretive analysis of jurisprudence, the 
Constitutional Court of Korea’s commitment to defending the constitution has led its 
decisions to both curb and strengthen existing security  instruments. On the one hand, the 
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court has clearly  sought to dismantle a variety of arbitrary  or extra-legal rules and practices 
associated with the security  measures inherited from the authoritarian period; but on the 
other hand, its rulings have also reinforced these instruments’ post-transition relevance and 
functionality by holding them constitutional. In ruling so, the court has strengthened the 
conservative dimension of the transition: that of a move away from authoritarianism, but 
toward a version of constitutional democracy  that politically excludes certain segments of 
society, namely the actors, demands, and alternative ‘‘national’’ imaginary  of the popular 
democratization movement. Excavating the two-sidedness of the Constitutional Court of 
Korea’s intervention and disclosing how constitutionalism is not an institutional-discursive 
formation intrinsically  tied to the promotion of liberal values have been made possible by the 
critical approach adopted by the present research.  
 As an in-depth reading of constitutional decisions has shown, the resilience of 
existing security instruments has not been primarily  justified by the court in relation to the 
crisis situation experienced by  the Korean peninsula in the context of the division and of the 
tensions chronically  escalating between Pyongyang and Seoul. Instead of appealing to the 
exigencies of national security, the court has construed such tools as necessary to ensure the 
stability  of the ‘‘basic order of free democracy.’’As a result, the role of the court has not been 
one of mere reconfirmation vis-à-vis security  devices. By shaping them in a way consistent 
with the procedural requisites of the rule of law, and by displacing the ground of their 
justification from national security  to the defense of the ‘‘basic order of free democracy,’’ 
constitutional jurisprudence has profoundly reinforced the excluding efficacy of these 
instruments.  
 This outcome has not been produced by the court out of deference vis-à-vis the 
political branches in matters of national security as demonstrated by the prudential yet 
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reproving language which the institution has been able to articulate. Instead, it is through its 
own affirmation as the ultimate protector of the constitutional order and thus largely as a 
result of its own doing that the Constitutional Court of Korea has consolidated the non-
inclusive legacy of the transition. By establishing itself as a privileged actor in charge of 
safeguarding ‘‘the basic order of democracy,’’ the court has also endowed itself with the 
capacity to unpack the values and arrangements worthy of being upheld in the name of 
defending the constitutional order. This dimension of the court’s contribution has been more 
lasting and successful than its attempt to control and shape security  instruments. On many 
occasions, the court’s more liberal efforts have indeed been constrained by the reluctance of 
other actors to abide by its dictates. By contrast, the constitutional arguments and language 
set forth by the court  to justify the permanence of security  instruments have gained authority 
outside the bench.
 *
 Since the late 1990s, the receding application of existing mechanisms of exclusion 
such as the National Security  Act and the ideological conversion policy (abolished in 2003) 
can be attributed to the formation of a new consensus over understanding the ‘‘national’’ and 
the corresponding defeat, rather than tolerance, of the alternative imaginary embodied in the 
‘‘minjung’’ discourse and identity. Indeed, ‘‘the culture of dissent’’ associated with the 
‘‘minjung’’ had not only  alienated the state but estranged the rest of civil society  by the end 
of the decade following the transition, to be replaced by the mushrooming of middle-class 
citizens’ movement groups and associations.4  This shift from ‘‘minjung’’ to ‘‘simin’’ 
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captures, for instance, the evolution undergone by ‘‘Minbyun,’’ the professional association 
of ‘‘Lawyers for Democracy’’ which first resorted to the constitutional court as a strategy to 
promote legal change but whose activities started to diversify beyond cases concerning 
political rights in the mid-1990s.5 
 With the fading of the ‘‘minjung’’ narrative, part of the disagreement over the 
boundaries of enmity  in the post-transition era has disappeared. In the process, some of the 
claims associated with this imaginary, such as the demand for reunification, also vanished. 
The late 1990s which coincided with the East Asian crisis thus saw the emergence of a ‘‘new 
consensus on the market-driven politics of unification’’ and the idea of reconciliation 
through the mutual gains of economic cooperation across the Korean peninsula.6  In this 
sense, the policy of engagement with North Korea embraced by the Kim Dae-jung 
(1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) administrations has remained inscribed within 
the parameters of neoliberalism and the pursuit of ‘‘chaebŏl-biased and growth-first policy’’ 
as a ‘‘national’’ goal, making the conservative legacy of the transition endure as 
demonstrated by Choi Jang-Jip.7 
 Challenges to the ‘‘national’’ have, however, come from other fronts than the 
‘‘minjung’’ discourse and identity which were articulated by students and intellectuals until 
the late 1990s. A different  type of contestation has emanated from the refusal to perform the 
‘‘duty of national defense,’’ a form of dissent which democratization forces never engaged 
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5  Patricia Goedde, ‘‘Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Minbyun). The Evolution of its Legal Mobilization 
since 1988,’’ in Gi-Wook Shin and Paul Chang (eds.), South Korean Social Movements. From Democracy to 
Civil Society, Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2011, p.233.
6  Hyun Ok Park, ‘‘The Politics of Unification and Neoliberal Democracy. Economic Cooperation and North 
Korean Human Rights,’’ in Sonia Ryang (ed.), North Korea. Toward a Better Understanding, Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2009, p.110.
7 Jang-Jip Choi, Democracy After Democratization, The Korean Experience, Stanford: Walter H.  Shorenstein 
Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, 2012, p.75.
in. By contrast  to the ‘‘minjung,’’ religious minorities such as Jehovah’s Witnesses 
jeopardize a certain idea of the ‘‘national’’ not by formulating an alternative version of its 
contents, but by making a claim that situates itself beyond the realm of the nation-state. 
Having their profession of faith or pacifism recognized as speech, and not as noise or threat, 
is still at stake for the hundreds conscientious objectors sent to South Korean prisons for 
dodging the draft every year. 
 The end of the year 2013 has also unveiled how the dispute over the boundaries of 
enmity is far from having reached a close, and how prominent a role the constitutional court 
is still expected to play  in it. In November 2013, the constitutional court has indeed received 
its first request for the dissolution of a political party, the ‘‘Unified Progressive 
Party’’ (‘‘t’onghap chinbodang’’) on the ground that it constitutes a ‘‘revolutionary 
organization’’ whose activities or purposes contradict  the ‘‘basic order of free democracy.’’ 
While the case is still pending, the intense debates which it has prompted demonstrate, as did 
the controversy over the possible abolition of the National Security Act in 2004, that the 
disagreement over the contours of inclusion and exclusion in contemporary South Korea is 
not settled yet and will continue to unfold on the constitutional stage. By contrast  to the late 
1980s and following decade, the resort to legal mobilization in general, and constitutional 
litigation in particular, no longer appears solely  activated by the groups which the transition 
marginalized. Since the 2000s, conservative forces have increasingly  invested the site of 
constitutional adjudication as a place where to preserve their understanding of the 
‘‘national.’’
 South Korea has consequently been characterized by  at least two important dynamics 
in the mobilization of civil society groups in recent years: on the one hand, some of the most 
active and powerful parts of civil society are conservatively-oriented today and thus militate 
454
against reform; on the other hand, the ability and opportunity of groups and individuals to 
practice the language of rights is more than ever unequally  distributed. In particular, 
economic marginalization in capitalist society can be identified as hindering the emergence 
of citizenship, that is to say, the constitution of subjects into citizens endowed with rights 
which they can press against the state.8  As a result, those who are not only economically 
marginalized but politically underrepresented in South Korea’s post-transition order may as 
well be excluded from the stage of constitutional contention. Taking this site for what it is, 
with both its possibilities and limits, delineates in fine this dissertation’s objective.
*
 While the specifics of the disagreement which has led to the activation of 
constitutional justice in the late 1980s are idiosyncratic to the South Korean case, the 
paradox of defending constitutionalism which its court instantiates is likely to be found in 
other contexts. Indeed, the Constitutional Court of Korea does not stand as the only 
institution which has performed its function of protecting the constitutional order in a double 
way, strengthening existing forms of non-inclusiveness through its commitment to define 
and defend so-called basic structures and fundamental values against the perils which 
endanger them. Yet, the South Korean case also illustrates how a given constitutional order 
can register and institutionalize dynamics of inclusion and exclusion distinct from tensions 
between religion and secularism, separatist and federalist nationalisms, or ethnocultural 
cleavages which tend to divide constitutional democracies such as Israel, Canada, or India. 
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8 Seungsook Moon, Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea, Durham, London: Duke 
University Press, 2005, p. 177.
 As demonstrated by  the present research, contention over the boundaries of enmity 
and the definition of what counts as ‘‘national’’ and ‘‘anti-national’’ may also be sustained by 
the very  modalities and frustrations associated with the institutionalization of democracy. In 
this respect, the paradox in which the Constitutional Court of Korea has been caught could 
reveal itself as paradigmatic of transitions taking place by  amendment rather than 
replacement of the constitution, due to the limited re-foundation of the political order to 
which they give rise. Conducting further research in this direction would provide a critical 
contribution to the field of constitutional politics and would highlight the full comparative 
scope of the ambivalent relations identified between constitutionalism and democracy  in the 
case of South Korea.  
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